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2502 · Asahi Group Holdings
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Asahi Group Holdings’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 2502) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2015–2024
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2015’15 | 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.69T | ¥1.71T | ¥2.08T | ¥2.12T | ¥2.09T | ¥2.03T | ¥2.24T | ¥2.51T | ¥2.77T | ¥2.94T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 39% | 38% | — | — | — | 36% | 37% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 28% | 28% | — | — | — | 27% | 28% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥40.9B | ¥26.5B | ¥104.7B | ¥211.8B | ¥201.4B | ¥135.2B | ¥211.9B | ¥217.0B | ¥245.0B | ¥269.1B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 2.4% | 1.6% | 5.0% | 10.0% | 9.6% | 6.7% | 9.5% | 8.6% | 8.8% | 9.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥75.8B | ¥89.2B | ¥141.0B | ¥151.1B | ¥142.2B | ¥92.8B | ¥153.5B | ¥151.6B | ¥164.1B | ¥192.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥116.5B | ¥154.5B | ¥231.7B | ¥252.4B | ¥253.5B | ¥275.9B | ¥337.8B | ¥266.0B | ¥347.5B | ¥403.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | — | — | ¥109.2B | ¥113.0B | ¥123.3B | ¥134.8B | ¥140.4B | ¥148.0B | ¥157.9B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥40.7B | ¥65.2B | ¥90.7B | (¥7.8B) | (¥1.8B) | ¥59.8B | ¥49.5B | (¥26.0B) | ¥35.5B | ¥53.7B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | ¥78.9B | ¥74.3B | ¥80.8B | ¥80.8B | ¥83.0B | ¥89.6B | ¥108.3B | CapexCapex |
| — | — | — | 3.7% | 3.6% | 4.0% | 3.6% | 3.3% | 3.2% | 3.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | — | ¥173.6B | ¥179.2B | ¥195.1B | ¥257.0B | ¥182.9B | ¥258.0B | ¥295.4B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | — | 8.2% | 8.6% | 9.6% | 11.5% | 7.3% | 9.3% | 10.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | — | ¥173.6B | ¥179.2B | ¥195.1B | ¥257.0B | ¥182.9B | ¥258.0B | ¥295.4B | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | — | 8.2% | 8.6% | 9.6% | 11.5% | 7.3% | 9.3% | 10.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥21.6B | ¥23.8B | ¥26.6B | ¥41.2B | ¥48.6B | ¥46.3B | ¥54.2B | ¥55.7B | ¥57.8B | ¥66.4B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥20.0B | ¥21M | ¥38M | ¥250M | ¥31M | ¥309M | ¥26M | ¥263M | ¥25M | ¥30.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 3% | 2% | 3% | 8% | 7% | 3% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 10% | 11% | 12% | 13% | 11% | 6% | 9% | 7% | 7% | 7% | Return on equityROE |
| 7% | 8% | 10% | 10% | 8% | 3% | 6% | 5% | 4% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥22.8B | ¥20.6B | ¥58.1B | ¥57.3B | ¥48.5B | ¥48.5B | ¥52.7B | ¥37.4B | ¥59.9B | ¥84.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| — | — | — | ¥427.3B | ¥407.6B | ¥378.9B | ¥396.0B | ¥415.7B | ¥465.6B | ¥440.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | — | — | ¥416.8B | ¥423.8B | ¥477.1B | ¥531.6B | ¥591.9B | ¥714.8B | ¥720.9B | Accounts payablePayables |
| — | — | — | ¥10.4B | (¥16.2B) | (¥98.2B) | (¥135.6B) | (¥176.2B) | (¥249.1B) | (¥280.5B) | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥326.7B | ¥251.6B | ¥254.0B | ¥714.6B | ¥735.1B | ¥689.1B | ¥700.2B | ¥737.5B | ¥847.0B | ¥857.9B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥248.5B | ¥306.2B | ¥489.3B | ¥371.3B | ¥455.1B | ¥1.07T | ¥637.9B | ¥512.7B | ¥624.1B | ¥812.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 0.8× | 0.5× | 1.9× | 1.6× | 0.6× | 1.1× | 1.4× | 1.4× | 1.1× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | ¥705.1B | ¥702.9B | ¥1.72T | ¥1.82T | ¥1.97T | ¥2.15T | ¥2.20T | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥1.80T | ¥2.09T | ¥3.35T | ¥3.08T | ¥3.14T | ¥4.44T | ¥4.55T | ¥4.83T | ¥5.29T | ¥5.40T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥371.8B | ¥530.4B | ¥1.29T | ¥1.03T | ¥943.2B | ¥1.82T | ¥1.60T | ¥1.50T | ¥1.41T | ¥1.28T | Total debtDebt |
| ¥349.0B | ¥509.8B | ¥1.23T | ¥970.1B | ¥894.7B | ¥1.78T | ¥1.54T | ¥1.46T | ¥1.35T | ¥1.20T | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 30.4× | 19.8× | 29.7× | 31.4× | 27.3× | 12.1× | 16.7× | 17.6× | 17.2× | 14.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥789.4B | ¥836.4B | ¥1.15T | ¥1.15T | ¥1.25T | ¥1.52T | ¥1.76T | ¥2.06T | ¥2.46T | ¥2.67T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.45B | 1.45B | 1.45B | 1.45B | 1.45B | 1.52B | 1.52B | 1.52B | 1.52B | 1.52B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1164.58 | ¥1176.56 | ¥1437.10 | ¥1461.51 | ¥1439.97 | ¥1333.17 | ¥1470.13 | ¥1650.95 | ¥1820.56 | ¥1932.55 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥52.23 | ¥61.50 | ¥97.19 | ¥104.14 | ¥98.02 | ¥61.03 | ¥100.92 | ¥99.64 | ¥107.87 | ¥126.28 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | — | ¥119.63 | ¥123.49 | ¥128.26 | ¥168.97 | ¥120.28 | ¥169.60 | ¥194.21 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | — | ¥119.63 | ¥123.49 | ¥128.26 | ¥168.97 | ¥120.28 | ¥169.60 | ¥194.21 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥14.91 | ¥16.42 | ¥18.32 | ¥28.42 | ¥33.47 | ¥30.42 | ¥35.65 | ¥36.65 | ¥37.98 | ¥43.64 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | — | ¥54.38 | ¥51.22 | ¥53.11 | ¥53.12 | ¥54.60 | ¥58.90 | ¥71.22 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥544.14 | ¥576.50 | ¥789.34 | ¥790.22 | ¥859.08 | ¥996.79 | ¥1155.22 | ¥1354.85 | ¥1617.71 | ¥1754.62 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.8%/yr | +6.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +8.4%/yr (6-yr) | +9.5%/yr |
| EPS | +10.3%/yr | +5.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +12.7%/yr | +5.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +4.6%/yr (6-yr) | +6.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +13.9%/yr | +15.4%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2024 the business turned ¥192.1B of profit into ¥295.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2020 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥192.1B | ¥164.1B | ¥151.6B | ¥153.5B | ¥92.8B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥157.9B | +¥148.0B | +¥140.4B | +¥134.8B | +¥123.3B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥53.7B | +¥35.5B | −¥26.0B | +¥49.5B | +¥59.8B |
| Cash from operations | ¥403.7B | ¥347.5B | ¥266.0B | ¥337.8B | ¥275.9B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥108.3B | −¥89.6B | −¥83.0B | −¥80.8B | −¥80.8B |
| Owner earnings | ¥295.4B | ¥258.0B | ¥182.9B | ¥257.0B | ¥195.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 10% | 9% | 7% | 11% | 10% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 14.6×ComfortableOperating income ¥269.1B ÷ interest expense ¥18.4B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥1.20T · 4.4× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥84.0B − debt ¥1.28T
What this means
Netting ¥84.0B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.28T of debt leaves ¥1.20T owed, about 4.4× a year's operating profit (4.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–8%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥212.6B ÷ invested capital ¥3.86TIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle7-yr median margin, range 7%–11%; latest ¥295.4B = operating cash ¥403.7B − maintenance capex ¥108.3BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 7 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥403.7B ÷ net income ¥192.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks ¥96.4B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥295.4B
What this means
Of ¥295.4B Owner Earnings, ¥96.4B (33%) went back to shareholders, ¥66.4B dividends, ¥30.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.69×HarvestingCapex ¥108.3B ÷ depreciation ¥157.9B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2015–2024
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → 9% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 9% lately, median 9% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 7%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +8%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 8% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2016 · 1.6% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2018–2024
Over the record, the business generated ¥2.14T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested¥595.7B · 28%
- Dividends¥370.1B · 17%
- Buybacks¥30.9B · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥1.14T · 53%
- Returned to owners¥401.1B
26% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥370.1B as dividends and ¥30.9B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥30.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count4.8%
The diluted count rose from 1451M to 1521M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record¥43.64/sh
Paid in 7 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥646.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥62.8B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Asahi Group Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2015–2024.
2 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.8%
Diluted shares grew 4.8% over 2018–2024, even as the company spent ¥30.9B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥371.8B → ¥1.28T
Debt rose from ¥371.8B to ¥1.28T while owner earnings went from about ¥182.6B to ¥245.4B — about 2.0 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 5.2 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Asahi Group Holdings has delivered.
Through the cycle, Asahi Group Holdings earns about ¥273.8B on its 9.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ¥295.4B on 1521M diluted shares; net debt ¥1.20T. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
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