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ACI, Albertsons
Albertsons runs supermarkets across the United States under a collection of regional banners. It sells groceries — packaged non-perishables, fresh food, and the other staples that fill a store — to households who shop in person or order ahead for pickup and delivery, and it fills prescriptions at in-store pharmacy counters. It earns a thin slice on each item and lives on the volume that moves through the registers.
We operate 22 well known banners including Albertsons, Safeway, Vons, Pavilions, Randalls, Tom Thumb, Carrs, Jewel-Osco, ACME, Shaw's, Star Market, United Supermarkets, Market Street, Haggen, Kings Food Markets and Balducci's Food Lovers Market , with approximately 280,000 talented and dedicated employees.
Our stores operate in premier locations and have leading market share within attractive and growing geographies.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is led by Non-perishables (49%) and Fresh (31%), with 3 more lines behind.
- What moves the needle
- Groceries sit close to a commodity: the same brands line a rival's shelves, and a shopper will cross the street to save a little, so the question that governs the business is whether scale buys a cost position low enough to hold the customer and still earn a return — the gross margin and the return on capital in the record below show whether it does. Pricing power is the harder test, since the goods are interchangeable; the filing leans instead on the reputation of its banners and its customer relationships to keep traffic, and that is what an owner should weigh. The pharmacy counter ties part of the business to healthcare, where the filing warns that larger, consolidated buyers hold the market power to squeeze what the counter is paid. And the company carries debt against a thin stream of earnings, so the lenders' covenants bite when the cushion is small — the figures are below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 12%). Owner earnings, the cash-based check, have been thin too. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Revenue spreads across 5 lines, the largest Non-perishables at 49%.
- Non-perishables49%$40.6B
- Fresh31%$26.0B
- Pharmacy14%$11.4B
- Fuel5%$3.8B
- Other2%$1.3B
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMFeb 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $59.7B | $59.9B | $60.5B | $62.5B | $69.7B | $71.9B | $77.6B | $79.2B | $80.4B | $83.2B | $83.2B | RevenueRevenue |
| 28% | 27% | 28% | 28% | 29% | 29% | 28% | 28% | 28% | 27% | 27% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 27% | 27% | 27% | 27% | 27% | 25% | 25% | 25% | 26% | 26% | 26% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $608M | ($57M) | $787M | $1.4B | $1.6B | $2.4B | $2.3B | $2.1B | $1.5B | $728M | $728M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 1.0% | −0.1% | 1.3% | 2.3% | 2.3% | 3.4% | 3.0% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($373M) | $46M | $131M | $466M | $850M | $1.6B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $959M | $217M | $217M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | 22% | 25% | 23% | 22% | 18% | 15% | 19% | 19% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $1.8B | $1.0B | $1.7B | $1.9B | $3.9B | $3.5B | $2.9B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.4B | $2.4B | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.8B | $1.9B | $1.9B | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $888M | ($404M) | $251M | ($287M) | $1.5B | $111M | ($605M) | ($520M) | ($202M) | $140M | $140M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $1.4B | $1.5B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B | $1.6B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $1.9B | $1.8B | $1.8B | CapexCapex |
| 2.3% | 2.5% | 2.2% | 2.3% | 2.4% | 2.2% | 2.8% | 2.6% | 2.4% | 2.2% | 2.2% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $438M | ($502M) | $344M | $437M | $2.3B | $1.9B | $700M | $628M | $749M | $527M | $527M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 0.7% | −0.8% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 3.2% | 2.7% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $438M | ($502M) | $344M | $437M | $2.3B | $1.9B | $700M | $628M | $749M | $527M | $527M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.7% | −0.8% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 3.2% | 2.7% | 0.9% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 0.6% | 0.6% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $221M | $149M | $0 | $0 | $98M | $25M | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $94M | $207M | $255M | $276M | $295M | $323M | $323M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| $0 | $0 | $26M | $0 | $1.9B | $0 | $0 | $0 | $83M | $1.5B | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| — | -0% | 7% | 11% | 15% | 23% | 18% | 16% | 12% | 6% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| — | 3% | 9% | 20% | 64% | 54% | 94% | 47% | 28% | 12% | 12% | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | 9% | 20% | 57% | 47% | 78% | 37% | 20% | −6% | −6% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $1.2B | $670M | $926M | $471M | $1.7B | $2.9B | $456M | $189M | $294M | $199M | $199M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $631M | $615M | $586M | $525M | $551M | $561M | $688M | $724M | $835M | $933M | $933M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $4.5B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.5B | $4.8B | $4.9B | $5.0B | $5.2B | $5.2B | InventoryInvent. |
| $3.0B | $2.8B | $2.9B | $2.9B | $3.5B | $4.2B | $4.2B | $4.2B | $4.1B | $4.0B | $4.0B | Accounts payablePayables |
| $2.1B | $2.2B | $2.0B | $2.0B | $1.4B | $825M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.7B | $2.1B | $2.1B | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $6.8B | $6.1B | $6.3B | $5.7B | $7.0B | $8.4B | $6.3B | $6.3B | $6.6B | $6.7B | $6.7B | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $5.7B | $5.0B | $5.2B | $5.9B | $6.8B | $8.3B | $8.4B | $7.5B | $7.3B | $7.8B | $7.8B | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.2× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 1.0× | 0.7× | 0.8× | 0.9× | 0.9× | 0.9× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.2B | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $23.8B | $21.8B | $20.8B | $24.7B | $26.6B | $28.1B | $26.2B | $26.2B | $26.8B | $26.8B | $26.8B | Total assetsAssets |
| $12.0B | $11.7B | $10.4B | $8.7B | $8.3B | $8.0B | $8.9B | $8.1B | $7.8B | $8.9B | $10.6B | Total debtDebt |
| $10.8B | $11.0B | $9.5B | $8.2B | $6.6B | $5.1B | $8.5B | $7.9B | $7.5B | $8.7B | $10.4B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| — | $1.4B | $1.5B | $2.3B | $1.3B | $3.0B | $1.6B | $2.7B | $3.4B | $1.8B | $1.8B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| — | 580M | 581M | 580M | 578M | 475M | 534M | 581M | 584M | 547M | 547M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| — | $103.41 | $104.24 | $107.63 | $120.55 | $151.25 | $145.41 | $136.36 | $137.70 | $152.00 | $152.00 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| — | $0.08 | $0.23 | $0.80 | $1.47 | $3.41 | $2.83 | $2.23 | $1.64 | $0.40 | $0.40 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| — | $-0.87 | $0.59 | $0.75 | $3.91 | $4.01 | $1.31 | $1.08 | $1.28 | $0.96 | $0.96 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| — | $-0.87 | $0.59 | $0.75 | $3.91 | $4.01 | $1.31 | $1.08 | $1.28 | $0.96 | $0.96 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.16 | $0.44 | $0.48 | $0.48 | $0.51 | $0.59 | $0.59 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| — | $2.62 | $2.31 | $2.53 | $2.84 | $3.38 | $4.03 | $3.50 | $3.31 | $3.36 | $3.36 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| — | $2.41 | $2.50 | $3.93 | $2.29 | $6.36 | $3.02 | $4.73 | $5.80 | $3.36 | $3.36 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +4.9%/yr (8-yr) | +4.7%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −24.4%/yr |
| EPS | +22.2%/yr (8-yr) | −23.0%/yr |
| Dividends / share | — | +29.5%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +3.1%/yr (8-yr) | +3.4%/yr |
| Book value / share | +4.2%/yr (8-yr) | +7.9%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned $217M of profit into $527M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $217M | $959M | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.6B |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$1.9B | +$1.8B | +$1.8B | +$1.8B | +$1.7B |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$96M | +$106M | +$105M | +$138M | +$101M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$140M | −$202M | −$520M | −$605M | +$111M |
| Cash from operations | $2.4B | $2.7B | $2.7B | $2.9B | $3.5B |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$1.8B | −$1.9B | −$2.0B | −$2.2B | −$1.6B |
| Owner earnings | $527M | $749M | $628M | $700M | $1.9B |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 1% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 3% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $96M), owner earnings is nearer $432M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $9.6B · 13.2× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $199M − debt $9.8B
What this means
Netting $199M of cash and short-term investments against $9.8B of debt leaves $9.6B owed, about 13.2× a year's operating profit (13.5× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 4 + DIO 31 − DPO 24 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Solid through the cycle9-yr median, range -0%–23%; 5% latest = NOPAT $591M ÷ invested capital $11.5BIndustry peers: median 10%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran 5% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Thin, recently turned positivelatest $527M = operating cash $2.4B − maintenance capex $1.8B; positive each of the last 3 years, after an earlier loss stretch (10-yr median 1%)Industry peers: median 2%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 1% of revenue this year, a 1% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $96M of SBC) leaves $432M.
- Are earnings backed by cash? 10.89×Cash-backedCash from ops $2.4B ÷ net income $217M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $1.8B ÷ Owner Earnings $527M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $527M of Owner Earnings, $1.8B (342%) went back to shareholders, $323M dividends, $1.5B buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $96M stock comp, the real buyback was about $1.4B. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.96×MaintainingCapex $1.8B ÷ depreciation $1.9B
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size PassRevenue ≥ $2B · $83.2B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.86×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $9.8B vs ($1.1B) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability NearA profit every year (10-yr record) · 1 loss year
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 6 of 10 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.67/share (latest year $0.44), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $3.71/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 9 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 1 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 4 of 9 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 1% → 2% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin held roughly steady — about 1% early, 2% lately, median 2%.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Worst year 2018 · −0.1% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2018, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count −0.6%/yr
What this means
The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
Results have held roughly flat while the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary — watch whether the words are doing work the numbers are not.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“The emergence of artificial intelligence powered agentic shopping tools, through which AI agents autonomously research, compare and purchase products on behalf of consumers, could further disrupt traditional grocery retail.”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of fiscal year-end, Feb 28, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$199M
- Receivables$933M
- Inventory$5.2B
- Other current assets$411M
- Debt due within a year$52M
- Accounts payable$4.0B
- Other current liabilities$3.8B
Its current ratio is below 1, which usually reads as strain; here it is likely structural strength. What it owes in the near term is money to suppliers and customers (payables and deferred revenue), not to lenders, so the balance sheet is funded by operating float, the way Costco's and Amazon's are. The low ratio can be the edge, not the risk; the cash-conversion cycle and the debt due above say which.
From the company's latest filing.
Debt maturity
the debt note, SEC EDGAR →Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.
Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.
Against what the business has and earns
Cash on hand as of Feb 28, 2026 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to $726M against the $485M due in the twelve months after the Feb 28, 2026 schedule: 1.5 times it.
Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Feb 28, 2026 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.
Lease obligations
the lease note, SEC EDGAR →Debt by another name. What the business owes on the property, aircraft, stores and equipment it rents rather than owns is a fixed claim due on a schedule; added back to the debt, it is the true leverage. That ladder, operating and finance leases together, and what it adds to the debt on the page above.
Lease payments by year, scaled to the largest; “later” is everything beyond year five, shown apart. These are the contractual cash payments, before the interest the filing imputes back out to the balance-sheet liability.
True leverage: debt plus leases
Counting the leases the way Buffett does, the fixed claims on this business come to $16.6B, of which the leases are 41%. The lease wall above and the debt schedule together are the calendar of what must be paid, and when.
Lease ladder read from the ASC 842 tags in the company’s Feb 28, 2026 annual report and reconciled: the yearly buckets sum to the undiscounted total, which less the imputed interest equals the balance-sheet liability; a ladder that doesn’t tie out is withheld.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $24.4B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$16.9B · 69%
- Dividends$1.5B · 6%
- Buybacks$3.5B · 14%
- Retained (debt / cash)$2.6B · 11%
- Returned to owners$4.9B
66% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.5B as dividends and $3.5B as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $3.5B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count−5.6%
The diluted count fell from 580M to 547M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.
- Dividend record$0.59/sh
Paid in 6 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
- Return on what it retained30%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($1.8B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $541M, so each retained $1 added about 0.30 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$142M written down across 1 year (2018): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 29% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | $8.6M | $27.6M | $1.9B |
| 2023 | $16.1M | $25.8M | $700M |
| 2024 | $15.1M | $18.7M | $628M |
| 2025 | $15.2M | $14.1M | $749M |
| 2026 | $546k | −$1.1M | $527M |
| 2026 | $16.8M | $14.2M | $527M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership1.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio541:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$96M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 0% of revenue, equal to 13% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Albertsons is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.
- Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?10 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 10 of the last 10 years, $645M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did the share count rise anyway?
- Did debt outgrow the business?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
Peers, Food & Drug Retailing
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KRKroger Company (The) | $147.6B | 35% | 2.1% | 12% | 1% |
| ACIAlbertsons | $83.2B | 28% | 2.1% | 12% | 1% |
| SFMSprouts Farmers | $8.8B | 36% | 5.3% | 30% | 5% |
| ARKOARKO Corp. | $7.6B | — | 1.3% | 10% | 1% |
| IMKTAIngles Markets Incorporated | $5.3B | 24% | 3.6% | 9% | 2% |
| WMKWeis Markets Inc. | $5.0B | — | 2.7% | 8% | 2% |
| GOGrocery Outlet | $4.7B | 30% | 2.9% | 5% | 3% |
| VLGEAVillage Super Market Inc. | $2.3B | 28% | 2.1% | 10% | 2% |
| Group median | — | 29% | 2.4% | 10% | 2% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Albertsons has delivered.
Through the cycle, Albertsons earns about $635M on its 0.8% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 0.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $527M on 495M shares outstanding, per the 10-K cover, as of 2026-04-23; net debt $10.4B. The if-converted diluted count is 547M, 11% above the shares outstanding: the dilution overhang (convertibles, options) a buyer inherits. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← ACHR its page in the Manual ACIC →
Industry order: ← 8267 the Food & Drug Retailing chapter ARKO →