Owner Scorecard


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FIP, FTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock

Railroads capital-intensive UnprofitableDistress / turnaround

Our Ports and Terminals business, consisting of our Jefferson Terminal and Repauno segments, develops or acquires industrial properties in strategic locations that store and handle for third parties a variety of energy products including crude oil, refined products and clean fuels.

Our Sustainability and Energy Transition business focuses on investments in companies and assets that utilize green technology, produce sustainable fuels and products or enable customers to reduce their carbon footprint.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
FIP · FTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$503M
+51.6% YoY · 49% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $595M 5-yr avg $307M
Operating margin 3.0% 5-yr avg −24.8%
Owner-earnings margin −44% 5-yr avg −49%
Free cash flow margin −61% 5-yr avg −81%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has run around −30% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 56% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on volume and pricing against the operating ratio. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2020–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$69M$120M$262M$320M$331M$503M$595MRevenueRevenue
12%7%4%4%4%3%2%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($55M)($72M)($58M)($44M)($99M)$8M$18MOperating incomeOp. inc.
−80.5%−59.5%−22.0%−13.8%−30.0%1.6%3.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
($55M)($80M)($177M)($184M)($294M)($207M)($467M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
($47M)($62M)($43M)$6M($15M)($118M)($102M)Operating cash flowOp. cash
$31M$54M$71M$81M$79M$132M$158MDepreciationDeprec.
($23M)($36M)$64M$108M$200M($43M)$207MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$248M$141M$217M$99M$80M$281M$260MCapexCapex
361.0%117.2%82.9%30.9%24.0%55.8%43.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($78M)($116M)($113M)($94M)($95M)($250M)($260M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
−113.7%−96.3%−43.3%−29.2%−28.6%−49.8%−43.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($294M)($203M)($260M)($94M)($95M)($399M)($362M)Free cash flowFCF
−429.4%−168.5%−99.2%−29.2%−28.6%−79.3%−60.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$627M$4M$4M$0$857M$1.1BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$0$0$3M$12M$13M$14M$14MDividends paidDiv. paid
-5%-3%-3%-2%-4%ROICROIC
-6%-5%-32%-38%-145%-973%Return on equityROE
−6%−5%−33%−40%−152%n/mRetained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$55M$50M$36M$29M$28M$57M$38MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$50M$61M$56M$53M$95M$95MReceivablesReceiv.
$50M$61M$56M$53M$95M$95MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$413M$278M$186M$220M$484M$398MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$129M$160M$151M$251M$410M$362MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.2×1.7×1.2×0.9×1.2×1.1×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$257M$260M$275M$275M$366M$366MGoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B$2.5B$2.4B$2.4B$5.7B$5.7BTotal assetsAssets
$719M$1.2B$1.3B$1.6B$3.8B$3.8BTotal debtDebt
$669M$1.2B$1.3B$1.6B$3.7B$3.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-5.1×-4.5×-1.1×-0.4×-0.8×0.0×0.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$995M$1.5B$552M$484M$203M$21M($122M)Shareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
99.4M99.4M103M103M108M115M117MShares out (diluted)Shares
$0.69$1.21$2.55$3.11$3.06$4.36$5.10Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.56$-0.80$-1.73$-1.78$-2.72$-1.80$-4.00EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.78$-1.16$-1.10$-0.91$-0.88$-2.17$-2.23Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-2.96$-2.04$-2.53$-0.91$-0.88$-3.46$-3.10Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.03$0.12$0.12$0.12$0.12Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$2.49$1.42$2.11$0.96$0.73$2.43$2.23Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.02$14.71$5.37$4.70$1.87$0.19$-1.05Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
5-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+44.6%/yr+44.6%/yr
Capital spending / share−0.5%/yr−0.5%/yr
Book value / share−55.0%/yr−55.0%/yr

The record, charted

FY2020–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
115Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−4%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($250M)owner earningsvs.($207M)net incomelow FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($250M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $132M it takes just to hold its position. It put $148M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($399M).

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($207M)($294M)($184M)($177M)($80M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$132M+$79M+$81M+$71M+$54M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$43M+$200M+$108M+$64M−$36M
Cash from operations($118M)($15M)$6M($43M)($62M)
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$132M−$80M−$99M−$71M−$54M
Owner earnings($250M)($95M)($94M)($113M)($116M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$148M−$146M−$87M
Free cash flow($399M)($95M)($94M)($260M)($203M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue-50%-29%-29%-43%-96%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $132M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $148M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income $8M ÷ interest expense $266M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.7B · 466.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $57M − debt $3.8B
    What this means

    Netting $57M of cash and short-term investments against $3.8B of debt leaves $3.7B owed, about 466.4× a year's operating profit (473.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    5-yr median, range -5%–-2%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit
    Industry peers: median 14%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Consumes cash through the cycle
    6-yr median margin, range -114%–-29%; latest ($250M) = operating cash ($118M) − maintenance capex $132M
    Industry peers: median 26%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -50% of revenue this year, a -50% median across 6 years. It chose to put $148M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($399M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, and burning cash
    Net income ($207M) · cash from operations ($118M)

    In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.

    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.

How is the cash used?

  • No surplus to allocate
    What this means

    The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.12×
    Expanding
    Capex $281M ÷ depreciation $132M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $503M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.18×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.8B vs $74M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 4 of 6 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth
    Earnings +33% over the record ·
    What this means

    Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.93/share (latest year $-1.76), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2020–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 0 of 6
    What this means

    Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −54% → −14% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −54% early to −14% lately, median −30% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2020 · −80.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +3.0%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$398M
  • Cash & short-term investments$38M
  • Receivables$95M
  • Other current assets$264M
Current liabilities$362M
  • Debt due within a year$25M
  • Other current liabilities$336M
Current ratio1.10×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.10×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.10×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$36Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$25M due · $38M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Cash runway0.1 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+95.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.1×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($530M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($4.5B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$3.9B$97M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$5Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$409M7% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$1.5Bover 6 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership2.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$161M · 27% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
    “As of and for the year ended December 31, 2025, our largest customer accounted for 27% of our revenue and 17% of total accounts receivable, net.”verify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Railroads

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UNPUnion Pacific Corporation$24.5B39.6%16%29%
CSXCSX Corporation$14.1B38.6%14%26%
NSCNorfolk Southern Corporation$12.2B34.1%11%23%
FIPFTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock$503M-26.0%-3%-47%
Group median36.3%13%25%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

FTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Revenue, delivered46%/yr’20→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−61%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "FTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock (FIP), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/FIP, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← FIGS its page in the Manual FIS →

Industry order: ← CSX the Railroads chapter NSC →