Owner Scorecard


← All companies ← ABG Manual ABNB → ← 9735 Commercial Services & Supplies ACCO →

ABM, ABM Industries Incorporated

ABM's position as a market leader in electric vehicle charging infrastructure, power, and bundled energy solutions.

Since that time, we have grown into a multi-segment facility solutions company, primarily through strategic acquisitions and new service offerings, increasing our revenue to more than $8.5 billion.

With demand increasing for industry-specific service providers, the acquisition of Air Serv established "Aviation" as our first industry group.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
ABM · ABM Industries Incorporated
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$8.7B
+4.6% YoY · 8% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $9.1B 5-yr avg $7.8B
Gross margin 12% 5-yr avg 13%
Operating margin 3.5% 5-yr avg 3.8%
ROIC 7% 5-yr avg 7%
Owner-earnings margin 4% 5-yr avg 2%
Free cash flow margin 4% 5-yr avg 2%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by B&I (47%) and M&D (19%), with 3 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 12% and operating margin about 3.2% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. On a spread this thin the operating result swings hard on small moves in cost or volume — it has ranged from 1.6% to 5.1% over the years, so the cost line is where the needle moves. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 0 of 8 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest B&I at 47%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • B&I47%$4.1B
  • M&D19%$1.6B
  • Aviation13%$1.1B
  • Technical Solutions11%$961M
  • Education11%$922M
By geographyUnited States92%International8%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2017–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMApr 2026
Income statement
$5.5B$6.4B$6.5B$6.0B$6.2B$7.8B$8.1B$8.4B$8.7B$9.1BRevenueRevenue
10%11%11%14%16%13%13%12%12%12%Gross marginGross mgn
8%7%7%8%12%8%7%9%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$102M$139M$208M$96M$206M$349M$410M$212M$312M$313MOperating incomeOp. inc.
1.9%2.2%3.2%1.6%3.3%4.5%5.1%2.5%3.6%3.5%Operating marginOp. mgn
$4M$98M$127M$300K$126M$230M$251M$81M$162M$158MNet incomeNet inc.
-9%20%30%26%24%39%26%27%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$6M$321M$263M$458M$314M$20M$243M$227M$234M$437MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$70M$113M$107M$96M$90M$112M$121M$107M$106M$110MDepreciationDeprec.
($82M)$94M$10M$341M$65M($353M)($159M)$9M($72M)$132MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$57M$51M$60M$38M$34M$51M$53M$59M$79M$103MCapexCapex
1.0%0.8%0.9%0.6%0.6%0.7%0.6%0.7%0.9%1.1%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
($52M)$270M$203M$420M$280M($30M)$191M$167M$155M$334MOwner earningsOwner earn.
−0.9%4.2%3.1%7.0%4.5%−0.4%2.4%2.0%1.8%3.7%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
($52M)$270M$203M$420M$280M($30M)$191M$167M$155M$334MFree cash flowFCF
−0.9%4.2%3.1%7.0%4.5%−0.4%2.4%2.0%1.8%3.7%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$854M$0$0$0$710M$195M$0$114M$37M$281MAcquisitionsAcquis.
$40M$46M$48M$49M$51M$52M$58M$57M$66M$67MDividends paidDiv. paid
$8M$0$0$5M$0$98M$138M$56M$122MBuybacksBuybacks
6%7%3%6%9%10%4%7%7%ROICROIC
0%7%8%0%8%13%14%5%9%9%Return on equityROE
−3%4%5%−3%5%10%11%1%5%5%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$63M$39M$59M$394M$63M$73M$70M$65M$104M$95MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$1.0B$1.0B$1.0BReceivablesReceiv.
$231M$222M$281M$273M$289M$316M$299M$324M$401M$417MAccounts payablePayables
$807M$792M$598MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.4B$1.4B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.9B$2.0BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$758M$793M$902M$987M$1.3B$1.4B$1.2B$1.3B$1.3B$1.4BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.5×1.4×1.5×1.1×1.2×1.4×1.3×1.5×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.9B$1.8B$1.8B$1.7B$2.2B$2.5B$2.5B$2.6B$2.6B$2.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$3.8B$3.6B$3.7B$3.8B$4.4B$4.9B$4.9B$5.1B$5.3B$5.6BTotal assetsAssets
$1.2B$939M$801M$720M$884M$1.3B$1.3B$1.3B$1.6B$1.9BTotal debtDebt
$1.1B$900M$743M$326M$821M$1.2B$1.2B$1.3B$1.5B$1.8BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
5.3×2.6×4.1×2.1×7.2×8.5×5.0×2.5×3.2×3.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$1.4B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8B$1.8B$1.7BShareholders’ equityEquity
0.2%0.3%0.3%0.3%0.5%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%0.4%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
58.3M66.4M66.9M67.3M68.0M67.5M66.3M63.6M62.7M59.9MShares out (diluted)Shares
$93.54$97.02$97.14$88.97$91.60$115.65$122.12$131.44$139.49$151.13Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.07$1.47$1.90$0.00$1.86$3.41$3.79$1.28$2.59$2.64EPS (diluted)EPS
$-0.89$4.07$3.04$6.23$4.12$-0.45$2.88$2.63$2.47$5.58Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$-0.89$4.07$3.04$6.23$4.12$-0.45$2.88$2.63$2.47$5.58Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.68$0.69$0.71$0.73$0.75$0.77$0.87$0.89$1.05$1.12Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$0.98$0.77$0.89$0.56$0.50$0.75$0.79$0.93$1.26$1.71Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$23.60$21.91$23.05$22.29$23.66$25.44$27.15$28.02$28.48$29.19Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
8-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+5.1%/yr+9.4%/yr
Owner earnings / share−16.9%/yr
EPS+58.5%/yr+257.1%/yr
Dividends / share+5.6%/yr+7.4%/yr
Capital spending / share+3.2%/yr+17.5%/yr
Book value / share+2.4%/yr+5.0%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Aviation+8.3%
    “Aviation Year Ended October 31, ($ in millions) 2025 2024 Increase Revenues $ 1,118.7 $ 1,032.6 $ 86.1 8.3% Operating profit 65.2 59.1 6.1 10.3% Operating profit margin 5.8 % 5.7 % 10 bps Aviation revenues increased by $86.1 million, or 8.3% to $1,118.7 million, during 2025, as compared to 2024. The increase was primarily attributable to new business and scope expansions with the existing clients as well as an increase in travel volume.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2017–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
63Mpeak FY2021
ROIC
7%low FY2020
Gross margin
12%low FY2017
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
9.4×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$155Mowner earningsvs.$162Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2017FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $162M of profit but $155M of owner earnings: $7M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$162M
Owner earnings$155M · 2% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$162M$81M$251M$230M$126M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$106M+$107M+$121M+$112M+$90M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$38M+$30M+$31M+$31M+$34M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$72M+$9M−$159M−$353M+$65M
Cash from operations$234M$227M$243M$20M$314M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$79M−$59M−$53M−$51M−$34M
Owner earnings$155M$167M$191M($30M)$280M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%2%2%0%4%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $38M), owner earnings is nearer $117M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Adequate
    Operating income $312M ÷ interest expense $96M
    What this means

    Comfortable in a normal year, but below the margin of safety Graham looked for. Worth checking how stable the coverage has been across a full cycle.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $1.5B · 4.7× operating profit
    Heavy net debt
    Cash $104M − debt $1.6B
    What this means

    Netting $104M of cash and short-term investments against $1.6B of debt leaves $1.5B owed, about 4.7× a year's operating profit (5.0× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Tight
    DSO 42 + DIO 0 − DPO 19 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash. (Little or no inventory, a services / asset-light model, so the inventory leg is ~0.)

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    8-yr median, range 3%–10%; 7% latest = NOPAT $230M ÷ invested capital $3.2B
    Industry peers: median 5%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 7% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Thin, recently turned positive
    latest $155M = operating cash $234M − maintenance capex $79M; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (9-yr median 2%)
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 2% median across 9 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $38M of SBC) leaves $117M.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $234M ÷ net income $162M
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $188M ÷ Owner Earnings $155M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $155M of Owner Earnings, $188M (121%) went back to shareholders, $66M dividends, $122M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $38M stock comp, the real buyback was about $84M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.75×
    Harvesting
    Capex $79M ÷ depreciation $106M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.48×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $1.6B vs $633M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (9-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (9)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +116%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.82/share (latest year $2.77), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $30.48/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2017–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 9 of 9
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 9 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → 4% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 2% early to 4% lately, median 3% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 14%
    What this means

    Reinvested capital came back at only a modest incremental return — near the cost of capital, where extra growth adds little per dollar. The record shows whether it is a soft stretch or a thinning moat.

  • Owner earnings growth +5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 1.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count +0.9%/yr
    What this means

    Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Moderate contestability

AI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$2.0B
  • Cash & short-term investments$95M
  • Receivables$1.0B
  • Other current assets$925M
Current liabilities$1.4B
  • Debt due within a year$42M
  • Accounts payable$417M
  • Other current liabilities$933M
Current ratio1.46×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.46×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.07×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$642Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash$42M due · $95M cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Apr 30, 2026 balance sheet
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+8.4%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value($1.3B)equity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($1.9B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$107M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue$100Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26$30M
'27$30M
'28$30M
'29$30M
'30$1.4B

Bars scaled to the largest single year.

Due in the next 12 months$30Mthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years$60Mthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year$1.4Bin 2030the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Due over the next five years$1.6Bthe near slice; the balance sheet carries $1.6B of debt in all

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Apr 30, 2026$95M
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)$155M
Together, against $30M due next year8.3×

Cash on hand as of Apr 30, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $250M against the $30M due in the twelve months after the Oct 31, 2025 schedule: 8.3 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Oct 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the balance-sheet debt.

How the cash was used, 2017–2025

Over the record, the business generated $2.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$482M · 23%
  • Dividends$465M · 22%
  • Buybacks$427M · 20%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$712M · 34%
  • Returned to owners$892M

    56% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $465M as dividends and $427M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $685M and cash and short-term investments rose $32M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$43.69

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 10M shares were bought for $427M, about $43.69 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $25.50 (2020) to $47.95 (2024); its heaviest year, 2023, paid $41.35 ($138M).

  • Net change in share count2.7%

    The diluted count rose from 58M to 60M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record$1.05/sh

    Paid in 9 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 6% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained16%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($189M over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $31M, so each retained $1 added about 0.16 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$2.8B54% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equityexceeds itgoodwill alone is larger than the company’s entire book equity; stripped of the acquisition premium, there is no net book worth
Cash spent acquiring$1.9Bover 9 years buying other businesses, against $482M of capital spent building

$184M written down across 2 years (2018, 2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Scott Salmirs$7.6M$14.0M$280M
2022Scott Salmirs$8.3M$8.9M($30M)
2023Scott Salmirs$8.3M$5.3M$191M
2024Scott Salmirs$8.7M$11.6M$167M
2025Scott Salmirs$9.1M$6.2M$155M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership<1%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio219:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$38M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 12% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ABM Industries Incorporated is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$1.2B → $1.9B

    Debt rose from $1.2B to $1.9B while owner earnings went from about $141M to $171M — about 8.4 years of owner earnings in debt then, about 11 now: measured against what the business earns, the balance sheet carries more debt than it did. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

And these came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Income taxes, Insurance reserves as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Commercial Services & Supplies

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DASHDoorDash Inc.$13.7B-12.2%-14%8%
FISFidelity National Info$10.7B36%14.3%4%23%
CNXCConcentrix Corporation$9.8B36%6.5%6%7%
IPGInterpublic$9.2B14%11.1%24%7%
ABMABM Industries Incorporated$8.7B12%3.2%7%2%
APGAPi Group Corporation$7.9B25%3.9%4%7%
BRBroadridge Financial Solutions Inc.$6.9B28%14.4%18%13%
NSPInsperity Inc.$6.8B3.8%4%
Group median27%5.2%6%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ABM Industries Incorporated has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, ABM Industries Incorporated earns about $206M on its 2.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 1.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+7%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $334M on 59M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-06-04; net debt $1.8B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($103M) runs well above depreciation ($110M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $357M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ABM Industries Incorporated (ABM), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ABM, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ABG its page in the Manual ABNB →

Industry order: ← 9735 the Commercial Services & Supplies chapter ACCO →