ROIC
1%low FY2023
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VERX, Vertex Inc.
Software asset-light
Vertex is a leading provider of enterprise compliance technology for global commerce.
Our software, data, and services help businesses operate with confidence by automating and governing transaction-based compliance obligations that arise wherever they buy, sell, and move goods and services around the world.
Unlike direct taxes, which are paid directly by the entity being taxed, indirect taxes are collected from a purchaser and remitted to taxing authorities by the seller or service provider as part of each transaction.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
$748M
+12.2% YoY · 15% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $768M 5-yr avg $581M
Revenue $197M +11.1% vs yr-ago qtr
Operating margin −5.4% yr-ago 2.5%
Net income ($3M) yr-ago $11M
Net margin −1.3% yr-ago 6.3%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Cloud subscriptions (47%), Software licenses (38%) and Services (15%).
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −1.0% through the cycle on a 62% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 5.9% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on retention and the cost of growth. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −1%, above 15% in 0 of 5 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 14% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 3 lines, the largest Cloud subscriptions at 47%.
Revenue by product line, FY2025
- Cloud subscriptions47%$353M
- Software licenses38%$287M
- Services15%$109M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||
| $272M | $322M | $375M | $426M | $492M | $572M | $667M | $748M | $768M | RevenueRevenue |
| 65% | 66% | 56% | 62% | 61% | 61% | 64% | 64% | 64% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 22% | 22% | 40% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 23% | 24% | 24% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 9% | 10% | 15% | 10% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 11% | 11% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($3M) | $32M | ($105M) | ($3M) | ($8M) | ($18M) | ($2M) | $2M | ($13M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −1.0% | 9.9% | −28.0% | −0.7% | −1.6% | −3.1% | −0.3% | 0.3% | −1.7% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($6M) | $31M | ($75M) | ($1M) | ($12M) | ($13M) | ($53M) | $7M | ($6M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||
| $80M | $92M | $60M | $90M | $64M | $74M | $165M | $166M | $189M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $25M | $25M | $32M | $45M | $61M | $72M | $83M | $97M | $102M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $57M | $27M | ($45M) | $21M | ($5M) | ($18M) | $87M | $4M | $38M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $21M | $20M | $21M | $32M | $46M | $49M | $72M | — | $72M | CapexCapex |
| 7.7% | 6.3% | 5.6% | 7.5% | 9.3% | 8.6% | 10.8% | — | 9.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $59M | $72M | $39M | $59M | $18M | $25M | $93M | — | $117M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 21.8% | 22.4% | 10.3% | 13.8% | 3.7% | 4.4% | 14.0% | — | 15.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $59M | $72M | $39M | $59M | $18M | $25M | $93M | — | $117M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 21.8% | 22.4% | 10.3% | 13.8% | 3.7% | 4.4% | 14.0% | — | 15.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | $12M | $251M | $474K | — | — | — | $474K | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $28M | $29M | $146M | — | — | — | — | — | $146M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $1M | $841K | — | — | — | — | — | $10M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | — | — | -1% | -3% | -6% | -1% | 1% | -3% | ROICROIC |
| — | — | -34% | -1% | -5% | -5% | -29% | 3% | -3% | Return on equityROE |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||
| $56M | $76M | $303M | $73M | $92M | $68M | $296M | $314M | $252M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $62M | $70M | $77M | $77M | $103M | $142M | $164M | $183M | $159M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $11M | $9M | $13M | $14M | $24M | $36M | $38M | $36M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $62M | $60M | $68M | $64M | $89M | $118M | $128M | $146M | $123M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $166M | $403M | $196M | $243M | $267M | $536M | $561M | $489M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $335M | $292M | $369M | $403M | $441M | $537M | $575M | $567M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 0.5× | 1.4× | 0.5× | 0.6× | 0.6× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $0 | $16M | $270M | $252M | $258M | $358M | $392M | $402M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| — | $265M | $519M | $670M | $719M | $760M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $51M | $1M | — | $49M | $47M | $335M | $337M | $341M | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($24M) | ($302M) | — | ($43M) | ($22M) | $39M | $23M | $88M | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| ($126M) | ($130M) | $222M | $230M | $230M | $253M | $179M | $259M | $247M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 1.9% | 2.9% | 39.5% | 6.1% | 4.0% | 5.9% | 7.1% | 7.7% | 7.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Gross margin
64%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
0.4×peak FY2024
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
$93Mowner earningsvs.($53M)net incomelow FY2022
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
FY2018FY2025
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned a $53M loss into $93M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($53M) | ($13M) | ($12M) | ($1M) | ($75M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$83M | +$72M | +$61M | +$45M | +$32M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$47M | +$34M | +$20M | +$26M | +$148M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$87M | −$18M | −$5M | +$21M | −$45M |
| Cash from operations | $165M | $74M | $64M | $90M | $60M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$72M | −$49M | −$46M | −$32M | −$21M |
| Owner earnings | $93M | $25M | $18M | $59M | $39M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 4% | 4% | 14% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $47M), owner earnings is nearer $46M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $26M · 11.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $314M − debt $340M
What this means
Netting $314M of cash and short-term investments against $340M of debt leaves $26M owed, about 11.1× a year's operating profit (145.9× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 89 + DIO 0 − DPO 51 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range -6%–1%; 1% latest = NOPAT $2M ÷ invested capital $285MIndustry peers: median -16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 4%–22%; latest $94M = operating cash $166M − maintenance capex $72MIndustry peers: median 0%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $58M of SBC) leaves $36M.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 22.96×Cash-backedCash from ops $166M ÷ net income $7M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $156M ÷ Owner Earnings $94M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $94M of Owner Earnings, $156M (167%) went back to shareholders, $146M dividends, $10M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($58M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.74×HarvestingCapex $72M ÷ depreciation $97M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $748M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.98×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $340M vs ($14M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (8-yr record) · 6 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 3 of 8 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.12/share (latest year $0.04), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $1.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 8
What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −6% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The record and the words agree: the margin widened and the filing attributes the gain to its own pricing, not volume alone.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −6% early to −1% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −28.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Elevated contestabilityThe product is software or information, the very thing capable AI now produces more cheaply, so the moat is more contestable than the record alone implies.
In its own filing Named as a competitive risk
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat.
“We may face challenges in using and properly managing use of Artificial Intelligence ("AI") in our business, which could result in reputational or competitive harm, and legal liability, and could adversely and materially affect the results of our business, operations, financial condition, and cash flows .…”
AI has collapsed the cost of building a capable substitute for the very thing this business sells. When a credible alternative can be assembled for a fraction of the incumbent's price, it is pricing power that erodes first, not revenue tomorrow. The live question is whether the moat survives that, not whether it held in the past. Whether that question is answerable at all is yours to decide, against your own circle of competence.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assets$489M
- Cash & short-term investments$252M
- Receivables$159M
- Other current assets$77M
Current liabilities$567M
- Debt due within a year$3M
- Accounts payable$36M
- Other current liabilities$528M
Current ratio0.86×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.86×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.45×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($78M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $252M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+11.1%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.2× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($159M)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($479M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$353M$12M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$398Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2018–2024
Over the record, the business generated $626M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$261M · 42%
- Dividends$203M · 32%
- Buybacks$2M · 0%
- Retained (debt / cash)$160M · 26%
- Returned to owners$205M
56% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $203M as dividends and $2M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $197M.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $2M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count—
No continuous share count across the span.
- Dividend recordPays
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
Goodwill & intangibles$395M31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$263Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $261M of capital spent building
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $6.9M | −$14.9M | $59M |
| 2022 | $7.0M | $6.7M | $18M |
| 2023 | $7.5M | $20.2M | $25M |
| 2024 | $8.4M | $36.0M | $93M |
| 2025 | $10.3M | −$16.5M | — |
| 2025 | $25.6M | $26.6M | — |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio183:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$58M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 8% of revenue, equal to 2478% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Vertex Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?7.4% vs 18.2%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 18.2% early in the record and 7.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
And these came back clean
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Software
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COURCoursera Inc. | $758M | 53% | -22.9% | — | 0% |
| BANDBandwidth Inc. | $754M | 44% | -2.3% | -2% | 5% |
| SPSCSPS Commerce | $752M | 67% | 14.1% | 13% | 21% |
| VERXVertex Inc. | $748M | 63% | -0.9% | -1% | 14% |
| BRZEBraze | $738M | 67% | -30.7% | -30% | -5% |
| CWANClearwater Analytics | $731M | 72% | 1.7% | 0% | 15% |
| APPNAppian Corporation | $727M | 71% | -18.7% | -50% | -6% |
| NTSKNetskope Inc. | $709M | 65% | -76.9% | -107% | -27% |
| Group median | — | 66% | -10.5% | -2% | 2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Vertex Inc. has delivered.
$
Through the cycle, Vertex Inc. earns about $98M on its 13.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’24+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’24−2%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’24−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $117M on 162M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $88M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Vertex Inc. (VERX), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VERX, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← VELO its page in the Manual VFC →
Industry order: ← VEEV the Software chapter VIA →