Owner Scorecard


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9532 · Osaka Gas

Gas utilities Capital-intensive J-GAAP
Latest filing: FY2026 annual securities report (有価証券報告書) · EDINET

This is a quantitative scorecard. The numbers below are read directly from Osaka Gas’s EDINET filing, in yen. The Japanese-language narrative, what the business does, its risks, what changed this year, is not machine-read here, so we do not paraphrase it. Find it on EDINET (code 9532) →

I

The record

What the business has done across the cycle, read straight from the EDINET filing: the multi-year record, and the walk from reported profit to the cash an owner could take out.

The record, 2017–2026

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’252026’26
Income statement
¥1.18T¥1.30T¥1.37T¥1.37T¥1.36T¥1.59T¥2.28T¥2.08T¥2.07T¥2.03TRevenueRevenue
30%32%20%22%Gross marginGross mgn
¥97.3B¥78.1B¥68.0B¥83.8B¥112.5B¥99.2B¥60.0B¥172.6B¥160.7B¥174.8BOperating incomeOp. inc.
8.2%6.0%5.0%6.1%8.2%6.2%2.6%8.3%7.8%8.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
¥61.3B¥37.7B¥33.6B¥41.8B¥80.9B¥130.4B¥57.1B¥132.7B¥134.4B¥152.8BNet incomeNet inc.
Cash flow & returns
¥148.8B¥168.7B¥65.1B¥182.9B¥219.8B¥145.3B¥33.6B¥312.6B¥283.7B¥340.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
¥86.2B¥86.4B¥99.7B¥91.9B¥101.4B¥108.9B¥119.8B¥123.6B¥127.5B¥135.1BDepreciationDeprec.
¥1.3B¥44.6B(¥68.2B)¥49.2B¥37.5B(¥94.0B)(¥143.4B)¥56.4B¥21.7B¥52.9BWorking capital & otherWC & other
¥83.4B¥73.1B¥80.1B¥117.6B¥169.6B¥173.4B¥172.1B¥174.6B¥210.8B¥238.5BCapexCapex
7.0%5.6%5.8%8.6%12.4%10.9%7.6%8.4%10.2%11.7%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
¥65.4B¥95.6B(¥15.0B)¥91.0B¥118.4B¥36.4B(¥86.3B)¥189.0B¥156.1B¥205.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
5.5%7.4%−1.1%6.6%8.7%2.3%−3.8%9.1%7.5%10.1%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
¥65.4B¥95.6B(¥15.0B)¥65.3B¥50.2B(¥28.1B)(¥138.5B)¥138.0B¥72.8B¥102.2BFree cash flowFCF
5.5%7.4%−1.1%4.8%3.7%−1.8%−6.1%6.6%3.5%5.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
¥20.8B¥20.8B¥20.8B¥20.8B¥20.8B¥22.9B¥24.9B¥26.0B¥39.5B¥42.2BDividends paidDiv. paid
¥226M¥175M¥85M¥60M¥52M¥357M¥38M¥20.1B¥40.1B¥63.5BBuybacksBuybacks
6%5%4%5%6%4%2%5%5%6%ROICROIC
6%4%3%4%8%10%4%8%10%11%Return on equityROE
4%2%1%2%6%8%2%7%7%8%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
¥166.9B¥171.1B¥115.8B¥146.8B¥166.8B¥130.8B¥84.8B¥77.2B¥82.3B¥58.5BCash & investmentsCash+inv
¥177.5B¥190.4B¥219.2B¥210.5B¥211.7B¥227.1B¥279.6B¥270.5B¥317.9B¥296.7BReceivablesReceiv.
¥69.8B¥76.9B¥112.3B¥108.1B¥94.2B¥145.4B¥219.4B¥211.8B¥205.0B¥222.7BInventoryInvent.
¥50.2B¥58.5B¥66.1B¥59.4B¥60.5B¥104.9B¥69.1B¥82.9B¥103.7B¥94.5BAccounts payablePayables
¥197.0B¥208.8B¥265.4B¥259.2B¥245.4B¥267.6B¥429.8B¥399.4B¥419.1B¥424.9BOperating working capitalOper. WC
¥482.1B¥503.3B¥532.2B¥560.0B¥583.3B¥707.7B¥780.9B¥762.5B¥812.8B¥828.9BCurrent assetsCur. assets
¥262.3B¥324.1B¥353.2B¥312.3B¥322.8B¥400.2B¥459.8B¥393.9B¥409.8B¥450.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.8×1.6×1.5×1.8×1.8×1.8×1.7×1.9×2.0×1.8×Current ratioCurr. ratio
¥13.6B¥14.7B¥11.5B¥12.1B¥13.7B¥11.1B¥9.5B¥5.5B¥4.1B¥6.5BGoodwillGoodwill
¥1.89T¥1.90T¥2.03T¥2.14T¥2.31T¥2.59T¥2.82T¥2.98T¥3.20T¥3.32TTotal assetsAssets
¥485.8B¥430.4B¥517.4B¥656.8B¥688.3B¥788.0B¥978.3B¥994.2B¥1.12T¥1.14TTotal debtDebt
¥318.9B¥259.4B¥401.6B¥509.9B¥521.5B¥657.3B¥893.6B¥916.9B¥1.04T¥1.08TNet debt / (cash)Net debt
10.1×8.2×6.7×6.9×10.1×9.5×4.6×12.0×10.5×12.7×Interest coverageInt. cov.
¥991.9B¥1.03T¥1.04T¥952.2B¥1.01T¥1.30T¥1.42T¥1.60T¥1.30T¥1.35TShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
417M417M417M417M417M417M417M410M404M398MShares out (diluted)Shares
¥2841.14¥3110.87¥3292.37¥3284.75¥3273.75¥3818.57¥5460.10¥5081.70¥5120.00¥5102.79Revenue / shareRev/sh
¥147.05¥90.53¥80.64¥100.29¥194.05¥313.00¥137.06¥323.68¥332.62¥383.91EPS (diluted)EPS
¥156.87¥229.55¥-35.96¥218.31¥284.04¥87.47¥-207.00¥461.18¥386.36¥516.74Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
¥156.87¥229.55¥-35.96¥156.76¥120.45¥-67.44¥-332.41¥336.57¥180.23¥256.86Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
¥49.93¥49.92¥49.92¥49.92¥49.90¥54.86¥59.83¥63.34¥97.86¥106.12Dividends / shareDiv/sh
¥200.24¥175.39¥192.23¥282.17¥407.04¥416.27¥412.98¥426.06¥521.77¥599.53Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
¥2380.41¥2469.04¥2484.03¥2285.11¥2427.59¥3110.51¥3401.12¥3915.46¥3222.07¥3395.01Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+6.7%/yr+9.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+14.2%/yr+12.7%/yr
EPS+11.3%/yr+14.6%/yr
Dividends / share+8.7%/yr+16.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+13.0%/yr+8.1%/yr
Book value / share+4.0%/yr+6.9%/yr

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2026 the business earned ¥205.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the ¥135.1B it takes just to hold its position. It put ¥103.4B more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was ¥102.2B.

Reported net income¥152.8B
Owner earnings¥205.6B · 10% of revenue
FY2026FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022
Reported net income¥152.8B¥134.4B¥132.7B¥57.1B¥130.4B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+¥135.1B+¥127.5B+¥123.6B+¥119.8B+¥108.9B
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+¥52.9B+¥21.7B+¥56.4B−¥143.4B−¥94.0B
Cash from operations¥340.7B¥283.7B¥312.6B¥33.6B¥145.3B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−¥135.1B−¥127.5B−¥123.6B−¥119.8B−¥108.9B
Owner earnings¥205.6B¥156.1B¥189.0B(¥86.3B)¥36.4B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−¥103.4B−¥83.3B−¥51.1B−¥52.3B−¥64.5B
Free cash flow¥102.2B¥72.8B¥138.0B(¥138.5B)(¥28.1B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue10%8%9%-4%2%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about ¥135.1B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other ¥103.4B of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

II

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, and stewardship. The same checks the US pages run, in yen.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2026 Annual securities report · source on EDINET →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income ¥174.8B ÷ interest expense ¥13.8B
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? ¥1.08T · 6.2× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash ¥58.5B − debt ¥1.14T
    What this means

    Netting ¥58.5B of cash and short-term investments against ¥1.14T of debt leaves ¥1.08T owed, about 6.2× a year's operating profit (6.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 53 + DIO 51 − DPO 22 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 2%–6%; 6% latest = NOPAT ¥138.1B ÷ invested capital ¥2.43T
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -4%–10%; latest ¥205.6B = operating cash ¥340.7B − maintenance capex ¥135.1B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 10% of revenue this year, a 7% median across 10 years. It chose to put ¥103.4B more into growth, so free cash flow this year was ¥102.2B — the gap is investment, not weakness.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops ¥340.7B ÷ net income ¥152.8B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks ¥105.8B ÷ Owner Earnings ¥205.6B
    What this means

    Of ¥205.6B Owner Earnings, ¥105.8B (51%) went back to shareholders, ¥42.2B dividends, ¥63.5B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.77×
    Expanding
    Capex ¥238.5B ÷ depreciation ¥135.1B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Durability & moat, 2017–2026

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 6% → 8% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 6% early to 8% lately, median 6% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 6%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +9%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 9% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2023 · 2.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

How the cash was used, 2017–2026

Over the record, the business generated ¥1.90T of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

  • Reinvested¥1.49T · 79%
  • Dividends¥259.5B · 14%
  • Buybacks¥124.6B · 7%
  • Retained (debt / cash)¥23.8B · 1%
  • Returned to owners¥384.2B

    45% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, ¥259.5B as dividends and ¥124.6B as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose ¥651.7B and cash and short-term investments fell ¥108.4B.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran ¥124.6B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−4.5%

    The diluted count fell from 417M to 398M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record¥106.12/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 9% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained28%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (¥478.5B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew ¥134.9B, so each retained ¥1 added about 0.28 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Osaka Gas is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

III

The price

What a price would have to assume, set against the record above.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Osaka Gas has delivered.

Osaka Gas’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

¥

Through the cycle, Osaka Gas earns about ¥142.4B on its 7.0% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 10.1% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+1%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow ¥102.2B on 398M diluted shares; net debt ¥1.08T. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex (¥238.5B) runs well above depreciation (¥135.1B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about ¥205.6B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Figures from EDINET, the Financial Services Agency’s disclosure system, the same kind of filing the US pages draw from EDGAR. A separate pool: these names never pass through the US industry classifier.

Manual order: ← 9531 its page in the Manual 9602 →

Industry order: ← 9531 the Gas Utilities chapter ATO →