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1803 · Shimizu
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Shimizu’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1803) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.57T | ¥1.52T | ¥1.66T | ¥1.70T | ¥1.46T | ¥1.48T | ¥1.93T | ¥2.01T | ¥1.94T | ¥2.06T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 13% | 13% | — | — | — | 10% | 13% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 5% | 6% | — | — | — | 6% | 7% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 1% | 1% | — | — | — | 1% | 1% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥128.8B | ¥121.4B | ¥129.7B | ¥133.9B | ¥100.2B | ¥45.1B | ¥54.6B | (¥24.7B) | ¥71.0B | ¥118.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 8.2% | 8.0% | 7.8% | 7.9% | 6.9% | 3.0% | 2.8% | −1.2% | 3.7% | 5.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥98.9B | ¥85.0B | ¥99.7B | ¥99.0B | ¥77.2B | ¥47.8B | ¥49.1B | ¥17.2B | ¥66.0B | ¥126.6B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥143.7B | ¥82.9B | (¥14.9B) | ¥170.6B | ¥80.7B | ¥77.8B | ¥83.8B | (¥21.3B) | ¥159.1B | ¥41.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥11.7B | ¥12.4B | ¥13.3B | ¥13.6B | ¥16.7B | ¥20.2B | ¥25.8B | ¥30.3B | ¥33.5B | ¥33.5B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥33.1B | (¥14.5B) | (¥127.9B) | ¥57.9B | (¥13.2B) | ¥9.8B | ¥9.0B | (¥68.7B) | ¥59.6B | (¥118.5B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥30.9B | ¥30.6B | ¥58.7B | ¥123.9B | ¥122.9B | ¥109.8B | ¥68.6B | ¥57.7B | ¥34.1B | ¥98.7B | CapexCapex |
| 2.0% | 2.0% | 3.5% | 7.3% | 8.4% | 7.4% | 3.5% | 2.9% | 1.8% | 4.8% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥132.0B | ¥70.5B | (¥28.2B) | ¥156.9B | ¥64.0B | ¥57.6B | ¥58.0B | (¥51.5B) | ¥125.0B | ¥8.1B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 8.4% | 4.6% | −1.7% | 9.2% | 4.4% | 3.9% | 3.0% | −2.6% | 6.4% | 0.4% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥112.7B | ¥52.2B | (¥73.7B) | ¥46.7B | (¥42.2B) | (¥32.0B) | ¥15.3B | (¥79.0B) | ¥125.0B | (¥57.0B) | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.2% | 3.4% | −4.4% | 2.7% | −2.9% | −2.2% | 0.8% | −3.9% | 6.4% | −2.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥12.6B | ¥24.4B | ¥22.8B | ¥31.9B | ¥24.5B | ¥22.3B | ¥16.2B | ¥17.6B | ¥16.9B | ¥28.9B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥21M | ¥13M | ¥3M | ¥20.0B | ¥2M | ¥20.1B | ¥1M | ¥25.5B | ¥34.5B | ¥10.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 20% | 17% | 14% | 18% | 11% | 4% | 4% | -2% | 7% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| 17% | 13% | 14% | 16% | 12% | 5% | 5% | 2% | 10% | 16% | Return on equityROE |
| 15% | 9% | 10% | 11% | 8% | 3% | 4% | −0% | 7% | 12% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥315.8B | ¥341.2B | ¥230.0B | ¥353.7B | ¥338.3B | ¥287.1B | ¥386.8B | ¥339.2B | ¥582.1B | ¥472.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥1.06T | ¥1.10T | ¥1.15T | ¥1.15T | ¥1.01T | ¥1.15T | ¥1.45T | ¥1.47T | ¥1.52T | ¥1.61T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥790.9B | ¥814.3B | ¥837.9B | ¥871.6B | ¥714.9B | ¥848.2B | ¥1.09T | ¥1.19T | ¥1.21T | ¥1.24T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.3× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.3× | 1.2× | 1.3× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥1.69T | ¥1.78T | ¥1.86T | ¥1.90T | ¥1.91T | ¥2.13T | ¥2.45T | ¥2.54T | ¥2.52T | ¥2.65T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥252.1B | ¥254.0B | ¥232.9B | ¥335.9B | ¥327.9B | ¥394.0B | ¥493.9B | ¥521.8B | ¥533.9B | ¥542.0B | Total debtDebt |
| (¥63.7B) | (¥87.1B) | ¥3.0B | (¥17.8B) | (¥10.4B) | ¥106.8B | ¥107.1B | ¥182.5B | (¥48.3B) | ¥69.5B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 45.3× | 49.5× | 53.6× | 59.7× | 33.0× | 17.0× | 13.7× | -4.4× | 11.8× | 15.7× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥576.9B | ¥656.3B | ¥735.2B | ¥606.7B | ¥659.5B | ¥875.2B | ¥907.3B | ¥948.1B | ¥693.2B | ¥783.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 789M | 789M | 789M | 789M | 789M | 789M | 789M | 744M | 717M | 717M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1987.82 | ¥1926.96 | ¥2111.51 | ¥2153.79 | ¥1847.11 | ¥1880.70 | ¥2452.48 | ¥2696.76 | ¥2712.97 | ¥2871.26 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥125.48 | ¥107.77 | ¥126.40 | ¥125.52 | ¥97.88 | ¥60.57 | ¥62.21 | ¥23.08 | ¥92.11 | ¥176.67 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥167.41 | ¥89.38 | ¥-35.81 | ¥199.01 | ¥81.12 | ¥73.00 | ¥73.61 | ¥-69.26 | ¥174.44 | ¥11.34 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥142.96 | ¥66.25 | ¥-93.41 | ¥59.17 | ¥-53.54 | ¥-40.58 | ¥19.36 | ¥-106.16 | ¥174.44 | ¥-79.55 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥15.95 | ¥30.90 | ¥28.90 | ¥40.46 | ¥31.01 | ¥28.25 | ¥20.59 | ¥23.72 | ¥23.52 | ¥40.29 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥39.24 | ¥38.86 | ¥74.47 | ¥157.14 | ¥155.85 | ¥139.21 | ¥86.97 | ¥77.58 | ¥47.55 | ¥137.65 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥731.60 | ¥832.36 | ¥932.44 | ¥769.47 | ¥836.38 | ¥1109.90 | ¥1150.62 | ¥1274.83 | ¥967.27 | ¥1093.31 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.2%/yr | +9.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −25.9%/yr | −32.5%/yr |
| EPS | +3.9%/yr | +12.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +10.8%/yr | +5.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +15.0%/yr | −2.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +4.6%/yr | +5.5%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥8.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥33.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥65.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥57.0B).
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥126.6B | ¥66.0B | ¥17.2B | ¥49.1B | ¥47.8B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥33.5B | +¥33.5B | +¥30.3B | +¥25.8B | +¥20.2B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥118.5B | +¥59.6B | −¥68.7B | +¥9.0B | +¥9.8B |
| Cash from operations | ¥41.6B | ¥159.1B | (¥21.3B) | ¥83.8B | ¥77.8B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥33.5B | −¥34.1B | −¥30.3B | −¥25.8B | −¥20.2B |
| Owner earnings | ¥8.1B | ¥125.0B | (¥51.5B) | ¥58.0B | ¥57.6B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥65.1B | — | −¥27.4B | −¥42.8B | −¥89.6B |
| Free cash flow | (¥57.0B) | ¥125.0B | (¥79.0B) | ¥15.3B | (¥32.0B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 0% | 6% | -3% | 3% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥33.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥65.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 15.7×ComfortableOperating income ¥118.7B ÷ interest expense ¥7.6B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥69.5B · 0.6× operating profitModest net debtCash ¥354.5B + ST investments ¥118.0B − debt ¥542.0B
What this means
Netting ¥472.5B of cash and short-term investments against ¥542.0B of debt leaves ¥69.5B owed, about 0.6× a year's operating profit (4.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -2%–20%; 10% latest = NOPAT ¥93.7B ÷ invested capital ¥971.1BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -3%–9%; latest ¥8.1B = operating cash ¥41.6B − maintenance capex ¥33.5BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥65.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥57.0B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Thinly cash-backedCash from ops ¥41.6B ÷ net income ¥126.6B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks ¥38.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥8.1B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against ¥8.1B of Owner Earnings, ¥38.9B (478%) went back to shareholders, ¥28.9B dividends, ¥10.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.94×ExpandingCapex ¥98.7B ÷ depreciation ¥33.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 3% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −16%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
- Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −1.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.1%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥803.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥735.9B · 92%
- Dividends¥218.0B · 27%
- Buybacks¥110.2B · 14%
- Returned to owners¥328.1B
55% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥218.0B as dividends and ¥110.2B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥260.1B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥260.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥252.1B to ¥542.0B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥110.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−9.1%
The diluted count fell from 789M to 717M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥40.29/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−7%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥438.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥30.9B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Shimizu is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.4% vs 3.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.8% early in the record and 1.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥252.1B → ¥542.0B
Debt rose from ¥252.1B to ¥542.0B while owner earnings went from about ¥58.1B to ¥27.2B — about 4.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 20 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Shimizu has delivered.
Shimizu’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Shimizu earns about ¥85.1B on its 4.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow (¥57.0B) on 717M diluted shares; net debt ¥69.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥98.7B) runs well above depreciation (¥33.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥8.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 1802 its page in the Manual 1808 →
Industry order: ← 1802 the Construction & Engineering chapter 1812 →