← All companies ← VSECU Manual VSNT → ← VRT Electronic Components & Instruments

VSH, Vishay Intertechnology Inc.

Electronic Components & Instruments asset-light Cyclical

Vishay Intertechnology Inc. manufactures one of the world's largest portfolios of discrete semiconductors and passive electronic components that support innovative designs in the automotive, industrial, computing, consumer, telecommunications, military, aerospace, and healthcare markets.

Serving customers worldwide, Vishay brands itself as The DNA of tech .

Our passive components are used to restrict current flow, suppress voltage increases, store and discharge energy, control alternating current ("AC") and voltage, filter out unwanted electrical signals, and perform other functions.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

VSH · Vishay Intertechnology Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$3.1B

+4.5% YoY · 4% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.2B 5-yr avg $3.2B

Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 25%

Operating margin 2.4% 5-yr avg 9.7%

ROIC 2% 5-yr avg 13%

Owner-earnings margin 0% 5-yr avg 4%

Free cash flow margin −3% 5-yr avg 1%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is led by Resistors (25%) and MOSFETs (21%), with 4 more segments behind.
Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 24% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 0.2% to 18% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Inventory runs near 17% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run in the teens (median 15%, above 15% in 5 of 9 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 7 segments, the largest Resistors at 25%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Resistors25%$759M
MOSFETs21%$630M
Diodes19%$593M
Capacitors16%$506M
Inductors12%$364M
Optoelectronic Components7%$217M
Corporate / Other0%$0

By geographyAsia41%Germany29%United States25%Other Europe4%Israel1%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMApr 2026
											Income statement
$2.3B	$2.6B	$3.0B	$2.7B	$2.5B	$3.2B	$3.5B	$3.4B	$2.9B	$3.1B	$3.2B	RevenueRevenue
24%	27%	—	—	—	—	30%	29%	21%	19%	20%	Gross marginGross mgn
15%	14%	13%	14%	15%	13%	13%	14%	17%	18%	17%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	3%	4%	4%	4%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$197M	$324M	$485M	$262M	$210M	$468M	$615M	$486M	$6M	$57M	$78M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
8.5%	12.5%	16.0%	9.8%	8.4%	14.4%	17.6%	14.3%	0.2%	1.9%	2.4%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$49M	($20M)	$346M	$164M	$123M	$298M	$429M	$324M	($31M)	($9M)	$2M	Net incomeNet inc.
48%	—	17%	27%	22%	31%	28%	30%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$297M	$369M	$259M	$296M	$315M	$457M	$484M	$366M	$174M	$184M	$232M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$159M	$163M	$162M	$164M	$166M	$167M	$164M	$184M	$211M	$225M	$229M	DepreciationDeprec.
$88M	$226M	($249M)	($32M)	$26M	($8M)	($109M)	($142M)	($6M)	($31M)	$425K	Working capital & otherWC & other
$135M	$170M	$230M	$157M	$124M	$218M	$325M	$329M	$320M	$273M	$322M	CapexCapex
5.8%	6.6%	7.6%	5.9%	4.9%	6.7%	9.3%	9.7%	10.9%	8.9%	10.1%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$162M	$198M	$97M	$140M	$191M	$290M	$320M	$181M	($37M)	($89M)	$3M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
7.0%	7.6%	3.2%	5.2%	7.6%	9.0%	9.2%	5.3%	−1.3%	−2.9%	0.1%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$162M	$198M	$29M	$140M	$191M	$239M	$159M	$36M	($146M)	($89M)	($91M)	Free cash flowFCF
7.0%	7.6%	0.9%	5.2%	7.6%	7.4%	4.5%	1.1%	−5.0%	−2.9%	−2.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	$15M	$12M	$26M	$21M	$50M	$14M	$216M	$0	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$23M	$40M	$0	$0	$0	$0	$83M	$79M	$50M	$13M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	15%	34%	15%	12%	23%	23%	17%	0%	1%	2%	ROICROIC
3%	-1%	25%	11%	8%	17%	21%	15%	-2%	-0%	0%	Return on equityROE
3%	−1%	25%	11%	8%	17%	21%	15%	−2%	−0%	0%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$1.1B	$1.3B	$764M	$803M	$778M	$921M	$916M	$1.0B	$606M	$515M	$480M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$274M	$340M	$397M	$328M	$339M	$396M	$416M	$427M	$402M	$382M	$369M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$381M	$430M	$480M	$432M	$448M	$537M	$619M	$648M	$689M	$759M	$791M	InventoryInvent.
$174M	$222M	$218M	$174M	$196M	$254M	$189M	$191M	$216M	$215M	$239M	Accounts payablePayables
$481M	$547M	$658M	$586M	$591M	$679M	$846M	$883M	$875M	$926M	$921M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.9B	$2.2B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.3B	$1.9B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
$457M	$563M	$644M	$520M	$562M	$694M	$726M	$692M	$708M	$720M	$712M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.1×	3.9×	2.8×	3.3×	3.0×	2.9×	2.9×	3.3×	2.7×	2.6×	2.6×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$141M	$143M	$147M	$151M	$158M	$165M	$201M	$201M	$179M	$180M	$180M	GoodwillGoodwill
$3.1B	$3.5B	$3.1B	$3.1B	$3.2B	$3.5B	$3.9B	$4.2B	$4.1B	$4.2B	$4.3B	Total assetsAssets
$357M	$370M	$495M	$499M	$395M	$456M	$501M	$818M	$905M	$951M	$983M	Total debtDebt
($741M)	($925M)	($270M)	($304M)	($383M)	($465M)	($415M)	($190M)	$299M	$436M	$504M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
7.7×	11.6×	13.2×	7.8×	6.6×	26.7×	35.9×	19.3×	0.2×	1.5×	2.0×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.6B	$1.4B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$2.1B	$2.1B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
											Per share
151M	146M	155M	145M	145M	145M	144M	140M	137M	136M	137M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$15.38	$17.85	$19.63	$18.38	$17.23	$22.27	$24.30	$24.26	$21.45	$22.61	$23.23	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.32	$-0.14	$2.24	$1.13	$0.85	$2.05	$2.98	$2.31	$-0.23	$-0.07	$0.02	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.07	$1.36	$0.63	$0.96	$1.32	$1.99	$2.23	$1.29	$-0.27	$-0.66	$0.02	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.07	$1.36	$0.19	$0.96	$1.32	$1.64	$1.10	$0.26	$-1.07	$-0.66	$-0.66	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.89	$1.17	$1.49	$1.08	$0.85	$1.50	$2.26	$2.35	$2.34	$2.01	$2.35	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$10.39	$9.82	$8.94	$10.23	$10.85	$11.98	$14.22	$15.66	$14.81	$15.38	$15.10	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+4.4%/yr	+5.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+9.4%/yr	+18.8%/yr
Book value / share	+4.5%/yr	+7.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

136Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

1%low FY2024

Gross margin

19%low FY2025

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

-1.0×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

($89M)owner earningsvs.($9M)net incomelow FY2025

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported a $9M loss but ($89M) of owner earnings: $80M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($9M)	($31M)	$324M	$429M	$298M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$225M	+$211M	+$184M	+$164M	+$167M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$31M	−$6M	−$142M	−$109M	−$8M
Cash from operations	$184M	$174M	$366M	$484M	$457M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$273M	−$211M	−$184M	−$164M	−$167M
Owner earnings	($89M)	($37M)	$181M	$320M	$290M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$109M	−$145M	−$161M	−$51M
Free cash flow	($89M)	($146M)	$36M	$159M	$239M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	-3%	-1%	5%	9%	9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 1.5×

Thin

Operating income $57M ÷ interest expense $39M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $436M · 7.7× operating profit

Heavy net debt

Cash $515M + ST investments $265K − debt $951M

What this means
Netting $515M of cash and short-term investments against $951M of debt leaves $436M owed, about 7.7× a year's operating profit (16.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 126d

Long (60+ days)

DSO 45 + DIO 112 − DPO 32 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 15%

High through the cycle

9-yr median, range 0%–34%; 1% latest = NOPAT $28M ÷ invested capital $2.5B

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 5%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -3%–9%; latest ($89M) = operating cash $184M − maintenance capex $273M

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's -3% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years.
Are earnings backed by cash? $184M

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($9M) · cash from operations $184M

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? —

No surplus to allocate

What this means
The business didn't generate positive Owner Earnings this year, so any distributions came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not from operations.
Investing or harvesting? 1.22×

Expanding

Capex $273M ÷ depreciation $225M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $3.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.62×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $951M vs $1.2B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −24%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.70/share (latest year $-0.07), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $15.35/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 12% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 5% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −9%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Worst year 2024 · 0.2% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count −1.2%/yr

What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
How management talks about it Owner’s terms

What this means
Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 4, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B

Cash & short-term investments$480M
Receivables$369M
Inventory$791M
Other current assets$237M

Current liabilities$712M

Accounts payable$239M
Other current liabilities$473M

Current ratio2.64×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.53×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.67×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+17.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.0× → 2.6×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.8Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($310M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$1.1B$119M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$33Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.3B · 71%
Buybacks$288M · 9%
Retained (debt / cash)$631M · 20%

Returned to owners$288M
20% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $288M as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $626M and cash and short-term investments fell $619M.
Average price paid for buybacks$19.62
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 15M shares were bought for $288M, about $19.62 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $13.22 (2016) to $23.88 (2023); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $19.57 ($83M).
Net change in share count−8.8%
The diluted count fell from 151M to 137M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $134M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Dr. Gerald Paul	$8.4M	$8.1M	$290M
2022	—	$6.8M	$6.8M	$320M
2023	Joel Smejkal	$4.8M	$4.9M	$181M
2024	Joel Smejkal	$5.5M	$3.4M	($37M)
2025	Joel Smejkal	$10.3M	$6.2M	($89M)

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Vishay Intertechnology Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?0.4% vs 5.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 5.9% early in the record and 0.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$357M → $983M
Debt rose from $357M to $983M while owner earnings went from about $152M to $18M — about 2.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 53 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?28% → 36% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $655M to $1.2B while revenue grew 38%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (28% of revenue then, 36% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean

Did the share count rise anyway?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$2.4B · 74% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Net revenues from our top 30 customers represent approximately 74% of our total net revenues.”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Inventory as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
HUBBHubbell	$5.8B	31%	14.1%	14%	12%
SWKSSkyworks Solutions Inc.	$4.1B	47%	27.8%	23%	28%
QRVOQorvo Inc.	$3.7B	40%	6.1%	3%	19%
NXTNextpower Inc.	$3.6B	26%	16.4%	59%	11%
VSHVishay Intertechnology Inc.	$3.1B	26%	11.1%	15%	6%
TTMITTM Technologies Inc.	$2.9B	18%	5.5%	5%	7%
MPWRMonolithic Power Systems Inc.	$2.8B	55%	20.6%	23%	27%
BHEBenchmark Electronics Inc.	$2.7B	12%	2.9%	5%	4%
Group median	—	28%	12.6%	15%	11%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Vishay Intertechnology Inc. has delivered.

Vishay Intertechnology Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Vishay Intertechnology Inc. earns about $189M on its 6.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s −2.9% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($189M) Net of stock comp Steady-state · maintenance capex (($41M))

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($91M) on 136M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $504M. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($322M) runs well above depreciation ($229M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ($41M), the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh VSH against another business →

The owners of VSH: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Vishay Intertechnology Inc. (VSH), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/VSH, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← VSECU its page in the Manual VSNT →

Industry order: ← VRT the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter