← All companies ← ABM Manual ABR → ← 4661 Hotels & Resorts ATAT →

ABNB, Airbnb Inc.

We operate a global marketplace connecting guests with stays, experiences, and services, collectively in over 220 countries and regions.

Every day, hosts offer unique stays, experiences, and services that enable guests to connect with communities in a more authentic way.

Our key strategic priorities include making our service better, bringing Airbnb to more parts of the world, and expanding what we offer.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ABNB · Airbnb Inc.

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$12.2B

+10.3% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $12.6B 5-yr avg $9.5B

Gross margin 83% 5-yr avg 82%

Operating margin 20.5% 5-yr avg 17.5%

ROIC 65% 5-yr avg 52%

Owner-earnings margin 36% 5-yr avg 39%

Free cash flow margin 36% 5-yr avg 39%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 82% and operating margin about 15% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. The operating margin has swung widely — from −106% to 23% — on a steadier 82% gross margin, so what moves it sits below the gross line, in operating spend and one-off charges more than in the cost of the product itself. Stock-based pay runs about 13% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has run high across the record (median 53%, above 15% in 4 of 4 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 21% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2019–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
								Income statement
$4.8B	$3.4B	$6.0B	$8.4B	$9.9B	$11.1B	$12.2B	$12.6B	RevenueRevenue
75%	74%	81%	82%	83%	83%	83%	83%	Gross marginGross mgn
15%	34%	14%	11%	20%	11%	11%	11%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
20%	81%	24%	18%	17%	19%	19%	19%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
($502M)	($3.6B)	$429M	$1.8B	$1.5B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.6B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−10.4%	−106.3%	7.2%	21.5%	15.3%	23.0%	20.8%	20.5%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($674M)	($4.6B)	($352M)	$1.9B	$4.8B	$2.6B	$2.5B	$2.5B	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	—	5%	—	21%	20%	22%	Effective tax rateTax rate
								Cash flow & returns
$223M	($740M)	$2.3B	$3.4B	$3.9B	$4.5B	$4.6B	$4.6B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$57M	$67M	$86M	$43M	$18M	$16M	$17M	$17M	DepreciationDeprec.
$742M	$775M	$1.7B	$564M	($2.0B)	$447M	$526M	$387M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$125M	$37M	$25M	$25M	—	—	—	$38M	CapexCapex
2.6%	1.1%	0.4%	0.3%	—	—	—	0.3%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$166M	($777M)	$2.3B	$3.4B	—	—	—	$4.5B	Owner earningsOwner earn.
3.4%	−23.0%	38.2%	40.5%	—	—	—	36.0%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$97M	($777M)	$2.3B	$3.4B	—	—	—	$4.5B	Free cash flowFCF
2.0%	−23.0%	38.2%	40.5%	—	—	—	35.8%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$192M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
—	$0	$0	$1.5B	$2.3B	$3.4B	$3.8B	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	49%	—	46%	57%	56%	65%	ROICROIC
—	-158%	-7%	34%	59%	31%	31%	33%	Return on equityROE
—	−158%	−7%	34%	59%	31%	31%	33%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
								Balance sheet
$2.0B	$6.4B	$8.3B	$9.6B	$10.1B	$10.6B	$11.0B	$12.0B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
—	$80M	$118M	$137M	$141M	$142M	$232M	$180M	Accounts payablePayables
—	$8.9B	$12.4B	$14.9B	$16.5B	$17.2B	$18.8B	$23.6B	Current assetsCur. assets
—	$5.1B	$6.4B	$8.0B	$9.9B	$10.2B	$13.6B	$16.4B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
—	1.7×	1.9×	1.9×	1.7×	1.7×	1.4×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$652M	$656M	$653M	$650M	$752M	$750M	$754M	$754M	GoodwillGoodwill
—	$10.5B	$13.7B	$16.0B	$20.6B	$21.0B	$22.2B	$26.8B	Total assetsAssets
—	$1.8B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.0B	$2.5B	Total debtDebt
—	($4.6B)	($6.3B)	($7.6B)	($8.1B)	($8.6B)	($9.0B)	($9.5B)	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
($808M)	$2.9B	$4.8B	$5.6B	$8.2B	$8.4B	$8.2B	$7.6B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
2.0%	88.9%	15.0%	11.1%	11.3%	12.7%	13.0%	13.0%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
								Per share
261M	284M	616M	680M	662M	645M	623M	608M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$18.44	$11.89	$9.73	$12.35	$14.98	$17.21	$19.65	$20.80	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-2.59	$-16.14	$-0.57	$2.78	$7.24	$4.11	$4.03	$4.14	EPS (diluted)EPS
$0.64	$-2.74	$3.71	$5.01	—	—	—	$7.48	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$0.37	$-2.74	$3.71	$5.01	—	—	—	$7.45	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.48	$0.13	$0.04	$0.04	—	—	—	$0.06	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$-3.10	$10.21	$7.75	$8.18	$12.33	$13.04	$13.16	$12.56	Book value / shareBVPS

The diluted share count moved ×2.17 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	6-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.1%/yr	+10.6%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+99.0%/yr (3-yr)	+99.0%/yr (3-yr)
Capital spending / share	−57.6%/yr (3-yr)	−57.6%/yr (3-yr)
Book value / share	—	+5.2%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

Net income-5.2%
“In 2025, net income decreased by 5% to $2.5 billion, compared to the prior year, primarily due to an increase in compensation expense and marketing spend, as well as lower interest income, which was partially offset by the increase in revenue of $1.1 billion.”
✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2019–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

623Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

56%low FY2023

Gross margin

83%low FY2020

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$3.4Bowner earningsvs.$1.9Bnet incomelow FY2020

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2019FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2019–FY2022cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2022 the business turned $1.9B of profit into $3.4B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

Reported net income$1.9B

Owner earnings$3.4B · 41% of revenue

	FY2022	FY2021	FY2020	FY2019
Reported net income	$1.9B	($352M)	($4.6B)	($674M)
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$43M	+$86M	+$67M	+$57M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$930M	+$899M	+$3.0B	+$98M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$564M	+$1.7B	+$775M	+$742M
Cash from operations	$3.4B	$2.3B	($740M)	$223M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$25M	−$25M	−$37M	−$57M
Owner earnings	$3.4B	$2.3B	($777M)	$166M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	—	—	−$68M
Free cash flow	$3.4B	$2.3B	($777M)	$97M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	41%	38%	-23%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $930M), owner earnings is nearer $2.5B.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? —

No meaningful interest burden

Little or no interest expense reported

What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +$9.0B

Net cash

Cash $6.6B + ST investments $4.5B − debt $2.0B

What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $9.0B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 49%

Very high (≥25%) through the cycle

4-yr median, range 46%–57%; 56% latest = NOPAT $2.0B ÷ invested capital $3.6B

Industry peers: median 12%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 4 years (it ran 56% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 3%

Thin through the cycle

4-yr median margin, range -23%–41%; latest $4.6B = operating cash $4.6B − maintenance capex $17M

Industry peers: median 22%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 38% of revenue this year, a 3% median across 4 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $1.6B of SBC) leaves $3.0B.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.85×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $4.6B ÷ net income $2.5B

In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 82%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $3.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $4.6B

What this means
Of $4.6B Owner Earnings, $3.8B (82%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $3.8B buybacks. Net of $1.6B stock comp, the real buyback was about $2.2B. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.47×

Expanding

Capex $25M ÷ depreciation $17M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $12.2B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Miss

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.38×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Pass

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.0B vs $5.1B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (7-yr record) · 3 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · none paid

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.55/share (latest year $4.20), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2019–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 4 of 7

What this means
Lost money in 3 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 5 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −37% → 20% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −37% early to 20% lately, median 15% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC —

What this means
The reinvested base moved too little against the change in profit to read a reliable return on it here — the figure would be a small-denominator artifact, not a moat. Judge this one on the owner-earnings record and the cash it returns instead.
Worst year 2020 · −106.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“For purposes of this risk factor, references to "open source software" include AI and ML Technologies that are made available under open source licenses.”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$23.6B

Cash & short-term investments$12.0B
Receivables$191M
Other current assets$11.4B

Current liabilities$16.4B

Accounts payable$180M
Other current liabilities$16.2B

Current ratio1.44×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.44×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.73×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$7.2Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+17.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$6.9Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value$4.4BGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.7B$263M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$2.7Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2019–2022

Over the record, the business generated $5.2B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

Reinvested$212M · 4%
Buybacks$1.5B · 29%
Retained (debt / cash)$3.5B · 67%

Returned to owners$1.5B
30% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $1.5B as buybacks.
Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $10.0B.
Average price paid for buybacks$108.70
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 14M shares were bought for $1.5B, about $108.70 each.
Net change in share count133.3%
The diluted count rose from 261M to 608M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Net income
2021	Brian Chesky	$132k	$301.4M	($352M)
2022	Brian Chesky	$311k	−$585.3M	$1.9B
2023	Brian Chesky	$295k	$303.5M	$4.8B
2024	Brian Chesky	$186k	$5.3M	$2.6B
2025	Brian Chesky	$242k	−$89.2M	$2.5B

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Net income is the whole business's, as filed, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership1.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$1.6B
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 13% of revenue, equal to 63% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Airbnb Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2019–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?133.3%
Diluted shares grew 133.3% over 2019–2022, even as the company spent $1.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did reported profit become cash?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Hotels & Resorts

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SPGIS&P Global Inc.	$15.3B	70%	44.4%	91%	33%
NOWServiceNow Inc.	$13.3B	77%	4.4%	6%	30%
DXCDXC Technology Company Common Stock	$12.6B	—	8.0%	12%	8%
ABNBAirbnb Inc.	$12.2B	82%	15.3%	53%	21%
SHOPShopify Inc.	$11.6B	49%	-1.3%	-0%	15%
EBAYeBay Inc.	$11.1B	76%	23.3%	16%	22%
WDAYWorkday Inc.	$9.6B	99%	-4.7%	-4%	22%
ROLRollins	$3.8B	51%	17.9%	30%	16%
Group median	—	76%	11.7%	14%	21%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Airbnb Inc. has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Airbnb Inc. earns about $4.6B on its 37.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 37.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($4.6B) Net of stock comp (−$1.6B) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($4.5B)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2021+49%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $4.5B on 598M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net cash $9.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($38M) runs well above depreciation ($17M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $4.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ABNB against another business →

The owners of ABNB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Airbnb Inc. (ABNB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ABNB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ABM its page in the Manual ABR →

Industry order: ← 4661 the Hotels & Resorts chapter ATAT →