Owner Scorecard


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6103 · Okuma

Machine tools Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Okuma’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 6103) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥162.7B¥182.1B¥211.7B¥172.1B¥123.4B¥172.8B¥227.6B¥228.0B¥206.8B¥235.9BRevenueRevenue
30%28%32%29%Gross marginGross mgn
21%24%25%23%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%3%1%1%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥15.6B¥22.5B¥27.6B¥15.0B¥4.8B¥14.5B¥24.8B¥25.4B¥14.7B¥15.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.6%12.3%13.0%8.7%3.9%8.4%10.9%11.1%7.1%6.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥10.2B¥14.2B¥18.5B¥10.7B¥2.1B¥11.6B¥19.2B¥19.4B¥9.6B¥12.6BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥9.9B¥29.8B¥11.6B¥10.0B¥19.0B¥16.2B¥16.1B¥5.3B¥17.8B¥23.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥5.5B¥5.1B¥5.6B¥6.0B¥6.6B¥7.0B¥8.0B¥9.6B¥9.2B¥9.3BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥5.8B)¥10.5B(¥12.5B)(¥6.7B)¥10.3B(¥2.4B)(¥11.1B)(¥23.8B)(¥997M)¥2.0BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥7.0B¥7.9B¥6.5B¥10.0B¥2.6B¥3.7B¥5.5B¥6.4B¥6.6B¥23.9BCapexCapex
4.3%4.3%3.1%5.8%2.1%2.2%2.4%2.8%3.2%10.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥4.5B¥24.8B¥5.1B¥4.1B¥16.4B¥12.4B¥10.5B(¥1.1B)¥11.2B¥14.5BOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.7%13.6%2.4%2.4%13.3%7.2%4.6%−0.5%5.4%6.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥2.9B¥22.0B¥5.1B¥65M¥16.4B¥12.4B¥10.5B(¥1.1B)¥11.2B(¥108M)Free cash flowFCF
1.8%12.1%2.4%0.0%13.3%7.2%4.6%−0.5%5.4%−0.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥3.0B¥2.9B¥3.9B¥4.1B¥2.5B¥1.7B¥4.5B¥5.9B¥6.1B¥6.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥8M¥20M¥3.0B¥5M¥5M¥798M¥2.3B¥3.7B¥1.2B¥5.0BBuybacksBuybacks
11%16%18%9%3%8%13%10%7%7%ROICROIC
7%9%11%7%1%6%9%8%5%6%Return on equityROE
5%7%9%4%−0%5%7%6%2%3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥48.4B¥59.4B¥58.4B¥44.4B¥54.1B¥61.0B¥64.7B¥49.2B¥48.3B¥47.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥34.6B¥37.8B¥45.2B¥29.2B¥27.0B¥33.1B¥36.5B¥41.9B¥36.9B¥44.9BReceivablesReceiv.
¥45.9B¥48.3B¥54.6B¥52.3B¥48.7B¥63.4B¥79.1B¥81.8B¥85.6B¥82.1BInventoryInvent.
¥13.4B¥17.1B¥18.9B¥10.0B¥10.0B¥16.6B¥18.8B¥11.2B¥15.5B¥14.7BAccounts payablePayables
¥67.1B¥69.0B¥80.9B¥71.4B¥65.7B¥79.9B¥96.9B¥112.5B¥107.0B¥112.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥143.5B¥156.7B¥166.7B¥136.6B¥140.1B¥174.3B¥196.0B¥187.8B¥184.6B¥190.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥47.9B¥55.4B¥61.5B¥32.7B¥38.3B¥55.6B¥65.4B¥46.8B¥42.7B¥52.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×2.8×2.7×4.2×3.7×3.1×3.0×4.0×4.3×3.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥770M¥1.1B¥1.1B¥1.0B¥1.1B¥1.1B¥1.1BGoodwillGoodwill
¥211.1B¥232.0B¥237.7B¥212.3B¥223.2B¥259.0B¥287.5B¥297.8B¥298.2B¥340.4BTotal assetsAssets
¥14.4B¥11.5B¥10.9B¥6.2B¥5.0B¥5.0B¥5.0B¥5.0B¥10.0B¥25.0BTotal debtDebt
(¥34.0B)(¥47.9B)(¥47.4B)(¥38.2B)(¥49.1B)(¥56.0B)(¥59.7B)(¥44.2B)(¥38.3B)(¥22.8B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
148.2×316.8×501.4×405.3×133.9×192.8×314.0×437.3×164.6×102.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥145.2B¥160.9B¥168.6B¥164.3B¥163.9B¥193.7B¥212.8B¥237.8B¥198.4B¥199.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
67.5M67.5M67.5M67.5M67.5M67.5M67.5M67.5M67.5M67.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2409.70¥2697.82¥3136.31¥2549.16¥1827.79¥2559.75¥3371.89¥3377.19¥3063.58¥3494.12Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥151.70¥210.72¥274.34¥158.67¥30.93¥171.52¥284.33¥287.08¥142.05¥185.96EPS (diluted)EPS
¥66.14¥366.79¥76.26¥60.02¥242.29¥184.00¥156.26¥-16.63¥165.50¥215.27Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥43.24¥325.17¥76.26¥0.96¥242.29¥184.00¥156.26¥-16.63¥165.50¥-1.60Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥45.13¥42.76¥57.03¥60.79¥37.40¥25.71¥67.12¥86.91¥89.85¥89.62Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥103.82¥116.65¥96.30¥147.77¥38.59¥55.37¥81.65¥94.42¥98.19¥354.45Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥2150.10¥2383.38¥2497.11¥2433.92¥2427.37¥2868.55¥3152.87¥3523.12¥2938.16¥2961.09Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Share counts before 2025 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.2%/yr+13.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share+14.0%/yr−2.3%/yr
EPS+2.3%/yr+43.2%/yr
Dividends / share+7.9%/yr+19.1%/yr
Capital spending / share+14.6%/yr+55.8%/yr
Book value / share+3.6%/yr+4.1%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥14.5B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥9.3B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥14.6B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥108M).

Reported net income¥12.6B
Owner earnings¥14.5B · 6% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥12.6B¥9.6B¥19.4B¥19.2B¥11.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥9.3B+¥9.2B+¥9.6B+¥8.0B+¥7.0B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥2.0B−¥997M−¥23.8B−¥11.1B−¥2.4B
Cash from operations¥23.8B¥17.8B¥5.3B¥16.1B¥16.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥9.3B−¥6.6B−¥6.4B−¥5.5B−¥3.7B
Owner earnings¥14.5B¥11.2B(¥1.1B)¥10.5B¥12.4B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥14.6B
Free cash flow(¥108M)¥11.2B(¥1.1B)¥10.5B¥12.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue6%5%0%5%7%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥9.3B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥14.6B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥15.5B ÷ interest expense ¥152M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥47.8B − debt ¥25.0B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥22.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 69 + DIO 180 − DPO 32 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 3%–18%; 7% latest = NOPAT ¥12.2B ÷ invested capital ¥177.1B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -0%–14%; latest ¥14.5B = operating cash ¥23.8B − maintenance capex ¥9.3B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥14.6B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥108M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥23.8B ÷ net income ¥12.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥11.1B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥14.5B
    What this means

    Of ¥14.5B Owner Earnings, ¥11.1B (76%) went back to shareholders, ¥6.0B dividends, ¥5.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 2.58×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥23.9B ÷ depreciation ¥9.3B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 8% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −4%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2021 · 3.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥159.5B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥80.1B · 50%
  • Dividends¥40.7B · 25%
  • Buybacks¥16.1B · 10%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥22.6B · 14%
  • Returned to owners¥56.8B

    55% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥40.7B as dividends and ¥16.1B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥16.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count0.0%

    The diluted count barely moved (68M to 68M): buybacks roughly offset the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥89.62/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−5%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥71.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥3.3B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Okuma is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥14.4B → ¥25.0B

    Debt rose from ¥14.4B to ¥25.0B while owner earnings went from about ¥11.5B to ¥8.2B — about 1.3 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 3.1 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Okuma has delivered.

Okuma’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Okuma earns about ¥11.8B on its 5.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow (¥108M) on 68M diluted shares; net cash ¥22.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥23.9B) runs well above depreciation (¥9.3B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥14.5B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 6098 its page in the Manual 6113 →

Industry order: ← 5631 the Industrial Machinery chapter 6113 →