Owner Scorecard


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AEIS, Advanced Energy Industries Inc.

Advanced Energy provides highly engineered, critical, precision power conversion, measurement, and control solutions to our global customers.

Our products enable customers to reduce or optimize their energy consumption through increased power conversion efficiency, power density, power coupling, and process control across a wide range of applications.

We are organized on a global, functional basis and operate as a single segment of power electronics conversion products.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
AEIS · Advanced Energy Industries Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$1.8B
+21.4% YoY · 5% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $1.9B 5-yr avg $1.6B
Gross margin 38% 5-yr avg 36%
Operating margin 10.8% 5-yr avg 8.3%
ROIC 10% 5-yr avg 12%
Owner-earnings margin 7% 5-yr avg 8%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 38% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a solid spread between what it charges and what the product costs to make. The operating margin has swung widely — from 2.5% to 30% over the years — so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year, and the worst year more than the best. Inventory runs near 20% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 19%, above 15% in 6 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

70% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025
  • All others36%$656M
  • United States30%$541M
  • Mexico14%$253M
  • Japan12%$218M
  • Taiwan7%$130M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$484M$671M$719M$789M$1.4B$1.5B$1.8B$1.7B$1.5B$1.8B$1.9BRevenueRevenue
52%53%51%40%38%37%37%36%36%38%38%Gross marginGross mgn
16%14%15%18%13%13%12%13%15%13%13%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
9%9%11%13%10%11%10%12%14%13%13%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$127M$201M$172M$54M$176M$152M$233M$114M$37M$168M$206MOperating incomeOp. inc.
26.2%29.9%23.9%6.9%12.4%10.4%12.6%6.9%2.5%9.3%10.8%Operating marginOp. mgn
$127M$138M$147M$65M$135M$135M$200M$128M$54M$148M$191MNet incomeNet inc.
8%31%15%14%15%9%17%-7%-8%12%8%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$119M$183M$151M$48M$201M$140M$184M$209M$131M$233M$198MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$8M$9M$14M$26M$48M$53M$60M$67M$69M$62M$62MDepreciationDeprec.
($22M)$23M($19M)($50M)$7M($63M)($96M)($17M)($38M)($33M)($115M)Working capital & otherWC & other
$7M$9M$20M$25M$36M$29M$59M$61M$57M$107M$130MCapexCapex
1.4%1.3%2.8%3.2%2.6%2.0%3.2%3.7%3.8%6.0%6.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$112M$174M$138M$23M$165M$111M$125M$148M$74M$171M$137MOwner earningsOwner earn.
23.3%25.9%19.2%2.9%11.6%7.7%6.8%8.9%5.0%9.5%7.2%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$112M$174M$131M$23M$165M$111M$125M$148M$74M$126M$68MFree cash flowFCF
23.3%25.9%18.2%2.9%11.6%7.7%6.8%8.9%5.0%7.0%3.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$17M$94M$366M$5M$22M$149M$14M$14MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$15M$15M$15M$15M$16M$16MDividends paidDiv. paid
$0$30M$95M$12M$78M$27M$40M$2M$30MBuybacksBuybacks
106%122%57%7%23%19%20%11%4%9%10%ROICROIC
33%26%24%10%17%15%19%11%5%11%14%Return on equityROE
14%17%10%3%10%13%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$282M$410M$352M$349M$483M$547M$459M$1.0B$722M$791M$702MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$76M$87M$301M$282M$265M$325M$377MReceivablesReceiv.
$56M$78M$98M$230M$221M$338M$376M$336M$360M$411M$459MInventoryInvent.
$46M$48M$40M$171M$125M$194M$170M$142M$144M$224M$272MAccounts payablePayables
$85M$118M$58M$59M$96M$145M$506M$477M$482M$512M$563MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$438M$595M$568M$867M$980M$1.2B$1.2B$1.7B$1.4B$1.6B$1.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$95M$106M$110M$320M$296M$370M$393M$336M$314M$991M$1.0BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
4.6×5.6×5.2×2.7×3.3×3.1×3.0×5.1×4.4×1.6×1.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$42M$54M$102M$203M$210M$212M$281M$284M$296M$301M$300MGoodwillGoodwill
$572M$733M$816M$1.5B$1.6B$1.8B$2.0B$2.6B$2.3B$2.5B$2.6BTotal assetsAssets
$339M$322M$393M$373M$916M$565M$1.1B$1.1BTotal debtDebt
($10M)($161M)($154M)($86M)($129M)($157M)$344M$435MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
3042.0×752.4×15.9×30.6×42.4×31.8×6.8×1.5×10.1×12.4×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$392M$521M$607M$677M$815M$871M$1.1B$1.1B$1.2B$1.4B$1.4BShareholders’ equityEquity
1.3%1.9%1.3%0.9%0.9%1.1%1.1%1.9%3.1%3.1%3.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
40.0M40.2M39.4M38.5M38.5M38.4M37.7M37.8M37.8M38.6M42.2MShares out (diluted)Shares
$12.08$16.70$18.27$20.49$36.73$37.96$48.92$43.80$39.21$46.60$45.15Revenue / shareRev/sh
$3.18$3.43$3.74$1.69$3.49$3.51$5.29$3.39$1.43$3.84$4.51EPS (diluted)EPS
$2.81$4.32$3.50$0.60$4.28$2.91$3.31$3.91$1.96$4.44$3.24Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.81$4.32$3.33$0.60$4.28$2.91$3.31$3.91$1.96$3.26$1.62Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.40$0.40$0.40$0.41$0.40$0.37Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.17$0.23$0.52$0.65$0.94$0.75$1.56$1.61$1.50$2.78$3.08Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$9.79$12.96$15.42$17.58$21.14$22.71$28.26$30.27$31.83$35.31$32.81Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+16.2%/yr+4.9%/yr
Owner earnings / share+5.2%/yr+0.7%/yr
EPS+2.1%/yr+1.9%/yr
Dividends / share+0.2%/yr (4-yr)+0.2%/yr (4-yr)
Capital spending / share+36.4%/yr+24.1%/yr
Book value / share+15.3%/yr+10.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
39Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
9%low FY2024
Gross margin
38%low FY2024
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
2.0×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$171Mowner earningsvs.$148Mnet incomelow FY2019

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $171M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $62M it takes just to hold its position. It put $45M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $126M.

Reported net income$148M
Owner earnings$171M · 10% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$148M$54M$128M$200M$135M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$62M+$69M+$67M+$60M+$53M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$56M+$46M+$31M+$20M+$16M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$33M−$38M−$17M−$96M−$63M
Cash from operations$233M$131M$209M$184M$140M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$62M−$57M−$61M−$59M−$29M
Owner earnings$171M$74M$148M$125M$111M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$45M
Free cash flow$126M$74M$148M$125M$111M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%5%9%7%8%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $62M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $45M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $56M), owner earnings is nearer $116M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $168M ÷ interest expense $17M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $342M · 2.0× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $791M + ST investments $2M − debt $1.1B
    What this means

    Netting $793M of cash and short-term investments against $1.1B of debt leaves $342M owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (6.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 66 + DIO 134 − DPO 73 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–122%; 9% latest = NOPAT $149M ÷ invested capital $1.7B
    Industry peers: median 11%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–26%; latest $171M = operating cash $233M − maintenance capex $62M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. It chose to put $45M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $126M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $56M of SBC) leaves $116M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $233M ÷ net income $148M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $46M ÷ Owner Earnings $171M
    What this means

    Of $171M Owner Earnings, $46M (27%) went back to shareholders, $16M dividends, $30M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($56M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.73×
    Expanding
    Capex $107M ÷ depreciation $62M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Near
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Near
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.59×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.1B vs $583M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −20%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.90/share (latest year $3.90), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $35.83/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 3 of 7 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 27% → 6% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 27% early to 6% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2024 · 2.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.4%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record paid
    What this means

    Paid a dividend in 5 of the years on record.

  • How management talks about it Owner’s terms
    What this means

    Returns have thinned, but the filing discusses it in an owner’s vocabulary rather than selling past it — candor about a hard stretch counts for more than an adjective.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“Our competitors may also be more successful in implementing an AI strategy and develop more successful products with the aid of AI technology.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$1.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments$702M
  • Receivables$377M
  • Inventory$459M
  • Other current assets$52M
Current liabilities$1.0B
  • Debt due within a year$568M
  • Accounts payable$272M
  • Other current liabilities$160M
Current ratio1.59×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.13×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.70×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$589Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$568M due · $702M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+26.3%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters5.5× → 1.6×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$972Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value$399MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$1.3B$115M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$6Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.6B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$411M · 26%
  • Dividends$77M · 5%
  • Buybacks$314M · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$799M · 50%
  • Returned to owners$390M

    31% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $77M as dividends and $314M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments rose $420M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$72.27

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $314M, about $72.27 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $47.66 (2020) to $100.67 (2025); its heaviest year, 2018, paid $56.09 ($95M).

  • Net change in share count5.4%

    The diluted count rose from 40M to 42M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$0.40/sh

    Paid in 5 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 0% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($887M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $10M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$419M16% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity22%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$667Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $411M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Steve Kelley$1.2M$835k$111M
2021Steve Kelley$6.5M$5.1M$111M
2022Steve Kelley$7.7M$7.4M$125M
2023Steve Kelley$8.6M$11.2M$148M
2024Steve Kelley$8.8M$8.1M$74M
2025Steve Kelley$11.2M$31.6M$171M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership1.3%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio840:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$56M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 3% of revenue, equal to 33% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Advanced Energy Industries Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?7.8% vs 22.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 22.8% early in the record and 7.8% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?5.4%

    Diluted shares grew 5.4% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $314M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?27% → 44% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $131M to $835M while revenue grew 294%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (27% of revenue then, 44% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$438M · 23% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “During the year ended December 31, 2025, three customers accounted for 23%, 19%, and 12% of our total revenue, respectively.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Pension & retirement, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Electronic Components & Instruments

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
UCTTUltra Clean Holdings$2.1B18%4.7%11%4%
CRUSCirrus Logic$2.0B51%18.3%21%21%
AEISAdvanced Energy Industries Inc.$1.8B38%11.4%19%9%
OSISOSI Systems Inc. Common Stock (DE)$1.7B35%9.6%11%6%
KEKimball Electronics Inc.$1.5B8%3.9%7%2%
DIODDiodes$1.5B35%11.8%11%9%
ENPHEnphase Energy$1.5B41%13.2%16%22%
VREXVarex Imaging Corporation$845M33%7.2%6%7%
Group median35%10.5%11%8%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Advanced Energy Industries Inc. has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Advanced Energy Industries Inc. earns about $166M on its 9.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 9.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+1%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−4%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $68M on 38M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $435M. The if-converted diluted count is 42M, 11% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($130M) runs well above depreciation ($62M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $136M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Advanced Energy Industries Inc. (AEIS), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AEIS, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← AEHR its page in the Manual AEO →

Industry order: ← 6981 the Electronic Components & Instruments chapter ALNT →