Owner Scorecard


← Japan catalog ← 7272 Manual 7453 → Leisure Products 7832 →

7309 · Shimano

Bicycle components Consumer & brand J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2025 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Shimano’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 7309) →

Where the money comes from

on EDINET →

The biggest segment, Bicycle Components, is also where the profit is made: 76% of revenue and 83% of the profitable segments' operating profit. Other ran a ¥29M operating loss.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
Operating profit profitable segments only
  • Bicycle Components76%¥355.0B83% of profit
  • Fishing Tackle24%¥110.8B17% of profit
  • Other0%¥439Mloss of ¥29M

From the segment footnote of the company's own annual securities report. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of the profitable segments' operating profit (a loss-making segment carries its loss in dollars in the legend, not a share of the bar), before unallocated corporate costs.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25
Income statement
¥323.0B¥335.8B¥348.0B¥363.2B¥378.0B¥546.5B¥628.9B¥474.4B¥451.0B¥466.2BRevenueRevenue
39%40%38%36%Gross marginGross mgn
20%19%24%25%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥64.5B¥64.4B¥65.7B¥68.0B¥82.7B¥148.3B¥169.2B¥83.7B¥65.1B¥51.7BOperating incomeOp. inc.
20.0%19.2%18.9%18.7%21.9%27.1%26.9%17.6%14.4%11.1%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥51.0B¥38.4B¥53.9B¥51.8B¥63.5B¥115.9B¥128.2B¥61.1B¥76.3B¥34.0BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥64.0B¥69.3B¥49.6B¥67.9B¥91.0B¥112.4B¥110.7B¥114.6B¥87.0B¥63.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥15.5B¥18.8B¥17.5B¥18.1B¥18.3B¥18.7B¥21.0B¥23.9B¥25.0B¥27.2BDepreciationDeprec.
(¥2.5B)¥12.0B(¥21.9B)(¥2.1B)¥9.3B(¥22.2B)(¥38.5B)¥29.5B(¥14.3B)¥2.6BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥29.4B¥12.9B¥22.3B¥23.3B¥23.4B¥16.2B¥20.2B¥24.8B¥36.8B¥35.5BCapexCapex
9.1%3.8%6.4%6.4%6.2%3.0%3.2%5.2%8.2%7.6%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥48.5B¥56.4B¥32.1B¥49.8B¥72.8B¥96.3B¥90.4B¥89.8B¥62.0B¥36.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
15.0%16.8%9.2%13.7%19.3%17.6%14.4%18.9%13.7%7.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥34.7B¥56.4B¥27.3B¥44.6B¥67.7B¥96.3B¥90.4B¥89.8B¥50.2B¥28.3BFree cash flowFCF
10.7%16.8%7.9%12.3%17.9%17.6%14.4%18.9%11.1%6.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥14.4B¥14.4B¥14.4B¥14.4B¥14.4B¥36.6B¥21.5B¥25.8B¥26.6B¥28.6BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥6M¥6M¥18M¥14M¥18M¥24.2B¥34.4B¥14.7B¥21.5B¥50.0BBuybacksBuybacks
25%21%19%23%27%44%41%20%27%20%ROICROIC
13%9%12%11%12%19%17%8%11%5%Return on equityROE
9%6%9%8%9%13%14%4%7%1%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥196.5B¥199.8B¥176.4B¥264.7B¥300.2B¥357.8B¥417.3B¥482.0B¥530.3B¥472.8BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥34.3B¥35.6B¥39.0B¥36.2B¥38.2B¥52.2B¥55.2B¥31.6B¥39.9B¥38.5BReceivablesReceiv.
¥31.7B¥33.8B¥36.1B¥39.9B¥41.1B¥55.5B¥80.0B¥74.3B¥73.7B¥83.7BInventoryInvent.
¥66.0B¥69.4B¥75.1B¥76.1B¥79.3B¥107.7B¥135.2B¥105.9B¥113.6B¥122.1BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥297.5B¥342.8B¥353.3B¥381.2B¥423.5B¥528.5B¥628.8B¥652.8B¥711.5B¥666.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥44.1B¥49.3B¥43.1B¥43.6B¥53.9B¥81.5B¥78.6B¥61.8B¥55.8B¥58.9BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
6.8×6.9×8.2×8.7×7.8×6.5×8.0×10.6×12.7×11.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥5.8B¥5.4B¥4.4B¥3.9B¥3.6B¥3.3B¥3.1B¥1.9B¥1.7B¥1.5BGoodwillGoodwill
¥444.0B¥488.8B¥503.8B¥538.8B¥590.4B¥705.4B¥826.4B¥871.7B¥959.0B¥938.3BTotal assetsAssets
¥9.0B¥8.6B¥1.1B¥4.5B¥2.4B¥6.3B¥5.4B¥3.4B¥3.6B¥4.0BTotal debtDebt
(¥187.4B)(¥191.1B)(¥175.2B)(¥260.2B)(¥297.8B)(¥351.5B)(¥411.9B)(¥478.6B)(¥526.7B)(¥468.8B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
400.9×349.7×318.9×673.4×780.2×1278.3×1098.4×396.5×556.3×474.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥391.4B¥430.5B¥453.5B¥490.1B¥539.1B¥616.7B¥741.1B¥802.4B¥715.4B¥670.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
92.7M92.7M92.7M92.7M92.7M92.4M91.2M90.0M89.1M86.5MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥3483.58¥3621.66¥3753.61¥3917.49¥4077.22¥5915.30¥6898.96¥5269.40¥5060.51¥5388.22Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥549.65¥414.61¥581.65¥559.03¥684.56¥1254.87¥1406.08¥679.19¥856.47¥392.82EPS (diluted)EPS
¥523.08¥608.36¥346.00¥536.75¥784.94¥1042.14¥992.07¥997.36¥695.64¥422.65Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥373.74¥608.36¥294.88¥481.50¥730.05¥1042.14¥992.07¥997.36¥563.38¥326.60Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥154.93¥154.91¥154.94¥154.95¥154.99¥396.10¥235.82¥286.64¥298.81¥330.63Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥316.88¥138.68¥239.99¥250.78¥251.94¥174.87¥222.10¥275.30¥413.20¥410.48Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥4221.11¥4642.63¥4890.61¥5285.39¥5814.78¥6674.43¥8129.61¥8913.33¥8027.81¥7749.38Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.0%/yr+5.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share−2.3%/yr−11.6%/yr
EPS−3.7%/yr−10.5%/yr
Dividends / share+8.8%/yr+16.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.9%/yr+10.3%/yr
Book value / share+7.0%/yr+5.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned ¥36.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥27.2B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥8.3B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥28.3B.

Reported net income¥34.0B
Owner earnings¥36.6B · 8% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income¥34.0B¥76.3B¥61.1B¥128.2B¥115.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥27.2B+¥25.0B+¥23.9B+¥21.0B+¥18.7B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥2.6B−¥14.3B+¥29.5B−¥38.5B−¥22.2B
Cash from operations¥63.8B¥87.0B¥114.6B¥110.7B¥112.4B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥27.2B−¥25.0B−¥24.8B−¥20.2B−¥16.2B
Owner earnings¥36.6B¥62.0B¥89.8B¥90.4B¥96.3B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥8.3B−¥11.8B
Free cash flow¥28.3B¥50.2B¥89.8B¥90.4B¥96.3B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue8%14%19%14%18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥27.2B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥8.3B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥51.7B ÷ interest expense ¥109M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash ¥472.8B − debt ¥4.0B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by ¥468.8B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 19%–44%; 20% latest = NOPAT ¥40.8B ÷ invested capital ¥201.8B
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 8%–19%; latest ¥36.6B = operating cash ¥63.8B − maintenance capex ¥27.2B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 8% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥8.3B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥28.3B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥63.8B ÷ net income ¥34.0B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks ¥78.6B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥36.6B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against ¥36.6B of Owner Earnings, ¥78.6B (215%) went back to shareholders, ¥28.6B dividends, ¥50.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.31×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥35.5B ÷ depreciation ¥27.2B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 19% → 14% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 19% early to 14% lately, median 19% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −1%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 1% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · 11.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −0.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated ¥830.3B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash builder, a large share of cash simply built up on the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested¥244.6B · 29%
  • Dividends¥211.0B · 25%
  • Buybacks¥144.9B · 17%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥229.8B · 28%
  • Returned to owners¥355.9B

    56% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥211.0B as dividends and ¥144.9B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt fell ¥5.0B and cash and short-term investments rose ¥276.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥144.9B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−6.7%

    The diluted count fell from 93M to 87M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥330.63/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 9% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained5%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥318.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥17.1B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.05 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Shimano is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 26% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from ¥66.0B to ¥122.1B while revenue grew 44%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 26% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Shimano has delivered.

¥

Through the cycle, Shimano earns about ¥68.5B on its 14.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 7.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−15%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−2%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥28.3B on 87M diluted shares; net cash ¥468.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥35.5B) runs well above depreciation (¥27.2B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥36.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 7272 its page in the Manual 7453 →

Industry order: the Leisure Products chapter 7832 →