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VCEL, Vericel Corporation
Vericel Corporation is a leading provider of advanced therapies for the sports medicine and severe burn care markets.
We have a highly differentiated portfolio of cell therapy and specialty biologic products that combines innovations in biology with medical technologies.
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approved autologous cell therapy products and one FDA-approved specialty biologic product in the U.S.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run around −5.1% through the cycle on a 67% gross margin, the operating line in the red even at its best — so the lever is whether the spending below the gross line can come down enough to clear a profit: revenue growth against the cost curve, and the cash runway until it does. Stock-based pay runs about 11% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on the pipeline against the patent cliff, and pricing. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −4%, above 15% in 0 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 10% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2016–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2016’16 | 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $54M | $63M | $91M | $118M | $122M | $153M | $164M | $198M | $237M | $276M | $292M | RevenueRevenue |
| 48% | 52% | 65% | 68% | 67% | 67% | 67% | 69% | 73% | 74% | 75% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 50% | 57% | 54% | 52% | 56% | 64% | 65% | 61% | 60% | 60% | 60% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 28% | 21% | 15% | 26% | 11% | 11% | 12% | 11% | 10% | 10% | 10% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| ($19M) | ($15M) | ($4M) | ($11M) | $2M | ($8M) | ($17M) | ($6M) | $5M | $11M | $16M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −35.4% | −23.9% | −4.3% | −9.5% | 1.9% | −5.1% | −10.4% | −3.3% | 1.9% | 4.0% | 5.4% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($20M) | ($17M) | ($8M) | ($10M) | $3M | ($7M) | ($17M) | ($3M) | $10M | $17M | $21M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | 6% | — | — | — | 1% | 5% | 4% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| ($20M) | ($13M) | ($412K) | ($7M) | $18M | $29M | $18M | $35M | $58M | $52M | $62M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $2M | $1M | $2M | $2M | $3M | $4M | $5M | $6M | $12M | $12M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($5M) | ($189K) | ($924K) | ($12M) | ($2M) | ($776K) | ($7M) | $2M | $6M | ($15M) | ($10M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1M | $2M | $3M | $3M | $3M | $8M | $8M | $20M | $64M | $27M | $14M | CapexCapex |
| 2.6% | 2.4% | 2.9% | 2.2% | 2.2% | 5.2% | 4.6% | 10.1% | 27.0% | 9.8% | 4.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| ($21M) | ($15M) | ($2M) | ($9M) | $15M | $26M | $14M | $31M | $53M | $40M | $47M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| −39.2% | −23.4% | −2.0% | −7.5% | 12.3% | 17.0% | 8.4% | 15.5% | 22.2% | 14.6% | 16.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| ($21M) | ($15M) | ($3M) | ($10M) | $15M | $21M | $10M | $15M | ($6M) | $25M | $47M | Free cash flowFCF |
| −39.2% | −23.4% | −3.4% | −8.3% | 12.3% | 13.8% | 6.2% | 7.7% | −2.4% | 9.0% | 16.3% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| -863% | — | -4% | -11% | 2% | -6% | -10% | -3% | 2% | 4% | 6% | ROICROIC |
| -79% | -77% | -8% | -9% | 2% | -4% | -9% | -1% | 4% | 5% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| −79% | −77% | −8% | −9% | 2% | −4% | −9% | −1% | 4% | 5% | 6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $23M | $27M | $83M | $70M | $76M | $103M | $120M | $110M | $116M | $137M | $145M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $17M | $18M | $23M | $32M | $35M | $37M | $47M | $58M | $61M | $85M | $72M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $3M | $4M | $4M | $7M | $9M | $13M | $16M | $13M | $17M | $18M | $18M | InventoryInvent. |
| $7M | $6M | $7M | $6M | $7M | $9M | $17M | $22M | $24M | $16M | $19M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $14M | $17M | $20M | $33M | $37M | $42M | $46M | $49M | $55M | $86M | $72M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $45M | $51M | $113M | $112M | $124M | $158M | $187M | $206M | $213M | $247M | $244M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $13M | $13M | $15M | $20M | $22M | $26M | $37M | $46M | $50M | $49M | $47M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 3.5× | 3.9× | 7.6× | 5.6× | 5.5× | 6.1× | 5.0× | 4.5× | 4.2× | 5.0× | 5.2× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $49M | $55M | $119M | $153M | $206M | $244M | $273M | $354M | $433M | $488M | $486M | Total assetsAssets |
| $32K | $0 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | $13M | Total debtDebt |
| ($23M) | ($27M) | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | ($132M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| -1283.0× | -162.9× | -126.1× | -1406.4× | 395.3× | -1963.5× | -46.6× | -10.8× | 7.4× | 17.5× | 24.8× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $25M | $23M | $102M | $111M | $134M | $170M | $192M | $226M | $292M | $355M | $356M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 4.6% | 4.3% | 7.9% | 11.2% | 11.3% | 22.4% | 22.7% | 16.4% | 15.4% | 14.0% | 13.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 34.6M | 33.4M | 40.2M | 44.2M | 47.3M | 46.5M | 47.1M | 47.6M | 51.7M | 52.2M | 50.8M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $1.57 | $1.88 | $2.26 | $2.67 | $2.58 | $3.29 | $3.47 | $4.15 | $4.59 | $5.30 | $5.75 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.56 | $-0.52 | $-0.20 | $-0.22 | $0.06 | $-0.16 | $-0.35 | $-0.07 | $0.20 | $0.32 | $0.42 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $-0.62 | $-0.44 | $-0.05 | $-0.20 | $0.32 | $0.56 | $0.29 | $0.64 | $1.02 | $0.77 | $0.94 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $-0.62 | $-0.44 | $-0.08 | $-0.22 | $0.32 | $0.45 | $0.21 | $0.32 | $-0.11 | $0.47 | $0.94 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.04 | $0.05 | $0.07 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.17 | $0.16 | $0.42 | $1.24 | $0.52 | $0.28 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $0.71 | $0.68 | $2.54 | $2.51 | $2.84 | $3.67 | $4.08 | $4.75 | $5.65 | $6.80 | $7.02 | Book value / shareBVPS |
Share counts before 2017 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +14.5%/yr | +15.5%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | +19.6%/yr |
| EPS | — | +39.2%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +32.7%/yr | +56.5%/yr |
| Book value / share | +28.5%/yr | +19.1%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2016–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $40M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $12M it takes just to hold its position. It put $16M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $25M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $17M | $10M | ($3M) | ($17M) | ($7M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$12M | +$6M | +$5M | +$4M | +$3M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$39M | +$36M | +$32M | +$37M | +$34M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$15M | +$6M | +$2M | −$7M | −$776K |
| Cash from operations | $52M | $58M | $35M | $18M | $29M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$12M | −$6M | −$5M | −$4M | −$3M |
| Owner earnings | $40M | $53M | $31M | $14M | $26M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$16M | −$58M | −$15M | −$4M | −$5M |
| Free cash flow | $25M | ($6M) | $15M | $10M | $21M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 15% | 22% | 16% | 8% | 17% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $12M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $16M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $39M), owner earnings is nearer $2M.
Much of fiscal 2025's profit didn't arrive as operating cash; it sits in “working capital & other” above. That can be a real inventory or timing swing, or profit that doesn't run through operating cash at all: a heavy tax year, equity-method earnings, or investment income booked through investing. For a year like this, owner earnings understates the cash earned; the full cash-flow statement carries the rest.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Can it pay its interest? 17.5×ComfortableOperating income $11M ÷ interest expense $630K
What this means
Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.
- Net cashCash $100M + ST investments $37M − debt $12K
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $137M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Long (60+ days)DSO 112 + DIO 91 − DPO 82 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle9-yr median, range -863%–4%; 4% latest = NOPAT $10M ÷ invested capital $255MIndustry peers: median -46%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range -39%–22%; latest $40M = operating cash $52M − maintenance capex $12MIndustry peers: median -92%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years. It chose to put $16M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $25M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $39M of SBC) leaves $2M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $52M ÷ net income $17M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Investing or harvesting? 2.35×ExpandingCapex $27M ÷ depreciation $12M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 2 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $276M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 5.03×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt PassDebt ≤ working capital · $12K vs $198M WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.15/share (latest year $0.32), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $6.94/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2016–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 3 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin −21% → 1% (3-yr avg ends)
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −21% early to 1% lately, median −5% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2016 · −35.4% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2016, understand why before trusting the good years.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“However, our competitors or other entities may also integrate artificial intelligence into their information systems and business operations more swiftly or effectively than us, potentially impairing our competitive edge and negatively impacting our financial performance.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$145M
- Receivables$72M
- Inventory$18M
- Other current assets$8M
- Debt due within a year$38K
- Accounts payable$19M
- Other current liabilities$28M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2016–2025
Over the record, the business generated $169M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$138M · 81%
- Retained (debt / cash)$32M · 19%
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $13M and cash and short-term investments rose $122M.
- Net change in share count46.6%
The diluted count rose from 35M to 51M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $13.2M | $15.2M | $26M |
| 2022 | $8.7M | $905k | $14M |
| 2023 | $7.1M | $11.0M | $31M |
| 2024 | $10.2M | $18.8M | $53M |
| 2025 | $11.2M | $169k | $40M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership7.6%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio40:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$39M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 14% of revenue, equal to 351% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Vericel Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?46.6%
Diluted shares grew 46.6% over 2016–2025. Owners were diluted on net; each share owns less of the business than it did. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Biotechnology
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TARSTarsus Pharmaceuticals Inc. | $451M | — | -65.9% | -41% | -46% |
| IMCRImmunocore Holdings plc | $400M | 99% | -23.9% | — | -3% |
| KRYSKrystal Biotech | $389M | — | 22.6% | -21% | 41% |
| TWSTTwist Bioscience Corporation | $377M | 38% | -115.4% | -51% | -92% |
| ADPTAdaptive Biotechnologies Corporation | $277M | 68% | -108.0% | -32% | -97% |
| VCELVericel Corporation | $276M | 67% | -4.7% | -4% | 10% |
| IOVAIovance Biotherapeutics Inc. | $264M | 34% | -240.9% | -65% | -222% |
| DNAGinkgo Bioworks Holdings Inc. | $170M | — | -246.5% | -351% | -105% |
| Group median | — | 67% | -87.0% | -41% | -69% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Vericel Corporation has delivered.
Vericel Corporation’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Vericel Corporation earns about $28M on its 10.3% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $47M on 51M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-30; net cash $132M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($14M) runs well above depreciation ($12M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $50M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← VC its page in the Manual VCTR →
Industry order: ← VALN the Biotechnology chapter VIR →