Owner Scorecard


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7272 · Yamaha Motor

Motorcycles Capital-intensive IFRS
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Yamaha Motor’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 7272) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥1.50T¥1.67T¥1.67T¥1.66T¥1.47T¥1.81T¥2.25T¥2.41T¥2.58T¥2.53TRevenueRevenue
27%25%32%31%Gross marginGross mgn
20%20%25%27%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
1%1%5%6%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
¥108.6B¥149.8B¥140.8B¥115.4B¥81.7B¥182.3B¥224.9B¥243.9B¥181.5B¥126.4BOperating incomeOp. inc.
7.2%9.0%8.4%6.9%5.6%10.1%10.0%10.1%7.0%5.0%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥63.2B¥101.6B¥93.4B¥75.7B¥53.1B¥155.6B¥174.4B¥158.4B¥108.1B¥16.1BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥143.2B¥126.3B¥58.9B¥99.1B¥110.5B¥141.3B¥70.9B¥86.0B¥176.8B¥138.6BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥42.4B¥45.5B¥46.4B¥49.7B¥48.2B¥51.1B¥59.8B¥71.0B¥83.1B¥88.8BDepreciationDeprec.
¥37.6B(¥20.7B)(¥80.9B)(¥26.3B)¥9.2B(¥65.4B)(¥163.3B)(¥143.4B)(¥14.3B)¥33.7BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥50.4B¥64.4B¥54.0B¥58.7B¥51.4B¥66.8B¥89.4B¥109.0B¥115.9B¥113.3BCapexCapex
3.4%3.9%3.2%3.5%3.5%3.7%4.0%4.5%4.5%4.5%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥92.7B¥80.9B¥4.9B¥40.4B¥59.1B¥90.2B¥11.1B¥15.0B¥93.8B¥49.8BOwner earningsOwner earn.
6.2%4.8%0.3%2.4%4.0%5.0%0.5%0.6%3.6%2.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥92.7B¥62.0B¥4.9B¥40.4B¥59.1B¥74.6B(¥18.5B)(¥23.0B)¥61.0B¥25.3BFree cash flowFCF
6.2%3.7%0.3%2.4%4.0%4.1%−0.8%−1.0%2.4%1.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥18.2B¥24.1B¥32.8B¥31.4B¥15.7B¥38.4B¥41.9B¥47.1B¥48.4B¥48.7BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥5M¥7M¥5M¥5M¥1M¥11.0B¥20.0B¥30.0B¥20.0B¥10.0BBuybacksBuybacks
11%14%12%9%6%13%14%12%8%6%ROICROIC
11%15%13%10%7%17%18%15%9%1%Return on equityROE
8%12%9%6%5%13%14%10%5%−3%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥135.5B¥155.6B¥138.2B¥122.7B¥267.2B¥274.9B¥296.8B¥347.0B¥373.0B¥398.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥145.7B¥165.2B¥164.4B¥164.9B¥146.0B¥161.6B¥187.4B¥179.7B¥178.2B¥181.7BReceivablesReceiv.
¥188.0B¥199.0B¥208.4B¥224.0B¥169.8B¥211.9B¥285.4B¥44.6B¥41.5B¥41.0BInventoryInvent.
¥113.0B¥120.1B¥118.3B¥113.0B¥121.2B¥140.5B¥148.1B¥154.1B¥149.9B¥160.4BAccounts payablePayables
¥220.7B¥244.1B¥254.5B¥276.0B¥194.6B¥233.0B¥324.7B¥70.2B¥69.8B¥62.3BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥794.9B¥855.0B¥849.8B¥874.8B¥921.6B¥1.04T¥1.31T¥1.51T¥1.61T¥1.69TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥474.6B¥502.2B¥580.6B¥496.3B¥430.8B¥513.3B¥752.9B¥193.8B¥242.1B¥195.6BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.7×1.7×1.5×1.8×2.1×2.0×1.7×7.8×6.6×8.6×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥2.7B¥2.7B¥2.9B¥8.6B¥16.7BGoodwillGoodwill
¥1.32T¥1.42T¥1.42T¥1.53T¥1.64T¥1.83T¥2.18T¥2.56T¥2.78T¥2.90TTotal assetsAssets
¥365.2B¥354.3B¥357.5B¥365.7B¥467.6B¥459.1B¥603.2B¥843.8B¥952.0B¥1.04TTotal debtDebt
¥229.7B¥198.7B¥219.3B¥242.9B¥200.4B¥184.2B¥306.4B¥496.8B¥579.0B¥645.4BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
23.4×38.9×41.9×34.1×22.5×68.8×53.9×13.7×12.9×10.3×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥575.4B¥665.2B¥695.7B¥766.9B¥797.6B¥900.7B¥964.2B¥1.08T¥1.16T¥1.13TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.05B1.05B1.05B1.05B1.05B1.05B1.05B1.05B1.03B1.02BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥1431.62¥1590.95¥1593.86¥1585.43¥1400.75¥1725.12¥2140.06¥2298.35¥2510.03¥2489.09Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥60.16¥96.79¥88.94¥72.13¥50.53¥148.08¥166.03¥150.78¥105.29¥15.82EPS (diluted)EPS
¥88.32¥77.05¥4.64¥38.51¥56.26¥85.86¥10.56¥14.27¥91.37¥48.95Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥88.32¥59.05¥4.64¥38.51¥56.26¥70.98¥-17.58¥-21.89¥59.40¥24.89Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥17.30¥22.96¥31.28¥29.94¥14.97¥36.59¥39.91¥44.82¥47.16¥47.82Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥48.05¥61.30¥51.43¥55.90¥48.93¥63.55¥85.08¥103.77¥112.91¥111.25Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥548.14¥633.71¥662.78¥730.39¥759.32¥857.25¥917.67¥1023.91¥1131.74¥1112.08Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2024 are restated ×3 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.3%/yr+12.2%/yr
Owner earnings / share−6.3%/yr−2.7%/yr
EPS−13.8%/yr−20.7%/yr
Dividends / share+12.0%/yr+26.2%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.8%/yr+17.9%/yr
Book value / share+8.2%/yr+7.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥49.8B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥88.8B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥24.5B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥25.3B.

Reported net income¥16.1B
Owner earnings¥49.8B · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income¥16.1B¥108.1B¥158.4B¥174.4B¥155.6B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥88.8B+¥83.1B+¥71.0B+¥59.8B+¥51.1B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥33.7B−¥14.3B−¥143.4B−¥163.3B−¥65.4B
Cash from operations¥138.6B¥176.8B¥86.0B¥70.9B¥141.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥88.8B−¥83.1B−¥71.0B−¥59.8B−¥51.1B
Owner earnings¥49.8B¥93.8B¥15.0B¥11.1B¥90.2B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥24.5B−¥32.8B−¥38.0B−¥29.6B−¥15.6B
Free cash flow¥25.3B¥61.0B(¥23.0B)(¥18.5B)¥74.6B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%4%1%0%5%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥88.8B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥24.5B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥126.4B ÷ interest expense ¥12.2B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥645.4B · 5.1× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥398.9B − debt ¥1.04T
    What this means

    Netting ¥398.9B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.04T of debt leaves ¥645.4B owed, about 5.1× a year's operating profit (8.3× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 26 + DIO 9 − DPO 33 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 6%–14%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥99.8B ÷ invested capital ¥1.78T
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 0%–6%; latest ¥49.8B = operating cash ¥138.6B − maintenance capex ¥88.8B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥138.6B ÷ net income ¥16.1B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks ¥58.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥49.8B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against ¥49.8B of Owner Earnings, ¥58.7B (118%) went back to shareholders, ¥48.7B dividends, ¥10.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.28×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥113.3B ÷ depreciation ¥88.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 8% → 7% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 8% early, 7% lately, median 7%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 5%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth −2%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 2% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 5.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥1.15T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥773.2B · 67%
  • Dividends¥346.8B · 30%
  • Buybacks¥91.0B · 8%
  • Returned to owners¥437.8B

    81% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥346.8B as dividends and ¥91.0B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥59.3B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥59.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥365.2B to ¥1.04T.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥91.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−3.0%

    The diluted count fell from 1050M to 1018M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥47.82/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 12% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained−1%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥561.7B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell ¥6.6B, so each retained ¥1 gave back about 0.01 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Yamaha Motor is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?2.1% vs 3.8%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 3.8% early in the record and 2.1% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥365.2B → ¥1.04T

    Debt rose from ¥365.2B to ¥1.04T while owner earnings went from about ¥59.5B to ¥52.9B — about 6.1 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 20 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Yamaha Motor has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Yamaha Motor earns about ¥76.9B on its 3.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 2.0% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+9%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥25.3B on 1018M diluted shares; net debt ¥645.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥113.3B) runs well above depreciation (¥88.8B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥49.8B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 7270 its page in the Manual 7309 →

Industry order: ← 7270 the Automobiles chapter AIIO →