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UROY, Uranium Royalty Corp.
Uranium Royalty Corp. is not, and will not be, the owner or operator of any of the properties underlying its current or future royalties, streams and similar interests and has no input in the exploration, development or operation of such properties.
Third-party owners and operators will generally have the power to determine the manner in which the properties are exploited, including decisions regarding feasibility, exploration and development of such properties or decisions to commence, continue or reduce, or suspend or discontinue production from a property.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn.
- What moves the needle
- Trading volume and the data franchise. What decides it: volumes across its markets, which spike when volatility does; the network economics of a deep liquidity pool rivals cannot easily replicate; and the recurring, high-margin market-data and listing fees layered on top. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Operating margin has been modest for a fee business (median −27%). It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near −2%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the volumes and the data franchise hold their pricing is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2022–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMApr 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||
| C$0 | C$14M | C$43M | C$16M | C$16M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | −27.3% | 16.6% | −31.0% | −31.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| — | −42.2% | 22.9% | −36.5% | −36.5% | Net marginNet mgn |
| (C$4M) | (C$6M) | C$10M | (C$6M) | (C$6M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||
| -3% | -3% | 4% | -2% | -2% | Return on equityROE |
| −3% | −3% | 4% | −2% | −2% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| C$178M | C$186M | C$279M | C$296M | C$296M | Total assetsAssets |
| C$4M | C$14M | C$21M | C$13M | C$13M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| C$165M | C$175M | C$276M | C$295M | C$295M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | |||||
| 88.3M | 97.9M | 109M | 127M | 127M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| C$0.00 | C$0.14 | C$0.39 | C$0.12 | C$0.12 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| C$-0.05 | C$-0.06 | C$0.09 | C$-0.04 | C$-0.04 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| C$1.87 | C$1.79 | C$2.54 | C$2.33 | C$2.33 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Is it a good business?
- Operating margin −31.0%Thin for a fee businessOperating income (C$5M) ÷ revenue C$16MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
The heart of a exchange: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Revenue is a toll on trading volume plus the recurring market-data and listing fees the venue generates, protected by the network economics of a deep liquidity pool that rivals cannot easily replicate. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.
- Net margin −36.5%SlimNet income (C$6M) ÷ revenue C$16M
What this means
What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.
- Return on equity −2%Below the cost of equityNet income (C$6M) ÷ equity C$295MIndustry peers: median 5%
What this means
Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Non-adoption of new technologies, including AI systems, may introduce adverse competitive risks.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Apr 30, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investmentsC$13M
- InventoryC$218M
- Other current assetsC$8M
- Accounts payableC$968K
From the company's latest filing.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Credit & receivables, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Op. margin | Net margin | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RPCRidgepost Capital Inc. | $297M | 21.9% | 6.6% | 5% |
| JSMNavient Corp | $271M | 882.2% | 110.0% | 17% |
| ALTIAlTi Global Inc. | $255M | -21.8% | -46.9% | -27% |
| ABXAbacus Global Management Inc. | $235M | 37.0% | 14.9% | 6% |
| DBRGDigitalBridge Group Inc. | $94M | -16.2% | -26.0% | -5% |
| VALUValue Line Inc. | $35M | 18.1% | 43.3% | 26% |
| UROYUranium Royalty Corp. | C$16M | -27.3% | -36.5% | -2% |
| TOPTOP Financial Group Limited | $5M | -24.9% | -24.8% | -3% |
| Group median | — | 0.9% | -9.1% | 1% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the home-market price, not the US ADR quote. Uranium Royalty Corp. reports in CAD, and every figure here (owner earnings, book value, the share count) is on that CAD, ordinary-share basis. Enter the price on the same basis: the local-exchange quote per ordinary share in CAD. A US ADR price in dollars bundles the ADR-to-ordinary ratio and the exchange rate, so it will not reconcile with these figures and would throw the multiple off.
The owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← UMC its page in the Manual USAS →
Industry order: ← UPST the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter VALU →