Owner Scorecard


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4661 · Oriental Land

Theme parks Consumer & brand J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Oriental Land’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 4661) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥477.7B¥479.3B¥525.6B¥464.4B¥170.6B¥275.7B¥483.1B¥618.5B¥679.4B¥704.5BRevenueRevenue
35%1%40%39%Gross marginGross mgn
14%27%15%15%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥113.2B¥110.3B¥129.3B¥96.9B(¥46.0B)¥7.7B¥111.2B¥165.4B¥172.1B¥168.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
23.7%23.0%24.6%20.9%−27.0%2.8%23.0%26.7%25.3%23.9%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥82.4B¥81.2B¥90.3B¥62.2B(¥54.2B)¥8.1B¥80.7B¥120.2B¥124.2B¥121.9BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥117.6B¥122.9B¥135.0B¥73.3B(¥23.8B)¥54.6B¥167.7B¥197.7B¥195.4B¥181.3BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥38.3B¥37.3B¥38.2B¥39.4B¥45.9B¥44.1B¥46.3B¥46.7B¥65.4B¥66.5BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥3.0B)¥4.3B¥6.5B(¥28.3B)(¥15.5B)¥2.4B¥40.7B¥30.7B¥5.8B(¥7.1B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥48.2B¥55.1B¥78.6B¥127.0B¥111.6B¥98.8B¥88.5B¥48.3B¥100.0B¥77.0BCapexCapex
10.1%11.5%14.9%27.3%65.4%35.8%18.3%7.8%14.7%10.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥79.3B¥85.5B¥96.8B¥33.9B(¥69.7B)¥10.5B¥121.4B¥149.3B¥130.0B¥104.3BOwner earningsOwner earn.
16.6%17.8%18.4%7.3%−40.9%3.8%25.1%24.1%19.1%14.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥69.4B¥67.7B¥56.4B(¥53.6B)(¥135.4B)(¥44.2B)¥79.2B¥149.3B¥95.3B¥104.3BFree cash flowFCF
14.5%14.1%10.7%−11.5%−79.4%−16.0%16.4%24.1%14.0%14.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥11.6B¥13.2B¥13.1B¥14.4B¥11.4B¥8.5B¥10.8B¥15.4B¥24.7B¥22.9BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥25.2B¥20.0B¥0¥20.7B¥1M¥142M¥0¥4M¥61.8B¥0BuybacksBuybacks
15%15%15%12%-5%1%9%15%13%12%ROICROIC
12%11%11%8%-7%1%10%13%13%11%Return on equityROE
11%9%10%6%−9%−0%8%11%10%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥141.8B¥186.3B¥222.6B¥281.2B¥198.8B¥129.9B¥142.2B¥273.0B¥326.3B¥365.0BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥18.9B¥20.0B¥22.1B¥7.2B¥12.0B¥15.4B¥22.1B¥28.8B¥30.6B¥34.1BReceivablesReceiv.
¥9.9B¥10.3B¥9.3B¥11.7B¥12.5B¥6.1B¥13.8B¥9.4B¥16.0B¥13.1BInventoryInvent.
¥17.5B¥17.6B¥19.9B¥13.9B¥9.1B¥12.2B¥20.3B¥23.8B¥23.6B¥28.1BAccounts payablePayables
¥11.3B¥12.7B¥11.4B¥5.0B¥15.5B¥9.3B¥15.5B¥14.5B¥23.0B¥19.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥319.1B¥359.1B¥441.8B¥316.7B¥274.1B¥271.4B¥348.9B¥452.2B¥525.4B¥675.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥111.1B¥123.6B¥154.7B¥100.5B¥121.4B¥85.2B¥161.2B¥247.0B¥235.9B¥206.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×2.9×2.9×3.2×2.3×3.2×2.2×1.8×2.2×3.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥849.8B¥910.7B¥1.05T¥1.01T¥1.04T¥1.09T¥1.21T¥1.36T¥1.44T¥1.63TTotal assetsAssets
¥60.6B¥59.6B¥108.4B¥87.1B¥186.2B¥242.6B¥241.0B¥209.0B¥266.7B¥326.7BTotal debtDebt
(¥81.2B)(¥126.8B)(¥114.1B)(¥194.1B)(¥12.6B)¥112.8B¥98.7B(¥64.1B)(¥59.6B)(¥38.3B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
538.8×530.2×582.3×332.9×-130.3×17.0×307.2×472.7×160.4×68.6×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥669.5B¥722.0B¥803.2B¥810.3B¥745.2B¥756.3B¥829.7B¥949.6B¥961.0B¥1.06TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.82B1.82B1.82B1.82B1.82B1.82B1.82B1.82B1.80B1.80BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥262.72¥263.57¥289.05¥255.41¥93.81¥151.63¥265.68¥340.12¥377.34¥391.31Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥45.30¥44.65¥49.65¥34.21¥-29.80¥4.44¥44.40¥66.11¥68.96¥67.69EPS (diluted)EPS
¥43.63¥47.03¥53.21¥18.64¥-38.35¥5.77¥66.76¥82.13¥72.19¥57.91Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥38.17¥37.25¥31.02¥-29.50¥-74.48¥-24.33¥43.56¥82.13¥52.95¥57.91Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥6.39¥7.24¥7.22¥7.94¥6.29¥4.68¥5.94¥8.45¥13.70¥12.73Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥26.51¥30.31¥43.21¥69.83¥61.37¥54.35¥48.68¥26.58¥55.57¥42.78Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥368.18¥397.03¥441.70¥445.60¥409.81¥415.91¥456.26¥522.18¥533.77¥590.23Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.5%/yr+33.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+3.2%/yr
EPS+4.6%/yr
Dividends / share+8.0%/yr+15.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.5%/yr−7.0%/yr
Book value / share+5.4%/yr+7.6%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported ¥121.9B of profit but ¥104.3B of owner earnings: ¥17.6B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income¥121.9B
Owner earnings¥104.3B · 15% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥121.9B¥124.2B¥120.2B¥80.7B¥8.1B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥66.5B+¥65.4B+¥46.7B+¥46.3B+¥44.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥7.1B+¥5.8B+¥30.7B+¥40.7B+¥2.4B
Cash from operations¥181.3B¥195.4B¥197.7B¥167.7B¥54.6B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥77.0B−¥65.4B−¥48.3B−¥46.3B−¥44.1B
Owner earnings¥104.3B¥130.0B¥149.3B¥121.4B¥10.5B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥34.6B−¥42.2B−¥54.7B
Free cash flow¥104.3B¥95.3B¥149.3B¥79.2B(¥44.2B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue15%19%24%25%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥168.4B ÷ interest expense ¥2.5B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥236.1B + ST investments ¥128.9B − debt ¥326.7B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥38.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 18 + DIO 11 − DPO 24 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -5%–15%; 12% latest = NOPAT ¥133.0B ÷ invested capital ¥1.15T
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -41%–25%; latest ¥104.3B = operating cash ¥181.3B − maintenance capex ¥77.0B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥181.3B ÷ net income ¥121.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥22.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥104.3B
    What this means

    Of ¥104.3B Owner Earnings, ¥22.9B (22%) went back to shareholders, ¥22.9B dividends, ¥0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.16×
    Maintaining
    Capex ¥77.0B ÷ depreciation ¥66.5B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 24% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 24% early, 25% lately, median 23%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · −27.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥1.22T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥833.2B · 68%
  • Dividends¥146.1B · 12%
  • Buybacks¥128.0B · 10%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥114.4B · 9%
  • Returned to owners¥274.0B

    37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥146.1B as dividends and ¥128.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥266.1B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥223.2B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥128.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−1.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (1818M to 1800M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥12.73/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained9%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥442.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥40.7B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Oriental Land is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥60.6B → ¥326.7B

    Debt rose from ¥60.6B to ¥326.7B while owner earnings went from about ¥87.2B to ¥127.9B — about 0.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Oriental Land has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Oriental Land earns about ¥121.4B on its 17.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ¥104.3B on 1800M diluted shares; net cash ¥38.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 4578 its page in the Manual 4689 →

Industry order: the Hotels & Resorts chapter ABNB →