← Japan catalog ← 6976 Manual 6988 → ← 6976 Electronic Components & Instruments AEIS →
6981 · Murata Manufacturing
The numbers below are read directly from Murata Manufacturing’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative is not machine-read; the short business note that follows is written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts. Find it on EDINET (code 6981) →
The business in brief
- What it is
- Murata makes the small passive components that sit inside almost every electronic device — above all the multilayer ceramic capacitors that store and steady electric charge, along with filters, inductors and related parts. It supplies these in vast volume to the firms that build smartphones, cars, computers and industrial gear, earning its keep as a high-volume maker of pieces that cost very little each but are needed in great number. The work is capital-intensive: the money goes into ceramic process know-how and the plants that turn it into parts at scale.
- What moves the needle
- The question that governs this business is whether a component that sells for a trifling sum is a franchise or a commodity. The case for a franchise rests on process mastery and scale — making a smaller, more reliable capacitor at lower cost than anyone else, so customers design Murata's parts in and are loath to switch; the test is whether margins and returns on capital hold through the cycle rather than collapsing when buyers push back on price. The bad case is the commodity case: capacity is dear and lumpy, demand swings with the electronics it feeds, and a glut can leave costly plants idle while prices fall. Watch the cost position and the steadiness of returns; the figures are in the record below.
Written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts.
Where the money comes from
on EDINET →The biggest segment, Components, is also where the profit is made: 64% of revenue and 100% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Devices And Modules ran a ¥26.5B operating loss; Other ran a ¥6.8B operating loss.
- Components64%¥1.18T100% of profit
- Devices And Modules36%¥656.0Bloss of ¥26.5B
- Other4%¥69.7Bloss of ¥6.8B
From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥831.1B | ¥948.6B | ¥1.05T | ¥1.04T | ¥1.11T | ¥1.23T | ¥1.69T | ¥1.64T | ¥1.74T | ¥1.83T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 23% | 24% | — | — | — | 41% | 42% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 20% | 19% | — | — | — | 16% | 16% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 9% | 9% | — | — | — | 7% | 7% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥33.5B | ¥8.4B | ¥46.1B | ¥37.8B | ¥47.1B | ¥125.5B | ¥298.2B | ¥215.4B | ¥279.7B | ¥281.8B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 4.0% | 0.9% | 4.4% | 3.6% | 4.3% | 10.2% | 17.7% | 13.1% | 16.0% | 15.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥75.8B | ¥48.1B | ¥67.0B | ¥67.7B | ¥85.3B | ¥184.8B | ¥243.9B | ¥180.8B | ¥233.8B | ¥233.9B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥277.6B | ¥489.6B | ¥451.9B | ¥425.2B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥169.6B | ¥175.9B | ¥173.3B | ¥178.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | (¥135.9B) | ¥132.9B | ¥44.8B | ¥13.1B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥189.9B | ¥228.6B | ¥182.9B | ¥244.6B | CapexCapex |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 11.3% | 13.9% | 10.5% | 13.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥87.7B | ¥313.8B | ¥269.0B | ¥247.0B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.2% | 19.1% | 15.4% | 13.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥87.7B | ¥261.0B | ¥269.0B | ¥180.6B | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | 5.2% | 15.9% | 15.4% | 9.9% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥46.7B | ¥51.1B | ¥57.6B | ¥59.9B | ¥67.2B | ¥76.8B | ¥92.0B | ¥94.5B | ¥101.6B | ¥110.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥87M | ¥53M | ¥33M | ¥12M | ¥20M | ¥12M | ¥80.0B | ¥11M | ¥80.0B | ¥100.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 4% | 1% | 4% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 12% | 8% | 11% | 11% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 8% | 11% | 11% | 14% | 8% | 10% | 7% | 9% | 9% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | −1% | 2% | 1% | 3% | 5% | 6% | 3% | 5% | 5% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥144.9B | ¥18.9B | ¥53.8B | ¥117.2B | ¥162.3B | ¥245.1B | ¥469.4B | ¥622.0B | ¥625.1B | ¥653.7B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥209.9B | ¥263.7B | ¥276.2B | ¥308.9B | ¥354.1B | ¥369.2B | ¥263.7B | ¥309.7B | ¥326.2B | ¥366.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥6.4B | ¥12.5B | ¥19.8B | ¥13.9B | ¥14.5B | ¥15.2B | ¥12.0B | ¥12.4B | ¥10.8B | ¥9.8B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥216.2B | ¥276.1B | ¥296.0B | ¥322.8B | ¥368.6B | ¥384.3B | ¥275.7B | ¥322.1B | ¥337.0B | ¥375.7B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥496.0B | ¥419.0B | ¥470.4B | ¥549.8B | ¥660.6B | ¥811.0B | ¥1.41T | ¥1.50T | ¥1.50T | ¥1.58T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥337.9B | ¥402.5B | ¥328.6B | ¥362.8B | ¥496.5B | ¥549.8B | ¥521.6B | ¥657.8B | ¥655.1B | ¥593.2B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.5× | 1.0× | 1.4× | 1.5× | 1.3× | 1.5× | 2.7× | 2.3× | 2.3× | 2.7× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥123.2B | ¥137.1B | ¥135.7B | ¥99.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥942.9B | ¥1.02T | ¥1.05T | ¥1.15T | ¥1.27T | ¥2.80T | ¥2.86T | ¥3.04T | ¥3.03T | ¥3.20T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥235.1B | ¥244.3B | ¥282.0B | ¥353.0B | ¥405.0B | ¥442.4B | ¥155.2B | ¥105.9B | ¥57.6B | ¥52.5B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥90.2B | ¥225.5B | ¥228.3B | ¥235.9B | ¥242.7B | ¥197.3B | (¥314.2B) | (¥516.1B) | (¥567.6B) | (¥601.2B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 88.9× | 10.3× | 44.6× | 43.8× | 178.6× | 454.6× | 401.4× | 259.3× | 407.7× | 301.4× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥580.3B | ¥587.9B | ¥595.8B | ¥598.1B | ¥616.3B | ¥2.24T | ¥2.36T | ¥2.56T | ¥2.58T | ¥2.72T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 2.03B | 2.03B | 2.03B | 2.03B | 2.03B | 2.03B | 2.03B | 2.03B | 1.96B | 1.96B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥409.96 | ¥467.88 | ¥519.43 | ¥515.32 | ¥546.43 | ¥608.38 | ¥831.98 | ¥808.98 | ¥888.11 | ¥932.68 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥37.37 | ¥23.72 | ¥33.05 | ¥33.38 | ¥42.08 | ¥91.14 | ¥120.32 | ¥89.20 | ¥119.11 | ¥119.16 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥43.27 | ¥154.76 | ¥137.02 | ¥125.83 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥43.27 | ¥128.74 | ¥137.02 | ¥92.00 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥23.03 | ¥25.18 | ¥28.40 | ¥29.56 | ¥33.13 | ¥37.87 | ¥45.39 | ¥46.59 | ¥51.75 | ¥56.40 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | — | — | — | — | — | ¥93.67 | ¥112.77 | ¥93.19 | ¥124.61 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥286.22 | ¥289.99 | ¥293.88 | ¥295.00 | ¥304.00 | ¥1104.68 | ¥1164.02 | ¥1260.77 | ¥1314.72 | ¥1384.99 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2020 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.6%/yr | +11.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +42.7%/yr (3-yr) | +42.7%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | +13.8%/yr | +23.1%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +10.5%/yr | +11.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +10.0%/yr (3-yr) | +10.0%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +19.1%/yr | +35.4%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥247.0B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥178.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥66.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥180.6B.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥233.9B | ¥233.8B | ¥180.8B | ¥243.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥178.2B | +¥173.3B | +¥175.9B | +¥169.6B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥13.1B | +¥44.8B | +¥132.9B | −¥135.9B |
| Cash from operations | ¥425.2B | ¥451.9B | ¥489.6B | ¥277.6B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥178.2B | −¥182.9B | −¥175.9B | −¥189.9B |
| Owner earnings | ¥247.0B | ¥269.0B | ¥313.8B | ¥87.7B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥66.4B | — | −¥52.8B | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥180.6B | ¥269.0B | ¥261.0B | ¥87.7B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 13% | 15% | 19% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥178.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥66.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 301.4×ComfortableOperating income ¥281.8B ÷ interest expense ¥935M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +¥601.2BNet cashCash ¥653.7B − debt ¥52.5B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥601.2B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range 1%–12%; 11% latest = NOPAT ¥222.6B ÷ invested capital ¥2.12TIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 11% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle4-yr median margin, range 5%–19%; latest ¥247.0B = operating cash ¥425.2B − maintenance capex ¥178.2BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 13% median across 4 years. It chose to put ¥66.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥180.6B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥425.2B ÷ net income ¥233.9B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥210.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥247.0B
What this means
Of ¥247.0B Owner Earnings, ¥210.7B (85%) went back to shareholders, ¥110.7B dividends, ¥100.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.37×ExpandingCapex ¥244.6B ÷ depreciation ¥178.2B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 3% → 15% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 3% early to 15% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2018 · 0.9% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2023–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥1.64T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥846.1B · 51%
- Dividends¥398.8B · 24%
- Buybacks¥260.0B · 16%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥139.5B · 8%
- Returned to owners¥658.8B
72% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥398.8B as dividends and ¥260.0B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥260.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−3.2%
The diluted count fell from 2027M to 1963M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥56.40/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 8% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained23%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥233.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥53.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.23 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Murata Manufacturing is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Murata Manufacturing has delivered.
Through the cycle, Murata Manufacturing earns about ¥264.7B on its 14.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥180.6B on 1963M diluted shares; net cash ¥601.2B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥244.6B) runs well above depreciation (¥178.2B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥247.0B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 6976 its page in the Manual 6988 →
Industry order: ← 6976 the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter AEIS →