← Japan catalog ← 1801 Manual 1803 → ← 1801 Construction & Engineering 1803 →
1802 · Obayashi
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Obayashi’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1802) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.87T | ¥1.90T | ¥2.04T | ¥2.07T | ¥1.77T | ¥1.92T | ¥1.98T | ¥2.33T | ¥2.59T | ¥2.59T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 12% | 13% | — | — | — | 11% | 14% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 5% | 6% | — | — | — | 6% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 1% | 1% | — | — | — | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥133.7B | ¥137.8B | ¥155.5B | ¥152.9B | ¥123.2B | ¥41.1B | ¥93.8B | ¥79.4B | ¥142.5B | ¥194.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 7.1% | 7.3% | 7.6% | 7.4% | 7.0% | 2.1% | 4.7% | 3.4% | 5.5% | 7.5% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥94.5B | ¥92.7B | ¥113.2B | ¥113.1B | ¥98.8B | ¥39.1B | ¥77.7B | ¥75.1B | ¥145.4B | ¥173.8B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥158.9B | ¥114.0B | ¥44.2B | ¥237.6B | ¥24.8B | ¥69.7B | ¥228.5B | ¥50.4B | ¥84.2B | ¥252.9B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥15.0B | ¥14.7B | ¥17.7B | ¥19.9B | ¥20.0B | ¥20.7B | ¥23.9B | ¥27.1B | ¥32.1B | ¥36.4B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥49.4B | ¥6.7B | (¥86.6B) | ¥104.7B | (¥94.0B) | ¥9.9B | ¥126.8B | (¥51.8B) | (¥93.3B) | ¥42.8B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥39.8B | ¥72.0B | ¥36.6B | ¥47.5B | ¥57.4B | ¥58.0B | ¥96.6B | ¥78.4B | ¥49.9B | ¥125.6B | CapexCapex |
| 2.1% | 3.8% | 1.8% | 2.3% | 3.3% | 3.0% | 4.9% | 3.4% | 1.9% | 4.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥143.9B | ¥99.4B | ¥26.5B | ¥217.7B | ¥4.8B | ¥49.0B | ¥204.5B | ¥23.3B | ¥52.1B | ¥216.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 7.7% | 5.2% | 1.3% | 10.5% | 0.3% | 2.5% | 10.3% | 1.0% | 2.0% | 8.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥119.1B | ¥42.1B | ¥7.7B | ¥190.2B | (¥32.6B) | ¥11.7B | ¥131.9B | (¥28.0B) | ¥34.2B | ¥127.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.4% | 2.2% | 0.4% | 9.2% | −1.8% | 0.6% | 6.6% | −1.2% | 1.3% | 4.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥15.8B | ¥23.7B | ¥20.1B | ¥24.4B | ¥23.0B | ¥23.0B | ¥26.6B | ¥30.2B | ¥67.5B | ¥57.8B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥6M | ¥8M | ¥298M | ¥5M | ¥3M | ¥793M | ¥3M | ¥110M | ¥12.2B | ¥58.1B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 16% | 15% | 15% | 22% | 13% | 3% | 8% | 6% | 13% | 18% | ROICROIC |
| 15% | 13% | 14% | 16% | 13% | 4% | 7% | 6% | 16% | 17% | Return on equityROE |
| 12% | 10% | 12% | 13% | 10% | 2% | 5% | 4% | 8% | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥194.2B | ¥184.8B | ¥157.7B | ¥306.0B | ¥240.9B | ¥249.3B | ¥405.6B | ¥326.7B | ¥391.6B | ¥425.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥1.18T | ¥1.21T | ¥1.28T | ¥1.33T | ¥1.27T | ¥1.40T | ¥1.51T | ¥1.69T | ¥1.81T | ¥1.78T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥1.08T | ¥1.12T | ¥1.10T | ¥1.09T | ¥992.9B | ¥1.13T | ¥1.23T | ¥1.43T | ¥1.45T | ¥1.43T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥581M | ¥354M | ¥137M | — | ¥711M | ¥1.2B | ¥5.0B | ¥15.9B | ¥13.0B | ¥23.0B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥2.00T | ¥2.13T | ¥2.21T | ¥2.23T | ¥2.27T | ¥2.42T | ¥2.61T | ¥3.02T | ¥3.04T | ¥3.14T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥200.5B | ¥185.0B | ¥183.4B | ¥174.2B | ¥197.4B | ¥197.8B | ¥267.7B | ¥258.8B | ¥296.1B | ¥292.0B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥6.3B | ¥200M | ¥25.7B | (¥131.8B) | (¥43.5B) | (¥51.5B) | (¥138.0B) | (¥67.9B) | (¥95.5B) | (¥133.8B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 54.8× | 65.7× | 84.7× | 84.9× | 66.0× | 20.3× | 37.7× | 22.5× | 30.5× | 36.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥644.1B | ¥711.5B | ¥798.1B | ¥685.5B | ¥759.8B | ¥988.9B | ¥1.04T | ¥1.20T | ¥936.7B | ¥995.0B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 722M | 722M | 722M | 722M | 722M | 722M | 722M | 722M | 722M | 692M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥2595.56 | ¥2634.28 | ¥2826.97 | ¥2873.20 | ¥2448.89 | ¥2665.09 | ¥2749.64 | ¥3222.64 | ¥3590.76 | ¥3738.39 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥130.98 | ¥128.43 | ¥156.83 | ¥156.75 | ¥136.91 | ¥54.23 | ¥107.65 | ¥104.03 | ¥201.46 | ¥251.17 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥199.46 | ¥137.73 | ¥36.77 | ¥301.80 | ¥6.60 | ¥67.92 | ¥283.45 | ¥32.27 | ¥72.17 | ¥313.04 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥165.12 | ¥58.31 | ¥10.60 | ¥263.55 | ¥-45.22 | ¥16.17 | ¥182.77 | ¥-38.80 | ¥47.43 | ¥184.00 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥21.89 | ¥32.84 | ¥27.87 | ¥33.84 | ¥31.85 | ¥31.85 | ¥36.82 | ¥41.79 | ¥93.53 | ¥83.53 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥55.10 | ¥99.74 | ¥50.66 | ¥65.79 | ¥79.60 | ¥80.43 | ¥133.87 | ¥108.65 | ¥69.22 | ¥181.60 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥892.68 | ¥986.16 | ¥1106.22 | ¥950.05 | ¥1053.09 | ¥1370.62 | ¥1435.71 | ¥1656.59 | ¥1298.22 | ¥1438.23 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.1%/yr | +8.8%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +5.1%/yr | +116.3%/yr |
| EPS | +7.5%/yr | +12.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +16.0%/yr | +21.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +14.2%/yr | +17.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.4%/yr | +6.4%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥216.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥36.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥89.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥127.3B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥173.8B | ¥145.4B | ¥75.1B | ¥77.7B | ¥39.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥36.4B | +¥32.1B | +¥27.1B | +¥23.9B | +¥20.7B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥42.8B | −¥93.3B | −¥51.8B | +¥126.8B | +¥9.9B |
| Cash from operations | ¥252.9B | ¥84.2B | ¥50.4B | ¥228.5B | ¥69.7B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥36.4B | −¥32.1B | −¥27.1B | −¥23.9B | −¥20.7B |
| Owner earnings | ¥216.6B | ¥52.1B | ¥23.3B | ¥204.5B | ¥49.0B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥89.3B | −¥17.9B | −¥51.3B | −¥72.6B | −¥37.3B |
| Free cash flow | ¥127.3B | ¥34.2B | (¥28.0B) | ¥131.9B | ¥11.7B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 2% | 1% | 10% | 3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥36.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥89.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 36.7×ComfortableOperating income ¥194.7B ÷ interest expense ¥5.3B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +¥133.8BNet cashCash ¥416.0B + ST investments ¥9.8B − debt ¥292.0B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥133.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 3%–22%; 18% latest = NOPAT ¥153.8B ÷ invested capital ¥870.9BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–11%; latest ¥216.6B = operating cash ¥252.9B − maintenance capex ¥36.4BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥89.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥127.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥252.9B ÷ net income ¥173.8B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥115.8B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥216.6B
What this means
Of ¥216.6B Owner Earnings, ¥115.8B (53%) went back to shareholders, ¥57.8B dividends, ¥58.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.46×ExpandingCapex ¥125.6B ÷ depreciation ¥36.4B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (5%) sits below the early years (7%), but the latest year (8%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 7% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2022 · 2.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.5%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥1.27T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥661.8B · 52%
- Dividends¥312.0B · 25%
- Buybacks¥71.5B · 6%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥220.0B · 17%
- Returned to owners¥383.5B
37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥312.0B as dividends and ¥71.5B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥71.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−4.1%
The diluted count fell from 722M to 692M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥83.53/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained1%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥639.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥7.4B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Obayashi is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥200.5B → ¥292.0B
Debt rose from ¥200.5B to ¥292.0B while owner earnings went from about ¥89.9B to ¥97.3B — about 2.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Obayashi has delivered.
Obayashi’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Obayashi earns about ¥100.6B on its 3.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥127.3B on 692M diluted shares; net cash ¥133.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥125.6B) runs well above depreciation (¥36.4B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥216.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 1801 its page in the Manual 1803 →
Industry order: ← 1801 the Construction & Engineering chapter 1803 →