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4151 · Kyowa Kirin
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Kyowa Kirin’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 4151) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥348.0B | ¥353.4B | ¥271.5B | ¥305.8B | ¥318.4B | ¥352.2B | ¥398.4B | ¥442.2B | ¥495.6B | ¥496.8B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 74% | 75% | — | — | — | 73% | 74% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 38% | 40% | — | — | — | 34% | 33% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 18% | 20% | — | — | — | 25% | 18% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥31.7B | ¥38.6B | ¥42.2B | ¥50.0B | ¥48.7B | ¥24.8B | ¥40.6B | ¥53.4B | (¥4.6B) | ¥60.0B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 9.1% | 10.9% | 15.6% | 16.4% | 15.3% | 7.0% | 10.2% | 12.1% | −0.9% | 12.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥30.4B | ¥42.9B | ¥54.4B | ¥67.1B | ¥47.0B | ¥52.3B | ¥53.6B | ¥81.2B | ¥59.9B | ¥67.0B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥66.9B | ¥64.9B | ¥56.2B | ¥53.7B | ¥39.5B | ¥86.5B | ¥48.7B | ¥115.6B | ¥67.9B | ¥96.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | — | ¥16.2B | ¥18.8B | ¥20.5B | ¥19.5B | ¥18.5B | ¥21.1B | ¥24.8B | ¥26.1B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥36.4B | ¥22.0B | (¥14.5B) | (¥32.2B) | (¥28.0B) | ¥14.7B | (¥23.4B) | ¥13.3B | (¥16.8B) | ¥3.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | ¥4.2B | ¥7.0B | ¥10.1B | ¥6.5B | ¥15.6B | ¥17.2B | ¥26.0B | ¥37.7B | CapexCapex |
| — | — | 1.6% | 2.3% | 3.2% | 1.9% | 3.9% | 3.9% | 5.3% | 7.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | ¥52.0B | ¥46.6B | ¥29.4B | ¥80.0B | ¥33.1B | ¥98.3B | ¥41.8B | ¥70.5B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | 19.1% | 15.2% | 9.2% | 22.7% | 8.3% | 22.2% | 8.4% | 14.2% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | ¥52.0B | ¥46.6B | ¥29.4B | ¥80.0B | ¥33.1B | ¥98.3B | ¥41.8B | ¥58.9B | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | 19.1% | 15.2% | 9.2% | 22.7% | 8.3% | 22.2% | 8.4% | 11.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥13.7B | ¥13.7B | ¥16.1B | ¥21.7B | ¥23.6B | ¥24.2B | ¥25.3B | ¥29.0B | ¥30.9B | ¥30.9B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥9M | ¥16M | ¥14M | ¥22.6B | ¥14M | ¥23M | ¥11M | ¥10M | ¥40.0B | ¥9M | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | 7% | 8% | 10% | 7% | 7% | 7% | 10% | 7% | 8% | Return on equityROE |
| 3% | 5% | 6% | 7% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 6% | 3% | 4% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥6.7B | ¥7.2B | ¥15.9B | ¥20.8B | ¥287.0B | ¥335.1B | ¥339.2B | ¥403.1B | ¥244.7B | ¥218.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥71.0B | ¥71.3B | ¥104.4B | ¥89.0B | ¥92.3B | ¥104.3B | ¥111.7B | ¥119.1B | ¥157.0B | ¥181.2B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥21.1B | ¥18.9B | ¥19.7B | ¥22.1B | ¥23.1B | ¥30.3B | ¥33.7B | ¥39.0B | ¥46.3B | ¥36.6B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | ¥49.4B | ¥53.9B | ¥54.9B | ¥64.7B | ¥70.9B | ¥93.0B | ¥121.1B | ¥125.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥92.2B | ¥90.2B | ¥74.7B | ¥57.2B | ¥60.5B | ¥69.9B | ¥74.5B | ¥65.1B | ¥82.2B | ¥92.8B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥271.9B | ¥299.1B | ¥385.8B | ¥448.6B | ¥442.5B | ¥518.2B | ¥542.2B | ¥611.1B | ¥504.0B | ¥493.3B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥58.4B | ¥52.7B | ¥61.4B | ¥66.8B | ¥124.2B | ¥189.4B | ¥196.8B | ¥239.5B | ¥180.9B | ¥189.5B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 4.7× | 5.7× | 6.3× | 6.7× | 3.6× | 2.7× | 2.8× | 2.6× | 2.8× | 2.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | ¥140.1B | ¥133.6B | ¥132.7B | ¥136.4B | ¥135.8B | ¥140.4B | ¥181.0B | ¥183.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥683.8B | ¥708.3B | ¥742.0B | ¥784.5B | ¥801.3B | ¥921.9B | ¥939.9B | ¥1.03T | ¥1.07T | ¥1.11T | Total assetsAssets |
| 236.7× | 316.7× | 125.3× | 108.3× | 198.6× | 101.6× | 118.1× | 249.7× | -7.6× | 120.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥577.0B | ¥616.0B | ¥649.6B | ¥678.3B | ¥698.4B | ¥737.2B | ¥762.8B | ¥836.4B | ¥850.8B | ¥893.3B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 576M | 576M | 576M | 540M | 540M | 540M | 540M | 540M | 526M | 526M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥603.58 | ¥612.99 | ¥470.98 | ¥566.33 | ¥589.54 | ¥652.31 | ¥737.72 | ¥818.95 | ¥942.78 | ¥945.19 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥52.82 | ¥74.41 | ¥94.39 | ¥124.23 | ¥87.09 | ¥96.94 | ¥99.21 | ¥150.35 | ¥113.90 | ¥127.54 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | ¥90.12 | ¥86.34 | ¥54.42 | ¥148.20 | ¥61.31 | ¥182.11 | ¥79.61 | ¥134.08 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | ¥90.12 | ¥86.34 | ¥54.42 | ¥148.20 | ¥61.31 | ¥182.11 | ¥79.61 | ¥112.06 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥23.73 | ¥23.73 | ¥28.01 | ¥40.16 | ¥43.76 | ¥44.77 | ¥46.77 | ¥53.75 | ¥58.78 | ¥58.75 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | ¥7.34 | ¥13.02 | ¥18.73 | ¥12.08 | ¥28.82 | ¥31.88 | ¥49.53 | ¥71.75 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥1000.96 | ¥1068.60 | ¥1126.87 | ¥1256.02 | ¥1293.33 | ¥1365.11 | ¥1412.64 | ¥1548.92 | ¥1618.64 | ¥1699.53 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.1%/yr | +9.9%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +5.8%/yr (7-yr) | +19.8%/yr |
| EPS | +10.3%/yr | +7.9%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +10.6%/yr | +6.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +38.5%/yr (7-yr) | +30.8%/yr |
| Book value / share | +6.1%/yr | +5.6%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥70.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥26.1B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥11.6B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥58.9B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥67.0B | ¥59.9B | ¥81.2B | ¥53.6B | ¥52.3B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥26.1B | +¥24.8B | +¥21.1B | +¥18.5B | +¥19.5B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥3.4B | −¥16.8B | +¥13.3B | −¥23.4B | +¥14.7B |
| Cash from operations | ¥96.6B | ¥67.9B | ¥115.6B | ¥48.7B | ¥86.5B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥26.1B | −¥26.0B | −¥17.2B | −¥15.6B | −¥6.5B |
| Owner earnings | ¥70.5B | ¥41.8B | ¥98.3B | ¥33.1B | ¥80.0B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥11.6B | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥58.9B | ¥41.8B | ¥98.3B | ¥33.1B | ¥80.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 14% | 8% | 22% | 8% | 23% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥26.1B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥11.6B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 120.1×ComfortableOperating income ¥60.0B ÷ interest expense ¥500M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
What this means
This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 133 + DIO 104 − DPO 357 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Debt under-capturedIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.
- Solid through the cycle8-yr median margin, range 8%–23%; latest ¥70.5B = operating cash ¥96.6B − maintenance capex ¥26.1BIndustry peers: median 11%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 14% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 8 years. It chose to put ¥11.6B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥58.9B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥96.6B ÷ net income ¥67.0B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥30.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥70.5B
What this means
Of ¥70.5B Owner Earnings, ¥30.9B (44%) went back to shareholders, ¥30.9B dividends, ¥9M buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.44×ExpandingCapex ¥37.7B ÷ depreciation ¥26.1B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Operating margin 12% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
The recent-years average (8%) sits below the early years (12%), but the latest year (12%) is back near the early level: a cyclical trough dragging the window down, not a one-way slide. The through-cycle median is 11% — read it across the cycle, not on the dip.
- Owner earnings growth +2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −0.9% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −1.0%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2018–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥564.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested¥124.4B · 22%
- Dividends¥201.7B · 36%
- Buybacks¥62.7B · 11%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥175.8B · 31%
- Returned to owners¥264.4B
59% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥201.7B as dividends and ¥62.7B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose ¥202.9B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥62.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−8.8%
The diluted count fell from 576M to 526M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥58.75/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 11% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained13%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥218.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥27.6B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.13 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kyowa Kirin is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?26% → 44% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from ¥92.2B to ¥217.8B while revenue grew 43%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (26% of revenue then, 44% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kyowa Kirin has delivered.
Through the cycle, Kyowa Kirin earns about ¥73.1B on its 14.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.2% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥58.9B on 526M diluted shares; net cash ¥218.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥37.7B) runs well above depreciation (¥26.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥70.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 4063 its page in the Manual 4183 →
Industry order: the Pharmaceuticals chapter 4502 →