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5101 · Yokohama Rubber
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Yokohama Rubber’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 5101) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥574.0B | ¥646.3B | ¥650.2B | ¥650.5B | ¥570.6B | ¥670.8B | ¥860.5B | ¥985.3B | ¥1.09T | ¥1.23T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 32% | 32% | — | — | — | 36% | 36% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 24% | 25% | — | — | — | 23% | 23% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥21.2B | ¥18.5B | ¥53.5B | ¥58.6B | ¥36.4B | ¥83.6B | ¥68.9B | ¥100.4B | ¥119.2B | ¥152.9B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.7% | 2.9% | 8.2% | 9.0% | 6.4% | 12.5% | 8.0% | 10.2% | 10.9% | 12.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥9.4B | ¥40.0B | ¥35.6B | ¥42.0B | ¥26.3B | ¥65.5B | ¥45.9B | ¥67.2B | ¥74.9B | ¥105.4B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥77.7B | ¥60.5B | ¥82.8B | ¥75.4B | ¥78.3B | ¥68.3B | ¥39.2B | ¥159.7B | ¥94.5B | ¥135.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | — | ¥36.8B | ¥42.4B | ¥44.5B | ¥45.6B | ¥49.9B | ¥59.5B | ¥66.2B | ¥73.6B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥68.4B | ¥20.5B | ¥10.4B | (¥9.0B) | ¥7.5B | (¥42.8B) | (¥56.6B) | ¥33.0B | (¥46.6B) | (¥43.4B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | ¥45.4B | ¥49.5B | ¥30.8B | ¥35.9B | ¥54.4B | ¥58.3B | ¥77.0B | ¥111.6B | CapexCapex |
| — | — | 7.0% | 7.6% | 5.4% | 5.4% | 6.3% | 5.9% | 7.0% | 9.0% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | ¥37.5B | ¥25.9B | ¥47.5B | ¥32.4B | (¥15.1B) | ¥101.5B | ¥17.5B | ¥62.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | 5.8% | 4.0% | 8.3% | 4.8% | −1.8% | 10.3% | 1.6% | 5.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | ¥37.5B | ¥25.9B | ¥47.5B | ¥32.4B | (¥15.1B) | ¥101.5B | ¥17.5B | ¥24.0B | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | 5.8% | 4.0% | 8.3% | 4.8% | −1.8% | 10.3% | 1.6% | 1.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥8.3B | ¥9.1B | ¥9.9B | ¥9.9B | ¥10.4B | ¥10.3B | ¥10.6B | ¥10.8B | ¥15.4B | ¥15.9B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥3M | ¥5M | ¥3M | ¥3M | ¥11M | ¥76M | ¥108M | ¥4M | ¥3.9B | ¥6.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 3% | 2% | 7% | 7% | 5% | 10% | 7% | 7% | 8% | 8% | ROICROIC |
| 3% | 11% | 10% | 10% | 6% | 12% | 7% | 9% | 8% | 10% | Return on equityROE |
| 0% | 8% | 7% | 8% | 4% | 11% | 6% | 8% | 7% | 9% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥544M | ¥822M | ¥31.7B | ¥27.9B | ¥30.8B | ¥42.5B | ¥75.6B | ¥97.6B | ¥136.2B | ¥107.4B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥110.7B | ¥113.9B | ¥170.0B | ¥165.3B | ¥152.4B | ¥169.9B | ¥193.7B | ¥243.4B | ¥281.0B | ¥334.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥12.9B | ¥13.0B | ¥15.6B | ¥15.0B | ¥14.9B | ¥19.4B | ¥22.9B | ¥24.3B | ¥26.1B | ¥26.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | ¥83.9B | ¥75.0B | ¥67.2B | ¥71.9B | ¥78.1B | ¥105.2B | ¥108.5B | ¥112.7B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥123.6B | ¥126.9B | ¥101.7B | ¥105.2B | ¥100.1B | ¥117.3B | ¥138.5B | ¥162.4B | ¥198.6B | ¥247.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥153.7B | ¥157.3B | ¥335.5B | ¥331.5B | ¥309.3B | ¥383.6B | ¥504.0B | ¥618.1B | ¥749.7B | ¥826.2B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥112.5B | ¥284.8B | ¥180.5B | ¥172.9B | ¥160.0B | ¥178.7B | ¥223.0B | ¥270.4B | ¥282.1B | ¥315.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.4× | 0.6× | 1.9× | 1.9× | 1.9× | 2.1× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.7× | 2.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | ¥86.6B | ¥85.4B | ¥80.7B | ¥90.1B | ¥104.2B | ¥275.8B | ¥296.8B | ¥332.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥888.9B | ¥920.8B | ¥855.8B | ¥907.6B | ¥860.4B | ¥985.0B | ¥1.15T | ¥1.60T | ¥1.74T | ¥2.00T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥252.1B | ¥399.1B | ¥260.4B | ¥239.9B | ¥207.8B | ¥177.2B | ¥238.7B | ¥469.4B | ¥438.0B | ¥535.8B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥251.6B | ¥398.3B | ¥228.6B | ¥212.0B | ¥177.1B | ¥134.7B | ¥163.1B | ¥371.7B | ¥301.8B | ¥428.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 28.5× | 8.6× | 8.1× | 14.6× | 6.5× | 13.2× | 9.1× | 14.1× | 12.7× | 11.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥338.5B | ¥379.8B | ¥374.0B | ¥418.9B | ¥415.5B | ¥525.3B | ¥614.4B | ¥739.6B | ¥894.0B | ¥1.03T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 170M | 166M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥3385.74 | ¥3811.71 | ¥3835.11 | ¥3836.42 | ¥3365.23 | ¥3956.43 | ¥5075.09 | ¥5811.49 | ¥6456.81 | ¥7421.81 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥55.22 | ¥235.77 | ¥210.10 | ¥247.54 | ¥155.19 | ¥386.32 | ¥270.82 | ¥396.55 | ¥441.87 | ¥633.42 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | ¥220.96 | ¥152.49 | ¥280.12 | ¥190.94 | ¥-89.34 | ¥598.58 | ¥103.40 | ¥372.65 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | ¥220.96 | ¥152.49 | ¥280.12 | ¥190.94 | ¥-89.34 | ¥598.58 | ¥103.40 | ¥144.26 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥49.18 | ¥53.90 | ¥58.61 | ¥58.69 | ¥61.52 | ¥60.61 | ¥62.54 | ¥63.50 | ¥91.00 | ¥95.32 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | ¥267.52 | ¥292.07 | ¥181.66 | ¥211.92 | ¥320.72 | ¥343.58 | ¥453.94 | ¥670.85 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥1996.31 | ¥2239.93 | ¥2206.01 | ¥2470.63 | ¥2450.90 | ¥3098.29 | ¥3623.87 | ¥4361.95 | ¥5272.64 | ¥6195.17 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.1%/yr | +17.1%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +7.8%/yr (7-yr) | +5.9%/yr |
| EPS | +31.1%/yr | +32.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +7.6%/yr | +9.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +14.0%/yr (7-yr) | +29.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +13.4%/yr | +20.4%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥62.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥73.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥38.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥24.0B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥105.4B | ¥74.9B | ¥67.2B | ¥45.9B | ¥65.5B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥73.6B | +¥66.2B | +¥59.5B | +¥49.9B | +¥45.6B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥43.4B | −¥46.6B | +¥33.0B | −¥56.6B | −¥42.8B |
| Cash from operations | ¥135.6B | ¥94.5B | ¥159.7B | ¥39.2B | ¥68.3B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥73.6B | −¥77.0B | −¥58.3B | −¥54.4B | −¥35.9B |
| Owner earnings | ¥62.0B | ¥17.5B | ¥101.5B | (¥15.1B) | ¥32.4B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥38.0B | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥24.0B | ¥17.5B | ¥101.5B | (¥15.1B) | ¥32.4B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 5% | 2% | 10% | -2% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥73.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥38.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 11.4×ComfortableOperating income ¥152.9B ÷ interest expense ¥13.4B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥428.4B · 2.8× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash ¥107.4B − debt ¥535.8B
What this means
Netting ¥107.4B of cash and short-term investments against ¥535.8B of debt leaves ¥428.4B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 99 + DIO 12 − DPO 52 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 2%–10%; 8% latest = NOPAT ¥120.8B ÷ invested capital ¥1.46TIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid, recently turned positivelatest ¥62.0B = operating cash ¥135.6B − maintenance capex ¥73.6B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (8-yr median 5%)Industry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 8 years. It chose to put ¥38.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥24.0B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥135.6B ÷ net income ¥105.4B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks ¥21.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥62.0B
What this means
Of ¥62.0B Owner Earnings, ¥21.9B (35%) went back to shareholders, ¥15.9B dividends, ¥6.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.52×ExpandingCapex ¥111.6B ÷ depreciation ¥73.6B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 5% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 11% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · 2.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.2%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2018–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥733.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥462.8B · 63%
- Dividends¥93.3B · 13%
- Buybacks¥10.1B · 1%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥167.7B · 23%
- Returned to owners¥103.4B
33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥93.3B as dividends and ¥10.1B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥275.4B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥75.6B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥10.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−1.9%
The diluted count fell from 170M to 166M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥95.32/sh
Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained7%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥359.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥23.4B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Yokohama Rubber is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥252.1B → ¥535.8B
Debt rose from ¥252.1B to ¥535.8B while owner earnings went from about ¥36.9B to ¥60.3B — about 6.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?22% → 29% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from ¥123.6B to ¥360.2B while revenue grew 115%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (22% of revenue then, 29% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Yokohama Rubber has delivered.
Through the cycle, Yokohama Rubber earns about ¥60.8B on its 4.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥24.0B on 166M diluted shares; net debt ¥428.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥111.6B) runs well above depreciation (¥73.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥62.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 5020 its page in the Manual 5108 →
Industry order: the Auto Components chapter 5108 →