Owner Scorecard


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2503 · Kirin Holdings

Beverages Consumer & brand IFRS
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Kirin Holdings’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 2503) →

Where the money comes from

on EDINET →

The biggest segment, Alcoholic Beverages, is also where the profit is made: 44% of revenue and 43% of segment operating profit.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit same segments
  • Alcoholic Beverages44%¥1.08T43% of profit
  • Non Alcoholic Beverages24%¥581.5B21% of profit
  • Pharmaceuticals20%¥496.8B32% of profit
  • Health Science11%¥256.1B4% of profit

From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥1.85T¥1.86T¥1.93T¥1.94T¥1.85T¥1.82T¥1.99T¥2.13T¥2.34T¥2.43TRevenueRevenue
44%43%46%48%Gross marginGross mgn
34%35%37%37%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
0%0%0%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥69.2B¥69.6B¥198.3B¥87.7B¥102.9B¥68.1B¥116.0B¥150.3B¥125.3B¥209.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.7%3.7%10.3%4.5%5.6%3.7%5.8%7.0%5.4%8.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥148.9B¥242.0B¥164.2B¥59.6B¥71.9B¥59.8B¥111.0B¥112.7B¥58.2B¥147.5BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥232.3B¥221.7B¥198.1B¥178.8B¥164.8B¥219.3B¥135.6B¥203.2B¥242.8B¥295.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥67.9B¥80.7B¥82.1B¥81.1B¥85.9B¥87.2B¥95.7B¥101.8BDepreciationDeprec.
¥83.3B(¥20.3B)(¥34.1B)¥38.4B¥10.8B¥78.4B(¥61.4B)¥3.3B¥88.9B¥46.0BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥87.9B¥96.4B¥93.0B¥86.3B¥98.5B¥113.8B¥180.6B¥175.6BCapexCapex
4.6%5.0%5.0%4.7%5.0%5.3%7.7%7.2%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥130.1B¥82.4B¥71.8B¥133.0B¥37.1B¥116.0B¥147.1B¥193.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.7%4.2%3.9%7.3%1.9%5.4%6.3%8.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥110.2B¥82.4B¥71.8B¥133.0B¥37.1B¥89.4B¥62.3B¥119.8BFree cash flowFCF
5.7%4.2%3.9%7.3%1.9%4.2%2.7%4.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥17.3B¥18.3B¥44.8B¥51.4B¥55.3B¥54.2B¥53.8B¥57.5B¥58.3B¥58.7BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥24M¥56M¥100.1B¥23.3B¥76.8B¥34M¥50.0B¥25M¥82M¥19MBuybacksBuybacks
4%3%14%5%6%4%6%7%5%8%ROICROIC
21%26%18%7%9%7%11%10%5%11%Return on equityROE
19%24%13%1%2%1%6%5%−0%7%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥8.7B¥79.5B¥173.1B¥165.7B¥161.7B¥149.5B¥88.1B¥131.4B¥118.6B¥125.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥404.9B¥395.7B¥372.1B¥387.9B¥409.2B¥444.9B¥502.9B¥535.7BReceivablesReceiv.
¥227.1B¥231.1B¥220.3B¥229.6B¥265.2B¥306.7B¥364.3B¥381.5BAccounts payablePayables
¥177.8B¥164.6B¥151.9B¥158.4B¥144.0B¥138.3B¥138.6B¥154.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥178.7B¥244.7B¥831.8B¥812.1B¥866.5B¥826.6B¥887.0B¥957.8B¥1.04T¥1.07TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥369.0B¥405.3B¥400.8B¥586.6B¥557.0B¥512.8B¥533.8B¥561.8B¥479.4B¥546.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.5×0.6×2.1×1.4×1.6×1.6×1.7×1.7×2.2×2.0×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥244.2B¥233.9B¥245.7B¥264.2B¥289.5B¥390.6B¥501.5B¥533.3BGoodwillGoodwill
¥2.42T¥2.40T¥2.30T¥2.41T¥2.46T¥2.47T¥2.54T¥2.87T¥3.35T¥3.49TTotal assetsAssets
¥849.0B¥755.3B¥415.0B¥530.9B¥642.6B¥551.5B¥523.1B¥656.4B¥857.6B¥923.4BTotal debtDebt
¥840.3B¥675.7B¥241.9B¥365.2B¥481.0B¥402.0B¥435.1B¥525.0B¥739.0B¥798.1BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
10.5×13.2×34.8×13.1×21.0×15.3×23.7×25.3×18.1×19.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥695.9B¥947.2B¥906.6B¥906.6B¥838.6B¥894.2B¥980.0B¥1.13T¥1.18T¥1.29TShareholders’ equityEquity
¥64.0B¥29.6B¥13.4B¥6.2BGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
914M914M914M914M914M914M914M914M914M914MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2028.38¥2039.09¥2112.17¥2123.97¥2023.57¥1992.96¥2176.66¥2335.22¥2558.41¥2662.32Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥162.93¥264.76¥179.65¥65.25¥78.70¥65.42¥121.45¥123.30¥63.69¥161.42EPS (diluted)EPS
¥142.35¥90.18¥78.57¥145.48¥40.57¥126.89¥160.99¥211.79Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥120.53¥90.18¥78.57¥145.48¥40.57¥97.81¥68.12¥131.11Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥18.97¥19.97¥49.04¥56.20¥60.53¥59.28¥58.84¥62.91¥63.80¥64.26Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥96.15¥105.47¥101.78¥94.46¥107.75¥124.52¥197.58¥192.11Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥761.33¥1036.28¥991.88¥991.88¥917.49¥978.31¥1072.23¥1239.15¥1292.70¥1408.09Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+3.1%/yr+5.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.8%/yr (7-yr)+21.9%/yr
EPS−0.1%/yr+15.5%/yr
Dividends / share+14.5%/yr+1.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+10.4%/yr (7-yr)+13.5%/yr
Book value / share+7.1%/yr+8.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥193.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥101.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥73.7B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥119.8B.

Reported net income¥147.5B
Owner earnings¥193.6B · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income¥147.5B¥58.2B¥112.7B¥111.0B¥59.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥101.8B+¥95.7B+¥87.2B+¥85.9B+¥81.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥46.0B+¥88.9B+¥3.3B−¥61.4B+¥78.4B
Cash from operations¥295.4B¥242.8B¥203.2B¥135.6B¥219.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥101.8B−¥95.7B−¥87.2B−¥98.5B−¥86.3B
Owner earnings¥193.6B¥147.1B¥116.0B¥37.1B¥133.0B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥73.7B−¥84.9B−¥26.6B
Free cash flow¥119.8B¥62.3B¥89.4B¥37.1B¥133.0B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%6%5%2%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥101.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥73.7B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥209.7B ÷ interest expense ¥11.0B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥798.1B · 3.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash ¥125.3B − debt ¥923.4B
    What this means

    Netting ¥125.3B of cash and short-term investments against ¥923.4B of debt leaves ¥798.1B owed, about 3.8× a year's operating profit (4.4× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 80 + DIO 0 − DPO 109 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–14%; 8% latest = NOPAT ¥165.6B ÷ invested capital ¥2.09T
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    8-yr median margin, range 2%–8%; latest ¥193.6B = operating cash ¥295.4B − maintenance capex ¥101.8B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 8 years. It chose to put ¥73.7B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥119.8B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥295.4B ÷ net income ¥147.5B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥58.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥193.6B
    What this means

    Of ¥193.6B Owner Earnings, ¥58.7B (30%) went back to shareholders, ¥58.7B dividends, ¥19M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.72×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥175.6B ÷ depreciation ¥101.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 7% lately, median 5% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 9%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +7%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 7% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2016 · 3.7% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.0%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥1.64T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥932.1B · 57%
  • Dividends¥434.0B · 26%
  • Buybacks¥250.3B · 15%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥21.6B · 1%
  • Returned to owners¥684.4B

    75% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥434.0B as dividends and ¥250.3B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥508.4B and cash and short-term investments fell ¥47.8B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥250.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (914M to 914M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥64.26/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 4% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained57%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥100.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥57.5B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.57 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Kirin Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kirin Holdings has delivered.

Kirin Holdings’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Kirin Holdings earns about ¥142.7B on its 5.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 8.0% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+19%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25−1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥119.8B on 914M diluted shares; net debt ¥798.1B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥175.6B) runs well above depreciation (¥101.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥193.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 2502 its page in the Manual 2768 →

Industry order: ← 2502 the Brewers, Distillers & Wineries chapter AGCC →