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7013 · IHI
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from IHI’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 7013) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.49T | ¥1.59T | ¥1.48T | ¥1.26T | ¥1.11T | ¥1.17T | ¥1.35T | ¥1.32T | ¥1.63T | ¥1.64T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 18% | 16% | — | — | — | 23% | 23% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 15% | 15% | — | — | — | 14% | 15% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥47.4B | ¥72.3B | ¥82.5B | ¥47.9B | ¥28.0B | ¥81.5B | ¥82.0B | (¥70.1B) | ¥143.5B | ¥165.5B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 3.2% | 4.5% | 5.6% | 3.8% | 2.5% | 6.9% | 6.1% | −5.3% | 8.8% | 10.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥5.2B | ¥8.3B | ¥39.9B | ¥8.2B | ¥13.1B | ¥66.1B | ¥44.5B | (¥68.2B) | ¥112.7B | ¥161.0B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥65.4B | ¥99.0B | ¥46.4B | ¥42.5B | ¥36.4B | ¥114.2B | ¥54.1B | ¥62.1B | ¥177.6B | ¥121.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥57.9B | ¥56.5B | ¥53.2B | ¥57.7B | — | — | — | — | — | — | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥2.2B | ¥34.2B | (¥46.7B) | (¥23.4B) | ¥23.3B | ¥48.1B | ¥9.6B | ¥130.3B | ¥64.9B | (¥39.6B) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥54.3B | ¥59.4B | ¥64.2B | ¥66.4B | — | — | — | — | — | — | CapexCapex |
| 3.7% | 3.7% | 4.3% | 5.3% | — | — | — | — | — | — | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥11.1B | ¥39.6B | (¥17.8B) | (¥23.9B) | — | — | — | — | — | — | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 0.7% | 2.5% | −1.2% | −1.9% | — | — | — | — | — | — | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥11.1B | ¥39.6B | (¥17.8B) | (¥23.9B) | — | — | — | — | — | — | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.7% | 2.5% | −1.2% | −1.9% | — | — | — | — | — | — | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥16M | ¥4.6B | ¥9.2B | ¥10.8B | ¥3.0B | ¥4.5B | ¥12.1B | ¥15.1B | ¥15.2B | ¥21.2B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥2M | ¥419M | ¥424M | ¥14.9B | ¥312M | ¥109M | ¥13M | ¥5M | ¥11M | ¥1.4B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 6% | 10% | 9% | 5% | 3% | 9% | 8% | -7% | 13% | 13% | ROICROIC |
| 2% | 2% | 13% | 3% | 4% | 17% | 10% | -18% | 23% | 25% | Return on equityROE |
| 2% | 1% | 10% | −1% | 3% | 16% | 8% | −22% | 20% | 21% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥115.9B | ¥107.3B | ¥92.7B | ¥145.7B | ¥120.8B | ¥145.5B | ¥124.7B | ¥138.8B | ¥136.8B | ¥155.1B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥403.1B | ¥400.3B | ¥331.3B | ¥334.6B | ¥344.5B | ¥348.0B | ¥378.4B | ¥452.7B | ¥506.7B | ¥576.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥285.9B | ¥304.9B | ¥311.7B | ¥292.8B | ¥234.5B | ¥235.4B | ¥247.1B | ¥258.6B | ¥287.2B | ¥401.4B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥117.2B | ¥95.4B | ¥19.6B | ¥41.8B | ¥110.1B | ¥112.6B | ¥131.4B | ¥194.1B | ¥219.5B | ¥174.5B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥1.07T | ¥993.5B | ¥888.9B | ¥957.7B | ¥946.7B | ¥1.02T | ¥1.09T | ¥1.21T | ¥1.30T | ¥1.45T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥876.2B | ¥811.7B | ¥823.1B | ¥628.7B | ¥473.9B | ¥483.7B | ¥516.9B | ¥721.3B | ¥767.1B | ¥794.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.1× | 1.5× | 2.0× | 2.1× | 2.1× | 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.8× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥16.2B | ¥12.2B | ¥8.7B | ¥5.5B | ¥5.9B | ¥6.1B | ¥6.5B | ¥6.3B | ¥6.3B | ¥4.9B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥1.69T | ¥1.63T | ¥1.82T | ¥1.87T | ¥1.83T | ¥1.88T | ¥1.94T | ¥2.10T | ¥2.24T | ¥2.43T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥368.2B | ¥319.5B | ¥493.6B | ¥612.7B | ¥605.9B | ¥505.6B | ¥519.5B | ¥574.4B | ¥514.7B | ¥489.9B | Total debtDebt |
| ¥252.3B | ¥212.2B | ¥400.9B | ¥467.0B | ¥485.2B | ¥360.1B | ¥394.7B | ¥435.6B | ¥377.9B | ¥334.8B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 15.1× | 24.0× | 25.6× | 5.7× | 5.5× | 17.6× | 7.3× | -9.0× | 9.5× | 18.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥337.6B | ¥350.2B | ¥307.9B | ¥280.2B | ¥300.8B | ¥382.1B | ¥431.2B | ¥376.0B | ¥481.7B | ¥652.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | 1.08B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1372.73 | ¥1468.79 | ¥1370.07 | ¥1166.64 | ¥1027.85 | ¥1083.26 | ¥1249.54 | ¥1221.51 | ¥1502.50 | ¥1517.79 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥4.85 | ¥7.66 | ¥36.84 | ¥7.58 | ¥12.09 | ¥61.02 | ¥41.14 | ¥-63.00 | ¥104.12 | ¥148.69 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥10.26 | ¥36.58 | ¥-16.43 | ¥-22.04 | — | — | — | — | — | — | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥10.26 | ¥36.58 | ¥-16.43 | ¥-22.04 | — | — | — | — | — | — | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥0.01 | ¥4.27 | ¥8.53 | ¥9.97 | ¥2.76 | ¥4.19 | ¥11.18 | ¥13.99 | ¥14.00 | ¥19.61 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥50.11 | ¥54.87 | ¥59.29 | ¥61.28 | — | — | — | — | — | — | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥311.82 | ¥323.45 | ¥284.38 | ¥258.76 | ¥277.78 | ¥352.93 | ¥398.29 | ¥347.25 | ¥444.91 | ¥602.39 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Share counts before 2026 are restated ×7 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +1.1%/yr | +8.1%/yr |
| EPS | +46.3%/yr | +65.2%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +122.3%/yr | +48.1%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +6.9%/yr (3-yr) | +6.9%/yr (3-yr) |
| Book value / share | +7.6%/yr | +16.7%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2020 the business reported ¥8.2B of profit but (¥23.9B) of owner earnings: ¥32.1B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2020 | FY2019 | FY2018 | FY2017 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥8.2B | ¥39.9B | ¥8.3B | ¥5.2B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥57.7B | +¥53.2B | +¥56.5B | +¥57.9B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −¥23.4B | −¥46.7B | +¥34.2B | +¥2.2B |
| Cash from operations | ¥42.5B | ¥46.4B | ¥99.0B | ¥65.4B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥66.4B | −¥64.2B | −¥59.4B | −¥54.3B |
| Owner earnings | (¥23.9B) | (¥17.8B) | ¥39.6B | ¥11.1B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | -2% | -1% | 2% | 1% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Much of fiscal 2020's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 18.3×ComfortableOperating income ¥165.5B ÷ interest expense ¥9.1B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥334.8B · 2.0× operating profitMeaningful net debtCash ¥155.1B − debt ¥489.9B
What this means
Netting ¥155.1B of cash and short-term investments against ¥489.9B of debt leaves ¥334.8B owed, about 2.0× a year's operating profit (3.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle10-yr median, range -7%–13%; 13% latest = NOPAT ¥130.8B ÷ invested capital ¥987.1BIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Mostly cash-backedCash from ops ¥121.4B ÷ net income ¥161.0B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 4% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 4% early, 5% lately, median 5%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 4%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Worst year 2024 · −5.3% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −3.9%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2017–2020
Over the record, the business generated ¥253.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥244.2B · 96%
- Dividends¥24.7B · 10%
- Buybacks¥15.7B · 6%
- Returned to owners¥40.4B
445% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥24.7B as dividends and ¥15.7B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥31.3B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥31.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥368.2B to ¥612.7B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥15.7B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−85.7%
The diluted count fell from 1083M to 155M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥9.97/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 777% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained−55%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥21.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥11.7B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.55 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why IHI is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−1.5% vs 1.6%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 1.6% early in the record and −1.5% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥368.2B → ¥489.9B
Debt rose from ¥368.2B to ¥489.9B while owner earnings went from about ¥11.0B to (¥683M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?27% → 35% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from ¥403.1B to ¥576.0B while revenue grew 11%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (27% of revenue then, 35% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFIHI is profitable, but its owner-earnings base could not be formed from this filing’s tagged data (operating cash flow or capital spending is missing), so the owner-earnings reverse-DCF has no base to grow. We read the price from both ends instead: type a price to see the profitability it demands, then set the mature margin you would believe and weigh the two against each other. Nothing leaves your browser unless you enter it in your notebook.
Revenue, delivered9%/yr’21→’26
Enter a price to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Two reads of one future. From your price: the owner earnings the company must reach, valued at a mature multiple and discounted back at your rate, expressed as the margin it implies on revenue grown at your rate. From your belief: the mature margin you would credit, set on the dial above. When the margin the price demands runs above the one you would believe, you are paying for a future taken on faith. For a deep cyclical at a trough, normalized through-cycle earnings are the better lens; this mode is for the genuinely unprofitable, and for the profitable business whose capital spending currently outruns its cash.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 7012 its page in the Manual 7201 →
Industry order: the Aerospace & Defense chapter ACHR →