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VELO, Velo3D Inc.
We are a production-focused metal additive manufacturing technology company that develops and manufactures advanced metal additive manufacturing systems and provides production and engineering services that enable customers to manufacture high-value metal parts at scale.
Additive manufacturing ("AM"), also referred to as three-dimensional printing ("3D printing"), has historically been used primarily for prototyping and limited production applications.
Combines two complementary operating models: Equipment sales, consisting primarily of our Sapphire family of metal additive manufacturing systems and associated software; and Production and engineering services, delivered through our Rapid Production Solutions ("RPS") offering and Expert Services organization.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No meaningful revenue yet; the record is the cash on hand against the burn. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −172% through the cycle on a −5.1% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 59% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the capital-goods cycle and the aftermarket. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −147%, above 15% in 0 of 4 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2020–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||
| $19M | $27M | $79M | $77M | $41M | $46M | $50M | RevenueRevenue |
| — | 18% | 1% | −34% | −5% | −16% | −11% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 34% | 85% | 47% | 54% | 118% | 65% | 51% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 75% | 98% | 59% | 54% | 38% | 23% | 22% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($21M) | ($58M) | ($106M) | ($133M) | ($79M) | ($55M) | ($50M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −111.8% | −210.5% | −135.1% | −172.1% | −192.2% | −119.5% | −99.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($22M) | ($107M) | $8M | ($135M) | ($70M) | ($71M) | ($53M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||
| ($26M) | ($56M) | ($124M) | ($106M) | ($33M) | ($27M) | ($33M) | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1M | $3M | $5M | $9M | $5M | $3M | $3M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($7M) | $43M | ($157M) | ($5M) | $20M | $31M | $9M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $401K | $10M | $14M | $1M | $9K | $3M | $4M | CapexCapex |
| 2.1% | 35.1% | 17.6% | 1.4% | 0.0% | 5.9% | 7.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($27M) | ($59M) | ($129M) | ($107M) | ($33M) | ($30M) | ($37M) | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −141.5% | −216.5% | −164.2% | −137.8% | −79.7% | −65.3% | −72.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($27M) | ($66M) | ($138M) | ($107M) | ($33M) | ($30M) | ($37M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −141.5% | −240.6% | −175.1% | −137.8% | −79.7% | −65.3% | −72.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | -249% | -120% | -84% | -175% | -65% | ROICROIC |
| — | -97% | 6% | -198% | -176% | -218% | -104% | Return on equityROE |
| — | −97% | 6% | −198% | −176% | −218% | −104% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||
| $16M | $223M | $186M | $31M | $1M | $39M | $17M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $1M | $13M | $10M | $10M | $4M | $6M | $7M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $7M | $22M | $43M | $61M | $50M | $27M | $28M | InventoryInvent. |
| $1M | $10M | $20M | $16M | $19M | $10M | $9M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $7M | $25M | $33M | $55M | $35M | $23M | $26M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $28M | $268M | $250M | $113M | $58M | $80M | $65M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $12M | $47M | $56M | $49M | $38M | $34M | $27M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.3× | 5.7× | 4.5× | 2.3× | 1.5× | 2.4× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $33M | $303M | $287M | $154M | $89M | $91M | $92M | Total assetsAssets |
| — | — | $8M | $44M | $36M | $31M | $26M | Total debtDebt |
| — | — | ($178M) | $13M | $35M | ($8M) | $10M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -33.2× | -21.1× | -285.8× | -13.7× | -4.9× | -12.6× | -12.5× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ($108M) | $110M | $139M | $68M | $40M | $33M | $52M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 7.7% | 15.9% | 25.6% | 32.2% | 28.8% | 20.7% | 15.5% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||
| 15.6M | 58.7M | 202M | 5.6M | 847K | 16.5M | 25.0M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.21 | $0.47 | $0.39 | $13.73 | $48.39 | $2.79 | $2.02 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-1.40 | $-1.82 | $0.04 | $-23.97 | $-82.32 | $-4.33 | $-2.13 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-1.72 | $-1.01 | $-0.64 | $-18.92 | $-38.58 | $-1.82 | $-1.46 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-1.72 | $-1.12 | $-0.68 | $-18.92 | $-38.58 | $-1.82 | $-1.46 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.03 | $0.16 | $0.07 | $0.19 | $0.01 | $0.16 | $0.15 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $-6.90 | $1.88 | $0.69 | $12.12 | $46.81 | $1.99 | $2.06 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×3.76 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×3.44 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/35.85 into 2023 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/6.66 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×19.46 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.52 into TTM — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 5-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +18.1%/yr | +18.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +45.0%/yr | +45.0%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2020–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $71M loss into ($30M) of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($71M) | ($70M) | ($135M) | $8M | ($107M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$3M | +$5M | +$9M | +$5M | +$3M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$10M | +$12M | +$25M | +$20M | +$4M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$31M | +$20M | −$5M | −$157M | +$43M |
| Cash from operations | ($27M) | ($33M) | ($106M) | ($124M) | ($56M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$3M | −$9K | −$1M | −$5M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | ($30M) | ($33M) | ($107M) | ($129M) | ($59M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | — | — | −$9M | −$7M |
| Free cash flow | ($30M) | ($33M) | ($107M) | ($138M) | ($66M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -65% | -80% | -138% | -164% | -217% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $10M), owner earnings is nearer ($40M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
“We have identified material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? -12.6×Does not cover its interestOperating income ($55M) ÷ interest expense $4M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net debt against an operating lossCash $39M + ST investments $7M − debt $61M
What this means
Netting $46M of cash and short-term investments against $61M of debt leaves $15M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 50 + DIO 185 − DPO 70 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle4-yr median, range -249%–-84%; -79% latest = NOPAT ($43M) ÷ invested capital $55MIndustry peers: median -3%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran -79% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Owner-earnings margin -141%Consumes cash through the cycle6-yr median margin, range -217%–-65%; latest ($30M) = operating cash ($27M) − maintenance capex $3MIndustry peers: median -4%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -65% of revenue this year, a -141% median across 6 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $10M of SBC) leaves ($40M).
- Are earnings backed by cash? ($27M)Loss, and burning cashNet income ($71M) · cash from operations ($27M)
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did not.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.80×MaintainingCapex $3M ÷ depreciation $3M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $46M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.37×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt NearDebt ≤ working capital · $61M vs $46M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (6-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-3.09/share (latest year $-2.39), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.10/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2020–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 1 of 6
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −152% → −161% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
The recent-years average (−161%) sits below the early years (−152%), but the latest year (−119%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is −172% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2021 · −210.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +1.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The use of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies in our business operations and product offerings may expose us to risks that could harm our competitive position and have a material adverse effect on our business and results of operations.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$17M
- Receivables$7M
- Inventory$28M
- Other current assets$14M
- Debt due within a year$17M
- Accounts payable$9M
- Other current liabilities$616K
From the company's latest filing.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | $455k | — | ($33M) |
| 2024 | $3,356 | $3,356 | ($33M) |
| 2025 | $1.1M | $1.1M | ($30M) |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership53.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$10M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 21% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?≈$17M · 33% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“For the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, sales to the top three customers accounted for 33.2% and 47.0% of our revenue, respectively.”verify →
- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductor Equipment
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| VECOVeeco Instruments Inc. | $664M | 40% | 5.2% | -1% | 6% |
| AZTAAzenta Inc. | $594M | 44% | -6.1% | -3% | 6% |
| OUSTOuster Inc. | $169M | 27% | -297.0% | -101% | -224% |
| ERIIEnergy Recovery Inc. | $135M | 69% | 13.5% | 13% | 8% |
| CEPLCapstone Energy Plus Inc. | $106M | 14% | -23.2% | -74% | -19% |
| ASYSAmtech Systems Inc. | $79M | 37% | 1.8% | 1% | -4% |
| VELOVelo3D Inc. | $46M | -5% | -153.6% | -147% | -140% |
| CHRNChronoScale Holdings Corporation | $13M | 50% | -120.5% | -139% | -100% |
| Group median | — | 39% | -14.6% | -38% | -11% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFVelo3D Inc. is profitable, but owner earnings are negative this year because capital spending currently outruns operating cash, a build-out, so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no positive base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the steady-state profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered17%/yr’20→’25
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Manual order: ← VEL its page in the Manual VERX →
Industry order: ← VECO the Semiconductor Equipment chapter