Owner Scorecard


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ABG, Asbury Automotive Group Inc

Asbury Automotive Group, Inc. is a Fortune 500 company and one of the largest franchised automotive retailers in the United States.

As of December 31, 2025, we owned and operated 223 new vehicle franchises, representing 36 brands of automobiles at 171 dealership locations, 39 collision centers, and Total Care Auto, Powered by Asbury ("TCA" or "TCA Business"), our finance and insurance ("F&I") product provider, within 15 states.

Our omni-channel platform is designed to engage with customers where and when they want to interact and to increase our market share through digital innovation.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ABG · Asbury Automotive Group Inc
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$18.0B
+4.7% YoY · 20% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $18.0B 5-yr avg $15.1B
Gross margin 17% 5-yr avg 18%
Operating margin 4.6% 5-yr avg 6.5%
ROIC 8% 5-yr avg 11%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 94% and operating margin about 4.8% through the cycle, a wide spread between price and the cost of what it sells — whether that advantage is durable pricing power or a margin that can erode is the question the record is for. That margin has held in a narrow 4.5%–8.2% band over the years, so steadiness itself is the evidence — the lever is unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run in the teens (median 14%, above 15% in 5 of 10 years). Owner earnings agree: roughly 4% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Returns like these are solid but short of clear franchise economics; whether they hold is what the 10-K settles, not the multiple.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$6.5B$6.5B$6.9B$7.2B$7.1B$9.8B$15.4B$14.8B$17.2B$18.0B$18.0BRevenueRevenue
16%19%17%17%17%Gross marginGross mgn
11%11%11%11%11%11%11%11%11%11%11%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$298M$288M$311M$325M$371M$792M$1.3B$954M$836M$861M$820MOperating incomeOp. inc.
4.6%4.5%4.5%4.5%5.2%8.0%8.2%6.4%4.9%4.8%4.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
$167M$139M$168M$184M$254M$532M$997M$603M$430M$492M$548MNet incomeNet inc.
38%33%25%24%25%24%24%25%25%26%26%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$143M$266M$10M$350M$653M$1.2B$696M$313M$671M$775M$773MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$31M$32M$34M$36M$39M$42M$69M$68M$75M$82M$86MDepreciationDeprec.
($67M)$82M($202M)$117M$347M$573M($391M)($381M)$139M$173M$110MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$81M$42M$40M$58M$74M$95M$142M$142MCapexCapex
1.2%0.7%0.6%0.8%0.8%0.6%1.0%0.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$112M$234M($30M)$314M$1.1B$627M$245M$688MOwner earningsOwner earn.
1.7%3.6%−0.4%4.3%11.4%4.1%1.7%3.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$61M$224M($30M)$292M$1.1B$601M$171M$631MFree cash flowFCF
0.9%3.5%−0.4%4.1%11.1%3.9%1.2%3.5%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0$80M$91M$210M$954M$3.7B$5M$1.5B$5M$1.8B$1.8BAcquisitionsAcquis.
$216M$40M$110M$21M$5M$10M$9M$11M$10M$13MBuybacksBuybacks
15%15%17%16%13%11%16%11%10%9%8%ROICROIC
60%35%36%29%28%25%34%19%12%13%14%Return on equityROE
60%35%36%29%28%25%34%19%12%13%14%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$3M$5M$8M$4M$1M$190M$241M$52M$84M$41M$28MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$138M$129M$130M$136M$156M$230M$172M$226M$286M$295M$251MReceivablesReceiv.
$895M$826M$1.1B$985M$875M$718M$959M$1.8B$2.0B$2.1B$2.1BInventoryInvent.
$82M$92M$82M$82M$98M$164M$147M$156M$169M$152M$835MAccounts payablePayables
$951M$862M$1.1B$1.0B$933M$784M$984M$1.8B$2.1B$2.3B$1.5BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.3B$1.3B$1.6B$1.6B$1.4B$1.9B$1.9B$3.1B$3.1B$3.4B$3.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.1B$1.1B$1.3B$1.2B$1.2B$1.6B$1.0B$2.9B$2.8B$3.6B$3.2BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.2×1.2×1.2×1.3×1.1×1.2×1.8×1.1×1.1×0.9×0.9×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$128M$161M$181M$202M$562M$2.3B$1.8B$2.0B$2.0B$2.3B$2.3BGoodwillGoodwill
$2.3B$2.4B$2.7B$2.9B$3.7B$8.0B$8.0B$10.2B$10.3B$11.6B$11.3BTotal assetsAssets
$936M$883M$913M$922M$1.2B$3.5B$3.3B$3.2B$3.0B$3.1B$3.5BTotal debtDebt
$932M$878M$905M$919M$1.2B$3.3B$3.1B$3.2B$2.9B$3.1B$3.5BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
7.8×7.9×5.8×4.9×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$280M$394M$473M$646M$906M$2.1B$2.9B$3.2B$3.5B$3.9B$3.9BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.1%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.2%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
$15M$1M$1MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
22.6M21.0M20.3M19.3M19.3M20.1M22.4M21.0M20.0M19.6M19.0MShares out (diluted)Shares
$288.84$307.45$338.64$373.59$369.52$489.44$689.01$704.89$859.43$918.32$945.45Revenue / shareRev/sh
$7.40$6.62$8.28$9.55$13.18$26.49$44.52$28.69$21.52$25.10$28.83EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.95$11.15$-1.49$16.25$55.81$27.99$11.68$36.19Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$2.70$10.67$-1.49$15.14$54.20$26.85$8.13$33.22Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$3.60$2.01$1.99$2.98$3.69$4.22$6.78$7.49Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$12.38$18.77$23.31$33.49$46.92$105.25$129.62$154.48$175.10$198.57$206.95Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+13.7%/yr+20.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share+13.1%/yr (7-yr)
EPS+14.5%/yr+13.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+9.4%/yr (7-yr)+27.8%/yr
Book value / share+36.1%/yr+33.4%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Operating income+3.0%
    “Income from operations during 2025 increased by $25.0 million (3%) compared to 2024, primarily due to a $123.0 million (4%) increase in gross profit and an $8.5 million (6%) decrease in asset impairments, partially offset by a $99.0 million (5%) increase in selling, general and administrative expenses and an $8.5 million (6%) increase in depreciation and amortization expense.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
20Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
9%low FY2025
Gross margin
17%low FY2016
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
13.0×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$245Mowner earningsvs.$603Mnet incomelow FY2018

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2023 the business earned $245M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $68M it takes just to hold its position. It put $75M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $171M.

Reported net income$603M
Owner earnings$245M · 2% of revenue
FY2023FY2022FY2021FY2019FY2018
Reported net income$603M$997M$532M$184M$168M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$68M+$69M+$42M+$36M+$34M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$24M+$21M+$16M+$13M+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$381M−$391M+$573M+$117M−$202M
Cash from operations$313M$696M$1.2B$350M$10M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−$68M−$69M−$42M−$36M−$40M
Owner earnings$245M$627M$1.1B$314M($30M)
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−$75M−$26M−$32M−$21M
Free cash flow$171M$601M$1.1B$292M($30M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%4%11%4%0%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $68M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $75M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $24M), owner earnings is nearer $222M.

Much of fiscal 2023's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income $861M ÷ interest expense $166M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.2B · 3.7× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $40M + ST investments $500K − debt $3.2B
    What this means

    Netting $41M of cash and short-term investments against $3.2B of debt leaves $3.2B owed, about 3.7× a year's operating profit (3.8× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 6 + DIO 52 − DPO 4 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 9%–17%; 9% latest = NOPAT $639M ÷ invested capital $7.1B
    Industry peers: median 13%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 9% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $693M = operating cash $775M − maintenance capex $82M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (7-yr median 4%)
    Industry peers: median 2%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a 4% median across 7 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $28M of SBC) leaves $665M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $775M ÷ net income $492M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Reinvests most of it
    Dividends + buybacks $13M ÷ Owner Earnings $693M
    What this means

    Of $693M Owner Earnings, $13M (2%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $13M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($28M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.73×
    Expanding
    Capex $142M ÷ depreciation $82M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $18.0B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 0.95×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $3.2B vs ($179M) WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +221%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $27.30/share (latest year $26.42), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $209.03/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 5 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 5% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 5% early, 5% lately, median 5%.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 9%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +14%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 14% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2017 · 4.5% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.6%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$28M
  • Receivables$251M
  • Inventory$2.1B
  • Other current assets$649M
Current liabilities$3.2B
  • Debt due within a year$3M
  • Accounts payable$835M
  • Other current liabilities$2.4B
Current ratio0.94×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.29×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.01×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital($179M)the cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$3M due · $28M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−0.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.3× → 0.9×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Debt incl. operating leases$2.5B$240M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$841Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$484M
'27$42M
'28$610M
'29$838M
'30$483M
later$1.1B

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months$484Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$527Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$838Min 2029the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal$3.6Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Mar 31, 2026$28M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$693M
Together, against $484M due next year1.5×

Cash on hand as of Mar 31, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $720M against the $484M due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 1.5 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2023

Over the record, the business generated $2.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$533M · 18%
  • Buybacks$417M · 14%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$2.0B · 68%
  • Returned to owners$417M

    16% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $417M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $2.6B and cash and short-term investments rose $24M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$6.98

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 3M shares were bought for $21M, about $6.98 each.

  • Net change in share count−15.9%

    The diluted count fell from 23M to 19M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

  • Return on what it retained24%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.4B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $559M, so each retained $1 added about 0.24 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill$2.3B20% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity59%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$8.3Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $533M of capital spent building

$16M written down across 2 years (2023, 2024): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mr. Hult$7.5M$9.7M$1.1B
2022Mr. Hult$8.6M$9.6M$627M
2023Mr. Hult$8.1M$10.5M$245M
2024Mr. Hult$9.0M$8.7M
2025Mr. Hult$10.7M$10.3M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • Stock-based compensation$28M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 3% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Asbury Automotive Group Inc is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?6 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 6 of the last 10 years, $458M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
ANAutoNation$27.6B18%4.3%14%2%
KMXCarMax$25.9B12%5.3%4%0%
GPIGroup 1 Automotive$22.6B16%3.9%13%3%
CVNACarvana$20.3B14%-0.7%-3%-17%
MUSAMurphy USA$19.4B90%3.6%20%3%
ABGAsbury Automotive Group Inc$18.0B17%4.8%14%4%
CASYCasey's General$17.6B67%4.3%11%4%
SAHSonic Automotive Inc.$15.2B15%2.4%14%1%
Group median17%4.1%13%2%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Asbury Automotive Group Inc has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Asbury Automotive Group Inc earns about $673M on its 3.7% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 3.8% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’18→’23+25%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’23+15%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $631M on 19M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $3.5B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($142M) runs well above depreciation ($86M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $691M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Asbury Automotive Group Inc (ABG), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ABG, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ABEO its page in the Manual ABM →

Industry order: ← AAP the Auto Dealers & Services chapter AN →