Owner Scorecard


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EMN, Eastman Chemical

Chemicals capital-intensive

Eastman has 36 manufacturing facilities and has equity interests in four manufacturing joint ventures in 12 countries that supply products to customers throughout the world.

With a robust portfolio of specialty businesses, Eastman works with customers to deliver innovative products and solutions with a commitment to safety and sustainability.

Eastman uses an innovation-driven growth model which consists of leveraging world class scalable technology platforms, delivering differentiated application development capabilities, and relentlessly engaging the market.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
EMN · Eastman Chemical
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$8.8B
−6.7% YoY · 1% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $8.6B 5-yr avg $9.7B
Gross margin 20% 5-yr avg 22%
Operating margin 17.7% 5-yr avg 9.8%
ROIC 11% 5-yr avg 8%
Owner-earnings margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%
Free cash flow margin 6% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Advanced Materials (33%) and Additives and Functional Products (33%), with 2 more segments behind.
What moves the needle
Gross margin has run about 24% and operating margin about 10% through the cycle, a thin spread that turns the result on volume and the cost of what it sells far more than on the price it sets. Inventory runs near 16% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on the spread and utilization. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has sat near the cost of capital (median 9%). By owner earnings: roughly 9% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 5 segments, the largest Advanced Materials at 33%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025
  • Advanced Materials33%$2.9B
  • Additives And Functional Products33%$2.9B
  • Chemical Intermediates22%$1.9B
  • Fibers12%$1.1B
  • Other0%$17M
By geographyAll Foreign Countries47%United States42%China11%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$9.0B$9.5B$10.2B$9.3B$8.5B$10.5B$10.6B$9.2B$9.4B$8.8B$8.6BRevenueRevenue
26%25%24%24%23%24%20%22%24%21%20%Gross marginGross mgn
8%8%7%7%8%8%7%8%8%8%8%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
2%2%2%3%3%2%2%3%3%3%3%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$1.4B$1.5B$1.3B$899M$519M$1.1B$974M$1.1B$1.1B$567M$1.5BOperating incomeOp. inc.
15.4%16.0%12.9%9.7%6.1%10.2%9.2%11.8%11.5%6.5%17.7%Operating marginOp. mgn
$854M$1.4B$1.1B$759M$478M$857M$793M$894M$905M$474M$399MNet incomeNet inc.
18%-8%17%16%8%20%19%18%16%16%12%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$1.4B$1.7B$1.5B$1.5B$1.5B$1.6B$975M$1.4B$1.3B$970M$1.0BOperating cash flowOp. cash
$580M$587M$604M$611M$574M$538M$477M$498M$509M$513M$518MDepreciationDeprec.
($49M)($314M)($141M)$134M$403M$224M($295M)($18M)($127M)($17M)$83MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$626M$649M$528M$425M$383M$555M$611M$828M$599M$546M$502MCapexCapex
6.9%6.8%5.2%4.6%4.5%5.3%5.8%9.0%6.4%6.2%5.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$759M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$364M$546M$688M$424M$498MOwner earningsOwner earn.
8.4%10.6%10.0%11.6%12.7%10.2%3.4%5.9%7.3%4.8%5.8%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$759M$1.0B$1.0B$1.1B$1.1B$1.1B$364M$546M$688M$424M$498MFree cash flowFCF
8.4%10.6%10.0%11.6%12.7%10.2%3.4%5.9%7.3%4.8%5.8%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$26M$4M$3M$48M$1M$114M$1M$77M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$272M$296M$318M$343M$358M$375M$381M$376M$379M$381M$381MDividends paidDiv. paid
10%13%9%7%4%8%8%9%9%5%11%ROICROIC
19%26%19%13%8%15%15%16%16%8%7%Return on equityROE
13%20%13%7%2%8%8%9%9%2%0%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$181M$191M$226M$204M$564M$459M$493M$548M$837M$566M$665MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$812M$1.0B$1.2B$980M$1.0B$1.1B$957M$826M$791M$737M$949MReceivablesReceiv.
$1.4B$1.5B$1.6B$1.7B$1.4B$1.5B$1.9B$1.7B$2.0B$2.0B$2.1BInventoryInvent.
$704M$842M$914M$890M$799M$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$1.3B$1.2B$2.0BAccounts payablePayables
$1.5B$1.7B$1.8B$1.8B$1.6B$1.4B$1.5B$1.3B$1.5B$1.5B$1.0BOperating working capitalOper. WC
$2.9B$3.1B$3.4B$3.3B$3.5B$4.6B$3.8B$3.5B$4.1B$3.6B$4.1BCurrent assetsCur. assets
$1.8B$2.0B$1.9B$1.8B$2.0B$3.0B$3.3B$2.6B$2.7B$2.7B$2.8BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
1.6×1.6×1.8×1.9×1.7×1.6×1.2×1.4×1.5×1.4×1.5×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$4.5B$4.5B$4.5B$4.4B$4.5B$3.6B$3.7B$3.6B$3.6B$3.7B$3.7BGoodwillGoodwill
$15.5B$16.0B$16.0B$16.0B$16.1B$15.5B$14.7B$14.6B$15.2B$14.9B$15.2BTotal assetsAssets
$6.6B$6.5B$6.2B$5.8B$5.6B$5.2B$5.2B$4.8B$5.0B$4.8B$7.3BTotal debtDebt
$6.4B$6.3B$5.9B$5.6B$5.1B$4.7B$4.7B$4.3B$4.2B$4.2B$6.6BNet debt / (cash)Net debt
$4.5B$5.4B$5.8B$6.0B$6.0B$5.7B$5.2B$5.5B$5.8B$6.0B$6.0BShareholders’ equityEquity
$38M$45M$45MGoodwill written downGW imp.
Per share
148M146M143M139M137M137M125M119M118M116M115MShares out (diluted)Shares
$60.70$65.36$71.04$66.95$62.07$76.41$84.71$77.14$79.58$75.71$75.12Revenue / shareRev/sh
$5.75$9.47$7.56$5.48$3.50$6.25$6.35$7.49$7.68$4.10$3.47EPS (diluted)EPS
$5.11$6.90$7.10$7.79$7.85$7.76$2.91$4.57$5.84$3.67$4.33Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$5.11$6.90$7.10$7.79$7.85$7.76$2.91$4.57$5.84$3.67$4.33Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$1.83$2.03$2.23$2.48$2.62$2.74$3.05$3.15$3.21$3.30$3.31Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$4.22$4.44$3.69$3.07$2.81$4.05$4.89$6.93$5.08$4.72$4.37Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$30.54$36.98$40.61$43.02$44.12$41.60$41.26$45.71$49.02$51.57$52.25Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+2.5%/yr+4.1%/yr
Owner earnings / share−3.6%/yr−14.1%/yr
EPS−3.7%/yr+3.2%/yr
Dividends / share+6.7%/yr+4.7%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.3%/yr+11.0%/yr
Book value / share+6.0%/yr+3.2%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
116Mpeak FY2016
ROIC
5%low FY2020
Gross margin
21%low FY2022
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
10.0×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$424Mowner earningsvs.$474Mnet incomelow FY2022

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business reported $474M of profit but $424M of owner earnings: $50M less than the profit line, taken out by capital spending and the timing of cash.

Reported net income$474M
Owner earnings$424M · 5% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income$474M$905M$894M$793M$857M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$513M+$509M+$498M+$477M+$538M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items−$17M−$127M−$18M−$295M+$224M
Cash from operations$970M$1.3B$1.4B$975M$1.6B
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$546M−$599M−$828M−$611M−$555M
Owner earnings$424M$688M$546M$364M$1.1B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue5%7%6%3%10%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position .

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Interest expense not tagged in the data
    What this means

    No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.

  • How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $4.2B · 2.8× operating profit
    Meaningful net debt
    Cash $566M − debt $4.8B
    What this means

    Netting $566M of cash and short-term investments against $4.8B of debt leaves $4.2B owed, about 2.8× a year's operating profit (3.1× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 31 + DIO 105 − DPO 64 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 4%–13%; 13% latest = NOPAT $1.3B ÷ invested capital $10.2B
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 13% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 3%–13%; latest $424M = operating cash $970M − maintenance capex $546M
    Industry peers: median 7%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 5% of revenue this year, a 8% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops $970M ÷ net income $474M

    In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.

    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $1.3B ÷ Owner Earnings $424M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $424M of Owner Earnings, $1.3B (302%) went back to shareholders, $381M dividends, $900M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.06×
    Maintaining
    Capex $546M ÷ depreciation $513M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 3 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Pass
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $8.8B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.37×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $4.8B vs $993M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −31%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $6.63/share (latest year $4.15), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $52.13/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 15% → 10% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices but names price competition too — and the margin slipped, so the pressure is winning here.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 15% early to 10% lately, median 10% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth −5%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings shrank about 5% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2020 · 6.1% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −2.7%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$4.1B
  • Cash & short-term investments$665M
  • Receivables$949M
  • Inventory$2.1B
  • Other current assets$364M
Current liabilities$2.8B
  • Accounts payable$2.0B
  • Other current liabilities$770M
Current ratio1.47×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.71×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.24×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$1.3Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago−4.9%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters1.4× → 1.5×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$1.4Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($5.1B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$4.6B$196M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $13.8B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$5.8B · 42%
  • Dividends$3.5B · 25%
  • Buybacks$900M · 7%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$3.6B · 26%
  • Returned to owners$4.4B

    55% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $3.5B as dividends and $900M as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran $900M over the span, but a stock split in the window left the reported buyback-share counts on a basis the diluted-share count doesn't match, so a comparable average price can't be drawn.

  • Net change in share count−22.5%

    The diluted count fell from 148M to 115M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record$3.30/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 7% a year. It was never cut over the span.

  • Return on what it retained−9%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out ($4.1B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) fell $375M, so each retained $1 gave back about 0.09 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$4.6B31% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity61%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$274Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $5.8B of capital spent building

$83M written down across 2 years (2018, 2019): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. That is roughly 30% of the cash it put into acquisitions over the span. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Mark J. Costa$17.8M$33.7M$1.1B
2022Mark J. Costa$17.1M$12.0M$364M
2023Mark J. Costa$17.6M$17.0M$546M
2024Mark J. Costa$15.9M$22.8M$688M
2025Mark J. Costa$19.5M−$5.8M$424M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership2.6%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Eastman Chemical is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

3 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?6.0% vs 9.7%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 9.7% early in the record and 6.0% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?25% → 35% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $2.2B to $3.0B while revenue grew −4%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (25% of revenue then, 35% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

  • Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?8 of 10 years

    Management took an impairment or write-down in 8 of the last 10 years, $404M in all. A charge taken almost every year is not one-time; it is the business — past deals coming due, and an admission the assets were worth less than what was paid. Munger's rule: when the "one-time" keeps happening, it is the business. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Chemicals

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DOWDow Inc. Common Stock$40.0B15%4.5%4%6%
CECelanese$9.5B25%14.1%10%13%
EMNEastman Chemical$8.8B24%10.8%9%9%
RPMRPM International$7.4B39%10.5%12%7%
DDDuPont de Nemours Inc.$6.8B33%9.9%3%5%
SEESealed Air$5.3B31%13.9%13%8%
ALBAlbemarle Corporation$5.1B33%18.6%7%12%
AVNTAvient$3.3B27%6.5%7%5%
Group median29%10.7%8%7%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Eastman Chemical has delivered.

$

Through the cycle, Eastman Chemical earns about $806M on its 9.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 4.8% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25−6%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25−5%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $498M on 114M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-03-31; net debt $6.6B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Eastman Chemical (EMN), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/EMN, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← EME its page in the Manual EMR →

Industry order: ← ECVT the Chemicals chapter ESI →