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2871 · Nichirei
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Nichirei’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 2871) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥539.7B | ¥568.0B | ¥580.1B | ¥584.9B | ¥572.8B | ¥602.7B | ¥662.2B | ¥680.1B | ¥702.1B | ¥716.1B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 17% | 17% | — | — | — | 18% | 18% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 12% | 11% | — | — | — | 13% | 13% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | 0% | 0% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥29.3B | ¥29.9B | ¥29.5B | ¥31.0B | ¥32.9B | ¥31.4B | ¥32.9B | ¥36.9B | ¥38.3B | ¥39.0B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 5.4% | 5.3% | 5.1% | 5.3% | 5.8% | 5.2% | 5.0% | 5.4% | 5.5% | 5.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥18.8B | ¥19.1B | ¥19.9B | ¥19.6B | ¥21.2B | ¥23.4B | ¥21.6B | ¥24.5B | ¥24.7B | ¥27.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥40.8B | ¥29.9B | ¥31.3B | ¥39.4B | ¥45.5B | ¥34.7B | ¥37.9B | ¥62.4B | ¥53.2B | ¥48.7B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥16.1B | ¥16.2B | ¥17.5B | ¥18.4B | ¥19.7B | ¥21.1B | ¥22.2B | ¥24.2B | ¥24.3B | ¥22.1B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥6.0B | (¥5.4B) | (¥6.1B) | ¥1.5B | ¥4.6B | (¥9.8B) | (¥5.9B) | ¥13.7B | ¥4.2B | (¥673M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥9.0B | ¥16.0B | ¥20.1B | ¥20.4B | ¥28.5B | ¥21.3B | ¥23.8B | ¥26.7B | ¥28.3B | ¥30.2B | CapexCapex |
| 1.7% | 2.8% | 3.5% | 3.5% | 5.0% | 3.5% | 3.6% | 3.9% | 4.0% | 4.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥31.9B | ¥13.9B | ¥11.2B | ¥19.1B | ¥25.8B | ¥13.4B | ¥14.0B | ¥35.7B | ¥24.9B | ¥26.7B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 5.9% | 2.4% | 1.9% | 3.3% | 4.5% | 2.2% | 2.1% | 5.3% | 3.5% | 3.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥31.9B | ¥13.9B | ¥11.2B | ¥19.1B | ¥16.9B | ¥13.4B | ¥14.0B | ¥35.7B | ¥24.9B | ¥18.5B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 5.9% | 2.4% | 1.9% | 3.3% | 3.0% | 2.2% | 2.1% | 5.3% | 3.5% | 2.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥3.4B | ¥4.2B | ¥4.1B | ¥4.9B | ¥5.7B | ¥7.1B | ¥6.6B | ¥8.0B | ¥9.9B | ¥12.1B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥9.1B | ¥14.0B | ¥10M | ¥18M | ¥7M | ¥10.0B | ¥5.0B | ¥10M | ¥10.0B | ¥3M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 10% | 9% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 8% | 8% | 9% | 10% | 10% | ROICROIC |
| 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 11% | 9% | 9% | 11% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 9% | 9% | 8% | 8% | 7% | 6% | 6% | 6% | 6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥20.5B | ¥17.1B | ¥20.7B | ¥25.4B | ¥28.0B | ¥23.3B | ¥27.8B | ¥29.7B | ¥35.9B | ¥51.5B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥76.5B | ¥85.1B | ¥87.2B | ¥82.3B | ¥81.7B | ¥91.0B | ¥101.3B | ¥105.8B | ¥101.4B | ¥107.8B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥35.7B | ¥37.1B | ¥37.5B | ¥39.2B | ¥38.5B | ¥41.1B | ¥42.7B | ¥37.8B | ¥39.6B | ¥39.5B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥112.2B | ¥122.2B | ¥124.8B | ¥121.5B | ¥120.2B | ¥132.0B | ¥144.0B | ¥143.6B | ¥141.1B | ¥147.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥146.3B | ¥153.6B | ¥160.6B | ¥170.3B | ¥169.6B | ¥180.3B | ¥196.7B | ¥201.4B | ¥204.9B | ¥230.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥88.8B | ¥110.5B | ¥99.6B | ¥108.4B | ¥108.5B | ¥120.8B | ¥130.1B | ¥123.5B | ¥129.1B | ¥149.3B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.6× | 1.4× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.5× | 1.5× | 1.6× | 1.6× | 1.5× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥2.4B | ¥2.3B | ¥3.3B | ¥2.8B | ¥1.5B | ¥6.7B | ¥6.7B | ¥6.9B | ¥7.4B | ¥10.6B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥346.2B | ¥367.3B | ¥377.3B | ¥390.0B | ¥405.7B | ¥427.6B | ¥457.3B | ¥485.2B | ¥499.2B | ¥557.2B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥89.8B | ¥97.7B | ¥96.0B | ¥96.3B | ¥96.4B | ¥104.7B | ¥114.6B | ¥98.0B | ¥106.3B | ¥124.8B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥69.3B | ¥80.7B | ¥75.3B | ¥70.9B | ¥68.4B | ¥81.4B | ¥86.8B | ¥68.2B | ¥70.3B | ¥73.2B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 30.7× | 33.3× | 33.9× | 39.2× | 46.5× | 50.7× | 41.8× | 41.7× | 33.3× | 28.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥164.7B | ¥169.7B | ¥183.8B | ¥175.4B | ¥191.0B | ¥217.9B | ¥233.5B | ¥265.9B | ¥227.9B | ¥243.1B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 296M | 280M | 280M | 280M | 280M | 268M | 268M | 268M | 257M | 257M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1824.08 | ¥2029.77 | ¥2073.03 | ¥2089.29 | ¥2045.50 | ¥2248.73 | ¥2470.13 | ¥2536.22 | ¥2732.58 | ¥2786.72 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥63.38 | ¥68.24 | ¥71.26 | ¥70.05 | ¥75.76 | ¥87.24 | ¥80.45 | ¥91.35 | ¥96.26 | ¥106.36 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥107.71 | ¥49.55 | ¥40.20 | ¥68.13 | ¥92.08 | ¥49.89 | ¥52.35 | ¥133.19 | ¥96.78 | ¥103.74 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥107.71 | ¥49.55 | ¥40.20 | ¥68.13 | ¥60.44 | ¥49.89 | ¥52.35 | ¥133.19 | ¥96.78 | ¥72.18 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥11.33 | ¥14.98 | ¥14.74 | ¥17.59 | ¥20.44 | ¥26.32 | ¥24.60 | ¥29.96 | ¥38.72 | ¥47.22 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥30.30 | ¥57.15 | ¥71.69 | ¥72.76 | ¥101.89 | ¥79.43 | ¥88.89 | ¥99.67 | ¥110.26 | ¥117.51 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥556.86 | ¥606.32 | ¥656.80 | ¥626.66 | ¥682.13 | ¥813.02 | ¥871.04 | ¥991.76 | ¥886.83 | ¥946.09 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2026 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.8%/yr | +6.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −0.4%/yr | +2.4%/yr |
| EPS | +5.9%/yr | +7.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +17.2%/yr | +18.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +16.3%/yr | +2.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.1%/yr | +6.8%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥26.7B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥22.1B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥8.1B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥18.5B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥27.3B | ¥24.7B | ¥24.5B | ¥21.6B | ¥23.4B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥22.1B | +¥24.3B | +¥24.2B | +¥22.2B | +¥21.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥673M | +¥4.2B | +¥13.7B | −¥5.9B | −¥9.8B |
| Cash from operations | ¥48.7B | ¥53.2B | ¥62.4B | ¥37.9B | ¥34.7B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥22.1B | −¥28.3B | −¥26.7B | −¥23.8B | −¥21.3B |
| Owner earnings | ¥26.7B | ¥24.9B | ¥35.7B | ¥14.0B | ¥13.4B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥8.1B | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥18.5B | ¥24.9B | ¥35.7B | ¥14.0B | ¥13.4B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 4% | 4% | 5% | 2% | 2% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥22.1B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥8.1B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 28.4×ComfortableOperating income ¥39.0B ÷ interest expense ¥1.4B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥73.2B · 1.9× operating profitModest net debtCash ¥51.5B − debt ¥124.8B
What this means
Netting ¥51.5B of cash and short-term investments against ¥124.8B of debt leaves ¥73.2B owed, about 1.9× a year's operating profit (3.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 8%–10%; 10% latest = NOPAT ¥30.8B ÷ invested capital ¥316.3BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 10% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 2%–6%; latest ¥26.7B = operating cash ¥48.7B − maintenance capex ¥22.1BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥8.1B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥18.5B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥48.7B ÷ net income ¥27.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥12.1B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥26.7B
What this means
Of ¥26.7B Owner Earnings, ¥12.1B (46%) went back to shareholders, ¥12.1B dividends, ¥3M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.37×ExpandingCapex ¥30.2B ÷ depreciation ¥22.1B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 5% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 5% early, 5% lately, median 5%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +1%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2023 · 5.0% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +6.3%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥423.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥224.3B · 53%
- Dividends¥66.1B · 16%
- Buybacks¥48.2B · 11%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥85.2B · 20%
- Returned to owners¥114.3B
53% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥66.1B as dividends and ¥48.2B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥48.2B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−13.1%
The diluted count fell from 296M to 257M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥47.22/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 17% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥105.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥10.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Nichirei is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nichirei has delivered.
Through the cycle, Nichirei earns about ¥24.4B on its 3.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥18.5B on 257M diluted shares; net debt ¥73.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥30.2B) runs well above depreciation (¥22.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥26.7B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 2802 its page in the Manual 2914 →
Industry order: ← 2802 the Food Products chapter AFRI →