Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 6702 Manual 6724 → ← 6526 Semiconductors 6963 →

6723 · Renesas Electronics

Semiconductors Capital-intensive IFRS
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Renesas Electronics’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 6723) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥471.0B¥779.3B¥756.5B¥718.2B¥715.7B¥993.9B¥1.50T¥1.47T¥1.35T¥1.32TRevenueRevenue
41%47%56%57%Gross marginGross mgn
38%37%39%39%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
14%13%10%9%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥54.7B¥91.1B¥68.2B¥6.3B¥65.1B¥173.8B¥424.2B¥390.8B¥223.0B¥201.2BOperating incomeOp. inc.
11.6%11.7%9.0%0.9%9.1%17.5%28.3%26.6%16.5%15.2%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥44.1B¥102.0B¥51.0B(¥6.3B)¥45.6B¥119.5B¥256.6B¥337.1B¥219.1B(¥51.8B)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥95.9B¥173.6B¥172.3B¥202.0B¥223.9B¥307.4B¥479.3B¥496.6B¥340.5B¥452.9BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥35.6B¥76.5B¥112.7B¥148.0B¥141.5B¥146.0B¥186.0B¥186.0B¥210.7B¥188.6BDepreciationDeprec.
¥16.1B(¥4.9B)¥8.6B¥60.3B¥36.7B¥41.8B¥36.7B(¥26.5B)(¥89.3B)¥316.0BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥44.9B¥114.7B¥64.5B¥38.3B¥22.3B¥36.9B¥66.1B¥88.2B¥129.9B¥89.2BCapexCapex
9.5%14.7%8.5%5.3%3.1%3.7%4.4%6.0%9.6%6.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥60.3B¥97.2B¥107.8B¥163.7B¥201.6B¥270.4B¥413.2B¥408.4B¥210.6B¥363.7BOwner earningsOwner earn.
12.8%12.5%14.2%22.8%28.2%27.2%27.5%27.8%15.6%27.5%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥51.0B¥58.9B¥107.8B¥163.7B¥201.6B¥270.4B¥413.2B¥408.4B¥210.6B¥363.7BFree cash flowFCF
10.8%7.6%14.2%22.8%28.2%27.2%27.5%27.8%15.6%27.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥200.0B¥50.0B¥0¥0BuybacksBuybacks
9%18%9%-1%7%10%17%17%9%-2%Return on equityROE
Balance sheet
¥354.3B¥69.5B¥188.8B¥146.5B¥219.8B¥221.9B¥336.1B¥434.7B¥229.2B¥295.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥80.5B¥96.5B¥79.4B¥84.5B¥82.3B¥140.5B¥162.6B¥169.0B¥167.1B¥169.1BReceivablesReceiv.
¥74.8B¥78.5B¥116.2B¥100.2B¥114.2B¥204.3B¥222.9B¥243.2B¥231.0B¥219.2BAccounts payablePayables
¥40.2B¥66.4B(¥36.8B)(¥15.7B)(¥31.9B)(¥63.9B)(¥60.3B)(¥74.2B)(¥63.9B)(¥50.0B)Operating working capitalOper. WC
¥558.5B¥311.6B¥393.6B¥334.0B¥402.8B¥517.6B¥715.1B¥800.7B¥617.3B¥723.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥185.6B¥321.1B¥320.0B¥407.1B¥430.8B¥741.7B¥896.8B¥1.10T¥786.4B¥929.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.0×1.0×1.2×0.8×0.9×0.7×0.8×0.7×0.8×0.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥172.8B¥187.2B¥625.0B¥590.5B¥1.09T¥1.26T¥1.36T¥2.26T¥2.24TGoodwillGoodwill
¥873.2B¥1.14T¥1.06T¥1.67T¥1.61T¥2.43T¥2.81T¥3.17T¥4.49T¥4.18TTotal assetsAssets
34.7×33.2×32.0×0.7×8.6×4.9×6.7×58.0×20.3×0.8×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥467.6B¥575.7B¥598.1B¥621.5B¥616.7B¥1.15T¥1.53T¥2.00T¥2.54T¥2.44TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.67B1.67B1.67B1.71B1.73B1.94B1.96B1.96B1.87B1.87BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥282.54¥467.41¥453.43¥419.96¥413.23¥511.32¥766.35¥750.29¥720.87¥706.30Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥26.46¥61.20¥30.56¥-3.69¥26.34¥61.50¥131.03¥172.12¥117.12¥-27.67EPS (diluted)EPS
¥36.15¥58.27¥64.61¥95.70¥116.42¥139.13¥210.98¥208.53¥112.58¥194.43Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥30.60¥35.33¥64.61¥95.70¥116.42¥139.13¥210.98¥208.53¥112.58¥194.43Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥26.91¥68.83¥38.67¥22.38¥12.85¥19.00¥33.77¥45.05¥69.44¥47.66Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥280.47¥345.33¥358.49¥363.37¥356.08¥591.66¥783.14¥1022.01¥1356.44¥1306.01Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+10.7%/yr+11.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+20.6%/yr+10.8%/yr
Dividends / share+1.2%/yr (1-yr)+1.2%/yr (1-yr)
Capital spending / share+6.6%/yr+30.0%/yr
Book value / share+18.6%/yr+29.7%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a ¥51.8B loss into ¥363.7B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income(¥51.8B)¥219.1B¥337.1B¥256.6B¥119.5B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥188.6B+¥210.7B+¥186.0B+¥186.0B+¥146.0B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥316.0B−¥89.3B−¥26.5B+¥36.7B+¥41.8B
Cash from operations¥452.9B¥340.5B¥496.6B¥479.3B¥307.4B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−¥89.2B−¥129.9B−¥88.2B−¥66.1B−¥36.9B
Owner earnings¥363.7B¥210.6B¥408.4B¥413.2B¥270.4B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue28%16%28%28%27%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ¥201.2B ÷ interest expense ¥245.6B
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Debt under-captured — leverage unknown, not low
    What this means

    This company pays far more interest than its tagged debt implies (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so its net cash or net debt cannot be read honestly: the gap is unknown, not zero, and 'net cash' here would be exactly the fiction the figure is meant to prevent. Judge it on the record and owner earnings instead.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 47 + DIO 0 − DPO 141 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Debt under-captured
    Industry peers: median 21%
    What this means

    This company's interest bill implies far more debt than its filings tag at the consolidated level (the rest sits under segment dimensions the data source strips), so invested capital, and the return on it, cannot be read honestly. Judge this one on Owner Earnings and the record instead.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 12%–28%; latest ¥363.7B = operating cash ¥452.9B − maintenance capex ¥89.2B
    Industry peers: median 36%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 28% of revenue this year, a 23% median across 10 years.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income (¥51.8B) · cash from operations ¥452.9B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks ¥50.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥363.7B
    What this means

    Of ¥363.7B Owner Earnings, ¥50.3B (14%) went back to shareholders, ¥50.3B dividends, ¥0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.47×
    Harvesting
    Capex ¥89.2B ÷ depreciation ¥188.6B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Operating margin 11% → 19% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 11% early to 19% lately, median 12% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Owner earnings growth +15%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 15% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 0.9% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +1.3%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 2 of the years on record.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥2.94T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested¥695.0B · 24%
  • Dividends¥100.0B · 3%
  • Buybacks¥250.0B · 8%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥1.90T · 65%
  • Returned to owners¥350.0B

    15% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥100.0B as dividends and ¥250.0B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥250.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count12.2%

    The diluted count rose from 1667M to 1871M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record¥26.90/sh

    Paid in 2 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 1% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained31%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥767.0B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥239.2B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.31 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Renesas Electronics is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?12.2%

    Diluted shares grew 12.2% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent ¥250.0B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Renesas Electronics has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Renesas Electronics earns about ¥330.3B on its 25.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 27.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−4%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+20%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ¥363.7B on 1871M diluted shares; net cash ¥53.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 6702 its page in the Manual 6724 →

Industry order: ← 6526 the Semiconductors chapter 6963 →