Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog Manual 1605 → Food Products 2002 →

1332 · Nissui

Packaged food Consumer & brand J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Nissui’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1332) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥636.0B¥677.3B¥712.1B¥690.0B¥656.5B¥693.7B¥768.2B¥831.4B¥886.1B¥931.3BRevenueRevenue
19%19%16%16%Gross marginGross mgn
16%17%12%12%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥22.6B¥23.2B¥21.7B¥22.8B¥18.1B¥27.1B¥24.5B¥29.7B¥31.8B¥40.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.6%3.4%3.0%3.3%2.8%3.9%3.2%3.6%3.6%4.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥14.2B¥17.2B¥15.4B¥14.8B¥14.5B¥17.3B¥21.2B¥23.9B¥25.4B¥27.5BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥30.2B¥28.3B¥24.7B¥18.8B¥45.9B¥29.1B¥3.4B¥54.5B¥40.4B¥53.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥16.4B¥17.6B¥18.3B¥19.4B¥19.6B¥19.8B¥20.4B¥22.2B¥25.1B¥26.5BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥392M)(¥6.5B)(¥9.0B)(¥15.4B)¥11.8B(¥7.9B)(¥38.3B)¥8.4B(¥10.1B)(¥810M)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥23.4B¥26.8B¥21.9B¥27.9B¥23.3B¥17.6B¥20.9B¥25.2B¥29.8B¥43.1BCapexCapex
3.7%4.0%3.1%4.1%3.6%2.5%2.7%3.0%3.4%4.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥13.8B¥10.7B¥2.8B(¥664M)¥22.6B¥11.5B(¥17.5B)¥29.3B¥10.5B¥26.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.2%1.6%0.4%−0.1%3.4%1.7%−2.3%3.5%1.2%2.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥6.7B¥1.5B¥2.8B(¥9.2B)¥22.6B¥11.5B(¥17.5B)¥29.3B¥10.5B¥10.2BFree cash flowFCF
1.1%0.2%0.4%−1.3%3.4%1.7%−2.3%3.5%1.2%1.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥1.6B¥2.3B¥2.5B¥2.5B¥2.6B¥3.6B¥5.0B¥6.2B¥8.1B¥9.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥3M¥5M¥202M¥2M¥1M¥2M¥2M¥286M¥4M¥6.1BBuybacksBuybacks
5%5%5%5%4%5%4%5%6%6%ROICROIC
10%11%9%10%9%8%10%9%11%12%Return on equityROE
9%9%8%8%7%7%7%7%8%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥25.2B¥24.3B¥16.2B¥32.1B¥14.8B¥15.7B¥14.2B¥19.5B¥18.7B¥24.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥75.2B¥84.7B¥88.8B¥80.0B¥77.1B¥90.3B¥95.7B¥108.3B¥107.4B¥115.7BReceivablesReceiv.
¥57.3B¥64.6B¥65.6B¥68.3B¥67.0B¥77.5B¥92.8B¥98.3B¥102.6B¥112.8BInventoryInvent.
¥34.6B¥44.7B¥49.4B¥35.5B¥41.7B¥50.3B¥50.1B¥56.6B¥56.4B¥78.5BAccounts payablePayables
¥97.9B¥104.6B¥104.9B¥112.8B¥102.5B¥117.5B¥138.4B¥150.0B¥153.5B¥150.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥233.1B¥253.2B¥247.6B¥253.1B¥231.8B¥265.1B¥304.3B¥325.2B¥332.6B¥376.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥216.2B¥212.9B¥202.7B¥196.9B¥153.5B¥177.8B¥198.8B¥212.8B¥226.2B¥276.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.2×1.2×1.3×1.5×1.5×1.5×1.5×1.5×1.4×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥871M¥535M¥276M¥669M¥452M¥657M¥1.4B¥2.6B¥2.1B¥4.1BGoodwillGoodwill
¥451.9B¥482.2B¥477.9B¥491.5B¥475.4B¥505.7B¥549.0B¥606.4B¥634.9B¥749.5BTotal assetsAssets
¥243.4B¥214.6B¥204.5B¥235.2B¥193.4B¥198.5B¥226.4B¥227.7B¥230.3B¥284.5BTotal debtDebt
¥218.3B¥190.3B¥188.3B¥203.1B¥178.6B¥182.8B¥212.1B¥208.1B¥211.6B¥260.3BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
10.4×11.6×12.4×14.0×13.7×23.2×15.0×10.0×10.0×12.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥141.2B¥157.1B¥166.2B¥148.1B¥159.8B¥208.6B¥220.6B¥257.3B¥223.8B¥236.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
312M312M312M312M312M312M312M312M312M312MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2035.50¥2167.82¥2279.26¥2208.54¥2101.24¥2220.28¥2458.73¥2660.99¥2836.24¥2980.71Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥45.50¥55.16¥49.22¥47.27¥46.26¥55.29¥67.96¥76.34¥81.24¥88.07EPS (diluted)EPS
¥44.25¥34.33¥8.89¥-2.13¥72.29¥36.84¥-56.06¥93.67¥33.73¥85.48Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥21.55¥4.95¥8.89¥-29.32¥72.29¥36.84¥-56.06¥93.67¥33.73¥32.54Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥5.13¥7.46¥7.97¥7.97¥8.47¥11.46¥15.93¥19.91¥25.89¥29.53Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥75.05¥85.71¥70.15¥89.45¥74.66¥56.36¥66.93¥80.73¥95.51¥137.87Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥451.96¥502.85¥531.82¥473.93¥511.46¥667.66¥706.19¥823.56¥716.34¥755.50Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.3%/yr+7.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.6%/yr+3.4%/yr
EPS+7.6%/yr+13.7%/yr
Dividends / share+21.5%/yr+28.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+7.0%/yr+13.1%/yr
Book value / share+5.9%/yr+8.1%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥26.7B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥26.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥16.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥10.2B.

Reported net income¥27.5B
Owner earnings¥26.7B · 3% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥27.5B¥25.4B¥23.9B¥21.2B¥17.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥26.5B+¥25.1B+¥22.2B+¥20.4B+¥19.8B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥810M−¥10.1B+¥8.4B−¥38.3B−¥7.9B
Cash from operations¥53.2B¥40.4B¥54.5B¥3.4B¥29.1B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥26.5B−¥29.8B−¥25.2B−¥20.9B−¥17.6B
Owner earnings¥26.7B¥10.5B¥29.3B(¥17.5B)¥11.5B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥16.5B
Free cash flow¥10.2B¥10.5B¥29.3B(¥17.5B)¥11.5B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue3%1%4%-2%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥26.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥16.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥40.4B ÷ interest expense ¥3.3B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥260.3B · 6.4× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥24.3B − debt ¥284.5B
    What this means

    Netting ¥24.3B of cash and short-term investments against ¥284.5B of debt leaves ¥260.3B owed, about 6.4× a year's operating profit (7.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 45 + DIO 53 − DPO 37 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥31.9B ÷ invested capital ¥496.3B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest ¥26.7B = operating cash ¥53.2B − maintenance capex ¥26.5B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 3% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥16.5B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥10.2B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥53.2B ÷ net income ¥27.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥15.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥26.7B
    What this means

    Of ¥26.7B Owner Earnings, ¥15.3B (57%) went back to shareholders, ¥9.2B dividends, ¥6.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.62×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥43.1B ÷ depreciation ¥26.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 3% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 3% early, 4% lately, median 3%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 2.8% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥328.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥260.1B · 79%
  • Dividends¥43.7B · 13%
  • Buybacks¥6.6B · 2%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥18.2B · 6%
  • Returned to owners¥50.2B

    46% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥43.7B as dividends and ¥6.6B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥6.6B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (312M to 312M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥29.53/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 21% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained9%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥141.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥13.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Nissui is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nissui has delivered.

Nissui’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Nissui earns about ¥15.1B on its 1.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥10.2B on 312M diluted shares; net debt ¥260.3B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥43.1B) runs well above depreciation (¥26.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥26.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: its page in the Manual 1605 →

Industry order: the Food Products chapter 2002 →