Owner Scorecard


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8002 · Marubeni

Trading house Trading & distribution IFRS
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

The numbers below are read directly from Marubeni’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative is not machine-read; the short business note that follows is written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts. Find it on EDINET (code 8002) →

The business in brief

What it is
Marubeni is one of Japan's sogo shosha — a general trading house that buys, moves, finances, and resells goods across many industries, and owns stakes in the businesses it trades with. It earns money two ways: thin margins on the enormous flows of goods passing through its hands, and its share of the profits and dividends from a sprawling portfolio of subsidiaries and affiliates. The customer is rarely the public; it sits between producers and industrial buyers, and between capital and projects, taking a cut of the transaction and a piece of the equity.
What moves the needle
The first test is franchise versus middleman: a trading house has no single product to defend, so the question is whether its web of relationships, logistics, and financing buys a durable spread — or whether it is a leveraged proxy for commodity prices and the yen, with someone else always able to disintermediate it. Watch the cost of carrying this much working capital and debt against the spreads earned, because a diversified book can hide that the marginal deal clears barely above its funding cost. Watch, too, the reinvestment record: capital here flows into ventures and equity stakes whose returns depend on cycles management does not control, so the discipline of what gets bought, and at what price, governs the outcome more than any line of trade. The bad case is a balance sheet carried large while the returns on it sit near or below the cost of the money — see the margins, the returns on capital, and the debt in the record below.

Written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts.

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥7.13T¥7.54T¥7.40T¥6.83T¥6.33T¥8.51T¥9.19T¥7.25T¥7.79T¥8.27TRevenueRevenue
10%11%15%14%Gross marginGross mgn
8%8%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥155.3B¥211.3B¥230.9B(¥197.4B)¥225.3B¥424.3B¥543.0B¥471.4B¥503.0B¥543.9BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥324.3B¥253.4B¥284.9B¥327.0B¥397.1B¥311.9B¥606.3B¥442.5B¥597.9B¥535.4BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥168.9B¥42.2B¥54.0B¥524.4B¥171.7B(¥112.4B)¥63.3B(¥28.9B)¥95.0B(¥8.5B)Working capital & otherWC & other
¥103.2B¥93.2B¥109.9B¥124.1B¥101.8B¥104.3B¥153.4B¥177.6B¥153.5BCapexCapex
1.4%1.3%1.6%2.0%1.2%1.1%2.1%2.3%1.9%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥150.2B¥191.7B¥217.1B¥273.0B¥210.1B¥502.1B¥289.1B¥420.4B¥381.9BOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.0%2.6%3.2%4.3%2.5%5.5%4.0%5.4%4.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥150.2B¥191.7B¥217.1B¥273.0B¥210.1B¥502.1B¥289.1B¥420.4B¥381.9BFree cash flowFCF
2.0%2.6%3.2%4.3%2.5%5.5%4.0%5.4%4.6%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥34.7B¥45.1B¥61.6B¥59.9B¥49.5B¥82.5B¥127.2B¥138.5B¥147.5B¥165.3BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥6M¥7M¥5M¥4M¥3M¥19.2B¥40.8B¥50.0B¥50.0B¥70.0BBuybacksBuybacks
9%12%12%-13%12%19%19%14%14%12%Return on equityROE
7%9%9%−17%10%15%14%10%10%9%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥391.8B¥625.8B¥509.3B¥522.6B¥745.9B¥578.6B¥608.9B¥506.3B¥569.1B¥551.1BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥463.6B¥557.1B¥437.9B¥338.2B¥352.6B¥381.9B¥375.7B¥402.4B¥374.1B¥382.2BReceivablesReceiv.
¥463.6B¥557.1B¥437.9B¥338.2B¥352.6B¥381.9B¥375.7B¥402.4B¥374.1B¥382.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥1.43T¥3.28T¥3.16T¥3.00T¥3.38T¥4.43T¥3.76T¥3.95T¥4.02T¥4.51TCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥1.59T¥1.66T¥1.32T¥1.22T¥1.31T¥1.41T¥1.13T¥1.26T¥1.14T¥1.07TCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
0.9×2.0×2.4×2.5×2.6×3.1×3.3×3.1×3.5×4.2×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥126.4B¥169.3B¥130.8B¥133.4B¥144.3B¥153.6B¥214.4B¥223.5B¥267.0BGoodwillGoodwill
¥6.90T¥6.88T¥6.81T¥6.32T¥6.94T¥8.26T¥7.95T¥8.92T¥9.20T¥10.53TTotal assetsAssets
¥1.81T¥2.54T¥2.37T¥2.38T¥2.43T¥2.44T¥2.09T¥2.41T¥2.54T¥2.41TTotal debtDebt
¥1.42T¥1.92T¥1.86T¥1.86T¥1.69T¥1.86T¥1.48T¥1.90T¥1.97T¥1.86TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
-2.8×-1.5×-0.9×-1.0×-1.6×-3.9×-0.7×-0.7×-1.0×-0.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥1.68T¥1.77T¥1.98T¥1.52T¥1.82T¥2.24T¥2.88T¥3.46T¥3.63T¥4.36TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
1.74B1.74B1.74B1.74B1.74B1.74B1.70B1.68B1.66B1.66BShares out (diluted)Shares
¥4101.87¥4338.66¥4258.63¥3928.58¥3643.63¥4894.28¥5411.27¥4325.31¥4690.73¥4977.15Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥89.39¥121.56¥132.85¥-113.61¥129.66¥244.08¥319.71¥281.22¥302.85¥327.47EPS (diluted)EPS
¥86.45¥110.29¥124.92¥157.07¥120.86¥295.62¥172.46¥253.13¥229.96Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥86.45¥110.29¥124.92¥157.07¥120.86¥295.62¥172.46¥253.13¥229.96Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥19.97¥25.96¥35.45¥34.45¥28.47¥47.46¥74.90¥82.64¥88.80¥99.51Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥59.37¥53.64¥63.22¥71.40¥58.56¥61.39¥91.49¥106.91¥92.42Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥968.80¥1019.30¥1137.98¥871.99¥1046.67¥1289.74¥1694.39¥2063.88¥2185.29¥2627.55Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.2%/yr+6.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.0%/yr (8-yr)+7.9%/yr
EPS+15.5%/yr+20.4%/yr
Dividends / share+19.5%/yr+28.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+5.7%/yr (8-yr)+5.3%/yr
Book value / share+11.7%/yr+20.2%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business reported ¥543.9B of profit but ¥381.9B of owner earnings: ¥161.9B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income¥543.9B
Owner earnings¥381.9B · 5% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥543.9B¥503.0B¥471.4B¥543.0B¥424.3B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−¥8.5B+¥95.0B−¥28.9B+¥63.3B−¥112.4B
Cash from operations¥535.4B¥597.9B¥442.5B¥606.3B¥311.9B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−¥153.5B−¥177.6B−¥153.4B−¥104.3B−¥101.8B
Owner earnings¥381.9B¥420.4B¥289.1B¥502.1B¥210.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%5%4%5%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Not the right lens here
    What this means

    This business earns through equity-method affiliates, so interest coverage on its operating line isn't meaningful. Read its solvency on net debt against equity instead.

  • Net debt
    Cash ¥551.1B − debt ¥2.41T
    What this means

    Netting ¥551.1B of cash and short-term investments against ¥2.41T of debt leaves ¥1.86T owed. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Is it a good business?

  • Operating income not meaningful here
    Industry peers: median 16%
    What this means

    This business earns mostly through equity-method affiliates, so its operating line understates its earning power and a ROIC built on it would mislead. Read it on return on equity and the record instead.

  • Thin through the cycle
    9-yr median margin, range 2%–5%; latest ¥381.9B = operating cash ¥535.4B − maintenance capex ¥153.5B
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 9 years.

  • Mostly cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥535.4B ÷ net income ¥543.9B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥235.3B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥381.9B
    What this means

    Of ¥381.9B Owner Earnings, ¥235.3B (62%) went back to shareholders, ¥165.3B dividends, ¥70.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting?
    Not enough data
    What this means

    The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin −1% → −1% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about −1% early, −1% lately, median −1%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −1%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.

  • Owner earnings growth +11%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 11% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2025 · −1.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2025, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −0.5%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2018–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥3.76T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested¥1.12T · 30%
  • Dividends¥877.1B · 23%
  • Buybacks¥230.1B · 6%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥1.53T · 41%
  • Returned to owners¥1.11T

    42% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥877.1B as dividends and ¥230.1B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥230.1B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−4.4%

    The diluted count fell from 1738M to 1661M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥99.51/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 18% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained10%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥1.85T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥177.5B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Marubeni is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Marubeni has delivered.

Marubeni’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Marubeni earns about ¥329.6B on its 4.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+3%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’26+11%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ¥381.9B on 1661M diluted shares; net debt ¥1.86T. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 8001 its page in the Manual 8015 →

Industry order: ← 8001 the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter 8015 →