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ALB, Albemarle Corporation

Chemicals capital-intensive Cyclical

Albemarle is a world leader in transforming essential resources into critical ingredients for mobility, energy, connectivity, and health.

The end markets we serve include grid storage, automotive, aerospace, conventional energy, electronics, construction, agriculture and food, pharmaceuticals and medical devices.

We and our joint ventures currently operate more than 25 production and research and development ("R&D") facilities, as well as a number of administrative and sales offices, around the world.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

ALB · Albemarle Corporation

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$5.1B

−4.4% YoY · 10% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $5.5B 5-yr avg $6.2B

Gross margin 18% 5-yr avg 20%

Operating margin −2.8% 5-yr avg 4.0%

ROIC −1% 5-yr avg 2%

Owner-earnings margin 10% 5-yr avg 10%

Free cash flow margin 10% 5-yr avg −5%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

Situation: Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Gross margin has run about 32% and operating margin about 19% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −33% and 34% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 21% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 7%, above 15% in 2 of 9 years). By owner earnings: roughly 12% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

83% of revenue comes from outside the United States.

Revenue by geography, FY2025

China39%$2.0B
Other21%$1.1B
United States17%$890M
South Korea15%$790M
Japan7%$360M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$2.7B	$3.1B	$3.4B	$3.6B	$3.1B	$3.3B	$7.3B	$9.6B	$5.4B	$5.1B	$5.5B	RevenueRevenue
36%	36%	36%	35%	32%	30%	42%	12%	1%	13%	18%	Gross marginGross mgn
13%	15%	13%	15%	14%	13%	7%	9%	11%	11%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
3%	3%	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$601M	$572M	$912M	$666M	$506M	$798M	$2.5B	$252M	($1.8B)	($367M)	($153M)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
22.4%	18.6%	27.0%	18.6%	16.2%	24.0%	33.7%	2.6%	−33.0%	−7.1%	−2.8%	Operating marginOp. mgn
$644M	$55M	$694M	$533M	$376M	$124M	$2.7B	$1.6B	($1.2B)	($511M)	($233M)	Net incomeNet inc.
13%	—	17%	14%	13%	19%	13%	21%	—	—	—	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$736M	$304M	$546M	$719M	$799M	$344M	$1.9B	$1.3B	$688M	$1.3B	$1.1B	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$226M	$197M	$201M	$213M	$232M	$254M	$301M	$430M	$589M	$659M	$655M	DepreciationDeprec.
($151M)	$33M	($363M)	($47M)	$168M	($54M)	($1.1B)	($713M)	$1.2B	$1.1B	$618M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$197M	$318M	$700M	$852M	$850M	$954M	$1.3B	$2.2B	$1.7B	$590M	$506M	CapexCapex
7.3%	10.3%	20.7%	23.7%	27.2%	28.7%	17.2%	22.4%	31.3%	11.5%	9.2%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$539M	$107M	$345M	$506M	$567M	$90M	$1.6B	$897M	$99M	$692M	$575M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
20.1%	3.5%	10.2%	14.1%	18.1%	2.7%	22.0%	9.3%	1.8%	13.5%	10.5%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$539M	($14M)	($154M)	($132M)	($52M)	($609M)	$646M	($828M)	($993M)	$692M	$575M	Free cash flowFCF
20.1%	−0.4%	−4.6%	−3.7%	−1.6%	−18.3%	8.8%	−8.6%	−18.5%	13.5%	10.5%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	$0	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$135M	$141M	$145M	$152M	$162M	$178M	$184M	$187M	$189M	$191M	$191M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$0	$250M	$500M	$0	$0	—	—	—	—	—	—	BuybacksBuybacks
13%	7%	16%	9%	6%	—	22%	2%	-11%	-3%	-1%	ROICROIC
17%	1%	19%	14%	9%	2%	34%	17%	-12%	-5%	-2%	Return on equityROE
13%	−2%	15%	10%	5%	−1%	31%	15%	−14%	−7%	−4%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$2.3B	$1.2B	$589M	$647M	$784M	$476M	$1.5B	$1.1B	$1.3B	$1.7B	$1.2B	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$486M	$534M	$606M	$613M	$531M	$557M	$1.2B	$1.2B	$742M	$594M	$523M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$450M	$593M	$701M	$769M	$750M	$799M	$2.1B	$2.2B	$1.5B	$1.2B	$1.3B	InventoryInvent.
$282M	$419M	$523M	$574M	$483M	$600M	$1.5B	—	—	—	$1.8B	Accounts payablePayables
$654M	$709M	$784M	$807M	$798M	$755M	$1.7B	$3.4B	$2.2B	$1.8B	$111M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$3.3B	$2.5B	$2.0B	$2.2B	$2.2B	$2.0B	$5.2B	$5.2B	$3.8B	$4.0B	$3.3B	Current assetsCur. assets
$1.1B	$1.2B	$1.2B	$1.4B	$1.8B	$1.9B	$2.7B	$3.6B	$2.0B	$1.8B	$1.6B	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.9×	2.1×	1.7×	1.6×	1.2×	1.1×	1.9×	1.5×	2.0×	2.2×	2.1×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
$1.5B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.7B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.6B	$1.5B	$1.5B	GoodwillGoodwill
$8.2B	$7.8B	$7.6B	$9.9B	$10.5B	$11.0B	$15.5B	$18.3B	$16.6B	$16.4B	$15.1B	Total assetsAssets
$2.4B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$3.1B	$3.6B	$2.4B	$3.2B	$4.2B	$3.5B	$3.2B	$3.6B	Total debtDebt
$72M	$669M	$1.1B	$2.4B	$2.8B	$1.9B	$1.7B	$3.1B	$2.3B	$1.5B	$2.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
9.2×	5.0×	17.4×	11.5×	6.9×	13.0×	20.1×	2.2×	-10.7×	-1.8×	-0.8×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$3.8B	$3.7B	$3.6B	$3.9B	$4.3B	$5.6B	$8.0B	$9.4B	$10.0B	$9.5B	$9.9B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
0.6%	0.6%	0.5%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%	0.8%	0.7%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
113M	112M	109M	106M	107M	117M	118M	118M	118M	118M	119M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$23.64	$27.34	$30.83	$33.76	$29.29	$28.56	$62.14	$81.66	$45.76	$43.71	$46.33	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.68	$0.49	$6.34	$5.02	$3.52	$1.06	$22.84	$13.36	$-10.04	$-4.34	$-1.96	EPS (diluted)EPS
$4.76	$0.95	$3.16	$4.76	$5.31	$0.77	$13.64	$7.61	$0.84	$5.89	$4.85	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$4.76	$-0.12	$-1.41	$-1.25	$-0.48	$-5.23	$5.49	$-7.03	$-8.45	$5.89	$4.85	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.20	$1.25	$1.32	$1.43	$1.52	$1.53	$1.57	$1.59	$1.60	$1.62	$1.61	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.74	$2.83	$6.40	$8.01	$7.96	$8.18	$10.71	$18.30	$14.30	$5.01	$4.26	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$33.51	$32.70	$32.76	$36.98	$39.96	$48.27	$67.77	$79.92	$84.77	$81.02	$83.05	Book value / shareBVPS

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+7.1%/yr	+8.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+2.4%/yr	+2.1%/yr
Dividends / share	+3.4%/yr	+1.3%/yr
Capital spending / share	+12.5%/yr	−8.8%/yr
Book value / share	+10.3%/yr	+15.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count

118Mpeak FY2022

ROIC

−3%low FY2024

Gross margin

13%low FY2024

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

2.2×peak FY2024

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$692Mowner earningsvs.($511M)net incomelow FY2021

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $511M loss into $692M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	($511M)	($1.2B)	$1.6B	$2.7B	$124M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$659M	+$589M	+$430M	+$301M	+$254M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$40M	+$32M	+$37M	+$30M	+$20M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$1.1B	+$1.2B	−$713M	−$1.1B	−$54M
Cash from operations	$1.3B	$688M	$1.3B	$1.9B	$344M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$590M	−$589M	−$430M	−$301M	−$254M
Owner earnings	$692M	$99M	$897M	$1.6B	$90M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	—	−$1.1B	−$1.7B	−$961M	−$700M
Free cash flow	$692M	($993M)	($828M)	$646M	($609M)
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	13%	2%	9%	22%	3%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $40M), owner earnings is nearer $652M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -1.8×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($367M) ÷ interest expense $208M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.2B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $1.6B − debt $3.9B

What this means
Netting $1.6B of cash and short-term investments against $3.9B of debt leaves $2.2B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. It also holds $64M in longer-dated marketable securities; counting those, it sits at $2.2B of net debt. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 13d

Tight

DSO 42 + DIO 96 − DPO 125 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 7%

Below average through the cycle

9-yr median, range -11%–22%; -2% latest = NOPAT ($290M) ÷ invested capital $11.8B

Industry peers: median 9%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 9 years (it ran -2% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 10%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range 2%–22%; latest $692M = operating cash $1.3B − maintenance capex $590M

Industry peers: median 8%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 10% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $40M of SBC) leaves $652M.
Are earnings backed by cash? $1.3B

Loss, but cash-generative

Net income ($511M) · cash from operations $1.3B

What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 28%

Reinvests most of it

Dividends + buybacks $191M ÷ Owner Earnings $692M

What this means
Of $692M Owner Earnings, $191M (28%) went back to shareholders, $191M dividends, $0 buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 0.90×

Maintaining

Capex $590M ÷ depreciation $659M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Pass

Revenue ≥ $2B · $5.1B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Pass

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 2.23×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $3.9B vs $2.2B WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth Miss

Earnings +33% over the record · −108%

What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-0.33/share (latest year $-4.33), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $80.84/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 23% → −13% (3-yr avg ends)

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 23% early to −13% lately, median 19% — competition or costs are biting in.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC −13%

What this means
Reinvested capital came back at a negative incremental return over this window — the invested base grew while operating profit did not. The filings show where it went.
Owner earnings growth +2%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 2% a year over the record.
Worst year 2024 · −33.0% op. margin

What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
Share count +0.4%/yr

What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“Integration of AI technologies into our operations may introduce new risks, require significant additional investment, and materially impact our competitive position if unsuccessful.”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$3.3B

Cash & short-term investments$1.1B
Receivables$523M
Inventory$1.3B
Other current assets$300M

Current liabilities$1.6B

Debt due within a year$75M
Accounts payable$1.8B

Current ratio2.07×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio1.21×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.69×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$1.7Bthe cushion left after near-term bills

Debt due this year vs. cash$75M due · $1.1B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Mar 31, 2026 balance sheet

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+32.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters2.7× → 2.1×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$8.2Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Debt incl. operating leases$2.0B$124M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$410Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $8.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$9.6B · 110%
Dividends$1.7B · 19%
Buybacks$750M · 9%

Returned to owners$2.4B
44% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $1.7B as dividends and $750M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$3.3B
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $3.3B beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $2.4B to $3.6B, and cash and short-term investments drew down $1.2B.
Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $750M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
Net change in share count4.7%
The diluted count rose from 113M to 119M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$1.62/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 3% a year. It was never cut over the span.
Return on what it retained9%
Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($2.6B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew $232M, so each retained $1 added about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	J. Kent Masters, Jr.	$9.0M	$20.3M	$90M
2022	J. Kent Masters, Jr.	$11.1M	$13.7M	$1.6B
2023	J. Kent Masters, Jr.	$14.5M	−$4.8M	$897M
2024	J. Kent Masters, Jr.	$14.4M	$4.4M	$99M
2025	J. Kent Masters, Jr.	$15.5M	$38.2M	$692M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$40M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Albemarle Corporation is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

1 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 5 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?4.7%
Diluted shares grew 4.7% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $750M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
CECelanese	$9.5B	25%	14.1%	10%	13%
EMNEastman Chemical	$8.8B	24%	10.8%	9%	9%
DDDuPont de Nemours Inc.	$6.8B	33%	9.9%	3%	5%
SEESealed Air	$5.3B	31%	13.9%	13%	8%
ALBAlbemarle Corporation	$5.1B	33%	18.6%	7%	12%
AVNTAvient	$3.3B	27%	6.5%	7%	5%
HXLHexcel	$1.9B	24%	11.6%	11%	9%
ASIXAdvanSix Inc. Common Stock	$1.5B	11%	4.6%	7%	2%
Group median	—	26%	11.2%	8%	8%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Albemarle Corporation has delivered.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Albemarle Corporation earns about $609M on its 11.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 13.5% margin runs in line with that. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($609M) Net of stock comp (−$41M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−17%/yr

Owner-earnings growth, delivered—

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $575M on 118M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $2.4B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh ALB against another business →

The owners of ALB: the meeting and the votes →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Albemarle Corporation (ALB), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ALB, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ALAB its page in the Manual ALE →

Industry order: ← ADUR the Chemicals chapter ALTO →