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4661 · Oriental Land
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Oriental Land’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 4661) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥477.7B | ¥479.3B | ¥525.6B | ¥464.4B | ¥170.6B | ¥275.7B | ¥483.1B | ¥618.5B | ¥679.4B | ¥704.5B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 35% | 1% | — | — | — | 40% | 39% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 14% | 27% | — | — | — | 15% | 15% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥113.2B | ¥110.3B | ¥129.3B | ¥96.9B | (¥46.0B) | ¥7.7B | ¥111.2B | ¥165.4B | ¥172.1B | ¥168.4B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 23.7% | 23.0% | 24.6% | 20.9% | −27.0% | 2.8% | 23.0% | 26.7% | 25.3% | 23.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥82.4B | ¥81.2B | ¥90.3B | ¥62.2B | (¥54.2B) | ¥8.1B | ¥80.7B | ¥120.2B | ¥124.2B | ¥121.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥117.6B | ¥122.9B | ¥135.0B | ¥73.3B | (¥23.8B) | ¥54.6B | ¥167.7B | ¥197.7B | ¥195.4B | ¥181.3B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥38.3B | ¥37.3B | ¥38.2B | ¥39.4B | ¥45.9B | ¥44.1B | ¥46.3B | ¥46.7B | ¥65.4B | ¥66.5B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥3.0B) | ¥4.3B | ¥6.5B | (¥28.3B) | (¥15.5B) | ¥2.4B | ¥40.7B | ¥30.7B | ¥5.8B | (¥7.1B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥48.2B | ¥55.1B | ¥78.6B | ¥127.0B | ¥111.6B | ¥98.8B | ¥88.5B | ¥48.3B | ¥100.0B | ¥77.0B | CapexCapex |
| 10.1% | 11.5% | 14.9% | 27.3% | 65.4% | 35.8% | 18.3% | 7.8% | 14.7% | 10.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥79.3B | ¥85.5B | ¥96.8B | ¥33.9B | (¥69.7B) | ¥10.5B | ¥121.4B | ¥149.3B | ¥130.0B | ¥104.3B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 16.6% | 17.8% | 18.4% | 7.3% | −40.9% | 3.8% | 25.1% | 24.1% | 19.1% | 14.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥69.4B | ¥67.7B | ¥56.4B | (¥53.6B) | (¥135.4B) | (¥44.2B) | ¥79.2B | ¥149.3B | ¥95.3B | ¥104.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 14.5% | 14.1% | 10.7% | −11.5% | −79.4% | −16.0% | 16.4% | 24.1% | 14.0% | 14.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥11.6B | ¥13.2B | ¥13.1B | ¥14.4B | ¥11.4B | ¥8.5B | ¥10.8B | ¥15.4B | ¥24.7B | ¥22.9B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥25.2B | ¥20.0B | ¥0 | ¥20.7B | ¥1M | ¥142M | ¥0 | ¥4M | ¥61.8B | ¥0 | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 15% | 15% | 15% | 12% | -5% | 1% | 9% | 15% | 13% | 12% | ROICROIC |
| 12% | 11% | 11% | 8% | -7% | 1% | 10% | 13% | 13% | 11% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 9% | 10% | 6% | −9% | −0% | 8% | 11% | 10% | 9% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥141.8B | ¥186.3B | ¥222.6B | ¥281.2B | ¥198.8B | ¥129.9B | ¥142.2B | ¥273.0B | ¥326.3B | ¥365.0B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥18.9B | ¥20.0B | ¥22.1B | ¥7.2B | ¥12.0B | ¥15.4B | ¥22.1B | ¥28.8B | ¥30.6B | ¥34.1B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥9.9B | ¥10.3B | ¥9.3B | ¥11.7B | ¥12.5B | ¥6.1B | ¥13.8B | ¥9.4B | ¥16.0B | ¥13.1B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥17.5B | ¥17.6B | ¥19.9B | ¥13.9B | ¥9.1B | ¥12.2B | ¥20.3B | ¥23.8B | ¥23.6B | ¥28.1B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥11.3B | ¥12.7B | ¥11.4B | ¥5.0B | ¥15.5B | ¥9.3B | ¥15.5B | ¥14.5B | ¥23.0B | ¥19.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥319.1B | ¥359.1B | ¥441.8B | ¥316.7B | ¥274.1B | ¥271.4B | ¥348.9B | ¥452.2B | ¥525.4B | ¥675.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥111.1B | ¥123.6B | ¥154.7B | ¥100.5B | ¥121.4B | ¥85.2B | ¥161.2B | ¥247.0B | ¥235.9B | ¥206.4B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.9× | 2.9× | 2.9× | 3.2× | 2.3× | 3.2× | 2.2× | 1.8× | 2.2× | 3.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥849.8B | ¥910.7B | ¥1.05T | ¥1.01T | ¥1.04T | ¥1.09T | ¥1.21T | ¥1.36T | ¥1.44T | ¥1.63T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥60.6B | ¥59.6B | ¥108.4B | ¥87.1B | ¥186.2B | ¥242.6B | ¥241.0B | ¥209.0B | ¥266.7B | ¥326.7B | Total debtDebt |
| (¥81.2B) | (¥126.8B) | (¥114.1B) | (¥194.1B) | (¥12.6B) | ¥112.8B | ¥98.7B | (¥64.1B) | (¥59.6B) | (¥38.3B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 538.8× | 530.2× | 582.3× | 332.9× | -130.3× | 17.0× | 307.2× | 472.7× | 160.4× | 68.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥669.5B | ¥722.0B | ¥803.2B | ¥810.3B | ¥745.2B | ¥756.3B | ¥829.7B | ¥949.6B | ¥961.0B | ¥1.06T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.82B | 1.82B | 1.82B | 1.82B | 1.82B | 1.82B | 1.82B | 1.82B | 1.80B | 1.80B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥262.72 | ¥263.57 | ¥289.05 | ¥255.41 | ¥93.81 | ¥151.63 | ¥265.68 | ¥340.12 | ¥377.34 | ¥391.31 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥45.30 | ¥44.65 | ¥49.65 | ¥34.21 | ¥-29.80 | ¥4.44 | ¥44.40 | ¥66.11 | ¥68.96 | ¥67.69 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥43.63 | ¥47.03 | ¥53.21 | ¥18.64 | ¥-38.35 | ¥5.77 | ¥66.76 | ¥82.13 | ¥72.19 | ¥57.91 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥38.17 | ¥37.25 | ¥31.02 | ¥-29.50 | ¥-74.48 | ¥-24.33 | ¥43.56 | ¥82.13 | ¥52.95 | ¥57.91 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥6.39 | ¥7.24 | ¥7.22 | ¥7.94 | ¥6.29 | ¥4.68 | ¥5.94 | ¥8.45 | ¥13.70 | ¥12.73 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥26.51 | ¥30.31 | ¥43.21 | ¥69.83 | ¥61.37 | ¥54.35 | ¥48.68 | ¥26.58 | ¥55.57 | ¥42.78 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥368.18 | ¥397.03 | ¥441.70 | ¥445.60 | ¥409.81 | ¥415.91 | ¥456.26 | ¥522.18 | ¥533.77 | ¥590.23 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.5%/yr | +33.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +3.2%/yr | — |
| EPS | +4.6%/yr | — |
| Dividends / share | +8.0%/yr | +15.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +5.5%/yr | −7.0%/yr |
| Book value / share | +5.4%/yr | +7.6%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business reported ¥121.9B of profit but ¥104.3B of owner earnings: ¥17.6B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥121.9B | ¥124.2B | ¥120.2B | ¥80.7B | ¥8.1B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥66.5B | +¥65.4B | +¥46.7B | +¥46.3B | +¥44.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥7.1B | +¥5.8B | +¥30.7B | +¥40.7B | +¥2.4B |
| Cash from operations | ¥181.3B | ¥195.4B | ¥197.7B | ¥167.7B | ¥54.6B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥77.0B | −¥65.4B | −¥48.3B | −¥46.3B | −¥44.1B |
| Owner earnings | ¥104.3B | ¥130.0B | ¥149.3B | ¥121.4B | ¥10.5B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −¥34.6B | — | −¥42.2B | −¥54.7B |
| Free cash flow | ¥104.3B | ¥95.3B | ¥149.3B | ¥79.2B | (¥44.2B) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 15% | 19% | 24% | 25% | 4% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 68.6×ComfortableOperating income ¥168.4B ÷ interest expense ¥2.5B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash ¥236.1B + ST investments ¥128.9B − debt ¥326.7B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥38.3B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 18 + DIO 11 − DPO 24 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range -5%–15%; 12% latest = NOPAT ¥133.0B ÷ invested capital ¥1.15TIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 12% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -41%–25%; latest ¥104.3B = operating cash ¥181.3B − maintenance capex ¥77.0BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 17% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥181.3B ÷ net income ¥121.9B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks ¥22.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥104.3B
What this means
Of ¥104.3B Owner Earnings, ¥22.9B (22%) went back to shareholders, ¥22.9B dividends, ¥0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.16×MaintainingCapex ¥77.0B ÷ depreciation ¥66.5B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 24% → 25% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 24% early, 25% lately, median 23%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 10%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +4%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 4% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2021 · −27.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥1.22T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥833.2B · 68%
- Dividends¥146.1B · 12%
- Buybacks¥128.0B · 10%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥114.4B · 9%
- Returned to owners¥274.0B
37% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥146.1B as dividends and ¥128.0B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥266.1B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥223.2B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥128.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−1.0%
The diluted count barely moved (1818M to 1800M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥12.73/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained9%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥442.9B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥40.7B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Oriental Land is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥60.6B → ¥326.7B
Debt rose from ¥60.6B to ¥326.7B while owner earnings went from about ¥87.2B to ¥127.9B — about 0.7 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 2.6 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Oriental Land has delivered.
Through the cycle, Oriental Land earns about ¥121.4B on its 17.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ¥104.3B on 1800M diluted shares; net cash ¥38.3B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 4578 its page in the Manual 4689 →
Industry order: the Hotels & Resorts chapter ABNB →