← Japan catalog ← 7974 Manual 8002 → ← 2768 Trading Companies & Distributors 8002 →
8001 · Itochu
The numbers below are read directly from Itochu’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative is not machine-read; the short business note that follows is written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts. Find it on EDINET (code 8001) →
The business in brief
- What it is
- Itochu is one of Japan's large general trading houses — a sogo shosha — that buys, sells, ships, and finances a wide range of goods around the world, and takes ownership stakes in the businesses along those supply chains. Among the majors it tilts more toward consumer-facing trade, with deep roots in textiles and a heavier weighting in food and the distribution that moves everyday goods, and less toward pulling resources out of the ground. It earns its keep two ways: a thin cut on the enormous volume of goods that passes through its hands, and its share of the profits from the many companies it part-owns.
- What moves the needle
- The first test is whether this is a franchise or a toll booth on other people's commodities: the margin on traded goods is thin and the prices are set by markets, so the durable edge, if there is one, lives not in pricing power over goods but in capital allocation — which businesses it chooses to own, at what price, and how those stakes earn. So watch return on capital against the cost of that capital, because a trading house carries debt against a low-margin pass-through, and leverage flatters the fat years and bites in the lean ones. The bad case is a commodity and demand cycle that rolls over while borrowings stay fixed and a few large stakes sour at once; the reinvestment question is whether retained profit buys stakes that clear the hurdle rather than empire. The record below holds the margins, the returns on capital, and the debt.
Written and reviewed by hand, grounded in the filing and the company’s established facts.
The record
What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| ¥4.84T | ¥5.51T | ¥11.60T | ¥10.98T | ¥10.36T | ¥12.29T | ¥13.95T | ¥14.03T | ¥14.72T | ¥14.82T | RevenueRevenue |
| — | — | — | 16% | 17% | — | — | — | 16% | 17% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| — | — | — | 13% | 13% | — | — | — | 11% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ¥352.2B | ¥400.3B | ¥500.5B | ¥501.3B | ¥401.4B | ¥820.3B | ¥800.5B | ¥801.8B | ¥880.3B | ¥900.3B | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| ¥389.7B | ¥388.2B | ¥476.6B | ¥878.1B | ¥895.9B | ¥801.2B | ¥938.1B | ¥978.1B | ¥997.3B | ¥1.13T | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| ¥37.5B | (¥12.1B) | (¥24.0B) | ¥376.8B | ¥494.5B | (¥19.1B) | ¥137.5B | ¥176.3B | ¥117.0B | ¥231.6B | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| — | ¥107.8B | ¥113.6B | ¥199.5B | ¥165.0B | ¥157.1B | ¥194.1B | ¥202.5B | ¥227.5B | ¥285.0B | CapexCapex |
| — | 2.0% | 1.0% | 1.8% | 1.6% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| — | ¥280.4B | ¥363.0B | ¥678.6B | ¥730.9B | ¥644.0B | ¥744.0B | ¥775.6B | ¥769.8B | ¥846.8B | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| — | 5.1% | 3.1% | 6.2% | 7.1% | 5.2% | 5.3% | 5.5% | 5.2% | 5.7% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| — | ¥280.4B | ¥363.0B | ¥678.6B | ¥730.9B | ¥644.0B | ¥744.0B | ¥775.6B | ¥769.8B | ¥846.8B | Free cash flowFCF |
| — | 5.1% | 3.1% | 6.2% | 7.1% | 5.2% | 5.3% | 5.5% | 5.2% | 5.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| ¥83.0B | ¥92.8B | ¥116.4B | ¥133.5B | ¥129.0B | ¥135.4B | ¥188.4B | ¥225.5B | ¥258.6B | ¥282.7B | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| ¥16.8B | ¥27.9B | ¥68.7B | ¥62.0B | ¥14.3B | ¥60.0B | ¥61.8B | ¥100.1B | ¥158.2B | ¥170.1B | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 15% | 15% | 17% | 17% | 12% | 20% | 17% | 15% | 15% | 14% | Return on equityROE |
| 11% | 12% | 13% | 12% | 8% | 16% | 13% | 11% | 11% | 9% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| ¥303.4B | ¥432.1B | ¥572.0B | ¥611.2B | ¥544.0B | ¥611.7B | ¥606.0B | ¥600.4B | ¥549.6B | ¥593.8B | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| ¥600.9B | ¥639.6B | ¥655.1B | ¥535.7B | ¥543.1B | ¥683.8B | ¥716.0B | ¥770.1B | ¥792.2B | ¥831.0B | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| ¥600.9B | ¥639.6B | ¥655.1B | ¥535.7B | ¥543.1B | ¥683.8B | ¥716.0B | ¥770.1B | ¥792.2B | ¥831.0B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| ¥1.46T | ¥3.92T | ¥4.41T | ¥4.13T | ¥4.28T | ¥4.81T | ¥5.12T | ¥5.62T | ¥5.72T | ¥6.27T | Current assetsCur. assets |
| ¥1.16T | ¥1.09T | ¥1.02T | ¥1.10T | ¥1.33T | ¥1.76T | ¥1.41T | ¥2.05T | ¥2.25T | ¥2.11T | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.3× | 3.6× | 4.3× | 3.8× | 3.2× | 2.7× | 3.6× | 2.7× | 2.5× | 3.0× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | ¥129.3B | ¥391.6B | ¥403.9B | ¥396.9B | ¥369.0B | ¥366.7B | ¥383.9B | ¥405.3B | ¥427.7B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| ¥8.12T | ¥8.66T | ¥10.10T | ¥10.92T | ¥11.18T | ¥12.15T | ¥13.12T | ¥14.49T | ¥15.13T | ¥16.73T | Total assetsAssets |
| ¥1.30T | ¥2.78T | ¥2.98T | ¥4.06T | ¥4.22T | ¥3.92T | ¥4.01T | ¥4.40T | ¥4.62T | ¥4.76T | Total debtDebt |
| ¥994.0B | ¥2.35T | ¥2.41T | ¥3.45T | ¥3.67T | ¥3.31T | ¥3.41T | ¥3.80T | ¥4.07T | ¥4.16T | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 3.2× | 0.2× | 0.4× | -0.0× | 0.4× | 1.6× | 1.7× | 0.5× | 0.3× | 0.3× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| ¥2.40T | ¥2.67T | ¥2.94T | ¥3.00T | ¥3.32T | ¥4.20T | ¥4.82T | ¥5.43T | ¥5.76T | ¥6.59T | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 8.31B | 8.31B | 7.92B | 7.92B | 7.92B | 7.92B | 7.92B | 7.92B | 7.92B | 7.92B | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| ¥581.93 | ¥662.71 | ¥1463.89 | ¥1385.96 | ¥1307.68 | ¥1551.32 | ¥1759.82 | ¥1770.46 | ¥1858.08 | ¥1870.55 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| ¥42.36 | ¥48.15 | ¥63.16 | ¥63.26 | ¥50.66 | ¥103.51 | ¥101.02 | ¥101.18 | ¥111.08 | ¥113.61 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | ¥33.72 | ¥45.80 | ¥85.63 | ¥92.23 | ¥81.27 | ¥93.88 | ¥97.87 | ¥97.14 | ¥106.86 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | ¥33.72 | ¥45.80 | ¥85.63 | ¥92.23 | ¥81.27 | ¥93.88 | ¥97.87 | ¥97.14 | ¥106.86 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| ¥9.99 | ¥11.17 | ¥14.69 | ¥16.85 | ¥16.28 | ¥17.08 | ¥23.77 | ¥28.45 | ¥32.63 | ¥35.67 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | ¥12.97 | ¥14.33 | ¥25.18 | ¥20.82 | ¥19.83 | ¥24.49 | ¥25.56 | ¥28.70 | ¥35.96 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| ¥288.88 | ¥321.07 | ¥370.61 | ¥378.06 | ¥418.49 | ¥529.92 | ¥608.66 | ¥684.84 | ¥726.24 | ¥831.60 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2022 are restated ×5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +13.9%/yr | +7.4%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | +15.5%/yr (8-yr) | +3.0%/yr |
| EPS | +11.6%/yr | +17.5%/yr |
| Dividends / share | +15.2%/yr | +17.0%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +13.6%/yr (8-yr) | +11.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +12.5%/yr | +14.7%/yr |
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business reported ¥900.3B of profit but ¥846.8B of owner earnings: ¥53.4B less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ¥900.3B | ¥880.3B | ¥801.8B | ¥800.5B | ¥820.3B |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +¥231.6B | +¥117.0B | +¥176.3B | +¥137.5B | −¥19.1B |
| Cash from operations | ¥1.13T | ¥997.3B | ¥978.1B | ¥938.1B | ¥801.2B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −¥285.0B | −¥227.5B | −¥202.5B | −¥194.1B | −¥157.1B |
| Owner earnings | ¥846.8B | ¥769.8B | ¥775.6B | ¥744.0B | ¥644.0B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 6% | 5% | 6% | 5% | 5% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Not the right lens here
What this means
This business earns through equity-method affiliates, so interest coverage on its operating line isn't meaningful. Read its solvency on net debt against equity instead.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥4.16T · 126.7× operating profitHeavy net debtCash ¥593.8B − debt ¥4.76T
What this means
Netting ¥593.8B of cash and short-term investments against ¥4.76T of debt leaves ¥4.16T owed, about 126.7× a year's operating profit (144.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Operating income not meaningful hereIndustry peers: median 16%
What this means
This business earns mostly through equity-method affiliates, so its operating line understates its earning power and a ROIC built on it would mislead. Read it on return on equity and the record instead.
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median margin, range 3%–7%; latest ¥846.8B = operating cash ¥1.13T − maintenance capex ¥285.0BIndustry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 6% of revenue this year, a 5% median across 9 years.
- Cash-backedCash from ops ¥1.13T ÷ net income ¥900.3B
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns about halfDividends + buybacks ¥452.7B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥846.8B
What this means
Of ¥846.8B Owner Earnings, ¥452.7B (53%) went back to shareholders, ¥282.7B dividends, ¥170.1B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? —Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 10 of 10
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 0% → 0% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 0% early, 0% lately, median 0%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 0%
What this means
Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.
- Owner earnings growth +12%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 12% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2020 · −0.0% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2020, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
How the cash was used, 2018–2026
Over the record, the business generated ¥7.49T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested¥1.65T · 22%
- Dividends¥1.56T · 21%
- Buybacks¥723.0B · 10%
- Retained (debt / cash)¥3.55T · 47%
- Returned to owners¥2.29T
39% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥1.56T as dividends and ¥723.0B as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥1.98T and cash and short-term investments rose ¥161.6B.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran ¥723.0B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−4.7%
The diluted count fell from 8314M to 7924M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record¥35.67/sh
Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 16% a year. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained10%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥3.72T over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥356.8B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.10 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Itochu is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥1.30T → ¥4.76T
Debt rose from ¥1.30T to ¥4.76T while owner earnings went from about ¥440.7B to ¥797.4B — about 2.9 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 6.0 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
The price
What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Itochu has delivered.
Through the cycle, Itochu earns about ¥790.8B on its 5.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 5.7% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings ¥846.8B on 7924M diluted shares; net debt ¥4.16T. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.
Manual order: ← 7974 its page in the Manual 8002 →
Industry order: ← 2768 the Trading Companies & Distributors chapter 8002 →