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VLGEA, Village Super Market Inc.

Village Super Market Inc. operates a chain of 34 supermarkets in New Jersey, New York, Maryland and Pennsylvania under the ShopRite and Fairway banners and three Gourmet Garage specialty markets in New York City.

The ShopRite Price Plus and Fairway Insider customer loyalty programs enable Village to offer continuity programs, focus on target marketing initiatives and to offer discounts and attach digital coupons directly to a customer's loyalty card.

Online grocery ordering for in-store pick up or home delivery is available in all of our ShopRite stores through either shoprite.com, the ShopRite app or through third party service providers.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

VLGEA · Village Super Market Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.3B

+3.8% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $2.4B 5-yr avg $2.2B

Gross margin 28% 5-yr avg 28%

Operating margin 2.8% 5-yr avg 2.4%

ROIC 6% 5-yr avg 10%

Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Center Store (60%), Fresh (36%) and Pharmacy (4%).
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 28% and operating margin about 2.1% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. That margin has held in a narrow 1.4%–3.1% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 10%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Center Store is 60% of revenue, with Fresh the other meaningful line at 36%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Center Store60%$1.4B
Fresh36%$833M
Pharmacy4%$93M
Other Product0%$10M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMApr 2026
										Income statement
$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.3B	$2.4B	RevenueRevenue
27%	27%	28%	28%	28%	28%	28%	29%	29%	28%	Gross marginGross mgn
23%	24%	24%	25%	25%	25%	24%	24%	24%	24%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$41M	$33M	$35M	$30M	$29M	$39M	$66M	$62M	$72M	$67M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
2.5%	2.1%	2.1%	1.7%	1.4%	1.9%	3.0%	2.8%	3.1%	2.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$23M	$25M	$26M	$25M	$20M	$27M	$50M	$50M	$56M	$54M	Net incomeNet inc.
41%	24%	28%	21%	31%	31%	32%	31%	31%	29%	Effective tax rateTax rate
										Cash flow & returns
$46M	$59M	$56M	$84M	$53M	$80M	$105M	$81M	$93M	$100M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$24M	$25M	$27M	$32M	$36M	$35M	$36M	$35M	$37M	$36M	DepreciationDeprec.
($4M)	$5M	($139K)	$24M	($6M)	$16M	$16M	($9M)	($3M)	$6M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$28M	$35M	$28M	$54M	$25M	$43M	$46M	$63M	$59M	$44M	CapexCapex
1.7%	2.2%	1.7%	3.0%	1.2%	2.1%	2.1%	2.8%	2.5%	1.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$18M	$34M	$28M	$52M	$27M	$36M	$69M	$45M	$57M	$56M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
1.1%	2.1%	1.7%	2.9%	1.4%	1.8%	3.2%	2.0%	2.4%	2.4%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$18M	$23M	$28M	$29M	$27M	$36M	$58M	$18M	$34M	$56M	Free cash flowFCF
1.1%	1.5%	1.7%	1.6%	1.4%	1.8%	2.7%	0.8%	1.5%	2.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$0	$5M	$74M	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	$13M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$4M	$632K	$1M	$4M	$0	$649K	$4M	$2M	$0	—	BuybacksBuybacks
10%	10%	9%	4%	7%	8%	12%	10%	11%	6%	ROICROIC
8%	8%	8%	8%	6%	7%	12%	11%	11%	11%	Return on equityROE
4%	4%	4%	4%	2%	4%	9%	8%	9%	8%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$87M	$96M	$101M	$112M	$116M	$135M	$141M	$117M	$111M	$129M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$42M	$39M	$39M	$42M	$43M	$44M	$45M	$47M	$51M	$51M	InventoryInvent.
$17M	$19M	$24M	$30M	$25M	$24M	$31M	$28M	$33M	$39M	Accounts payablePayables
$25M	$20M	$15M	$12M	$18M	$20M	$13M	$18M	$18M	$13M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$181M	$191M	$169M	$197M	$196M	$238M	$247M	$200M	$205M	$212M	Current assetsCur. assets
$96M	$102M	$112M	$163M	$152M	$158M	$179M	$174M	$181M	$182M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.9×	1.9×	1.5×	1.2×	1.3×	1.5×	1.4×	1.1×	1.1×	1.2×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$12M	$12M	$13M	$24M	$24M	$24M	$24M	$24M	$24M	$24M	GoodwillGoodwill
$455M	$482M	$502M	$916M	$889M	$924M	$968M	$982M	$1.0B	$1.0B	Total assetsAssets
$43M	$48M	$48M	$396M	$81M	$81M	$91M	$82M	$67M	$396M	Total debtDebt
($45M)	($48M)	($53M)	$285M	($36M)	($54M)	($50M)	($36M)	($43M)	$268M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
9.1×	7.5×	7.8×	11.6×	7.4×	10.0×	15.5×	15.0×	19.2×	19.6×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$287M	$303M	$319M	$332M	$341M	$372M	$410M	$448M	$492M	$515M	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
—	—	—	—	—	4.3M	4.2M	4.2M	—	4.2M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	—	—	—	—	$479.99	$515.38	$532.01	—	$569.89	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$6.25	$11.83	$12.00	—	$12.93	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	—	—	—	$8.47	$16.37	$10.80	—	$13.40	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$8.47	$13.82	$4.22	—	$13.40	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$3.04	$3.14	$3.17	—	$3.17	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$10.08	$11.04	$15.01	—	$10.42	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	—	—	—	—	$86.66	$97.57	$106.46	—	$122.48	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+5.3%/yr (2-yr)	+5.3%/yr (2-yr)
Owner earnings / share	+12.9%/yr (2-yr)	+12.9%/yr (2-yr)
EPS	+38.6%/yr (2-yr)	+38.6%/yr (2-yr)
Dividends / share	+2.2%/yr (2-yr)	+2.2%/yr (2-yr)
Capital spending / share	+22.1%/yr (2-yr)	+22.1%/yr (2-yr)
Book value / share	+10.8%/yr (2-yr)	+10.8%/yr (2-yr)

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

4Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

11%low FY2020

Gross margin

29%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-0.8×peak FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$57Mowner earningsvs.$56Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $57M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $37M it takes just to hold its position. It put $22M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $34M.

Reported net income$56M

Owner earnings$57M · 2% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$56M	$50M	$50M	$27M	$20M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$37M	+$35M	+$36M	+$35M	+$36M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$3M	+$4M	+$3M	+$2M	+$3M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$3M	−$9M	+$16M	+$16M	−$6M
Cash from operations	$93M	$81M	$105M	$80M	$53M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$37M	−$35M	−$36M	−$43M	−$25M
Owner earnings	$57M	$45M	$69M	$36M	$27M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$22M	−$28M	−$11M	—	—
Free cash flow	$34M	$18M	$58M	$36M	$27M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	2%	2%	3%	2%	1%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $37M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $22M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $3M), owner earnings is nearer $53M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 19.2×

Comfortable

Operating income $72M ÷ interest expense $4M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $285M · 4.0× operating profit

Meaningful net debt

Cash $111M − debt $396M

What this means
Netting $111M of cash and short-term investments against $396M of debt leaves $285M owed, about 4.0× a year's operating profit (5.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 10%

Solid through the cycle

9-yr median, range 4%–12%; 6% latest = NOPAT $50M ÷ invested capital $777M

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 2%

Thin through the cycle

9-yr median margin, range 1%–3%; latest $57M = operating cash $93M − maintenance capex $37M

Industry peers: median 2%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $3M of SBC) leaves $53M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.65×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $93M ÷ net income $56M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 24%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $13M ÷ Owner Earnings $57M

What this means
Of $57M Owner Earnings, $13M (24%) went back to shareholders, $13M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.60×

Expanding

Capex $59M ÷ depreciation $37M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.13×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $396M vs $24M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Pass

A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Pass

Earnings +33% over the record · +113%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $3.52/share (latest year $3.81), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $33.22/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 9 of 9

What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 2% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The margin has held, but the filing names price competition — the pressure is present even where the margin has absorbed it so far.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 3% lately, median 2% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
Owner earnings growth +9%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
Worst year 2021 · 1.4% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −0.3%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 9 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 25, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$212M

Cash & short-term investments$129M
Inventory$51M
Other current assets$32M

Current liabilities$182M

Debt due within a year$9M
Accounts payable$39M
Other current liabilities$134M

Current ratio1.17×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.88×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.71×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$30Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$9M due · $129M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 25, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+1.6%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.1× → 1.2×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$491Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($281M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$301M$245M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $656M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$382M · 58%
Dividends$117M · 18%
Buybacks$17M · 3%
Retained (debt / cash)$139M · 21%

Returned to owners$134M
37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $117M as dividends and $17M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $354M and cash and short-term investments rose $41M.
Average price paid for buybacks$95.39
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 0M shares were bought for $4M, about $95.39 each.
Net change in share count−2.1%
The diluted count fell from 4M to 4M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record$3.17/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 2% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained18%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($168M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $30M, so each retained $1 added about 0.18 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	$1.2M	$1.3M	$36M
2023	$1.9M	$2.0M	$69M
2024	$1.4M	$1.6M	$45M
2025	$876k	$973k	$57M
2025	$1.5M	$1.7M	$57M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership35.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$3M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Village Super Market Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$43M → $396M
Debt rose from $43M to $396M while owner earnings went from about $27M to $57M — about 1.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 7.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Pension & retirement as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Food & Drug Retailing

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SFMSprouts Farmers	$8.8B	36%	5.3%	30%	5%
ARKOARKO Corp.	$7.6B	—	1.3%	10%	1%
IMKTAIngles Markets Incorporated	$5.3B	24%	3.6%	9%	2%
WMKWeis Markets Inc.	$5.0B	—	2.7%	8%	2%
GOGrocery Outlet	$4.7B	30%	2.9%	5%	3%
VLGEAVillage Super Market Inc.	$2.3B	28%	2.1%	10%	2%
DNUTKrispy Kreme Inc.	$1.5B	—	0.6%	0%	-4%
NGVCNatural Grocers by Vitamin Cottage Inc.	$1.3B	—	2.7%	15%	2%
Group median	—	29%	2.7%	9%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Village Super Market Inc. has delivered.

Village Super Market Inc.’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Village Super Market Inc. earns about $47M on its 2.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($47M) Net of stock comp (−$4M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($64M)

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The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+12%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+3%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $56M on 15M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net debt $268M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($44M) runs well above depreciation ($36M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $64M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh VLGEA against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Village Super Market Inc. (VLGEA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VLGEA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VITL its page in the Manual VLO →

Industry order: ← USFD the Food & Drug Retailing chapter WMK →