Owner Scorecard


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UNP, Union Pacific Corporation

Railroads capital-intensive

Union Pacific runs a freight railroad across the western United States. It hauls other companies' goods by rail — bulk commodities such as coal and grain, industrial freight, and shipping containers — moving them from West Coast and Gulf Coast ports through inland markets to eastern gateways. Customers pay it to move the freight; the track and the trains are its own.

Union Pacific serves many of the fastest-growing U.S. population centers, operates from all major West Coast and Gulf Coast ports to Eastern gateways, connects with Canada's rail systems, and is the only railroad serving all six major Mexico gateways.

Union Pacific provides value to customers by delivering products in a safe, reliable, fuel-efficient, and environmentally responsible manner.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
UNP · Union Pacific Corporation
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$24.5B
+1.1% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $24.7B 5-yr avg $23.9B
Operating margin 40.2% 5-yr avg 40.1%
ROIC 15% 5-yr avg 16%
Owner-earnings margin 28% 5-yr avg 28%
Free cash flow margin 23% 5-yr avg 24%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
The question is whether a railroad's right-of-way is a real franchise or just a long, expensive ditch: a second network beside it is all but impossible to build, so the test is pricing power against a short list of rivals and the standing threat of trucking. Watch whether it can raise rates ahead of its own costs while pushing more tonnage over the same rails — the operating leverage that makes a railroad worth owning. The bad case is a road that merely hauls what others choose to produce: volumes ride on coal, grain, and trade flows it does not control, the network swallows capital in good years and bad, it leans on a few suppliers for locomotives and rail, and it carries debt against all of it. Whether the franchise is real shows in the margins, the return on capital, and the leverage in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 16%, above 15% in 8 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 29% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$19.9B$21.2B$22.8B$21.7B$19.5B$21.8B$24.9B$24.1B$24.3B$24.5B$24.7BRevenueRevenue
$7.2B$8.1B$8.5B$8.6B$7.8B$9.3B$9.9B$9.1B$9.7B$9.8B$9.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
36.3%38.2%37.3%39.4%40.1%42.8%39.9%37.7%40.1%40.2%40.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
$4.2B$10.7B$6.0B$5.9B$5.3B$6.5B$7.0B$6.4B$6.7B$7.1B$7.2BNet incomeNet inc.
37%23%24%23%23%23%23%23%22%22%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$7.5B$7.2B$8.7B$8.6B$8.5B$9.0B$9.4B$8.4B$9.3B$9.3B$9.5BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$2.0B$2.1B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2B$2.2B$2.3B$2.4B$2.5B$2.5BDepreciationDeprec.
$1.2B($5.7B)$433M$381M$908M$213M$19M($425M)$201M($313M)($291M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$3.5B$3.2B$3.4B$3.5B$2.9B$2.9B$3.6B$3.6B$3.5B$3.8B$3.8BCapexCapex
17.6%15.2%15.1%15.9%15.0%13.5%14.6%15.0%14.2%15.5%15.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$5.5B$5.1B$6.5B$6.4B$6.3B$6.8B$7.1B$6.1B$6.9B$6.8B$7.0BOwner earningsOwner earn.
27.5%24.1%28.4%29.4%32.4%31.3%28.6%25.1%28.7%27.8%28.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$4.0B$4.0B$5.2B$5.2B$5.6B$6.1B$5.7B$4.8B$5.9B$5.5B$5.7BFree cash flowFCF
20.2%18.8%23.0%23.8%28.7%28.0%23.1%19.8%24.3%22.4%23.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$1.9B$2.0B$2.3B$2.6B$2.6B$2.8B$3.2B$3.2B$3.2B$3.2B$3.3BDividends paidDiv. paid
$3.1B$4.0B$8.2B$5.8B$3.7B$7.3B$6.3B$705M$1.5B$2.7BBuybacksBuybacks
13%20%16%15%14%17%17%15%16%16%15%ROICROIC
21%43%29%33%32%46%58%43%40%39%37%Return on equityROE
12%35%18%18%16%26%32%22%21%21%20%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$831M$1.8B$960M$973M$1.1B$1.0B$1.3B$735MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.3B$1.5B$1.8B$1.6B$1.5B$1.7B$1.9B$2.1B$1.9B$1.9B$2.0BReceivablesReceiv.
$955M$1.0B$872M$749M$612M$752M$784M$856M$847M$804M$940MAccounts payablePayables
$303M$480M$883M$846M$893M$970M$1.1B$1.2B$1.0B$1.1B$1.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$3.6B$4.0B$4.2B$3.5B$4.2B$3.6B$4.0B$4.1B$4.0B$4.6B$4.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$3.6B$3.9B$4.6B$4.4B$4.2B$5.7B$5.5B$5.1B$5.3B$5.0B$4.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×1.0×0.9×0.8×1.0×0.6×0.7×0.8×0.8×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$55.7B$57.8B$59.1B$61.7B$62.4B$63.5B$65.4B$67.1B$67.7B$69.7B$69.6BTotal assetsAssets
$15.0B$16.9B$22.4B$25.2B$26.7B$29.7B$33.3B$32.6B$31.2B$31.8B$31.8BTotal debtDebt
$13.7B$15.7B$21.1B$24.4B$24.9B$28.8B$32.4B$31.5B$30.2B$30.5B$31.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
10.4×11.3×9.8×8.1×6.9×8.1×7.8×6.8×7.7×7.5×7.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$19.9B$24.9B$20.4B$18.1B$17.0B$14.2B$12.2B$14.8B$16.9B$18.5B$19.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%0.5%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
835M802M754M706M679M655M624M610M609M596M594MShares out (diluted)Shares
$23.87$26.49$30.27$30.74$28.76$33.27$39.86$39.53$39.85$41.13$41.61Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.07$13.36$7.91$8.38$7.88$9.95$11.21$10.45$11.09$11.98$12.15EPS (diluted)EPS
$6.57$6.39$8.61$9.05$9.32$10.41$11.40$9.93$11.42$11.45$11.85Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.81$4.98$6.96$7.30$8.27$9.30$9.20$7.82$9.68$9.23$9.60Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$2.25$2.47$3.05$3.68$3.87$4.27$5.06$5.20$5.28$5.43$5.48Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.20$4.04$4.56$4.89$4.31$4.48$5.80$5.91$5.67$6.36$6.44Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$23.86$31.00$27.08$25.67$24.97$21.61$19.49$24.23$27.75$30.99$32.71Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.2%/yr+7.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+6.4%/yr+4.2%/yr
EPS+10.0%/yr+8.7%/yr
Dividends / share+10.3%/yr+7.0%/yr
Capital spending / share+4.7%/yr+8.1%/yr
Book value / share+2.9%/yr+4.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Freight revenues+1.8%
    “Freight revenues from bulk shipments increased in 2025 compared to 2024 due to 6% higher volumes and core pricing gains, partially offset by negative mix, from increased coal shipments, and lower fuel surcharge revenues.”
    ✓ direction matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
596Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
16%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
4.5×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$6.8Bowner earningsvs.$7.1Bnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $6.8B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $2.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put $1.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $5.5B.

Reported net income$7.1B
Owner earnings$6.8B · 28% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$7.1B$6.7B$6.4B$7.0B$6.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$2.5B+$2.4B+$2.3B+$2.2B+$2.2B
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$107M+$99M+$88M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$313M+$201M−$425M+$19M+$213M
Cash from operations$9.3B$9.3B$8.4B$9.4B$9.0B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$2.5B−$2.4B−$2.3B−$2.2B−$2.2B
Owner earnings$6.8B$6.9B$6.1B$7.1B$6.8B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$1.3B−$1.1B−$1.3B−$1.4B−$728M
Free cash flow$5.5B$5.9B$4.8B$5.7B$6.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue28%29%25%29%31%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $2.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $1.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $9.8B ÷ interest expense $1.3B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $30.5B · 3.1× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $1.3B − debt $31.8B
    What this means

    Netting $1.3B of cash and short-term investments against $31.8B of debt leaves $30.5B owed, about 3.1× a year's operating profit (3.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 13%–20%; 16% latest = NOPAT $7.7B ÷ invested capital $49.0B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 24%–32%; latest $6.8B = operating cash $9.3B − maintenance capex $2.5B
    Industry peers: median 23%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 28% of revenue this year, a 28% median across 10 years. It chose to put $1.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $5.5B — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $107M of SBC) leaves $6.7B.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $9.3B ÷ net income $7.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks $5.9B ÷ Owner Earnings $6.8B
    What this means

    Of $6.8B Owner Earnings, $5.9B (87%) went back to shareholders, $3.2B dividends, $2.7B buybacks. Net of $107M stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.6B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.54×
    Expanding
    Capex $3.8B ÷ depreciation $2.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $24.5B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.91×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $31.8B vs ($459M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −3%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $11.38/share (latest year $12.02), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $31.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 37% → 39% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words Input costs rose and the filing says it recovered them in price — consistent with the margin holding here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 37% early to 39% lately, median 39% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 36.3% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −3.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.2B
  • Cash & short-term investments$735M
  • Receivables$2.0B
  • Other current assets$1.5B
Current liabilities$4.6B
  • Accounts payable$940M
  • Other current liabilities$3.7B
Current ratio0.92×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.92×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.16×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($387M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+3.2%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.0× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$19.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($46.0B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$32.7B$854M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$1.5B
'27$1.3B
'28$1.2B
'29$1.3B
'30$753M
later$27.4B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$1.5Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$2.8Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.5Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$33.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$735M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$6.8B
Together, against $1.5B due next year5.0×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $7.6B against the $1.5B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 5.0 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $86.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested$34.0B · 39%
  • Dividends$27.0B · 31%
  • Buybacks$43.3B · 50%
  • Returned to owners$70.3B

    110% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $27.0B as dividends and $43.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−$18.2B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $18.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $15.0B to $31.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$161.70

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 268M shares were bought for $43.3B, about $161.70 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $88.57 (2016) to $238.77 (2024); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $143.75 ($8.2B).

  • Net change in share count−28.9%

    The diluted count fell from 835M to 594M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$5.43/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearPay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021$14.5M$23.2M$6.8B
2022$14.3M$5.5M$7.1B
2023$2.0M$2.0M$6.1B
2023$15.6M$13.1M$6.1B
2024$17.6M$12.8M$6.9B
2025$20.3M$16.8M$6.8B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio151:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$107M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 1% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Union Pacific Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$15.0B → $31.8B

    Debt rose from $15.0B to $31.8B while owner earnings went from about $5.7B to $6.6B — about 2.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 4.8 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?6% → 8% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $1.3B to $2.0B while revenue grew 24%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (6% of revenue then, 8% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Railroads

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UNPUnion Pacific Corporation$24.5B39.6%16%29%
CSXCSX Corporation$14.1B38.6%14%26%
NSCNorfolk Southern Corporation$12.2B34.1%11%23%
FIPFTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock$503M-26.0%-3%-47%
Group median36.3%13%25%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Union Pacific Corporation has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Union Pacific Corporation earns about $7.0B on its 28.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 27.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−0%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $5.7B on 594M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-17; net debt $31.1B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($3.8B) runs well above depreciation ($2.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $7.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Union Pacific Corporation (UNP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/UNP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← UNMA its page in the Manual UNTY →

Industry order: ← NSC the Railroads chapter