Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 5020 Manual 5108 → Auto Components 5108 →

5101 · Yokohama Rubber

Tires Capital-intensive IFRS
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Yokohama Rubber’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 5101) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥574.0B¥646.3B¥650.2B¥650.5B¥570.6B¥670.8B¥860.5B¥985.3B¥1.09T¥1.23TRevenueRevenue
32%32%36%36%Gross marginGross mgn
24%25%23%23%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥21.2B¥18.5B¥53.5B¥58.6B¥36.4B¥83.6B¥68.9B¥100.4B¥119.2B¥152.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.7%2.9%8.2%9.0%6.4%12.5%8.0%10.2%10.9%12.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥9.4B¥40.0B¥35.6B¥42.0B¥26.3B¥65.5B¥45.9B¥67.2B¥74.9B¥105.4BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥77.7B¥60.5B¥82.8B¥75.4B¥78.3B¥68.3B¥39.2B¥159.7B¥94.5B¥135.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥36.8B¥42.4B¥44.5B¥45.6B¥49.9B¥59.5B¥66.2B¥73.6BDepreciationDeprec.
¥68.4B¥20.5B¥10.4B(¥9.0B)¥7.5B(¥42.8B)(¥56.6B)¥33.0B(¥46.6B)(¥43.4B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥45.4B¥49.5B¥30.8B¥35.9B¥54.4B¥58.3B¥77.0B¥111.6BCapexCapex
7.0%7.6%5.4%5.4%6.3%5.9%7.0%9.0%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥37.5B¥25.9B¥47.5B¥32.4B(¥15.1B)¥101.5B¥17.5B¥62.0BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.8%4.0%8.3%4.8%−1.8%10.3%1.6%5.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥37.5B¥25.9B¥47.5B¥32.4B(¥15.1B)¥101.5B¥17.5B¥24.0BFree cash flowFCF
5.8%4.0%8.3%4.8%−1.8%10.3%1.6%1.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥8.3B¥9.1B¥9.9B¥9.9B¥10.4B¥10.3B¥10.6B¥10.8B¥15.4B¥15.9BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥3M¥5M¥3M¥3M¥11M¥76M¥108M¥4M¥3.9B¥6.0BBuybacksBuybacks
3%2%7%7%5%10%7%7%8%8%ROICROIC
3%11%10%10%6%12%7%9%8%10%Return on equityROE
0%8%7%8%4%11%6%8%7%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥544M¥822M¥31.7B¥27.9B¥30.8B¥42.5B¥75.6B¥97.6B¥136.2B¥107.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥110.7B¥113.9B¥170.0B¥165.3B¥152.4B¥169.9B¥193.7B¥243.4B¥281.0B¥334.0BReceivablesReceiv.
¥12.9B¥13.0B¥15.6B¥15.0B¥14.9B¥19.4B¥22.9B¥24.3B¥26.1B¥26.2BInventoryInvent.
¥83.9B¥75.0B¥67.2B¥71.9B¥78.1B¥105.2B¥108.5B¥112.7BAccounts payablePayables
¥123.6B¥126.9B¥101.7B¥105.2B¥100.1B¥117.3B¥138.5B¥162.4B¥198.6B¥247.5BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥153.7B¥157.3B¥335.5B¥331.5B¥309.3B¥383.6B¥504.0B¥618.1B¥749.7B¥826.2BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥112.5B¥284.8B¥180.5B¥172.9B¥160.0B¥178.7B¥223.0B¥270.4B¥282.1B¥315.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.4×0.6×1.9×1.9×1.9×2.1×2.3×2.3×2.7×2.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥86.6B¥85.4B¥80.7B¥90.1B¥104.2B¥275.8B¥296.8B¥332.9BGoodwillGoodwill
¥888.9B¥920.8B¥855.8B¥907.6B¥860.4B¥985.0B¥1.15T¥1.60T¥1.74T¥2.00TTotal assetsAssets
¥252.1B¥399.1B¥260.4B¥239.9B¥207.8B¥177.2B¥238.7B¥469.4B¥438.0B¥535.8BTotal debtDebt
¥251.6B¥398.3B¥228.6B¥212.0B¥177.1B¥134.7B¥163.1B¥371.7B¥301.8B¥428.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
28.5×8.6×8.1×14.6×6.5×13.2×9.1×14.1×12.7×11.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥338.5B¥379.8B¥374.0B¥418.9B¥415.5B¥525.3B¥614.4B¥739.6B¥894.0B¥1.03TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
170M170M170M170M170M170M170M170M170M166MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥3385.74¥3811.71¥3835.11¥3836.42¥3365.23¥3956.43¥5075.09¥5811.49¥6456.81¥7421.81Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥55.22¥235.77¥210.10¥247.54¥155.19¥386.32¥270.82¥396.55¥441.87¥633.42EPS (diluted)EPS
¥220.96¥152.49¥280.12¥190.94¥-89.34¥598.58¥103.40¥372.65Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥220.96¥152.49¥280.12¥190.94¥-89.34¥598.58¥103.40¥144.26Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥49.18¥53.90¥58.61¥58.69¥61.52¥60.61¥62.54¥63.50¥91.00¥95.32Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥267.52¥292.07¥181.66¥211.92¥320.72¥343.58¥453.94¥670.85Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1996.31¥2239.93¥2206.01¥2470.63¥2450.90¥3098.29¥3623.87¥4361.95¥5272.64¥6195.17Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+9.1%/yr+17.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share+7.8%/yr (7-yr)+5.9%/yr
EPS+31.1%/yr+32.5%/yr
Dividends / share+7.6%/yr+9.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.0%/yr (7-yr)+29.9%/yr
Book value / share+13.4%/yr+20.4%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥62.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥73.6B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥38.0B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥24.0B.

Reported net income¥105.4B
Owner earnings¥62.0B · 5% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income¥105.4B¥74.9B¥67.2B¥45.9B¥65.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥73.6B+¥66.2B+¥59.5B+¥49.9B+¥45.6B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥43.4B−¥46.6B+¥33.0B−¥56.6B−¥42.8B
Cash from operations¥135.6B¥94.5B¥159.7B¥39.2B¥68.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥73.6B−¥77.0B−¥58.3B−¥54.4B−¥35.9B
Owner earnings¥62.0B¥17.5B¥101.5B(¥15.1B)¥32.4B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥38.0B
Free cash flow¥24.0B¥17.5B¥101.5B(¥15.1B)¥32.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%2%10%-2%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥73.6B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥38.0B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥152.9B ÷ interest expense ¥13.4B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥428.4B · 2.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash ¥107.4B − debt ¥535.8B
    What this means

    Netting ¥107.4B of cash and short-term investments against ¥535.8B of debt leaves ¥428.4B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (3.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 99 + DIO 12 − DPO 52 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–10%; 8% latest = NOPAT ¥120.8B ÷ invested capital ¥1.46T
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 8% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid, recently turned positive
    latest ¥62.0B = operating cash ¥135.6B − maintenance capex ¥73.6B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (8-yr median 5%)
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 8 years. It chose to put ¥38.0B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥24.0B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥135.6B ÷ net income ¥105.4B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥21.9B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥62.0B
    What this means

    Of ¥62.0B Owner Earnings, ¥21.9B (35%) went back to shareholders, ¥15.9B dividends, ¥6.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.52×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥111.6B ÷ depreciation ¥73.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 5% early to 11% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 12%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +3%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 3% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 2.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.2%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2018–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥733.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥462.8B · 63%
  • Dividends¥93.3B · 13%
  • Buybacks¥10.1B · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥167.7B · 23%
  • Returned to owners¥103.4B

    33% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥93.3B as dividends and ¥10.1B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥275.4B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥75.6B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥10.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−1.9%

    The diluted count fell from 170M to 166M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥95.32/sh

    Paid in 8 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained7%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥359.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥23.4B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.07 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Yokohama Rubber is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥252.1B → ¥535.8B

    Debt rose from ¥252.1B to ¥535.8B while owner earnings went from about ¥36.9B to ¥60.3B — about 6.8 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 8.9 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?22% → 29% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from ¥123.6B to ¥360.2B while revenue grew 115%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (22% of revenue then, 29% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Yokohama Rubber has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Yokohama Rubber earns about ¥60.8B on its 4.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.0% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+47%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥24.0B on 166M diluted shares; net debt ¥428.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥111.6B) runs well above depreciation (¥73.6B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥62.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 5020 its page in the Manual 5108 →

Industry order: the Auto Components chapter 5108 →