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6098 · Recruit Holdings
The numbers below are read directly from Recruit Holdings’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative is not machine-read; the short business note that follows is written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts. Find it on EDINET (code 6098) →
The business in brief
- What it is
- Recruit runs online marketplaces that connect people looking for work with employers who want to hire them, the best known being the job-search sites Indeed and Glassdoor. In Japan it also operates matching and media platforms around everyday decisions — jobs, housing, dining, travel and the like — and it supplies temporary and contract staffing to businesses in Japan and abroad. It is paid chiefly by employers: for job advertisements, for performance-based hiring tools, and for the labor it places.
- What moves the needle
- The part that matters most is a two-sided market: job seekers show up because the employers are there, and employers pay because the job seekers are there. The test is whether that loop hardens into a franchise an employer cannot easily route around — watch for pricing power over hiring fees, and for whether Recruit holds the candidate's attention more cheaply than rivals or than an employer's own hiring channel. The staffing arm is the plainer, commodity-like trade: labor-heavy, thin-margined and tied to the hiring cycle, so the bad case is a slump that thins job postings while staffing earns little. The figures for margins, returns on capital and the cash position sit in the record below.
Written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts.
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.94T | ¥2.17T | ¥2.31T | ¥2.40T | ¥2.27T | ¥2.87T | ¥3.43T | ¥3.42T | ¥3.56T | ¥3.70T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 54% | 50% | — | — | — | 59% | 59% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 44% | 43% | — | — | — | 44% | 41% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥76.4B | ¥191.8B | ¥223.1B | ¥206.0B | ¥162.8B | ¥378.9B | ¥344.3B | ¥402.5B | ¥490.5B | ¥630.6B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.9% | 8.8% | 9.7% | 8.6% | 7.2% | 13.2% | 10.0% | 11.8% | 13.8% | 17.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥136.7B | ¥151.7B | ¥174.3B | ¥179.9B | ¥131.4B | ¥296.8B | ¥269.8B | ¥353.7B | ¥408.5B | ¥496.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥154.4B | ¥194.1B | ¥277.0B | ¥303.3B | ¥286.6B | ¥439.6B | ¥438.2B | ¥535.4B | ¥610.4B | ¥669.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | ¥61.4B | ¥71.1B | ¥115.8B | ¥120.0B | ¥123.2B | ¥122.0B | ¥117.5B | ¥109.2B | ¥107.1B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥17.7B | (¥18.9B) | ¥31.6B | ¥7.7B | ¥35.2B | ¥19.6B | ¥46.4B | ¥64.2B | ¥92.6B | ¥65.4B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | ¥20.0B | ¥28.5B | ¥34.7B | ¥14.0B | ¥13.1B | ¥22.0B | ¥11.1B | ¥8.0B | ¥10.7B | CapexCapex |
| — | 0.9% | 1.2% | 1.4% | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 0.3% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | ¥174.1B | ¥248.5B | ¥268.7B | ¥272.6B | ¥426.5B | ¥416.2B | ¥524.2B | ¥602.4B | ¥658.7B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | 8.0% | 10.8% | 11.2% | 12.0% | 14.9% | 12.1% | 15.3% | 16.9% | 17.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | ¥174.1B | ¥248.5B | ¥268.7B | ¥272.6B | ¥426.5B | ¥416.2B | ¥524.2B | ¥602.4B | ¥658.7B | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | 8.0% | 10.8% | 11.2% | 12.0% | 14.9% | 12.1% | 15.3% | 16.9% | 17.8% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥28.2B | ¥54.6B | ¥42.6B | ¥49.3B | ¥40.4B | ¥34.3B | ¥34.6B | ¥35.4B | ¥35.6B | ¥35.4B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥31.2B | ¥1.1B | ¥1.3B | ¥81.3B | ¥70.7B | ¥124.6B | ¥152.5B | ¥218.9B | ¥824.5B | ¥678.8B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 5% | 24% | 24% | 17% | 13% | 31% | 27% | 29% | 38% | 48% | ROICROIC |
| 19% | 18% | 18% | 18% | 12% | 22% | 17% | 18% | 25% | 31% | Return on equityROE |
| 15% | 12% | 14% | 13% | 8% | 19% | 14% | 16% | 23% | 29% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥223.8B | ¥389.8B | ¥402.9B | ¥421.3B | ¥501.0B | ¥669.6B | ¥877.4B | ¥1.14T | ¥808.6B | ¥725.6B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥111.2B | ¥323.1B | ¥340.3B | ¥327.6B | ¥342.3B | ¥468.0B | ¥527.6B | ¥549.8B | ¥565.1B | ¥639.3B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | ¥204.2B | ¥212.2B | ¥219.0B | ¥243.9B | ¥283.8B | ¥349.9B | ¥359.9B | ¥377.5B | ¥425.5B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥111.2B | ¥118.9B | ¥128.1B | ¥108.6B | ¥98.4B | ¥184.2B | ¥177.6B | ¥190.0B | ¥187.5B | ¥213.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥530.4B | ¥771.0B | ¥809.0B | ¥830.0B | ¥927.5B | ¥1.18T | ¥1.47T | ¥1.76T | ¥1.47T | ¥1.56T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥651.8B | ¥324.2B | ¥263.8B | ¥328.0B | ¥399.6B | ¥408.3B | ¥427.9B | ¥572.4B | ¥645.6B | ¥557.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.8× | 2.4× | 3.1× | 2.5× | 2.3× | 2.9× | 3.4× | 3.1× | 2.3× | 2.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥0 | ¥312.9B | ¥410.7B | ¥383.2B | ¥399.4B | ¥436.0B | ¥463.0B | ¥510.6B | ¥508.1B | ¥553.3B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥1.46T | ¥1.57T | ¥1.75T | ¥2.00T | ¥2.20T | ¥2.42T | ¥2.79T | ¥3.14T | ¥2.77T | ¥2.79T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥689.0B | ¥183.1B | ¥162.1B | ¥408.4B | ¥417.8B | ¥271.4B | ¥253.5B | ¥219.7B | ¥207.9B | ¥185.6B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥465.2B | (¥206.7B) | (¥240.8B) | (¥12.8B) | (¥83.3B) | (¥398.1B) | (¥623.8B) | (¥917.1B) | (¥600.7B) | (¥539.9B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 66.0× | 174.0× | 596.5× | 62.3× | 41.3× | 87.6× | 69.8× | 13.0× | 46.2× | 59.9× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥737.6B | ¥835.6B | ¥965.8B | ¥988.4B | ¥1.09T | ¥1.36T | ¥1.63T | ¥2.00T | ¥1.62T | ¥1.58T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.70B | 1.70B | 1.70B | 1.70B | 1.70B | 1.70B | 1.70B | 1.65B | 1.56B | 1.47B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1145.03 | ¥1281.51 | ¥1362.51 | ¥1414.81 | ¥1338.09 | ¥1693.26 | ¥2022.17 | ¥2070.80 | ¥2274.73 | ¥2510.93 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥80.58 | ¥89.43 | ¥102.76 | ¥106.06 | ¥77.47 | ¥175.02 | ¥159.08 | ¥214.36 | ¥261.21 | ¥337.46 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | ¥102.67 | ¥146.51 | ¥158.42 | ¥160.72 | ¥251.47 | ¥245.39 | ¥317.74 | ¥385.20 | ¥447.35 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | ¥102.67 | ¥146.51 | ¥158.42 | ¥160.72 | ¥251.47 | ¥245.39 | ¥317.74 | ¥385.20 | ¥447.35 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥16.65 | ¥32.17 | ¥25.13 | ¥29.05 | ¥23.83 | ¥20.23 | ¥20.42 | ¥21.44 | ¥22.79 | ¥24.01 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | ¥11.79 | ¥16.79 | ¥20.44 | ¥8.26 | ¥7.74 | ¥12.99 | ¥6.75 | ¥5.08 | ¥7.27 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥434.90 | ¥492.70 | ¥569.46 | ¥582.83 | ¥643.63 | ¥804.13 | ¥959.34 | ¥1212.80 | ¥1034.32 | ¥1075.26 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.1%/yr | +13.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +20.2%/yr (8-yr) | +22.7%/yr |
| EPS | +17.3%/yr | +34.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +4.2%/yr | +0.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | −5.9%/yr (8-yr) | −2.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +10.6%/yr | +10.8%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned ¥496.9B of profit into ¥658.7B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥496.9B | ¥408.5B | ¥353.7B | ¥269.8B | ¥296.8B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥107.1B | +¥109.2B | +¥117.5B | +¥122.0B | +¥123.2B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥65.4B | +¥92.6B | +¥64.2B | +¥46.4B | +¥19.6B |
| Cash from operations | ¥669.4B | ¥610.4B | ¥535.4B | ¥438.2B | ¥439.6B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥10.7B | −¥8.0B | −¥11.1B | −¥22.0B | −¥13.1B |
| Owner earnings | ¥658.7B | ¥602.4B | ¥524.2B | ¥416.2B | ¥426.5B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 18% | 17% | 15% | 12% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 59.9×ComfortableOperating income ¥630.6B ÷ interest expense ¥10.5B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +¥539.9BNet cashCash ¥725.6B − debt ¥185.6B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥539.9B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 63 + DIO 0 − DPO 103 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 5%–48%; 48% latest = NOPAT ¥498.1B ÷ invested capital ¥1.04TIndustry peers: median 21%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 48% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median margin, range 8%–18%; latest ¥658.7B = operating cash ¥669.4B − maintenance capex ¥10.7BIndustry peers: median 36%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 18% of revenue this year, a 12% median across 9 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥669.4B ÷ net income ¥496.9B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks ¥714.1B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥658.7B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against ¥658.7B of Owner Earnings, ¥714.1B (108%) went back to shareholders, ¥35.4B dividends, ¥678.8B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.10×HarvestingCapex ¥10.7B ÷ depreciation ¥107.1B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 8 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 7% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 14% lately, median 10% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2017 · 3.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2018–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥3.75T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.
- Reinvested¥162.1B · 4%
- Dividends¥362.2B · 10%
- Buybacks¥2.15T · 57%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥1.08T · 29%
- Returned to owners¥2.52T
70% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥362.2B as dividends and ¥2.15T as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥2.15T over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−13.2%
The diluted count fell from 1696M to 1473M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥24.01/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend shrinking about 4% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Recruit Holdings is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?6% → 17% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from ¥111.2B to ¥639.3B while revenue grew 90%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (6% of revenue then, 17% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Recruit Holdings has delivered.
Recruit Holdings’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Recruit Holdings earns about ¥448.7B on its 12.1% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 17.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ¥658.7B on 1473M diluted shares; net cash ¥539.9B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 5803 its page in the Manual 6103 →
Industry order: the Staffing & Employment Services chapter AMN →