Owner Scorecard


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1803 · Shimizu

General Bldg Contractors - Nonresidential Bldgs Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Shimizu’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 1803) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥1.57T¥1.52T¥1.66T¥1.70T¥1.46T¥1.48T¥1.93T¥2.01T¥1.94T¥2.06TRevenueRevenue
13%13%10%13%Gross marginGross mgn
5%6%6%7%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥128.8B¥121.4B¥129.7B¥133.9B¥100.2B¥45.1B¥54.6B(¥24.7B)¥71.0B¥118.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.2%8.0%7.8%7.9%6.9%3.0%2.8%−1.2%3.7%5.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥98.9B¥85.0B¥99.7B¥99.0B¥77.2B¥47.8B¥49.1B¥17.2B¥66.0B¥126.6BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥143.7B¥82.9B(¥14.9B)¥170.6B¥80.7B¥77.8B¥83.8B(¥21.3B)¥159.1B¥41.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥11.7B¥12.4B¥13.3B¥13.6B¥16.7B¥20.2B¥25.8B¥30.3B¥33.5B¥33.5BDepreciationDeprec.
¥33.1B(¥14.5B)(¥127.9B)¥57.9B(¥13.2B)¥9.8B¥9.0B(¥68.7B)¥59.6B(¥118.5B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥30.9B¥30.6B¥58.7B¥123.9B¥122.9B¥109.8B¥68.6B¥57.7B¥34.1B¥98.7BCapexCapex
2.0%2.0%3.5%7.3%8.4%7.4%3.5%2.9%1.8%4.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥132.0B¥70.5B(¥28.2B)¥156.9B¥64.0B¥57.6B¥58.0B(¥51.5B)¥125.0B¥8.1BOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.4%4.6%−1.7%9.2%4.4%3.9%3.0%−2.6%6.4%0.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥112.7B¥52.2B(¥73.7B)¥46.7B(¥42.2B)(¥32.0B)¥15.3B(¥79.0B)¥125.0B(¥57.0B)Free cash flowFCF
7.2%3.4%−4.4%2.7%−2.9%−2.2%0.8%−3.9%6.4%−2.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥12.6B¥24.4B¥22.8B¥31.9B¥24.5B¥22.3B¥16.2B¥17.6B¥16.9B¥28.9BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥21M¥13M¥3M¥20.0B¥2M¥20.1B¥1M¥25.5B¥34.5B¥10.0BBuybacksBuybacks
20%17%14%18%11%4%4%-2%7%10%ROICROIC
17%13%14%16%12%5%5%2%10%16%Return on equityROE
15%9%10%11%8%3%4%−0%7%12%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥315.8B¥341.2B¥230.0B¥353.7B¥338.3B¥287.1B¥386.8B¥339.2B¥582.1B¥472.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥1.06T¥1.10T¥1.15T¥1.15T¥1.01T¥1.15T¥1.45T¥1.47T¥1.52T¥1.61TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥790.9B¥814.3B¥837.9B¥871.6B¥714.9B¥848.2B¥1.09T¥1.19T¥1.21T¥1.24TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.3×1.4×1.4×1.3×1.4×1.4×1.3×1.2×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥1.69T¥1.78T¥1.86T¥1.90T¥1.91T¥2.13T¥2.45T¥2.54T¥2.52T¥2.65TTotal assetsAssets
¥252.1B¥254.0B¥232.9B¥335.9B¥327.9B¥394.0B¥493.9B¥521.8B¥533.9B¥542.0BTotal debtDebt
(¥63.7B)(¥87.1B)¥3.0B(¥17.8B)(¥10.4B)¥106.8B¥107.1B¥182.5B(¥48.3B)¥69.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
45.3×49.5×53.6×59.7×33.0×17.0×13.7×-4.4×11.8×15.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥576.9B¥656.3B¥735.2B¥606.7B¥659.5B¥875.2B¥907.3B¥948.1B¥693.2B¥783.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
789M789M789M789M789M789M789M744M717M717MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥1987.82¥1926.96¥2111.51¥2153.79¥1847.11¥1880.70¥2452.48¥2696.76¥2712.97¥2871.26Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥125.48¥107.77¥126.40¥125.52¥97.88¥60.57¥62.21¥23.08¥92.11¥176.67EPS (diluted)EPS
¥167.41¥89.38¥-35.81¥199.01¥81.12¥73.00¥73.61¥-69.26¥174.44¥11.34Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥142.96¥66.25¥-93.41¥59.17¥-53.54¥-40.58¥19.36¥-106.16¥174.44¥-79.55Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥15.95¥30.90¥28.90¥40.46¥31.01¥28.25¥20.59¥23.72¥23.52¥40.29Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥39.24¥38.86¥74.47¥157.14¥155.85¥139.21¥86.97¥77.58¥47.55¥137.65Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥731.60¥832.36¥932.44¥769.47¥836.38¥1109.90¥1150.62¥1274.83¥967.27¥1093.31Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.2%/yr+9.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−25.9%/yr−32.5%/yr
EPS+3.9%/yr+12.5%/yr
Dividends / share+10.8%/yr+5.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+15.0%/yr−2.5%/yr
Book value / share+4.6%/yr+5.5%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥8.1B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥33.5B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥65.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥57.0B).

Reported net income¥126.6B
Owner earnings¥8.1B · 0% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥126.6B¥66.0B¥17.2B¥49.1B¥47.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥33.5B+¥33.5B+¥30.3B+¥25.8B+¥20.2B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥118.5B+¥59.6B−¥68.7B+¥9.0B+¥9.8B
Cash from operations¥41.6B¥159.1B(¥21.3B)¥83.8B¥77.8B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥33.5B−¥34.1B−¥30.3B−¥25.8B−¥20.2B
Owner earnings¥8.1B¥125.0B(¥51.5B)¥58.0B¥57.6B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥65.1B−¥27.4B−¥42.8B−¥89.6B
Free cash flow(¥57.0B)¥125.0B(¥79.0B)¥15.3B(¥32.0B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue0%6%-3%3%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥33.5B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥65.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Much of fiscal 2026's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥118.7B ÷ interest expense ¥7.6B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥69.5B · 0.6× operating profit
    Modest net debt
    Cash ¥354.5B + ST investments ¥118.0B − debt ¥542.0B
    What this means

    Netting ¥472.5B of cash and short-term investments against ¥542.0B of debt leaves ¥69.5B owed, about 0.6× a year's operating profit (4.6× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -2%–20%; 10% latest = NOPAT ¥93.7B ÷ invested capital ¥971.1B
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -3%–9%; latest ¥8.1B = operating cash ¥41.6B − maintenance capex ¥33.5B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 0% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥65.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥57.0B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Thinly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥41.6B ÷ net income ¥126.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks ¥38.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥8.1B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against ¥8.1B of Owner Earnings, ¥38.9B (478%) went back to shareholders, ¥28.9B dividends, ¥10.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.94×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥98.7B ÷ depreciation ¥33.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 3% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 8% early to 3% lately, median 6% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −16%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · −1.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥803.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥735.9B · 92%
  • Dividends¥218.0B · 27%
  • Buybacks¥110.2B · 14%
  • Returned to owners¥328.1B

    55% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥218.0B as dividends and ¥110.2B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥260.1B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥260.1B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥252.1B to ¥542.0B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥110.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−9.1%

    The diluted count fell from 789M to 717M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥40.29/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥438.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥30.9B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Shimizu is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?1.4% vs 3.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.8% early in the record and 1.4% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥252.1B → ¥542.0B

    Debt rose from ¥252.1B to ¥542.0B while owner earnings went from about ¥58.1B to ¥27.2B — about 4.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 20 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Shimizu has delivered.

Shimizu’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Shimizu earns about ¥85.1B on its 4.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow (¥57.0B) on 717M diluted shares; net debt ¥69.5B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥98.7B) runs well above depreciation (¥33.5B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥8.1B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 1802 its page in the Manual 1808 →

Industry order: ← 1802 the Construction & Engineering chapter 1812 →