Owner Scorecard


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8233 · Takashimaya

Department stores Consumer & brand J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Takashimaya’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 8233) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥860.8B¥844.9B¥846.9B¥848.5B¥620.9B¥695.7B¥368.9B¥385.8B¥412.8B¥402.0BRevenueRevenue
25%24%52%52%Gross marginGross mgn
31%36%59%61%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
¥34.0B¥35.3B¥26.7B¥25.6B(¥13.5B)¥4.1B¥32.5B¥45.9B¥57.5B¥53.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
3.9%4.2%3.1%3.0%−2.2%0.6%8.8%11.9%13.9%13.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥20.9B¥23.7B¥16.4B¥16.0B(¥34.0B)¥5.4B¥27.8B¥31.6B¥39.5B(¥8.2B)Net incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥42.3B¥36.9B¥67.9B¥40.6B¥43.7B¥21.0B¥36.5B¥59.5B¥72.5B¥53.8BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥19.4B¥19.1B¥19.9B¥31.1B¥28.0B¥31.4B¥33.3B¥34.2B¥32.9B¥33.8BDepreciationDeprec.
¥2.0B(¥5.8B)¥31.5B(¥6.5B)¥49.7B(¥15.7B)(¥24.6B)(¥6.3B)¥80M¥28.3BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥21.8B¥69.4B¥93.1B¥44.5B¥23.4B¥32.9B¥26.0B¥27.9B¥28.8B¥45.2BCapexCapex
2.5%8.2%11.0%5.2%3.8%4.7%7.1%7.2%7.0%11.3%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥20.5B(¥32.6B)(¥25.2B)(¥3.9B)¥20.3B(¥11.9B)¥10.5B¥31.7B¥43.7B¥8.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
2.4%−3.9%−3.0%−0.5%3.3%−1.7%2.8%8.2%10.6%2.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥20.5B(¥32.6B)(¥25.2B)(¥3.9B)¥20.3B(¥11.9B)¥10.5B¥31.7B¥43.7B¥8.6BFree cash flowFCF
2.4%−3.9%−3.0%−0.5%3.3%−1.7%2.8%8.2%10.6%2.1%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥4.2B¥4.2B¥4.2B¥4.1B¥4.0B¥4.0B¥4.0B¥4.9B¥6.8B¥9.0BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥7M¥9M¥8M¥9.8B¥0¥0¥16.7B¥2M¥15.0B¥15.0BBuybacksBuybacks
6%5%4%3%-2%1%4%5%7%6%ROICROIC
5%5%4%4%-9%1%6%7%9%-2%Return on equityROE
4%4%3%3%−10%0%5%6%8%−4%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥103.8B¥95.1B¥94.7B¥88.4B¥105.3B¥89.0B¥88.6B¥92.9B¥88.6B¥77.4BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥122.7B¥140.0B¥117.1B¥115.9B¥100.7B¥96.1B¥143.5B¥157.0B¥160.6B¥195.8BReceivablesReceiv.
¥41.2B¥43.5B¥43.8B¥44.4B¥41.8B¥37.9B¥35.2B¥35.9B¥35.4B¥35.2BInventoryInvent.
¥101.3B¥102.4B¥108.6B¥102.6B¥87.0B¥93.7B¥110.7B¥124.1B¥123.8B¥132.8BAccounts payablePayables
¥62.6B¥81.1B¥52.3B¥57.7B¥55.6B¥40.3B¥68.0B¥68.7B¥72.1B¥98.2BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥325.5B¥327.5B¥297.1B¥287.8B¥283.6B¥269.8B¥301.5B¥327.8B¥333.5B¥364.4BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥319.8B¥370.9B¥349.2B¥397.9B¥402.6B¥352.8B¥365.7B¥417.3B¥415.5B¥542.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.0×0.9×0.9×0.7×0.7×0.8×0.8×0.8×0.8×0.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥193M¥97M¥1.5B¥2.8B¥2.4B¥2.4B¥2.4B¥2.5B¥2.7B¥2.7BGoodwillGoodwill
¥986.5B¥1.04T¥1.08T¥1.17T¥1.15T¥1.14T¥1.18T¥1.27T¥1.30T¥1.35TTotal assetsAssets
¥156.6B¥175.3B¥197.6B¥288.9B¥293.5B¥302.2B¥303.8B¥345.8B¥341.5B¥414.5BTotal debtDebt
¥52.9B¥80.2B¥102.9B¥200.5B¥188.2B¥213.2B¥215.2B¥252.9B¥252.9B¥337.0BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
53.9×54.5×38.3×4.8×-2.8×0.9×6.3×8.1×7.3×6.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥421.9B¥449.5B¥461.6B¥413.5B¥375.4B¥420.5B¥436.5B¥478.8B¥426.7B¥395.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
178M178M178M178M178M178M178M178M316M305MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥4842.29¥4753.26¥4764.28¥4773.28¥3492.85¥3913.69¥2075.07¥2170.52¥1308.03¥1317.00Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥117.41¥133.09¥92.50¥90.17¥-191.10¥30.15¥156.61¥177.88¥125.25¥-26.85EPS (diluted)EPS
¥115.18¥-183.21¥-141.86¥-22.12¥114.19¥-66.92¥58.97¥178.21¥138.42¥28.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥115.18¥-183.21¥-141.86¥-22.12¥114.19¥-66.92¥58.97¥178.21¥138.42¥28.18Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥23.59¥23.59¥23.59¥23.32¥22.51¥22.51¥22.51¥27.50¥21.49¥29.59Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥122.59¥390.62¥523.91¥250.56¥131.76¥185.30¥146.34¥156.71¥91.30¥148.21Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥2373.38¥2528.85¥2596.69¥2325.94¥2112.06¥2365.50¥2455.47¥2693.55¥1352.16¥1296.52Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2019 are restated ×1/2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1.78 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−13.5%/yr−17.7%/yr
Owner earnings / share−14.5%/yr−24.4%/yr
Dividends / share+2.6%/yr+5.6%/yr
Capital spending / share+2.1%/yr+2.4%/yr
Book value / share−6.5%/yr−9.3%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business turned a ¥8.2B loss into ¥8.6B of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income(¥8.2B)¥39.5B¥31.6B¥27.8B¥5.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥33.8B+¥32.9B+¥34.2B+¥33.3B+¥31.4B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥28.3B+¥80M−¥6.3B−¥24.6B−¥15.7B
Cash from operations¥53.8B¥72.5B¥59.5B¥36.5B¥21.0B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−¥45.2B−¥28.8B−¥27.9B−¥26.0B−¥32.9B
Owner earnings¥8.6B¥43.7B¥31.7B¥10.5B(¥11.9B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%11%8%3%-2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥53.5B ÷ interest expense ¥7.8B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥337.0B · 6.3× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥77.4B − debt ¥414.5B
    What this means

    Netting ¥77.4B of cash and short-term investments against ¥414.5B of debt leaves ¥337.0B owed, about 6.3× a year's operating profit (7.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Negative, funded by others
    DSO 178 + DIO 67 − DPO 251 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -2%–7%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥42.3B ÷ invested capital ¥732.7B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest ¥8.6B = operating cash ¥53.8B − maintenance capex ¥45.2B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 10 years.

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income (¥8.2B) · cash from operations ¥53.8B
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks ¥24.0B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥8.6B
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against ¥8.6B of Owner Earnings, ¥24.0B (279%) went back to shareholders, ¥9.0B dividends, ¥15.0B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.34×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥45.2B ÷ depreciation ¥33.8B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 8 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 4% → 13% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 4% early to 13% lately, median 4% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 8%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Worst year 2021 · −2.2% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2021, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count −1.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥474.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥413.2B · 87%
  • Dividends¥49.4B · 10%
  • Buybacks¥56.5B · 12%
  • Returned to owners¥106.0B

    172% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥49.4B as dividends and ¥56.5B as buybacks.

  • Source of funding−¥44.4B

    Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran ¥44.4B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from ¥156.6B to ¥414.5B, and cash and short-term investments drew down ¥26.3B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥56.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count71.7%

    The diluted count rose from 178M to 305M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record¥29.59/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained122%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥33.2B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥40.4B, so each retained ¥1 added about 1.22 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Takashimaya is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

3 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?71.7%

    Diluted shares grew 71.7% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent ¥56.5B on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?¥156.6B → ¥414.5B

    Debt rose from ¥156.6B to ¥414.5B while owner earnings went from about (¥12.4B) to ¥28.0B: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 57% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from ¥163.9B to ¥231.0B while revenue grew −53%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 57% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Takashimaya has delivered.

¥
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023−6%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings ¥8.6B on 305M diluted shares; net debt ¥337.0B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 8058 its page in the Manual 8252 →

Industry order: ← 7532 the Department & General Merchandise Stores chapter 8252 →