Owner Scorecard


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ALTI, AlTi Global Inc.

Capital Markets & Asset Management financial Unprofitable

AlTi combines the breadth of a global firm with the service offering of a family office to deliver solutions designed to meet the full complexity of wealth and capital.

Separately, we have one internally managed fund and stakes in three Externally-Managed Funds in our alternatives platform, with a largely institutional client base.

Wealth & Capital Solutions and International Real Estate, and prior period data was recast for comparative purposes.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ALTI · AlTi Global Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$255M
+28.5% YoY · 35% 4-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $271M 5-yr avg $165M
Operating margin −28.1% 5-yr avg −14.4%
Net margin −42.0% 5-yr avg −35.2%
Return on equity −18% 5-yr avg −29%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is Management/advisory fees (78%), Incentive fees (14%) and Distributions from investments (8%).
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
What moves the needle
Assets under management and the fee rate on them. What decides it: net flows in or out, the market's move on the assets already there (the firm rises and falls with the indices it invests in), the drift toward cheaper passive products, and the operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Operating margin has been modest for a fee business (median −22%). It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near −27%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the assets stay (net flows, not last year's market) is what the flow disclosures and the 10-K settle, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Management/advisory fees is 78% of revenue, with Incentive fees the other meaningful line at 14%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Management/advisory fees78%$198M
  • Incentive fees14%$35M
  • Distributions from investments8%$21M
  • Other income/fees0%$1M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2021–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$76M$77M$221M$198M$255M$271MRevenueRevenue
10.3%−1.7%−21.8%−29.7%−29.0%−28.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
5.2%−7.7%−74.9%−51.9%−46.9%−42.0%Net marginNet mgn
$4M($6M)($166M)($103M)($120M)($114M)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
$19M$7M($82M)($58M)($52M)($16M)Owner earningsOwner earn.
-34%-47%-16%-20%-18%Return on equityROE
−34%−48%−16%−20%−18%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$346M$92M$1.3B$1.3B$1.2B$1.1BTotal assetsAssets
$8M$7M$15M$64M$41M$40MCash & investmentsCash+inv
($35M)$18M$352M$658M$600M$619MShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
7.0M7.0M116M79.7M99.9M111MShares out (diluted)Shares
$10.88$10.97$1.91$2.49$2.55$2.44Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.57$-0.84$-1.43$-1.29$-1.20$-1.03EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.71$0.96$-0.71$-0.73$-0.52$-0.14Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.00$0.00$0.03$0.00$0.00$0.00Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$-4.99$2.50$3.04$8.26$6.01$5.58Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×16.53 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.45 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
4-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−30.4%/yr−30.4%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+130.2%/yr+130.2%/yr (4-yr)

The record, charted

FY2021–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
100Mpeak FY2023
Revenue
$255Mlow FY2021
III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Is it a good business?

  • Operating margin −29.0%
    Thin for a fee business
    Operating income ($74M) ÷ revenue $255M
    Industry peers: median 25%
    What this means

    The heart of a asset manager: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Fees ride on assets under management, so the swing factors are net flows in or out and the market's move on the assets already there; the cost base is largely fixed, which lifts margins in a bull market and squeezes them in a bear one. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.

  • Net margin −46.9%
    Slim
    Net income ($120M) ÷ revenue $255M
    What this means

    What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.

  • Below the cost of equity
    Net income ($120M) ÷ equity $600M
    Industry peers: median 29%
    What this means

    Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2022

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$86K
  • Cash & short-term investments$40M
Current liabilities$8M
  • Other current liabilities$8M
Current ratio0.01×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.01×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio4.96×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($8M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Cash runway2.5 yrsthe business is consuming cash; this is how long the cash on hand lasts at that rate
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+28.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($197M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($256M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$76M$61M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 5-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$822M70% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity64%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$2Mover 5 years buying other businesses, against $9M of capital spent building

$183M written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 5-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.

  • Insider ownership1.8%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management

The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueOp. marginNet marginROE
HLNEHamilton Lane$759M33.2%23.8%29%
AAMIAcadian Asset Management Inc.$564M24.8%16.8%102%
GCMGGCM Grosvenor Inc.$558M18.9%3.3%168%
CNSCohen & Steers$556M38.3%28.4%39%
RPCRidgepost Capital Inc.$297M21.9%6.6%5%
ALTIAlTi Global Inc.$255M-21.8%-46.9%-27%
ABXAbacus Global Management Inc.$235M37.0%14.9%6%
DBRGDigitalBridge Group Inc.$94M-16.2%-26.0%-5%
Group median23.4%10.7%17%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

AlTi Global Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.

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The assumptions

Revenue, delivered40%/yr’21→’25

Enter a price to run it.

Owner earnings it must reach
Margin the price demands
Owner-earnings margin today−6%

Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "AlTi Global Inc. (ALTI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ALTI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ALT its page in the Manual ALTO →

Industry order: ← ACTG the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter AMG →