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7272 · Yamaha Motor
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Yamaha Motor’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 7272) →
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥1.50T | ¥1.67T | ¥1.67T | ¥1.66T | ¥1.47T | ¥1.81T | ¥2.25T | ¥2.41T | ¥2.58T | ¥2.53T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 27% | 25% | — | — | — | 32% | 31% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 20% | 20% | — | — | — | 25% | 27% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| — | — | — | 1% | 1% | — | — | — | 5% | 6% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ¥108.6B | ¥149.8B | ¥140.8B | ¥115.4B | ¥81.7B | ¥182.3B | ¥224.9B | ¥243.9B | ¥181.5B | ¥126.4B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 7.2% | 9.0% | 8.4% | 6.9% | 5.6% | 10.1% | 10.0% | 10.1% | 7.0% | 5.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥63.2B | ¥101.6B | ¥93.4B | ¥75.7B | ¥53.1B | ¥155.6B | ¥174.4B | ¥158.4B | ¥108.1B | ¥16.1B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥143.2B | ¥126.3B | ¥58.9B | ¥99.1B | ¥110.5B | ¥141.3B | ¥70.9B | ¥86.0B | ¥176.8B | ¥138.6B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥42.4B | ¥45.5B | ¥46.4B | ¥49.7B | ¥48.2B | ¥51.1B | ¥59.8B | ¥71.0B | ¥83.1B | ¥88.8B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ¥37.6B | (¥20.7B) | (¥80.9B) | (¥26.3B) | ¥9.2B | (¥65.4B) | (¥163.3B) | (¥143.4B) | (¥14.3B) | ¥33.7B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥50.4B | ¥64.4B | ¥54.0B | ¥58.7B | ¥51.4B | ¥66.8B | ¥89.4B | ¥109.0B | ¥115.9B | ¥113.3B | CapexCapex |
| 3.4% | 3.9% | 3.2% | 3.5% | 3.5% | 3.7% | 4.0% | 4.5% | 4.5% | 4.5% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥92.7B | ¥80.9B | ¥4.9B | ¥40.4B | ¥59.1B | ¥90.2B | ¥11.1B | ¥15.0B | ¥93.8B | ¥49.8B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 6.2% | 4.8% | 0.3% | 2.4% | 4.0% | 5.0% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 3.6% | 2.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥92.7B | ¥62.0B | ¥4.9B | ¥40.4B | ¥59.1B | ¥74.6B | (¥18.5B) | (¥23.0B) | ¥61.0B | ¥25.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 6.2% | 3.7% | 0.3% | 2.4% | 4.0% | 4.1% | −0.8% | −1.0% | 2.4% | 1.0% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥18.2B | ¥24.1B | ¥32.8B | ¥31.4B | ¥15.7B | ¥38.4B | ¥41.9B | ¥47.1B | ¥48.4B | ¥48.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥5M | ¥7M | ¥5M | ¥5M | ¥1M | ¥11.0B | ¥20.0B | ¥30.0B | ¥20.0B | ¥10.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 11% | 14% | 12% | 9% | 6% | 13% | 14% | 12% | 8% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| 11% | 15% | 13% | 10% | 7% | 17% | 18% | 15% | 9% | 1% | Return on equityROE |
| 8% | 12% | 9% | 6% | 5% | 13% | 14% | 10% | 5% | −3% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥135.5B | ¥155.6B | ¥138.2B | ¥122.7B | ¥267.2B | ¥274.9B | ¥296.8B | ¥347.0B | ¥373.0B | ¥398.9B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥145.7B | ¥165.2B | ¥164.4B | ¥164.9B | ¥146.0B | ¥161.6B | ¥187.4B | ¥179.7B | ¥178.2B | ¥181.7B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥188.0B | ¥199.0B | ¥208.4B | ¥224.0B | ¥169.8B | ¥211.9B | ¥285.4B | ¥44.6B | ¥41.5B | ¥41.0B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥113.0B | ¥120.1B | ¥118.3B | ¥113.0B | ¥121.2B | ¥140.5B | ¥148.1B | ¥154.1B | ¥149.9B | ¥160.4B | Accounts payablePayables |
| ¥220.7B | ¥244.1B | ¥254.5B | ¥276.0B | ¥194.6B | ¥233.0B | ¥324.7B | ¥70.2B | ¥69.8B | ¥62.3B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥794.9B | ¥855.0B | ¥849.8B | ¥874.8B | ¥921.6B | ¥1.04T | ¥1.31T | ¥1.51T | ¥1.61T | ¥1.69T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥474.6B | ¥502.2B | ¥580.6B | ¥496.3B | ¥430.8B | ¥513.3B | ¥752.9B | ¥193.8B | ¥242.1B | ¥195.6B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.7× | 1.7× | 1.5× | 1.8× | 2.1× | 2.0× | 1.7× | 7.8× | 6.6× | 8.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | — | ¥2.7B | ¥2.7B | ¥2.9B | ¥8.6B | ¥16.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥1.32T | ¥1.42T | ¥1.42T | ¥1.53T | ¥1.64T | ¥1.83T | ¥2.18T | ¥2.56T | ¥2.78T | ¥2.90T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥365.2B | ¥354.3B | ¥357.5B | ¥365.7B | ¥467.6B | ¥459.1B | ¥603.2B | ¥843.8B | ¥952.0B | ¥1.04T | Total debtDebt |
| ¥229.7B | ¥198.7B | ¥219.3B | ¥242.9B | ¥200.4B | ¥184.2B | ¥306.4B | ¥496.8B | ¥579.0B | ¥645.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 23.4× | 38.9× | 41.9× | 34.1× | 22.5× | 68.8× | 53.9× | 13.7× | 12.9× | 10.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥575.4B | ¥665.2B | ¥695.7B | ¥766.9B | ¥797.6B | ¥900.7B | ¥964.2B | ¥1.08T | ¥1.16T | ¥1.13T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 1.05B | 1.05B | 1.05B | 1.05B | 1.05B | 1.05B | 1.05B | 1.05B | 1.03B | 1.02B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥1431.62 | ¥1590.95 | ¥1593.86 | ¥1585.43 | ¥1400.75 | ¥1725.12 | ¥2140.06 | ¥2298.35 | ¥2510.03 | ¥2489.09 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥60.16 | ¥96.79 | ¥88.94 | ¥72.13 | ¥50.53 | ¥148.08 | ¥166.03 | ¥150.78 | ¥105.29 | ¥15.82 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥88.32 | ¥77.05 | ¥4.64 | ¥38.51 | ¥56.26 | ¥85.86 | ¥10.56 | ¥14.27 | ¥91.37 | ¥48.95 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥88.32 | ¥59.05 | ¥4.64 | ¥38.51 | ¥56.26 | ¥70.98 | ¥-17.58 | ¥-21.89 | ¥59.40 | ¥24.89 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥17.30 | ¥22.96 | ¥31.28 | ¥29.94 | ¥14.97 | ¥36.59 | ¥39.91 | ¥44.82 | ¥47.16 | ¥47.82 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥48.05 | ¥61.30 | ¥51.43 | ¥55.90 | ¥48.93 | ¥63.55 | ¥85.08 | ¥103.77 | ¥112.91 | ¥111.25 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥548.14 | ¥633.71 | ¥662.78 | ¥730.39 | ¥759.32 | ¥857.25 | ¥917.67 | ¥1023.91 | ¥1131.74 | ¥1112.08 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +6.3%/yr | +12.2%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −6.3%/yr | −2.7%/yr |
| EPS | −13.8%/yr | −20.7%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +12.0%/yr | +26.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +9.8%/yr | +17.9%/yr |
| Book value / share | +8.2%/yr | +7.9%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥49.8B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥88.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥24.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥25.3B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥16.1B | ¥108.1B | ¥158.4B | ¥174.4B | ¥155.6B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥88.8B | +¥83.1B | +¥71.0B | +¥59.8B | +¥51.1B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥33.7B | −¥14.3B | −¥143.4B | −¥163.3B | −¥65.4B |
| Cash from operations | ¥138.6B | ¥176.8B | ¥86.0B | ¥70.9B | ¥141.3B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥88.8B | −¥83.1B | −¥71.0B | −¥59.8B | −¥51.1B |
| Owner earnings | ¥49.8B | ¥93.8B | ¥15.0B | ¥11.1B | ¥90.2B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥24.5B | −¥32.8B | −¥38.0B | −¥29.6B | −¥15.6B |
| Free cash flow | ¥25.3B | ¥61.0B | (¥23.0B) | (¥18.5B) | ¥74.6B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 2% | 4% | 1% | 0% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥88.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥24.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 10.3×ComfortableOperating income ¥126.4B ÷ interest expense ¥12.2B
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥645.4B · 5.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥398.9B − debt ¥1.04T
What this means
Netting ¥398.9B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.04T of debt leaves ¥645.4B owed, about 5.1× a year's operating profit (8.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 26 + DIO 9 − DPO 33 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median, range 6%–14%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥99.8B ÷ invested capital ¥1.78TIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 0%–6%; latest ¥49.8B = operating cash ¥138.6B − maintenance capex ¥88.8BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥138.6B ÷ net income ¥16.1B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks ¥58.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥49.8B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against ¥49.8B of Owner Earnings, ¥58.7B (118%) went back to shareholders, ¥48.7B dividends, ¥10.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.28×ExpandingCapex ¥113.3B ÷ depreciation ¥88.8B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 8% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 8% early, 7% lately, median 7%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 5.0% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥1.15T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested¥773.2B · 67%
- Dividends¥346.8B · 30%
- Buybacks¥91.0B · 8%
- Returned to owners¥437.8B
81% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥346.8B as dividends and ¥91.0B as buybacks.
- Source of funding−¥59.3B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥59.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥365.2B to ¥1.04T.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥91.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−3.0%
The diluted count fell from 1050M to 1018M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥47.82/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained−1%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥561.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥6.6B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Yamaha Motor is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.1% vs 3.8%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.8% early in the record and 2.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥365.2B → ¥1.04T
Debt rose from ¥365.2B to ¥1.04T while owner earnings went from about ¥59.5B to ¥52.9B — about 6.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 20 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Yamaha Motor has delivered.
Through the cycle, Yamaha Motor earns about ¥76.9B on its 3.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥25.3B on 1018M diluted shares; net debt ¥645.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥113.3B) runs well above depreciation (¥88.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥49.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 7270 its page in the Manual 7309 →
Industry order: ← 7270 the Automobiles chapter AIIO →