Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 1721 Manual 1802 → ← 1721 Construction & Engineering 1802 →

1801 · Taisei

General Bldg Contractors - Nonresidential Bldgs Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Taisei’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1801) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥1.49T¥1.59T¥1.65T¥1.75T¥1.48T¥1.54T¥1.64T¥1.77T¥2.15T¥2.09TRevenueRevenue
15%15%11%16%Gross marginGross mgn
5%6%5%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥140.8B¥181.9B¥153.3B¥167.8B¥130.5B¥96.1B¥54.7B¥26.5B¥120.2B¥188.0BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.5%11.5%9.3%9.6%8.8%6.2%3.3%1.5%5.6%9.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥90.6B¥126.8B¥112.6B¥122.1B¥92.6B¥71.4B¥47.1B¥40.3B¥123.8B¥170.0BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥218.2B¥207.0B(¥71.0B)¥77.5B¥67.5B¥80.5B¥30.1B¥40.6B(¥13.8B)¥147.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥6.3B¥7.0B¥7.9B¥9.9B¥10.5B¥10.9B¥11.5B¥13.1B¥16.4B¥16.8BDepreciationDeprec.
¥121.3B¥73.2B(¥191.5B)(¥54.5B)(¥35.5B)(¥1.8B)(¥28.5B)(¥12.8B)(¥154.1B)(¥39.5B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥7.2B¥9.4B¥46.6B¥13.0B¥12.7B¥13.2B¥16.2B¥122.3B¥31.9B¥77.6BCapexCapex
0.5%0.6%2.8%0.7%0.9%0.9%1.0%6.9%1.5%3.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥210.9B¥200.0B(¥78.9B)¥67.6B¥54.8B¥67.3B¥18.6B¥27.5B(¥30.2B)¥130.5BOwner earningsOwner earn.
14.2%12.6%−4.8%3.9%3.7%4.4%1.1%1.6%−1.4%6.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥210.9B¥197.7B(¥117.7B)¥64.5B¥54.8B¥67.3B¥13.9B(¥81.7B)(¥45.8B)¥69.7BFree cash flowFCF
14.2%12.5%−7.1%3.7%3.7%4.4%0.8%−4.6%−2.1%3.3%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥22.0B¥25.0B¥29.9B¥29.0B¥27.3B¥26.6B¥25.7B¥24.4B¥23.9B¥45.5BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥20.0B¥25.0B¥36.0B¥28.0B¥20.4B¥20.0B¥50.0B¥20.0B¥82.1B¥78.0BBuybacksBuybacks
41%63%24%33%23%13%7%3%13%16%ROICROIC
16%19%16%18%13%8%6%4%17%22%Return on equityROE
12%15%11%14%9%5%3%2%14%16%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥534.8B¥687.3B¥437.6B¥482.7B¥494.3B¥496.8B¥415.9B¥430.8B¥356.0B¥273.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥1.22T¥1.33T¥1.20T¥1.30T¥1.24T¥1.30T¥1.35T¥1.63T¥1.60T¥1.64TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥987.0B¥1.02T¥924.8B¥957.4B¥841.1B¥926.4B¥1.02T¥1.30T¥1.29T¥1.38TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.3×1.3×1.4×1.5×1.4×1.3×1.3×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥1.76T¥1.91T¥1.85T¥1.89T¥1.87T¥1.96T¥2.02T¥2.58T¥2.43T¥2.71TTotal assetsAssets
¥235.3B¥244.6B¥218.1B¥208.6B¥219.8B¥225.1B¥202.6B¥305.6B¥305.4B¥420.0BTotal debtDebt
(¥299.4B)(¥442.7B)(¥219.5B)(¥274.0B)(¥274.5B)(¥271.7B)(¥213.2B)(¥125.2B)(¥50.5B)¥147.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
65.3×108.0×120.1×151.0×134.6×105.6×63.6×24.5×46.7×44.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥570.8B¥669.0B¥722.4B¥673.7B¥718.6B¥872.8B¥833.9B¥961.0B¥729.2B¥777.8BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
229M225M225M225M225M201M189M185M183M163MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥6484.62¥7061.05¥7352.22¥7799.59¥6591.85¥7685.33¥8702.12¥9551.22¥11761.01¥12801.91Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥394.88¥564.65¥501.34¥543.72¥412.19¥355.75¥249.64¥217.93¥676.02¥1041.78EPS (diluted)EPS
¥919.69¥890.58¥-351.31¥301.01¥243.92¥335.04¥98.65¥148.82¥-165.05¥799.83Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥919.69¥880.31¥-524.06¥287.18¥243.92¥335.04¥73.84¥-442.09¥-249.94¥427.17Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥96.06¥111.14¥133.19¥129.17¥121.56¥132.46¥136.26¥131.95¥130.36¥278.84Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥31.51¥41.66¥207.73¥57.86¥56.67¥65.89¥85.62¥661.86¥174.37¥475.40Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥2488.82¥2979.49¥3217.18¥3000.47¥3200.27¥4346.71¥4417.74¥5200.34¥3981.26¥4766.38Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.9%/yr+14.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−1.5%/yr+26.8%/yr
EPS+11.4%/yr+20.4%/yr
Dividends / share+12.6%/yr+18.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+35.2%/yr+53.0%/yr
Book value / share+7.5%/yr+8.3%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥130.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥16.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥60.8B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥69.7B.

Reported net income¥170.0B
Owner earnings¥130.5B · 6% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥170.0B¥123.8B¥40.3B¥47.1B¥71.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥16.8B+¥16.4B+¥13.1B+¥11.5B+¥10.9B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥39.5B−¥154.1B−¥12.8B−¥28.5B−¥1.8B
Cash from operations¥147.3B(¥13.8B)¥40.6B¥30.1B¥80.5B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥16.8B−¥16.4B−¥13.1B−¥11.5B−¥13.2B
Owner earnings¥130.5B(¥30.2B)¥27.5B¥18.6B¥67.3B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥60.8B−¥15.5B−¥109.2B−¥4.7B
Free cash flow¥69.7B(¥45.8B)(¥81.7B)¥13.9B¥67.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%-1%2%1%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥16.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥60.8B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥188.0B ÷ interest expense ¥4.2B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥147.0B · 0.8× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash ¥273.0B − debt ¥420.0B
    What this means

    Netting ¥273.0B of cash and short-term investments against ¥420.0B of debt leaves ¥147.0B owed, about 0.8× a year's operating profit (2.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–63%; 16% latest = NOPAT ¥148.5B ÷ invested capital ¥924.8B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 16% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -5%–14%; latest ¥130.5B = operating cash ¥147.3B − maintenance capex ¥16.8B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥60.8B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥69.7B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥147.3B ÷ net income ¥170.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥123.5B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥130.5B
    What this means

    Of ¥130.5B Owner Earnings, ¥123.5B (95%) went back to shareholders, ¥45.5B dividends, ¥78.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 4.63×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥77.6B ÷ depreciation ¥16.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 6 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 10% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 10% early to 5% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −7%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 1.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥783.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested¥350.2B · 45%
  • Dividends¥279.3B · 36%
  • Buybacks¥379.6B · 48%
  • Returned to owners¥658.8B

    99% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥279.3B as dividends and ¥379.6B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥225.2B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥225.2B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥235.3B to ¥420.0B, and cash and short-term investments drew down ¥261.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥379.6B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−28.8%

    The diluted count fell from 229M to 163M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥278.84/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 13% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−20%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥338.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥68.1B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.20 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Taisei is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.1% vs 7.3%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 7.3% early in the record and 2.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥235.3B → ¥420.0B

    Debt rose from ¥235.3B to ¥420.0B while owner earnings went from about ¥110.7B to ¥42.6B — about 2.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 9.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid reported profit become cash?0.79×

    Across the record the business reported ¥997.2B of net income but generated ¥783.8B of operating cash, a 0.79-to-one conversion. Profit that does not turn into cash over many years is the classic mark of earnings that are softer than they look. Ask where the gap sits, receivables, inventory, or costs being capitalized rather than expensed.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Taisei has delivered.

Taisei’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Taisei earns about ¥79.0B on its 3.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−27%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥69.7B on 163M diluted shares; net debt ¥147.0B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥77.6B) runs well above depreciation (¥16.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥130.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1721 its page in the Manual 1802 →

Industry order: ← 1721 the Construction & Engineering chapter 1802 →