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7309 · Shimano
This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Shimano’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 7309) →
Where the money comes from
on EDINET →The biggest segment, Bicycle Components, is also where the profit is made: 76% of revenue and 83% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Other ran a ¥29M operating loss.
- Bicycle Components76%¥355.0B83% of profit
- Fishing Tackle24%¥110.8B17% of profit
- Other0%¥439Mloss of ¥29M
From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥323.0B | ¥335.8B | ¥348.0B | ¥363.2B | ¥378.0B | ¥546.5B | ¥628.9B | ¥474.4B | ¥451.0B | ¥466.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 39% | 40% | — | — | — | 38% | 36% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 20% | 19% | — | — | — | 24% | 25% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥64.5B | ¥64.4B | ¥65.7B | ¥68.0B | ¥82.7B | ¥148.3B | ¥169.2B | ¥83.7B | ¥65.1B | ¥51.7B | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 20.0% | 19.2% | 18.9% | 18.7% | 21.9% | 27.1% | 26.9% | 17.6% | 14.4% | 11.1% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ¥51.0B | ¥38.4B | ¥53.9B | ¥51.8B | ¥63.5B | ¥115.9B | ¥128.2B | ¥61.1B | ¥76.3B | ¥34.0B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥64.0B | ¥69.3B | ¥49.6B | ¥67.9B | ¥91.0B | ¥112.4B | ¥110.7B | ¥114.6B | ¥87.0B | ¥63.8B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥15.5B | ¥18.8B | ¥17.5B | ¥18.1B | ¥18.3B | ¥18.7B | ¥21.0B | ¥23.9B | ¥25.0B | ¥27.2B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (¥2.5B) | ¥12.0B | (¥21.9B) | (¥2.1B) | ¥9.3B | (¥22.2B) | (¥38.5B) | ¥29.5B | (¥14.3B) | ¥2.6B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| ¥29.4B | ¥12.9B | ¥22.3B | ¥23.3B | ¥23.4B | ¥16.2B | ¥20.2B | ¥24.8B | ¥36.8B | ¥35.5B | CapexCapex |
| 9.1% | 3.8% | 6.4% | 6.4% | 6.2% | 3.0% | 3.2% | 5.2% | 8.2% | 7.6% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ¥48.5B | ¥56.4B | ¥32.1B | ¥49.8B | ¥72.8B | ¥96.3B | ¥90.4B | ¥89.8B | ¥62.0B | ¥36.6B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 15.0% | 16.8% | 9.2% | 13.7% | 19.3% | 17.6% | 14.4% | 18.9% | 13.7% | 7.8% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ¥34.7B | ¥56.4B | ¥27.3B | ¥44.6B | ¥67.7B | ¥96.3B | ¥90.4B | ¥89.8B | ¥50.2B | ¥28.3B | Free cash flowFCF |
| 10.7% | 16.8% | 7.9% | 12.3% | 17.9% | 17.6% | 14.4% | 18.9% | 11.1% | 6.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥14.4B | ¥14.4B | ¥14.4B | ¥14.4B | ¥14.4B | ¥36.6B | ¥21.5B | ¥25.8B | ¥26.6B | ¥28.6B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥6M | ¥6M | ¥18M | ¥14M | ¥18M | ¥24.2B | ¥34.4B | ¥14.7B | ¥21.5B | ¥50.0B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 25% | 21% | 19% | 23% | 27% | 44% | 41% | 20% | 27% | 20% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 9% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 19% | 17% | 8% | 11% | 5% | Return on equityROE |
| 9% | 6% | 9% | 8% | 9% | 13% | 14% | 4% | 7% | 1% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥196.5B | ¥199.8B | ¥176.4B | ¥264.7B | ¥300.2B | ¥357.8B | ¥417.3B | ¥482.0B | ¥530.3B | ¥472.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥34.3B | ¥35.6B | ¥39.0B | ¥36.2B | ¥38.2B | ¥52.2B | ¥55.2B | ¥31.6B | ¥39.9B | ¥38.5B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥31.7B | ¥33.8B | ¥36.1B | ¥39.9B | ¥41.1B | ¥55.5B | ¥80.0B | ¥74.3B | ¥73.7B | ¥83.7B | InventoryInvent. |
| ¥66.0B | ¥69.4B | ¥75.1B | ¥76.1B | ¥79.3B | ¥107.7B | ¥135.2B | ¥105.9B | ¥113.6B | ¥122.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥297.5B | ¥342.8B | ¥353.3B | ¥381.2B | ¥423.5B | ¥528.5B | ¥628.8B | ¥652.8B | ¥711.5B | ¥666.1B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥44.1B | ¥49.3B | ¥43.1B | ¥43.6B | ¥53.9B | ¥81.5B | ¥78.6B | ¥61.8B | ¥55.8B | ¥58.9B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 6.8× | 6.9× | 8.2× | 8.7× | 7.8× | 6.5× | 8.0× | 10.6× | 12.7× | 11.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| ¥5.8B | ¥5.4B | ¥4.4B | ¥3.9B | ¥3.6B | ¥3.3B | ¥3.1B | ¥1.9B | ¥1.7B | ¥1.5B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥444.0B | ¥488.8B | ¥503.8B | ¥538.8B | ¥590.4B | ¥705.4B | ¥826.4B | ¥871.7B | ¥959.0B | ¥938.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥9.0B | ¥8.6B | ¥1.1B | ¥4.5B | ¥2.4B | ¥6.3B | ¥5.4B | ¥3.4B | ¥3.6B | ¥4.0B | Total debtDebt |
| (¥187.4B) | (¥191.1B) | (¥175.2B) | (¥260.2B) | (¥297.8B) | (¥351.5B) | (¥411.9B) | (¥478.6B) | (¥526.7B) | (¥468.8B) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 400.9× | 349.7× | 318.9× | 673.4× | 780.2× | 1278.3× | 1098.4× | 396.5× | 556.3× | 474.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥391.4B | ¥430.5B | ¥453.5B | ¥490.1B | ¥539.1B | ¥616.7B | ¥741.1B | ¥802.4B | ¥715.4B | ¥670.6B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 92.7M | 92.7M | 92.7M | 92.7M | 92.7M | 92.4M | 91.2M | 90.0M | 89.1M | 86.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥3483.58 | ¥3621.66 | ¥3753.61 | ¥3917.49 | ¥4077.22 | ¥5915.30 | ¥6898.96 | ¥5269.40 | ¥5060.51 | ¥5388.22 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥549.65 | ¥414.61 | ¥581.65 | ¥559.03 | ¥684.56 | ¥1254.87 | ¥1406.08 | ¥679.19 | ¥856.47 | ¥392.82 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| ¥523.08 | ¥608.36 | ¥346.00 | ¥536.75 | ¥784.94 | ¥1042.14 | ¥992.07 | ¥997.36 | ¥695.64 | ¥422.65 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| ¥373.74 | ¥608.36 | ¥294.88 | ¥481.50 | ¥730.05 | ¥1042.14 | ¥992.07 | ¥997.36 | ¥563.38 | ¥326.60 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥154.93 | ¥154.91 | ¥154.94 | ¥154.95 | ¥154.99 | ¥396.10 | ¥235.82 | ¥286.64 | ¥298.81 | ¥330.63 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| ¥316.88 | ¥138.68 | ¥239.99 | ¥250.78 | ¥251.94 | ¥174.87 | ¥222.10 | ¥275.30 | ¥413.20 | ¥410.48 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥4221.11 | ¥4642.63 | ¥4890.61 | ¥5285.39 | ¥5814.78 | ¥6674.43 | ¥8129.61 | ¥8913.33 | ¥8027.81 | ¥7749.38 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +5.0%/yr | +5.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −2.3%/yr | −11.6%/yr |
| EPS | −3.7%/yr | −10.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +8.8%/yr | +16.4%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +2.9%/yr | +10.3%/yr |
| Book value / share | +7.0%/yr | +5.9%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥36.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥27.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥8.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥28.3B.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥34.0B | ¥76.3B | ¥61.1B | ¥128.2B | ¥115.9B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +¥27.2B | +¥25.0B | +¥23.9B | +¥21.0B | +¥18.7B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥2.6B | −¥14.3B | +¥29.5B | −¥38.5B | −¥22.2B |
| Cash from operations | ¥63.8B | ¥87.0B | ¥114.6B | ¥110.7B | ¥112.4B |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −¥27.2B | −¥25.0B | −¥24.8B | −¥20.2B | −¥16.2B |
| Owner earnings | ¥36.6B | ¥62.0B | ¥89.8B | ¥90.4B | ¥96.3B |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −¥8.3B | −¥11.8B | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | ¥28.3B | ¥50.2B | ¥89.8B | ¥90.4B | ¥96.3B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 8% | 14% | 19% | 14% | 18% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥27.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥8.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 474.1×ComfortableOperating income ¥51.7B ÷ interest expense ¥109M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? +¥468.8BNet cashCash ¥472.8B − debt ¥4.0B
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥468.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- High through the cycle10-yr median, range 19%–44%; 20% latest = NOPAT ¥40.8B ÷ invested capital ¥201.8BIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 8%–19%; latest ¥36.6B = operating cash ¥63.8B − maintenance capex ¥27.2BIndustry peers: median 7%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥8.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥28.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥63.8B ÷ net income ¥34.0B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks ¥78.6B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥36.6B
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against ¥36.6B of Owner Earnings, ¥78.6B (215%) went back to shareholders, ¥28.6B dividends, ¥50.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.31×ExpandingCapex ¥35.5B ÷ depreciation ¥27.2B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 19% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 19% early to 14% lately, median 19% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2025 · 11.1% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count −0.8%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated ¥830.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.
- Reinvested¥244.6B · 29%
- Dividends¥211.0B · 25%
- Buybacks¥144.9B · 17%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥229.8B · 28%
- Returned to owners¥355.9B
56% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥211.0B as dividends and ¥144.9B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell ¥5.0B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥276.3B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥144.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−6.7%
The diluted count fell from 93M to 87M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥330.63/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 9% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.
- Return on what it retained5%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥318.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥17.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Shimano is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 26% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from ¥66.0B to ¥122.1B while revenue grew 44%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 26% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Shimano has delivered.
Through the cycle, Shimano earns about ¥68.5B on its 14.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow ¥28.3B on 87M diluted shares; net cash ¥468.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥35.5B) runs well above depreciation (¥27.2B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥36.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 7272 its page in the Manual 7453 →
Industry order: the Leisure Products chapter 7832 →