Share count
55Mpeak FY2018
← All companies ← ABLV Manual ACCL → ← ACAD Pharmaceuticals ACIU →
ACB, Aurora Cannabis Inc.
A pharmaceutical business, where patents grant a temporary monopoly the pipeline must keep refilling.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2025
C$343M
+27.3% YoY · 7% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue C$343M 5-yr avg C$270M
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −115% through the cycle, the operating line deeply negative — so the lever is the path to a margin at all: revenue growth against the cost curve and the cash runway, not the level of a margin that isn't there yet. Inventory runs near 52% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −7%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 20-F →Revenue spreads across 4 regions, the largest Canada at 44%.
Revenue by geography, FY2025
- Canada44%C$152M
- Europe24%C$83M
- Australia15%C$51M
- New Zealand1%C$2M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2018–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||
| C$55M | C$246M | C$269M | C$245M | C$221M | C$270M | C$343M | C$343M | RevenueRevenue |
| (C$96M) | (C$318M) | (C$466M) | (C$283M) | (C$231M) | (C$45M) | C$5M | C$5M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −173.5% | −129.6% | −173.3% | −115.3% | −104.6% | −16.7% | 1.4% | 1.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| C$72M | (C$294M) | (C$3.3B) | (C$692M) | (C$1.7B) | (C$69M) | C$2M | (C$199M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||
| (C$82M) | (C$192M) | (C$342M) | (C$211M) | (C$110M) | (C$69M) | C$16M | C$16M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| C$12M | C$63M | C$68M | C$49M | C$49M | C$12M | C$9M | C$9M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| (C$166M) | C$38M | C$2.9B | C$432M | C$1.6B | (C$11M) | C$5M | C$206M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| C$137M | C$414M | — | C$53M | C$32M | C$17M | C$19M | C$32M | CapexCapex |
| 248.1% | 168.7% | — | 21.6% | 14.6% | 6.2% | 5.5% | 9.4% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| (C$94M) | (C$256M) | — | (C$264M) | (C$142M) | (C$80M) | C$7M | C$7M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −169.9% | −104.1% | — | −107.5% | −64.4% | −29.9% | 2.0% | 2.0% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| (C$219M) | (C$607M) | — | (C$264M) | (C$142M) | (C$85M) | (C$3M) | (C$16M) | Free cash flowFCF |
| −396.1% | −247.0% | — | −107.5% | −64.4% | −31.7% | −0.8% | −4.7% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -6% | -6% | -18% | -14% | -82% | -7% | 1% | — | ROICROIC |
| 5% | -7% | -153% | -34% | -260% | -12% | 0% | -35% | Return on equityROE |
| 5% | −7% | −153% | −34% | −260% | −12% | 0% | −35% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||
| C$77M | C$173M | C$162M | C$421M | C$438M | C$140M | C$138M | C$138M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| C$15M | C$103M | C$54M | C$56M | C$47M | C$45M | C$42M | C$42M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| C$30M | C$111M | C$136M | C$117M | C$116M | C$144M | C$188M | C$188M | InventoryInvent. |
| C$47M | C$153M | C$96M | C$58M | C$70M | C$59M | C$74M | C$74M | Accounts payablePayables |
| (C$3M) | C$62M | C$94M | C$116M | C$93M | C$130M | C$157M | C$157M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| C$220M | C$661M | C$418M | C$666M | C$745M | C$427M | C$478M | C$478M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| C$75M | C$436M | C$272M | C$116M | C$131M | C$125M | C$111M | C$111M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 2.9× | 1.5× | 1.5× | 5.7× | 5.7× | 3.4× | 4.3× | 4.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| C$761M | C$3.2B | C$928M | C$888M | C$0 | C$43M | C$44M | C$44M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| C$1.9B | C$5.5B | C$2.8B | C$2.6B | C$1.1B | C$839M | C$853M | C$853M | Total assetsAssets |
| C$9M | C$127M | C$84M | — | C$0 | C$57M | C$62M | C$62M | Total debtDebt |
| (C$68M) | (C$45M) | (C$78M) | — | (C$438M) | (C$83M) | (C$77M) | (C$77M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -8.1× | -8.1× | -6.1× | -4.3× | -3.2× | -3.3× | 0.6× | 0.6× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| C$1.5B | C$4.4B | C$2.1B | C$2.0B | C$662M | C$560M | C$567M | C$567M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| Per share | ||||||||
| 920M | 160M | 194M | 338M | 430M | 432M | 548M | 545M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| C$0.06 | C$1.53 | C$1.39 | C$0.73 | C$0.51 | C$0.62 | C$0.63 | C$0.63 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| C$0.08 | C$-1.83 | C$-16.96 | C$-2.05 | C$-4.00 | C$-0.16 | C$0.00 | C$-0.36 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| C$-0.10 | C$-1.59 | — | C$-0.78 | C$-0.33 | C$-0.19 | C$0.01 | C$0.01 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| C$-0.24 | C$-3.79 | — | C$-0.78 | C$-0.33 | C$-0.20 | C$-0.01 | C$-0.03 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| C$0.15 | C$2.59 | — | C$0.16 | C$0.07 | C$0.04 | C$0.03 | C$0.06 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| C$1.68 | C$27.35 | C$11.10 | C$6.02 | C$1.54 | C$1.30 | C$1.03 | C$1.04 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/5.74 into 2019 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1.75 into 2021 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
Share counts before 2024 are restated ×1/5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Share counts before TTM are restated ×10 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
| 7-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +39.8%/yr | −14.7%/yr |
| EPS | −37.5%/yr | — |
| Capital spending / share | −18.9%/yr | −31.6%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −6.7%/yr | −37.8%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2018–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
ROIC
1%low FY2022
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
C$7Mowner earningsvs.C$2Mnet incomelow FY2021
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned C$7M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the C$9M it takes just to hold its position. It put C$10M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was (C$3M).
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2022 | FY2021 | FY2019 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | C$2M | (C$69M) | (C$1.7B) | (C$692M) | (C$294M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +C$9M | +C$12M | +C$49M | +C$49M | +C$63M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +C$5M | −C$11M | +C$1.6B | +C$432M | +C$38M |
| Cash from operations | C$16M | (C$69M) | (C$110M) | (C$211M) | (C$192M) |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −C$9M | −C$12M | −C$32M | −C$53M | −C$63M |
| Owner earnings | C$7M | (C$80M) | (C$142M) | (C$264M) | (C$256M) |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −C$10M | −C$5M | — | — | −C$351M |
| Free cash flow | (C$3M) | (C$85M) | (C$142M) | (C$264M) | (C$607M) |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 2% | -30% | -64% | -108% | -104% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about C$9M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other C$10M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2025 40-F · source on SEC EDGAR →
Material weakness in financial controls
“Based on this evaluation, management concluded that a material weakness existed as of March 31, 2026, as described below, and due to this material weakness, ICFR is not effective as of March 31, 2026.”
The figures below are only as sound as the controls that produced them. read the note →
Will it survive?
- Does not cover its interestOperating income C$5M ÷ interest expense C$8M
What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
- Net cashCash C$138M + ST investments C$554K − debt C$62M
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by C$77M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle7-yr median, range -82%–1%; the latest year is left out — large non-operating charges put its operating line well above pretax profitIndustry peers: median -53%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years, so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Positive this year, negative across the cyclelatest C$7M = operating cash C$16M − maintenance capex C$9M (positive this year), after an earlier loss stretch (6-yr median -104%)Industry peers: median -45%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a -104% median across 6 years. It chose to put C$23M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was (C$16M) — the gap is investment, not weakness.
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income (C$199M) · cash from operations C$16M
In the filing’s words The filing discloses a material weakness in its financial controls — the reported numbers here, and the record built on them, are only as reliable as the controls that produced them.
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 3.55×ExpandingCapex C$32M ÷ depreciation C$9M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 4 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size —Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · C$343M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 4.31×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · C$62M vs C$367M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (7-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are C$-10.58/share (latest year C$-3.54), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is C$10.09/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2018–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 7
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 6 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −159% → −40% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −159% early to −40% lately, median −115% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2018 · −173.5% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Mar 31, 2025Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
Current assetsC$478M
- Cash & short-term investmentsC$138M
- ReceivablesC$42M
- InventoryC$188M
- Other current assetsC$109M
Current liabilitiesC$111M
- Debt due within a yearC$22M
- Accounts payableC$74M
- Other current liabilitiesC$16M
Current ratio4.31×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio2.62×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio1.25×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capitalC$367Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cashC$22M due · C$138M cash
covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book valueC$478Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset valueC$234MGraham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leasesC$105MC$43M of it operating leases
From the company's latest filing.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Aurora Cannabis Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2018–2025.
1 of the 3 tests turned up something to look into; the other 2 came back clean.
- Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?C$9M → C$62M
Debt rose from C$9M to C$62M while owner earnings went from about (C$204M) to (C$72M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.
And these came back clean
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Pharmaceuticals
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KRYSKrystal Biotech | $389M | — | 22.6% | -21% | 41% |
| TWSTTwist Bioscience Corporation | $377M | 38% | -115.4% | -51% | -92% |
| ARQTArcutis Biotherapeutics Inc. | $376M | 90% | -234.9% | -56% | -236% |
| AVIRAtea Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $351M | — | -51.5% | -80% | -38% |
| MNKDMannKind Corporation | $349M | 72% | -63.3% | — | -45% |
| ACBAurora Cannabis Inc. | C$343M | — | -115.3% | -7% | -84% |
| CRMDCorMedix Inc. | $312M | 8% | -8961.5% | -202% | -7330% |
| VCELVericel Corporation | $276M | 67% | -4.7% | -4% | 10% |
| Group median | — | — | -89.3% | -51% | -65% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFEnter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. Aurora Cannabis Inc.'s US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at CAD 1 = $0.712 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in CAD.
Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Aurora Cannabis Inc. has delivered.
Aurora Cannabis Inc.’s latest year shows negative owner earnings, the mark of a build-out: total capital spending outruns the cash the business throws off today. So the tool opens on the steady-state base (maintenance capex in place of the build-out spend), the cash it would earn at rest; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings growth, delivered—
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’22–’25)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Free cash flow ($12M) on 56M shares outstanding, per the 40-F cover, as of 2025-03-31; net cash $55M. The if-converted diluted count is 545M, 870% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base opens on the steady-state figure (the latest year is negative on total capex mid-build-out); clear Steady-state to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($23M) runs well above depreciation ($6M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $5M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Aurora Cannabis Inc. (ACB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ACB, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← ABLV its page in the Manual ACCL →
Industry order: ← ACAD the Pharmaceuticals chapter ACIU →