Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 1801 Manual 1803 → ← 1801 Construction & Engineering 1803 →

1802 · Obayashi

General Bldg Contractors - Nonresidential Bldgs Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Obayashi’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1802) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥1.87T¥1.90T¥2.04T¥2.07T¥1.77T¥1.92T¥1.98T¥2.33T¥2.59T¥2.59TRevenueRevenue
12%13%11%14%Gross marginGross mgn
5%6%6%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥133.7B¥137.8B¥155.5B¥152.9B¥123.2B¥41.1B¥93.8B¥79.4B¥142.5B¥194.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.1%7.3%7.6%7.4%7.0%2.1%4.7%3.4%5.5%7.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥94.5B¥92.7B¥113.2B¥113.1B¥98.8B¥39.1B¥77.7B¥75.1B¥145.4B¥173.8BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥158.9B¥114.0B¥44.2B¥237.6B¥24.8B¥69.7B¥228.5B¥50.4B¥84.2B¥252.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥15.0B¥14.7B¥17.7B¥19.9B¥20.0B¥20.7B¥23.9B¥27.1B¥32.1B¥36.4BDepreciationDeprec.
¥49.4B¥6.7B(¥86.6B)¥104.7B(¥94.0B)¥9.9B¥126.8B(¥51.8B)(¥93.3B)¥42.8BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥39.8B¥72.0B¥36.6B¥47.5B¥57.4B¥58.0B¥96.6B¥78.4B¥49.9B¥125.6BCapexCapex
2.1%3.8%1.8%2.3%3.3%3.0%4.9%3.4%1.9%4.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥143.9B¥99.4B¥26.5B¥217.7B¥4.8B¥49.0B¥204.5B¥23.3B¥52.1B¥216.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.7%5.2%1.3%10.5%0.3%2.5%10.3%1.0%2.0%8.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥119.1B¥42.1B¥7.7B¥190.2B(¥32.6B)¥11.7B¥131.9B(¥28.0B)¥34.2B¥127.3BFree cash flowFCF
6.4%2.2%0.4%9.2%−1.8%0.6%6.6%−1.2%1.3%4.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥15.8B¥23.7B¥20.1B¥24.4B¥23.0B¥23.0B¥26.6B¥30.2B¥67.5B¥57.8BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥6M¥8M¥298M¥5M¥3M¥793M¥3M¥110M¥12.2B¥58.1BBuybacksBuybacks
16%15%15%22%13%3%8%6%13%18%ROICROIC
15%13%14%16%13%4%7%6%16%17%Return on equityROE
12%10%12%13%10%2%5%4%8%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥194.2B¥184.8B¥157.7B¥306.0B¥240.9B¥249.3B¥405.6B¥326.7B¥391.6B¥425.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥1.18T¥1.21T¥1.28T¥1.33T¥1.27T¥1.40T¥1.51T¥1.69T¥1.81T¥1.78TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥1.08T¥1.12T¥1.10T¥1.09T¥992.9B¥1.13T¥1.23T¥1.43T¥1.45T¥1.43TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.1×1.2×1.2×1.3×1.2×1.2×1.2×1.2×1.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥581M¥354M¥137M¥711M¥1.2B¥5.0B¥15.9B¥13.0B¥23.0BGoodwillGoodwill
¥2.00T¥2.13T¥2.21T¥2.23T¥2.27T¥2.42T¥2.61T¥3.02T¥3.04T¥3.14TTotal assetsAssets
¥200.5B¥185.0B¥183.4B¥174.2B¥197.4B¥197.8B¥267.7B¥258.8B¥296.1B¥292.0BTotal debtDebt
¥6.3B¥200M¥25.7B(¥131.8B)(¥43.5B)(¥51.5B)(¥138.0B)(¥67.9B)(¥95.5B)(¥133.8B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
54.8×65.7×84.7×84.9×66.0×20.3×37.7×22.5×30.5×36.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥644.1B¥711.5B¥798.1B¥685.5B¥759.8B¥988.9B¥1.04T¥1.20T¥936.7B¥995.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
722M722M722M722M722M722M722M722M722M692MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2595.56¥2634.28¥2826.97¥2873.20¥2448.89¥2665.09¥2749.64¥3222.64¥3590.76¥3738.39Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥130.98¥128.43¥156.83¥156.75¥136.91¥54.23¥107.65¥104.03¥201.46¥251.17EPS (diluted)EPS
¥199.46¥137.73¥36.77¥301.80¥6.60¥67.92¥283.45¥32.27¥72.17¥313.04Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥165.12¥58.31¥10.60¥263.55¥-45.22¥16.17¥182.77¥-38.80¥47.43¥184.00Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥21.89¥32.84¥27.87¥33.84¥31.85¥31.85¥36.82¥41.79¥93.53¥83.53Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥55.10¥99.74¥50.66¥65.79¥79.60¥80.43¥133.87¥108.65¥69.22¥181.60Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥892.68¥986.16¥1106.22¥950.05¥1053.09¥1370.62¥1435.71¥1656.59¥1298.22¥1438.23Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.1%/yr+8.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.1%/yr+116.3%/yr
EPS+7.5%/yr+12.9%/yr
Dividends / share+16.0%/yr+21.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.2%/yr+17.9%/yr
Book value / share+5.4%/yr+6.4%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥216.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥36.4B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥89.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥127.3B.

Reported net income¥173.8B
Owner earnings¥216.6B · 8% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥173.8B¥145.4B¥75.1B¥77.7B¥39.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥36.4B+¥32.1B+¥27.1B+¥23.9B+¥20.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥42.8B−¥93.3B−¥51.8B+¥126.8B+¥9.9B
Cash from operations¥252.9B¥84.2B¥50.4B¥228.5B¥69.7B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥36.4B−¥32.1B−¥27.1B−¥23.9B−¥20.7B
Owner earnings¥216.6B¥52.1B¥23.3B¥204.5B¥49.0B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥89.3B−¥17.9B−¥51.3B−¥72.6B−¥37.3B
Free cash flow¥127.3B¥34.2B(¥28.0B)¥131.9B¥11.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%2%1%10%3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥36.4B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥89.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥194.7B ÷ interest expense ¥5.3B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥416.0B + ST investments ¥9.8B − debt ¥292.0B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥133.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–22%; 18% latest = NOPAT ¥153.8B ÷ invested capital ¥870.9B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 18% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–11%; latest ¥216.6B = operating cash ¥252.9B − maintenance capex ¥36.4B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥89.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥127.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥252.9B ÷ net income ¥173.8B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥115.8B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥216.6B
    What this means

    Of ¥216.6B Owner Earnings, ¥115.8B (53%) went back to shareholders, ¥57.8B dividends, ¥58.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 3.46×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥125.6B ÷ depreciation ¥36.4B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 7% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    The recent-years average (5%) sits below the early years (7%), but the latest year (8%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 7% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2022 · 2.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.5%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥1.27T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥661.8B · 52%
  • Dividends¥312.0B · 25%
  • Buybacks¥71.5B · 6%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥220.0B · 17%
  • Returned to owners¥383.5B

    37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥312.0B as dividends and ¥71.5B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥71.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−4.1%

    The diluted count fell from 722M to 692M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥83.53/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥639.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥7.4B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Obayashi is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥200.5B → ¥292.0B

    Debt rose from ¥200.5B to ¥292.0B while owner earnings went from about ¥89.9B to ¥97.3B — about 2.2 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Obayashi has delivered.

Obayashi’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Obayashi earns about ¥100.6B on its 3.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.4% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+0%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥127.3B on 692M diluted shares; net cash ¥133.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥125.6B) runs well above depreciation (¥36.4B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥216.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1801 its page in the Manual 1803 →

Industry order: ← 1801 the Construction & Engineering chapter 1803 →