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TTMI, TTM Technologies Inc.

Electronic Components & Instruments asset-light

We are a leading global manufacturer of technology products, including mission systems, RF components, RF microwave/microelectronic assemblies, and technologically advanced interconnect products, including PCBs and substrates.

We focus on providing time-to-market and volume production of advanced technology products and offer a one-stop design, engineering, and manufacturing solution to our customers.

We serve a diversified customer base consisting of approximately 1,300 customers in various markets throughout the world, including aerospace and defense, data center computing, automotive, medical, industrial, and instrumentation, and networking.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

TTMI · TTM Technologies Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$2.9B

+30.2% YoY · 6% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $3.1B 5-yr avg $2.4B

Gross margin 21% 5-yr avg 18%

Operating margin 9.2% 5-yr avg 5.3%

ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 5%

Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 6%

Free cash flow margin −0% 5-yr avg 4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Commercial (55%), A&D (44%) and RF&S Components (1%).
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 18% and operating margin about 5.3% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 1.3% to 9.1% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 5%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 7% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 3 segments, the largest Commercial at 55%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Commercial55%$1.6B
A&D44%$1.3B
RF&S Components1%$40M

By geographyUnited States53%Other38%Taiwan9%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
									Income statement
$2.5B	$2.2B	$2.1B	$2.1B	$2.2B	$2.5B	$2.2B	$2.9B	$3.1B	RevenueRevenue
17%	18%	18%	17%	17%	18%	19%	21%	21%	Gross marginGross mgn
6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	7%	7%	7%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
—	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$173M	$119M	$110M	$28M	$126M	$210M	$42M	$265M	$287M	Operating incomeOp. inc.
6.8%	5.3%	5.1%	1.3%	5.6%	8.4%	1.9%	9.1%	9.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$35M	$174M	$41M	$178M	$54M	$95M	($19M)	$177M	$195M	Net incomeNet inc.
47%	—	6%	—	22%	48%	—	16%	14%	Effective tax rateTax rate
									Cash flow & returns
$298M	$273M	$312M	$287M	$177M	$273M	$187M	$292M	$324M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$156M	$91M	$93M	$100M	$86M	$91M	$99M	$110M	$113M	DepreciationDeprec.
$96M	($12M)	$160M	($6M)	$19M	$67M	$84M	($38M)	($41M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$85M	$150M	$143M	$103M	$82M	$103M	$160M	$293M	$336M	CapexCapex
3.4%	6.7%	6.7%	4.9%	3.6%	4.1%	7.2%	10.1%	10.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$213M	$182M	$219M	$184M	$95M	$170M	$88M	$182M	$212M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
8.4%	8.1%	10.2%	8.7%	4.2%	6.8%	3.9%	6.2%	6.8%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$213M	$123M	$169M	$184M	$95M	$170M	$27M	($683K)	($12M)	Free cash flowFCF
8.4%	5.5%	7.9%	8.7%	4.2%	6.8%	1.2%	−0.0%	−0.4%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
—	$596M	—	—	$0	$298M	$0	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	—	—	—	$65M	$35M	$24M	$18M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
6%	5%	4%	2%	5%	5%	1%	10%	10%	ROICROIC
4%	14%	3%	12%	4%	6%	-1%	10%	11%	Return on equityROE
4%	14%	3%	12%	4%	6%	−1%	10%	11%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
									Balance sheet
$256M	$256M	$380M	$452M	$538M	$403M	$504M	$501M	$410M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$433M	$523M	$504M	$381M	$386M	$473M	$449M	$564M	$618M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$269M	$109M	$114M	$116M	$128M	$171M	$225M	$250M	$280M	InventoryInvent.
$372M	$431M	$330M	$327M	$361M	$362M	$406M	$544M	$608M	Accounts payablePayables
$330M	$201M	$287M	$170M	$152M	$282M	$267M	$270M	$290M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$1.0B	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.9B	$1.9B	Current assetsCur. assets
$689M	$673M	$947M	$518M	$558M	$761M	$809M	$962M	$1.0B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.5×	1.8×	1.4×	2.4×	2.5×	2.0×	2.0×	1.9×	1.9×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$373M	$699M	$707M	$637M	$637M	$760M	$670M	$670M	$670M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.5B	$2.8B	$3.6B	$2.9B	$3.0B	$3.3B	$3.5B	$3.8B	$4.0B	Total assetsAssets
$1.0B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$843M	$928M	$929M	$918M	$916M	$918M	Total debtDebt
$763M	$1.2B	$1.1B	$391M	$390M	$527M	$414M	$415M	$508M	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
2.3×	1.6×	1.3×	0.4×	2.8×	4.6×	0.9×	5.8×	6.5×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$821M	$1.2B	$1.3B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.8B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.4%	0.9%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	1.0%	1.4%	1.8%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
—	$171M	—	$69M	—	—	$44M	—	—	Goodwill written downGW imp.
									Per share
101M	134M	106M	106M	108M	104M	103M	105M	107M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$24.96	$16.70	$20.06	$19.79	$20.79	$24.02	$21.73	$27.56	$28.98	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.34	$1.30	$0.39	$1.67	$0.50	$0.91	$-0.18	$1.68	$1.82	EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.10	$1.36	$2.06	$1.73	$0.88	$1.64	$0.86	$1.72	$1.98	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.10	$0.92	$1.59	$1.73	$0.88	$1.64	$0.26	$-0.01	$-0.11	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.84	$1.12	$1.34	$0.97	$0.76	$0.99	$1.56	$2.77	$3.14	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$8.09	$9.15	$12.03	$13.58	$13.46	$14.78	$14.71	$16.71	$17.16	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.2%/yr	+6.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share	−2.5%/yr	−0.1%/yr
EPS	+22.0%/yr	+0.2%/yr
Capital spending / share	+16.1%/yr	+23.4%/yr
Book value / share	+9.5%/yr	+4.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

105Mpeak FY2018

ROIC

10%low FY2024

Gross margin

21%low FY2022

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.3×peak FY2018

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$182Mowner earningsvs.$177Mnet incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2020–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $182M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $110M it takes just to hold its position. It put $182M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ($683K).

Reported net income$177M

Owner earnings$182M · 6% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2020
Reported net income	$177M	($19M)	$95M	$54M	$178M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$110M	+$99M	+$91M	+$86M	+$100M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$42M	+$23M	+$20M	+$18M	+$16M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$38M	+$84M	+$67M	+$19M	−$6M
Cash from operations	$292M	$187M	$273M	$177M	$287M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$110M	−$99M	−$103M	−$82M	−$103M
Owner earnings	$182M	$88M	$170M	$95M	$184M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$182M	−$61M	—	—	—
Free cash flow	($683K)	$27M	$170M	$95M	$184M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	6%	4%	7%	4%	9%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $110M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $182M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $42M), owner earnings is nearer $140M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 5.8×

Comfortable

Operating income $265M ÷ interest expense $45M

What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $416M · 1.6× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $501M + ST investments $148K − debt $918M

What this means
Netting $501M of cash and short-term investments against $918M of debt leaves $416M owed, about 1.6× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 24d

Tight

DSO 71 + DIO 40 − DPO 86 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 5%

Below average through the cycle

8-yr median, range 1%–10%; 10% latest = NOPAT $223M ÷ invested capital $2.2B

Industry peers: median 15%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 7%

Solid through the cycle

8-yr median margin, range 4%–10%; latest $182M = operating cash $292M − maintenance capex $110M

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 8 years. It chose to put $182M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ($683K) — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $42M of SBC) leaves $140M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.64×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $292M ÷ net income $177M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 10%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $18M ÷ Owner Earnings $182M

What this means
Of $182M Owner Earnings, $18M (10%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $18M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($42M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 2.65×

Expanding

Capex $293M ÷ depreciation $110M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $2.9B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.93×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $918M vs $893M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Near

A profit every year (8-yr record) · 1 loss year

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Near

Earnings +33% over the record · +1%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.81/share (latest year $1.71), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $16.97/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 7 of 8

What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 8 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 6% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 6% early, 6% lately, median 5%.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital

What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
Owner earnings growth −5%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
Worst year 2020 · 1.3% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Share count +0.5%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.9B

Cash & short-term investments$410M
Receivables$618M
Inventory$280M
Other current assets$605M

Current liabilities$1.0B

Debt due within a year$4M
Accounts payable$608M
Other current liabilities$404M

Current ratio1.88×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.61×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.40×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$898Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$4M due · $410M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 30, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+30.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.0× → 1.9×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.0Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$1.0B$118M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$192Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$1.1B · 53%
Buybacks$142M · 7%
Retained (debt / cash)$838M · 40%

Returned to owners$142M
11% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $142M as buybacks.
Average price paid for buybacks$14.02
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $142M, about $14.02 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $12.28 (2024) to $25.54 (2025); its heaviest year, 2022, paid $13.70 ($65M).
Net change in share count5.5%
The diluted count rose from 101M to 107M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Return on what it retained−10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($593M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $58M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 8-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$825M21% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity38%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$895Mover 8 years buying other businesses, against $1.1B of capital spent building

$285M written down across 3 years (2018, 2020, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 32% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 8-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2022	—	$2.6M	$2.4M	$95M
2023	—	$4.0M	$3.4M	$170M
2024	—	$5.4M	$4.2M	$88M
2025	Mr. Roks	$5.1M	$9.0M	$182M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years. A dash under the name means the filing tags the figure without naming the officer.

Insider ownership1.3%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$42M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue, equal to 16% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why TTM Technologies Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?5.7% vs 8.9%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 8.9% early in the record and 5.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.5%
Diluted shares grew 5.5% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $142M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?4 of 8 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 4 of the last 8 years, $288M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
≈$1.4B · 44% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
“Our five largest OEM customers collectively accounted for approximately 44%, 42%, and 41% of our net sales for the years ended December 29, 2025, December 30, 2024, and January 1, 2024, respectively, and two customers collectively represented 23% of our net sales for the year ended December 29, 2025…”verify →
Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
PLXSPlexus Corp.	$4.0B	10%	4.5%	16%	2%
QRVOQorvo Inc.	$3.7B	40%	6.1%	3%	19%
NXTNextpower Inc.	$3.6B	26%	16.4%	59%	11%
VSHVishay Intertechnology Inc.	$3.1B	26%	11.1%	15%	6%
TTMITTM Technologies Inc.	$2.9B	18%	5.5%	5%	7%
MPWRMonolithic Power Systems Inc.	$2.8B	55%	20.6%	23%	27%
BHEBenchmark Electronics Inc.	$2.7B	12%	2.9%	5%	4%
KEKimball Electronics Inc.	$1.5B	8%	3.9%	7%	2%
Group median	—	22%	5.8%	11%	7%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what TTM Technologies Inc. has delivered.

TTM Technologies Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, TTM Technologies Inc. earns about $217M on its 7.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.2% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($217M) Net of stock comp (−$57M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($214M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’20→’25−1%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25−5%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ($12M) on 104M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-27; net debt $508M. The if-converted diluted count is 107M, 3% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($336M) runs well above depreciation ($113M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $214M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh TTMI against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "TTM Technologies Inc. (TTMI), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/TTMI, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← TTI its page in the Manual TTWO →

Industry order: ← TRNS the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter VICR →