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FIP, FTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock
Our Ports and Terminals business, consisting of our Jefferson Terminal and Repauno segments, develops or acquires industrial properties in strategic locations that store and handle for third parties a variety of energy products including crude oil, refined products and clean fuels.
Our Sustainability and Energy Transition business focuses on investments in companies and assets that utilize green technology, produce sustainable fuels and products or enable customers to reduce their carbon footprint.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −30% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Capital spending runs about 56% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on volume and pricing against the operating ratio. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $69M | $120M | $262M | $320M | $331M | $503M | $595M | RevenueRevenue |
| 12% | 7% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 3% | 2% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($55M) | ($72M) | ($58M) | ($44M) | ($99M) | $8M | $18M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −80.5% | −59.5% | −22.0% | −13.8% | −30.0% | 1.6% | 3.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($55M) | ($80M) | ($177M) | ($184M) | ($294M) | ($207M) | ($467M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($47M) | ($62M) | ($43M) | $6M | ($15M) | ($118M) | ($102M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $31M | $54M | $71M | $81M | $79M | $132M | $158M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($23M) | ($36M) | $64M | $108M | $200M | ($43M) | $207M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $248M | $141M | $217M | $99M | $80M | $281M | $260M | CapexCapex |
| 361.0% | 117.2% | 82.9% | 30.9% | 24.0% | 55.8% | 43.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($78M) | ($116M) | ($113M) | ($94M) | ($95M) | ($250M) | ($260M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −113.7% | −96.3% | −43.3% | −29.2% | −28.6% | −49.8% | −43.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($294M) | ($203M) | ($260M) | ($94M) | ($95M) | ($399M) | ($362M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −429.4% | −168.5% | −99.2% | −29.2% | −28.6% | −79.3% | −60.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | $627M | $4M | $4M | $0 | $857M | $1.1B | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $0 | $0 | $3M | $12M | $13M | $14M | $14M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| -5% | -3% | -3% | -2% | -4% | — | — | ROICROIC |
| -6% | -5% | -32% | -38% | -145% | -973% | — | Return on equityROE |
| −6% | −5% | −33% | −40% | −152% | n/m | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $55M | $50M | $36M | $29M | $28M | $57M | $38M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | $50M | $61M | $56M | $53M | $95M | $95M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $50M | $61M | $56M | $53M | $95M | $95M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $413M | $278M | $186M | $220M | $484M | $398M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $129M | $160M | $151M | $251M | $410M | $362M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 3.2× | 1.7× | 1.2× | 0.9× | 1.2× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $257M | $260M | $275M | $275M | $366M | $366M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $2.4B | $2.5B | $2.4B | $2.4B | $5.7B | $5.7B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $719M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $3.8B | $3.8B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $669M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $3.7B | $3.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -5.1× | -4.5× | -1.1× | -0.4× | -0.8× | 0.0× | 0.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $995M | $1.5B | $552M | $484M | $203M | $21M | ($122M) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||||
| 99.4M | 99.4M | 103M | 103M | 108M | 115M | 117M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.69 | $1.21 | $2.55 | $3.11 | $3.06 | $4.36 | $5.10 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.56 | $-0.80 | $-1.73 | $-1.78 | $-2.72 | $-1.80 | $-4.00 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.78 | $-1.16 | $-1.10 | $-0.91 | $-0.88 | $-2.17 | $-2.23 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-2.96 | $-2.04 | $-2.53 | $-0.91 | $-0.88 | $-3.46 | $-3.10 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.03 | $0.12 | $0.12 | $0.12 | $0.12 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $2.49 | $1.42 | $2.11 | $0.96 | $0.73 | $2.43 | $2.23 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $10.02 | $14.71 | $5.37 | $4.70 | $1.87 | $0.19 | $-1.05 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +44.6%/yr | +44.6%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −0.5%/yr | −0.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | −55.0%/yr | −55.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ($250M) of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $132M it takes just to hold its position. It put $148M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($399M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($207M) | ($294M) | ($184M) | ($177M) | ($80M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$132M | +$79M | +$81M | +$71M | +$54M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$43M | +$200M | +$108M | +$64M | −$36M |
| Cash from operations | ($118M) | ($15M) | $6M | ($43M) | ($62M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$132M | −$80M | −$99M | −$71M | −$54M |
| Owner earnings | ($250M) | ($95M) | ($94M) | ($113M) | ($116M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$148M | — | — | −$146M | −$87M |
| Free cash flow | ($399M) | ($95M) | ($94M) | ($260M) | ($203M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -50% | -29% | -29% | -43% | -96% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $132M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $148M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income $8M ÷ interest expense $266M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.7B · 466.4× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $57M − debt $3.8B
What this means
Netting $57M of cash and short-term investments against $3.8B of debt leaves $3.7B owed, about 466.4× a year's operating profit (473.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -5%–-2%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median 14%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -114%–-29%; latest ($250M) = operating cash ($118M) − maintenance capex $132MIndustry peers: median 26%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -50% of revenue this year, a -50% median across 6 years. It chose to put $148M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($399M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($118M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($207M) · cash from operations ($118M)
In the filing’s words And the filing leans heavily on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings — steering you off the GAAP figure just where the cash is not backing it. Read the reconciliation in the notes before taking the adjusted number.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- No surplus to allocate
What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.12×ExpandingCapex $281M ÷ depreciation $132M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $503M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 1.18×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.8B vs $74M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 6 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.93/share (latest year $-1.76), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $0.18/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 0 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 5 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −54% → −14% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −54% early to −14% lately, median −30% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2020 · −80.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +3.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$38M
- Receivables$95M
- Other current assets$264M
- Debt due within a year$25M
- Other current liabilities$336M
From the company's latest filing.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 6-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 6-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership2.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$161M · 27% of revenue on the largest customer (TTM)
“As of and for the year ended December 31, 2025, our largest customer accounted for 27% of our revenue and 17% of total accounts receivable, net.”verify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Railroads
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| UNPUnion Pacific Corporation | $24.5B | — | 39.6% | 16% | 29% |
| CSXCSX Corporation | $14.1B | — | 38.6% | 14% | 26% |
| NSCNorfolk Southern Corporation | $12.2B | — | 34.1% | 11% | 23% |
| FIPFTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock | $503M | — | -26.0% | -3% | -47% |
| Group median | — | — | 36.3% | 13% | 25% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFFTAI Infrastructure Inc. Common Stock is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered46%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← FIGS its page in the Manual FIS →
Industry order: ← CSX the Railroads chapter NSC →