Owner Scorecard


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5401 · Nippon Steel

Steel & metals Capital-intensive IFRS
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Nippon Steel’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 5401) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥4.63T¥5.71T¥6.18T¥5.92T¥4.83T¥6.81T¥7.98T¥8.87T¥8.70T¥10.06TRevenueRevenue
10%12%16%14%Gross marginGross mgn
10%10%9%10%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%1%0%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥114.2B¥288.7B¥265.1B(¥406.1B)¥11.4B¥840.9B¥883.6B¥778.7B¥548.0B¥242.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
2.5%5.1%4.3%−6.9%0.2%12.4%11.1%8.8%6.3%2.4%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥130.9B¥180.8B¥251.2B(¥431.5B)(¥32.4B)¥637.3B¥694.0B¥549.4B¥350.2B¥17.2BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥484.3B¥485.5B¥452.3B¥494.3B¥403.2B¥615.6B¥661.3B¥1.01T¥978.6B¥716.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥304.8B¥366.6B¥408.6B¥417.3B¥290.9B¥330.6B¥340.2B¥363.0B¥385.2B¥573.9BDepreciationDeprec.
¥48.6B(¥61.9B)(¥207.4B)¥508.5B¥144.8B(¥352.3B)(¥372.9B)¥97.8B¥243.1B¥125.9BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥321.9B¥411.9B¥438.8B¥460.6B¥459.8B¥466.9B¥470.0B¥466.3B¥597.9B¥863.2BCapexCapex
6.9%7.2%7.1%7.8%9.5%6.9%5.9%5.3%6.9%8.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥162.4B¥73.6B¥13.6B¥33.8B¥112.3B¥285.0B¥321.1B¥647.2B¥593.4B¥143.0BOwner earningsOwner earn.
3.5%1.3%0.2%0.6%2.3%4.2%4.0%7.3%6.8%1.4%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥162.4B¥73.6B¥13.6B¥33.8B(¥56.6B)¥148.7B¥191.3B¥543.8B¥380.7B(¥146.2B)Free cash flowFCF
3.5%1.3%0.2%0.6%−1.2%2.2%2.4%6.1%4.4%−1.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥13.6B¥66.3B¥70.7B¥46.1B¥73.8B¥165.9B¥152.1B¥162.1B¥146.5BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥44.3B¥96M¥55M¥43M¥30M¥59M¥58M¥73M¥58M¥29MBuybacksBuybacks
2%5%4%-7%0%13%12%9%6%2%ROICROIC
4%6%8%-16%-1%18%17%11%7%0%Return on equityROE
4%4%6%−18%16%13%8%3%−2%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥91.4B¥142.9B¥163.2B¥289.5B¥359.5B¥551.0B¥670.4B¥448.9B¥672.5B¥461.3BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥624.1B¥832.0B¥968.3B¥826.6B¥805.3B¥939.4B¥1.06T¥1.59T¥1.43T¥1.77TReceivablesReceiv.
¥728.3B¥1.58T¥1.61T¥1.45T¥1.38T¥1.53T¥1.59T¥1.89T¥1.67T¥2.34TAccounts payablePayables
¥1.11T¥631.4B(¥643.1B)(¥623.2B)(¥577.5B)(¥587.3B)(¥529.8B)(¥302.7B)(¥240.9B)(¥571.9B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
¥2.24T¥2.53T¥2.86T¥2.78T¥2.67T¥3.51T¥4.07T¥4.56T¥4.55T¥5.29TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥1.96T¥1.60T¥1.62T¥1.50T¥1.47T¥1.65T¥1.65T¥1.99T¥1.90T¥1.91TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.1×1.6×1.8×1.9×1.8×2.1×2.5×2.3×2.4×2.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥38.7B¥42.3B¥52.8B¥45.5B¥46.3B¥61.7B¥65.1B¥70.2B¥71.6B¥259.7BGoodwillGoodwill
¥7.26T¥7.76T¥8.05T¥7.44T¥7.57T¥8.75T¥9.57T¥10.71T¥10.94T¥14.66TTotal assetsAssets
¥2.10T¥1.72T¥1.99T¥2.13T¥2.22T¥2.38T¥2.37T¥2.36T¥2.15T¥4.17TTotal debtDebt
¥2.01T¥1.58T¥1.83T¥1.84T¥1.86T¥1.83T¥1.69T¥1.91T¥1.48T¥3.71TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
6.3×13.5×13.9×-18.6×0.5×38.6×42.2×25.5×14.3×2.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥3.29T¥3.14T¥3.23T¥2.64T¥2.76T¥3.47T¥4.18T¥4.78T¥5.38T¥5.53TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
4.75B4.75B4.75B4.75B4.75B4.75B4.75B4.75B5.37B5.37BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥975.02¥1202.32¥1300.18¥1246.22¥1016.35¥1432.97¥1678.50¥1865.89¥1618.18¥1872.70Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥27.56¥38.06¥52.86¥-90.81¥-6.83¥134.13¥146.06¥115.59¥65.18¥3.19EPS (diluted)EPS
¥34.18¥15.49¥2.86¥7.11¥23.64¥59.98¥67.58¥136.16¥110.42¥26.62Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥34.18¥15.49¥2.86¥7.11¥-11.92¥31.30¥40.25¥114.42¥70.84¥-27.21Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥2.85¥13.95¥14.88¥9.70¥15.52¥34.93¥32.01¥30.16¥27.26Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥67.74¥86.69¥92.34¥96.93¥96.77¥98.26¥98.92¥98.12¥111.27¥160.63Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥692.61¥660.20¥679.94¥555.94¥580.86¥729.61¥879.95¥1005.26¥1001.80¥1029.18Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2026 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+7.5%/yr+13.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share−2.7%/yr+2.4%/yr
EPS−21.3%/yr
Dividends / share+28.5%/yr+15.1%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+10.1%/yr+10.7%/yr
Book value / share+4.5%/yr+12.1%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥143.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥573.9B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥289.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥146.2B).

Reported net income¥17.2B
Owner earnings¥143.0B · 1% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥17.2B¥350.2B¥549.4B¥694.0B¥637.3B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥573.9B+¥385.2B+¥363.0B+¥340.2B+¥330.6B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥125.9B+¥243.1B+¥97.8B−¥372.9B−¥352.3B
Cash from operations¥716.9B¥978.6B¥1.01T¥661.3B¥615.6B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥573.9B−¥385.2B−¥363.0B−¥340.2B−¥330.6B
Owner earnings¥143.0B¥593.4B¥647.2B¥321.1B¥285.0B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥289.3B−¥212.7B−¥103.3B−¥129.8B−¥136.3B
Free cash flow(¥146.2B)¥380.7B¥543.8B¥191.3B¥148.7B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue1%7%7%4%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥573.9B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥289.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income ¥242.9B ÷ interest expense ¥89.6B
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥3.71T · 15.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥461.3B − debt ¥4.17T
    What this means

    Netting ¥461.3B of cash and short-term investments against ¥4.17T of debt leaves ¥3.71T owed, about 15.3× a year's operating profit (17.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -7%–13%; 2% latest = NOPAT ¥191.9B ÷ invested capital ¥9.24T
    Industry peers: median 6%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–7%; latest ¥143.0B = operating cash ¥716.9B − maintenance capex ¥573.9B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥289.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥146.2B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥716.9B ÷ net income ¥17.2B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks ¥146.5B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥143.0B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against ¥143.0B of Owner Earnings, ¥146.5B (102%) went back to shareholders, ¥146.5B dividends, ¥29M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.50×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥863.2B ÷ depreciation ¥573.9B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 6% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 9%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +13%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 13% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · −6.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥6.30T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥4.96T · 79%
  • Dividends¥897.0B · 14%
  • Buybacks¥44.8B · 1%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥403.1B · 6%
  • Returned to owners¥941.9B

    39% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥897.0B as dividends and ¥44.8B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥2.07T and cash and short-term investments rose ¥369.9B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥44.8B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count13.1%

    The diluted count rose from 4752M to 5374M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record¥27.26/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 33% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained27%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥1.41T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥378.0B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.27 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Nippon Steel is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?13.1%

    Diluted shares grew 13.1% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent ¥44.8B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?13% → 18% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from ¥624.1B to ¥1.77T while revenue grew 117%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (13% of revenue then, 18% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Nippon Steel has delivered.

Nippon Steel’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Nippon Steel earns about ¥293.4B on its 2.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.4% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+13%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow (¥146.2B) on 5374M diluted shares; net debt ¥3.71T. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥863.2B) runs well above depreciation (¥573.9B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥143.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 5333 its page in the Manual 5406 →

Industry order: the Steel chapter 5406 →