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CVNA, Carvana

Carvana Co. is a holding company that was formed as a Delaware corporation in 2016 in order to operate the business of Carvana Group, LLC.

Carvana is the leading e-commerce platform for buying and selling used cars.

Our differentiated business model combines a comprehensive online sales experience with a vertically integrated supply chain, designed to sell high-quality vehicles to our customers transparently and efficiently at a low price.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

CVNA · Carvana

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$20.3B

+48.6% YoY · 29% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $22.5B 5-yr avg $14.2B

Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 16%

Operating margin 9.2% 5-yr avg −0.2%

Owner-earnings margin 3% 5-yr avg −4%

Free cash flow margin 3% 5-yr avg −4%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Used Vehicle Sales (72%), Wholesale sales and revenues (20%) and Other sales and revenues (9%).
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run around −0.7% through the cycle on a 14% gross margin, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 19% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 0 of 6 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Used Vehicle Sales is 72% of revenue, with Wholesale sales and revenues the other meaningful line at 20%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025

Used Vehicle Sales72%$14.5B
Wholesale sales and revenues20%$4.1B
Other sales and revenues9%$1.7B

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
										Income statement
$859M	$2.0B	$3.9B	$5.6B	$12.8B	$13.6B	$10.8B	$13.7B	$20.3B	$22.5B	RevenueRevenue
8%	10%	13%	14%	15%	9%	16%	21%	21%	20%	Gross marginGross mgn
26%	22%	20%	20%	16%	20%	17%	14%	11%	11%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
($55M)	($30M)	($34M)	($40M)	$42M	($2.4B)	($80M)	$990M	$1.9B	$2.1B	Operating incomeOp. inc.
−6.4%	−1.6%	−0.9%	−0.7%	0.3%	−17.3%	−0.7%	7.2%	9.3%	9.2%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($63M)	($55M)	($115M)	($171M)	($135M)	($1.6B)	$450M	$210M	$1.4B	$1.4B	Net incomeNet inc.
										Cash flow & returns
($200M)	($414M)	($757M)	($608M)	($2.6B)	($1.3B)	$803M	$918M	$1.0B	$911M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
($143M)	($383M)	($675M)	($462M)	($2.5B)	$194M	$280M	$617M	($467M)	($629M)	Working capital & otherWC & other
$78M	$144M	$231M	$360M	$557M	$512M	$87M	$91M	$147M	$171M	CapexCapex
9.1%	7.3%	5.9%	6.4%	4.3%	3.8%	0.8%	0.7%	0.7%	0.8%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($278M)	($558M)	($988M)	($968M)	($3.2B)	($1.8B)	$716M	$827M	$889M	$740M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
−32.4%	−28.5%	−25.1%	−17.3%	−24.6%	−13.5%	6.6%	6.0%	4.4%	3.3%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($278M)	($558M)	($988M)	($968M)	($3.2B)	($1.8B)	$716M	$827M	$889M	$740M	Free cash flowFCF
−32.4%	−28.5%	−25.1%	−17.3%	−24.6%	−13.5%	6.6%	6.0%	4.4%	3.3%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$7M	$0	$0	$0	$2.2B	$7M	$0	$160M	$147M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$0	$5M	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$3M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
-2859%	-4%	-2%	-2%	—	-26%	-1%	—	—	—	ROICROIC
-50%	-70%	-117%	-44%	-44%	—	185%	17%	41%	39%	Return on equityROE
−50%	−75%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	39%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
										Balance sheet
$173M	$79M	$76M	$301M	$403M	$434M	$530M	$1.7B	$2.3B	$2.4B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$14M	$33M	$40M	$79M	$206M	$253M	$266M	$303M	$245M	$339M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$227M	$412M	$763M	$1.0B	$3.1B	$1.9B	$1.1B	$1.6B	$2.4B	$2.7B	InventoryInvent.
$11M	$33M	$64M	$67M	$141M	$232M	$231M	$236M	$236M	$320M	Accounts payablePayables
$231M	$412M	$739M	$1.0B	$3.2B	$1.9B	$1.2B	$1.7B	$2.4B	$2.7B	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$490M	$663M	$1.4B	$1.9B	$4.9B	$4.6B	$3.3B	$4.9B	$6.5B	$7.2B	Current assetsCur. assets
$306M	$330M	$865M	$467M	$2.9B	$2.6B	$1.5B	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.8B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×	2.0×	1.6×	4.1×	1.7×	1.8×	2.2×	3.6×	4.3×	4.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$0	$9M	$9M	$9M	$9M	$0	—	$0	$10M	$10M	GoodwillGoodwill
$641M	$991M	$2.1B	$3.0B	$7.0B	$8.7B	$7.1B	$8.5B	$13.2B	$13.8B	Total assetsAssets
$48M	$633M	$1.5B	$1.7B	$5.4B	$8.2B	$6.2B	$5.6B	$5.0B	$5.1B	Total debtDebt
($124M)	$555M	$1.4B	$1.4B	$5.0B	$7.8B	$5.7B	$3.8B	$2.7B	$2.7B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
-7.2×	-1.2×	-0.4×	-0.3×	0.2×	-4.8×	-0.1×	1.5×	3.7×	4.4×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$126M	$80M	$98M	$388M	$306M	($518M)	$243M	$1.3B	$3.4B	$3.7B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.7%	1.2%	0.8%	0.4%	0.3%	0.5%	0.7%	0.7%	0.5%	0.4%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
										Per share
—	—	93.7M	130M	166M	202M	201M	132M	224M	224M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
—	—	$42.05	$42.99	$77.37	$67.46	$53.70	$103.42	$90.61	$100.42	Revenue / shareRev/sh
—	—	$-1.23	$-1.32	$-0.82	$-7.87	$2.24	$1.59	$6.27	$6.43	EPS (diluted)EPS
—	—	$-10.54	$-7.45	$-19.03	$-9.10	$3.57	$6.26	$3.96	$3.30	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
—	—	$-10.54	$-7.45	$-19.03	$-9.10	$3.57	$6.26	$3.96	$3.30	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
—	—	$2.47	$2.77	$3.36	$2.54	$0.43	$0.69	$0.66	$0.76	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
—	—	$1.05	$2.99	$1.85	$-2.57	$1.21	$9.53	$15.34	$16.59	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2023 are restated ×2 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

The diluted share count moved ×1/1.52 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

The diluted share count moved ×1.7 into 2025 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	8-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+13.6%/yr (6-yr)	+16.1%/yr
Capital spending / share	−19.8%/yr (6-yr)	−25.0%/yr
Book value / share	+56.4%/yr (6-yr)	+38.7%/yr

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

224Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

−1%low FY2017

Gross margin

21%low FY2017

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

3.1×peak FY2023

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$889Mowner earningsvs.$1.4Bnet incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2023FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $1.4B of profit but $889M of owner earnings: $518M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$1.4B

Owner earnings$889M · 4% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$1.4B	$210M	$450M	($1.6B)	($135M)
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$96M	+$91M	+$73M	+$69M	+$39M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	−$467M	+$617M	+$280M	+$194M	−$2.5B
Cash from operations	$1.0B	$918M	$803M	($1.3B)	($2.6B)
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow	−$147M	−$91M	−$87M	−$512M	−$557M
Owner earnings	$889M	$827M	$716M	($1.8B)	($3.2B)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	4%	6%	7%	-13%	-25%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $96M), owner earnings is nearer $793M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? 3.7×

Adequate

Operating income $1.9B ÷ interest expense $505M

What this means
Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.7B · 1.4× operating profit

Modest net debt

Cash $2.3B − debt $5.0B

What this means
Netting $2.3B of cash and short-term investments against $5.0B of debt leaves $2.7B owed, about 1.4× a year's operating profit (2.7× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 54d

Tight

DSO 4 + DIO 54 − DPO 5 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital -4%

Below average through the cycle

6-yr median, range -2859%–-1%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profit

Industry peers: median 14%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 6 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 4%

Thin, recently turned positive

latest $889M = operating cash $1.0B − maintenance capex $147M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median -17%)

Industry peers: median 3%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 4% of revenue this year, a -17% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $96M of SBC) leaves $793M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 0.74×

Mostly cash-backed

Cash from ops $1.0B ÷ net income $1.4B

In the filing’s words Read against the cash, reported earnings have run ahead of the operating cash the business generated over the record — about 17% of assets a year, among the widest gaps in the catalogue. For an inventory- or content-heavy grower that can be cash tied up in real assets as it expands; elsewhere it can mean the earnings lean on accounting estimates — the cash-flow statement against the income statement is where to tell which.

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 1%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $5M ÷ Owner Earnings $889M

What this means
Of $889M Owner Earnings, $5M (1%) went back to shareholders, $5M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? —

Not enough data

What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.

Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $20.3B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 4.31×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Near

Debt ≤ working capital · $5.0B vs $5.0B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (9-yr record) · 6 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Miss

Uninterrupted dividends · 1 of 9 yrs

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $5.01/share (latest year $10.22), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $25.00/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 3 of 9

What this means
Lost money in 6 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 9 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin −3% → 5% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −3% early to 5% lately, median −1% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 17%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Worst year 2022 · −17.3% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2022, understand why before trusting the good years.
Dividend record paid

What this means
Paid a dividend in 1 of the years on record.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year

Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.

“For example, AI-driven automation and virtual assistants may streamline dealership operations, improve customer engagement, and increase efficiency in sourcing and managing used vehicles, which could significantly alter competitive dynamics and operational requirements in the automotive market.…”

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$7.2B

Cash & short-term investments$2.4B
Receivables$339M
Inventory$2.7B
Other current assets$1.8B

Current liabilities$1.8B

Debt due within a year$238M
Accounts payable$320M
Other current liabilities$1.2B

Current ratio4.09×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio2.57×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio1.37×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$5.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$238M due · $2.4B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+52.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters3.1× → 4.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$3.7Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$5.5B$392M of it operating leases; with finance leases, “total fixed claims” below reaches $5.7B (annual-report basis)

Deferred revenue$47Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Lease obligations

the lease note, SEC EDGAR →

Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.

Operating leasesFinance leases

'26$189M

'27$147M

'28$113M

'29$88M

'30$75M

later$180M

Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.

Due in the next 12 months$189Ma fixed cash payment, owed whether or not the business has a good year

Total lease payments$792Mevery year plus the tail, undiscounted: the full cash the leases will take

On the balance sheet$637Mthe present value of those payments, the recognised lease liability

True leverage: debt plus leases

On-balance-sheet debt$5.0B

Lease obligations (present value)$637M

Total fixed claims on the business$5.7B

Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $5.7B, of which the leases are 11%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.

Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$57M0% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity0%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$2.4Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $2.2B of capital spent building

$847M written down across 1 year (2022): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 36% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Garcia	$5.1M	$5.3M	($3.2B)
2022	Mr. Garcia	$5.6M	−$10.1M	($1.8B)
2023	Mr. Garcia	$6.5M	$38.1M	$716M
2024	Mr. Garcia	$10.6M	$118.1M	$827M
2025	Mr. Garcia	$8.4M	$110.1M	$889M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership4%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$96M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 5% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Carvana is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 4 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$48M → $5.1B
Debt rose from $48M to $5.1B while owner earnings went from about ($608M) to $811M: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Auto Dealers & Services

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
ANAutoNation	$27.6B	18%	4.3%	14%	2%
KMXCarMax	$25.9B	12%	5.3%	4%	0%
GPIGroup 1 Automotive	$22.6B	16%	3.9%	13%	3%
CVNACarvana	$20.3B	14%	-0.7%	-3%	-17%
MUSAMurphy USA	$19.4B	90%	3.6%	20%	3%
ABGAsbury Automotive Group Inc	$18.0B	17%	4.8%	14%	4%
CASYCasey's General	$17.6B	67%	4.3%	11%	4%
SAHSonic Automotive Inc.	$15.2B	15%	2.4%	14%	1%
Group median	—	17%	4.1%	13%	2%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Carvana has delivered.

Today’s price $

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($811M) Net of stock comp (−$99M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($764M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · since FY2023+11%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $740M on 138M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $2.7B. The if-converted diluted count is 224M, 63% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($171M) runs well above depreciation (—), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $764M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh CVNA against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Carvana (CVNA), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/CVNA, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← CVLT its page in the Manual CVS →

Industry order: ← CSAN the Auto Dealers & Services chapter CWH →