Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 1963 Manual 2269 → ← 1332 Food Products 2269 →

2002 · Nisshin Seifun Group

Packaged food Consumer & brand J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Nisshin Seifun Group’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 2002) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥532.0B¥540.1B¥565.3B¥712.2B¥679.5B¥679.7B¥798.7B¥858.2B¥851.5B¥865.0BRevenueRevenue
28%28%22%23%Gross marginGross mgn
24%24%17%17%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥25.5B¥27.2B¥26.9B¥28.9B¥27.2B¥29.4B¥32.8B¥47.8B¥46.4B¥46.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.8%5.0%4.8%4.1%4.0%4.3%4.1%5.6%5.4%5.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥19.5B¥21.3B¥22.3B¥22.4B¥19.0B¥17.5B(¥10.4B)¥31.7B¥34.7B¥32.6BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥35.4B¥42.9B¥39.9B¥38.4B¥49.5B¥41.8B¥23.4B¥73.2B¥55.2B¥69.2BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥16.1B¥15.5B¥15.0B¥21.2B¥22.3B¥23.1B¥22.8B¥23.0B¥23.8B¥26.6BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥237M)¥6.0B¥2.7B(¥5.2B)¥8.2B¥1.3B¥11.0B¥18.5B(¥3.2B)¥10.0BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥13.5B¥19.7B¥18.2B¥21.9B¥17.4B¥18.7B¥18.7B¥29.2B¥41.5B¥41.2BCapexCapex
2.5%3.6%3.2%3.1%2.6%2.7%2.3%3.4%4.9%4.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥21.8B¥27.4B¥21.6B¥16.5B¥32.1B¥23.1B¥4.8B¥50.2B¥31.4B¥42.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
4.1%5.1%3.8%2.3%4.7%3.4%0.6%5.8%3.7%4.9%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥21.8B¥23.2B¥21.6B¥16.5B¥32.1B¥23.1B¥4.8B¥44.0B¥13.7B¥28.0BFree cash flowFCF
4.1%4.3%3.8%2.3%4.7%3.4%0.6%5.1%1.6%3.2%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥7.5B¥8.1B¥9.2B¥9.8B¥10.1B¥11.6B¥11.6B¥12.5B¥14.6B¥17.4BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥2M¥10.2B¥190M¥190M¥133M¥190M¥190M¥120M¥14.1B¥17.9BBuybacksBuybacks
6%6%6%6%6%5%6%8%10%10%ROICROIC
5%5%5%6%5%4%-2%6%9%9%Return on equityROE
3%3%3%4%2%1%−5%4%5%4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥90.8B¥98.5B¥107.4B¥64.1B¥59.6B¥68.7B¥83.0B¥107.7B¥94.2B¥93.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥69.6B¥79.7B¥76.2B¥92.2B¥85.5B¥100.6B¥107.9B¥114.5B¥109.5B¥113.1BReceivablesReceiv.
¥64.0B¥71.9B¥73.3B¥79.9B¥81.6B¥96.6B¥128.8B¥124.9B¥120.6B¥128.1BInventoryInvent.
¥40.3B¥58.5B¥54.9B¥53.7B¥47.9B¥63.7B¥74.6B¥76.2B¥64.9B¥72.0BAccounts payablePayables
¥93.3B¥93.1B¥94.7B¥118.4B¥119.1B¥133.5B¥162.1B¥163.2B¥165.3B¥169.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥238.9B¥260.8B¥268.2B¥239.0B¥238.7B¥280.5B¥330.1B¥365.1B¥338.7B¥353.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥89.8B¥114.2B¥114.8B¥131.1B¥108.7B¥129.2B¥150.3B¥163.6B¥147.3B¥156.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.7×2.3×2.3×1.8×2.2×2.2×2.2×2.2×2.3×2.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥7.0B¥5.6B¥5.0B¥42.7B¥45.6B¥42.4B¥7.5B¥6.2B¥5.0B¥4.3BGoodwillGoodwill
¥555.3B¥591.5B¥594.8B¥666.2B¥687.4B¥723.1B¥713.9B¥826.7B¥789.7B¥849.7BTotal assetsAssets
¥15.2B¥15.4B¥17.2B¥84.5B¥77.1B¥79.7B¥85.2B¥87.1B¥84.6B¥91.6BTotal debtDebt
(¥75.6B)(¥83.0B)(¥90.2B)¥20.4B¥17.5B¥10.9B¥2.2B(¥20.6B)(¥9.5B)(¥2.2B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
126.3×123.1×104.7×9.1×9.8×10.1×9.3×12.7×12.3×12.2×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥406.8B¥413.8B¥418.8B¥350.9B¥360.0B¥460.6B¥438.5B¥516.4B¥369.6B¥367.1BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
304M304M304M304M304M304M304M304M291M282MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥1748.08¥1774.54¥1857.50¥2339.95¥2232.56¥2233.35¥2624.16¥2819.87¥2929.52¥3066.18Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥63.96¥70.11¥73.16¥73.62¥62.46¥57.53¥-34.11¥104.30¥119.33¥115.52EPS (diluted)EPS
¥71.67¥89.89¥71.10¥54.22¥105.62¥76.06¥15.66¥164.92¥108.17¥151.10Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥71.67¥76.11¥71.10¥54.22¥105.62¥76.06¥15.66¥144.58¥47.28¥99.32Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥24.79¥26.57¥30.26¥32.23¥33.22¥38.12¥38.12¥41.06¥50.16¥61.64Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥44.52¥64.74¥59.91¥72.02¥57.03¥61.39¥61.30¥95.91¥142.67¥145.95Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1336.60¥1359.57¥1376.17¥1153.01¥1182.79¥1513.50¥1440.74¥1696.63¥1271.54¥1301.25Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.4%/yr+6.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+8.6%/yr+7.4%/yr
EPS+6.8%/yr+13.1%/yr
Dividends / share+10.6%/yr+13.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.1%/yr+20.7%/yr
Book value / share−0.3%/yr+1.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥42.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥26.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥14.6B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥28.0B.

Reported net income¥32.6B
Owner earnings¥42.6B · 5% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥32.6B¥34.7B¥31.7B(¥10.4B)¥17.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥26.6B+¥23.8B+¥23.0B+¥22.8B+¥23.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥10.0B−¥3.2B+¥18.5B+¥11.0B+¥1.3B
Cash from operations¥69.2B¥55.2B¥73.2B¥23.4B¥41.8B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥26.6B−¥23.8B−¥23.0B−¥18.7B−¥18.7B
Owner earnings¥42.6B¥31.4B¥50.2B¥4.8B¥23.1B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥14.6B−¥17.7B−¥6.2B
Free cash flow¥28.0B¥13.7B¥44.0B¥4.8B¥23.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%4%6%1%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥26.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥14.6B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥46.7B ÷ interest expense ¥3.8B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥91.4B + ST investments ¥2.4B − debt ¥91.6B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥2.2B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 48 + DIO 70 − DPO 39 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 5%–10%; 10% latest = NOPAT ¥36.9B ÷ invested capital ¥367.3B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 1%–6%; latest ¥42.6B = operating cash ¥69.2B − maintenance capex ¥26.6B
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥14.6B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥28.0B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥69.2B ÷ net income ¥32.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥35.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥42.6B
    What this means

    Of ¥42.6B Owner Earnings, ¥35.3B (83%) went back to shareholders, ¥17.4B dividends, ¥17.9B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.55×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥41.2B ÷ depreciation ¥26.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 5% early, 5% lately, median 5%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 4.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥468.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥239.9B · 51%
  • Dividends¥112.4B · 24%
  • Buybacks¥43.2B · 9%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥73.3B · 16%
  • Returned to owners¥155.7B

    57% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥112.4B as dividends and ¥43.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥76.4B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥3.0B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥43.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−7.3%

    The diluted count fell from 304M to 282M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥61.64/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained32%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥55.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥17.8B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.32 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Nisshin Seifun Group is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥15.2B → ¥91.6B

    Debt rose from ¥15.2B to ¥91.6B while owner earnings went from about ¥23.6B to ¥41.4B — about 0.6 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nisshin Seifun Group has delivered.

Nisshin Seifun Group’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Nisshin Seifun Group earns about ¥34.3B on its 4.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.9% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+28%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥28.0B on 282M diluted shares; net cash ¥2.2B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥41.2B) runs well above depreciation (¥26.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥42.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1963 its page in the Manual 2269 →

Industry order: ← 1332 the Food Products chapter 2269 →