Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 6954 Manual 6971 → ← 6723 Semiconductors AAOI →

6963 · Rohm

Semiconductors Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Rohm’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 6963) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥352.0B¥397.1B¥399.0B¥362.9B¥359.9B¥452.1B¥507.9B¥467.8B¥448.5B¥481.1BRevenueRevenue
31%33%17%24%Gross marginGross mgn
23%22%25%22%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%9%13%10%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥31.8B¥57.0B¥55.9B¥29.5B¥38.5B¥71.5B¥92.3B¥43.3B(¥40.1B)¥10.9BOperating incomeOp. inc.
9.0%14.4%14.0%8.1%10.7%15.8%18.2%9.3%−8.9%2.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥26.4B¥37.2B¥45.4B¥25.6B¥37.0B¥66.8B¥80.4B¥54.0B(¥50.1B)(¥158.4B)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥67.4B¥74.7B¥66.0B¥79.1B¥46.0B¥92.2B¥98.6B¥82.9B¥84.0B¥89.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥40.8B¥43.4B¥45.4B¥44.3B¥40.2B¥42.0B¥56.1B¥72.1B¥83.4B¥57.0BDepreciationDeprec.
¥164M(¥5.9B)(¥24.9B)¥9.2B(¥31.2B)(¥16.7B)(¥37.9B)(¥43.2B)¥50.6B¥190.8BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥39.6B¥49.9B¥54.3B¥41.9B¥32.4B¥66.6B¥100.8B¥166.3B¥135.8B¥111.0BCapexCapex
11.3%12.6%13.6%11.5%9.0%14.7%19.8%35.5%30.3%23.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥27.8B¥24.9B¥11.7B¥37.3B¥13.6B¥50.2B¥42.5B¥10.8B¥538M¥32.4BOwner earningsOwner earn.
7.9%6.3%2.9%10.3%3.8%11.1%8.4%2.3%0.1%6.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥27.8B¥24.9B¥11.7B¥37.3B¥13.6B¥25.6B(¥2.1B)(¥83.4B)(¥51.8B)(¥21.5B)Free cash flowFCF
7.9%6.3%2.9%10.3%3.8%5.7%−0.4%−17.8%−11.6%−4.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥12.2B¥21.2B¥20.6B¥15.7B¥14.8B¥14.7B¥20.6B¥19.5B¥19.3B¥19.3BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥6M¥10M¥10.0B¥41.3B¥8.7B¥9M¥6M¥20.0B¥1M¥0BuybacksBuybacks
5%9%8%5%6%10%11%3%-3%1%ROICROIC
4%5%6%3%5%8%9%6%-6%-25%Return on equityROE
2%2%3%1%3%6%7%4%−9%−28%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥246.0B¥244.0B¥228.1B¥293.0B¥320.3B¥295.2B¥294.3B¥228.1B¥287.0B¥443.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥76.7B¥85.3B¥84.0B¥74.8B¥86.3B¥100.2B¥100.5B¥88.9B¥77.3B¥82.6BReceivablesReceiv.
¥23.2B¥27.6B¥30.3B¥27.6B¥33.4B¥39.7B¥53.8B¥52.5B¥43.1B¥40.9BInventoryInvent.
¥12.2B¥13.8B¥11.9B¥11.0B¥14.1B¥18.1B¥16.2B¥16.1B¥19.5B¥23.7BAccounts payablePayables
¥87.7B¥99.1B¥102.4B¥91.4B¥105.6B¥121.7B¥138.1B¥125.3B¥100.8B¥99.8BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥496.0B¥504.2B¥511.0B¥517.9B¥555.8B¥620.0B¥654.0B¥592.7B¥561.2B¥750.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥69.0B¥78.1B¥76.2B¥62.4B¥73.4B¥105.9B¥131.9B¥466.0B¥219.6B¥198.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
7.2×6.5×6.7×8.3×7.6×5.9×5.0×1.3×2.6×3.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥5.4B¥1.4B¥1.1B¥795M¥497M¥198MGoodwillGoodwill
¥834.5B¥864.1B¥874.4B¥848.9B¥926.2B¥1.03T¥1.12T¥1.48T¥1.44T¥1.28TTotal assetsAssets
¥40.9B¥40.7B¥40.5B¥40.3B¥340.1B¥400.0B¥400.0BTotal debtDebt
(¥252.0B)(¥279.6B)(¥254.7B)(¥253.9B)¥112.0B¥113.0B(¥43.8B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
55909.0×275.6×405.1×627.0×694.1×99.4×-38.5×7.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥725.5B¥751.9B¥766.8B¥745.2B¥758.7B¥840.4B¥915.5B¥968.1B¥815.9B¥638.3BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
445M445M440M440M412M412M412M412M404M404MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥791.39¥892.77¥906.79¥824.74¥873.51¥1097.39¥1232.72¥1135.39¥1110.72¥1191.67Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥59.42¥83.74¥103.28¥58.25¥89.81¥162.20¥195.08¥130.98¥-124.00¥-392.37EPS (diluted)EPS
¥62.49¥55.90¥26.63¥84.66¥33.00¥121.73¥103.13¥26.19¥1.33¥80.30Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥62.49¥55.90¥26.63¥84.66¥33.00¥62.14¥-5.20¥-202.46¥-128.38¥-53.29Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥27.35¥47.56¥46.88¥35.63¥35.98¥35.73¥50.02¥47.24¥47.80¥47.80Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥89.03¥112.10¥123.35¥95.18¥78.58¥161.60¥244.58¥403.58¥336.32¥274.83Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥1630.96¥1690.37¥1742.62¥1693.66¥1841.52¥2039.69¥2222.00¥2349.76¥2020.81¥1580.89Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×4 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+4.7%/yr+6.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+2.8%/yr+19.5%/yr
Dividends / share+6.4%/yr+5.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.3%/yr+28.5%/yr
Book value / share−0.3%/yr−3.0%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥32.4B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥57.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥53.9B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (¥21.5B).

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income(¥158.4B)(¥50.1B)¥54.0B¥80.4B¥66.8B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥57.0B+¥83.4B+¥72.1B+¥56.1B+¥42.0B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥190.8B+¥50.6B−¥43.2B−¥37.9B−¥16.7B
Cash from operations¥89.4B¥84.0B¥82.9B¥98.6B¥92.2B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥57.0B−¥83.4B−¥72.1B−¥56.1B−¥42.0B
Owner earnings¥32.4B¥538M¥10.8B¥42.5B¥50.2B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥53.9B−¥52.4B−¥94.2B−¥44.6B−¥24.6B
Free cash flow(¥21.5B)(¥51.8B)(¥83.4B)(¥2.1B)¥25.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue7%0%2%8%11%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥57.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥53.9B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥10.9B ÷ interest expense ¥1.5B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥428.7B + ST investments ¥15.1B − debt ¥400.0B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥43.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 63 + DIO 41 − DPO 24 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -3%–11%; 1% latest = NOPAT ¥8.6B ÷ invested capital ¥609.6B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 1% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–11%; latest ¥32.4B = operating cash ¥89.4B − maintenance capex ¥57.0B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 7% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥53.9B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (¥21.5B) — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income (¥158.4B) · cash from operations ¥89.4B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥19.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥32.4B
    What this means

    Of ¥32.4B Owner Earnings, ¥19.3B (60%) went back to shareholders, ¥19.3B dividends, ¥0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.95×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥111.0B ÷ depreciation ¥57.0B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 12% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 12% early to 1% lately, median 9% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −10%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −8.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥780.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥798.4B · 102%
  • Dividends¥177.8B · 23%
  • Buybacks¥80.0B · 10%
  • Returned to owners¥257.9B

    102% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥177.8B as dividends and ¥80.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥276.0B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥276.0B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥80.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−9.2%

    The diluted count fell from 445M to 404M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥47.80/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Rohm is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 4 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Rohm has delivered.

Rohm’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Rohm earns about ¥31.3B on its 6.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 6.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26−23%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow (¥21.5B) on 404M diluted shares; net cash ¥43.8B. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥111.0B) runs well above depreciation (¥57.0B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥32.4B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 6954 its page in the Manual 6971 →

Industry order: ← 6723 the Semiconductors chapter AAOI →