Revenue
$759Mlow FY2017
← All companies ← HLMN Manual HLT → ← HLI Capital Markets & Asset Management HOOD →
HLNE, Hamilton Lane
Capital Markets & Asset Management financial
We are a global private markets investment solutions provider dedicated to private markets investing.
We currently have approximately 785 employees, including approximately 265 investment professionals, operating across 23 global offices supporting our platform and servicing our clients throughout the world.
We offer a variety of investment solutions to address our clients' needs across a range of private markets, including private equity, private credit, real estate, infrastructure, other real assets, growth equity, venture capital and impact.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
Revenue · FY2026
$759M
+6.5% YoY · 17% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $759M 5-yr avg $584M
Net margin 32.8% 5-yr avg 29.8%
Revenue $199M +18.0% vs yr-ago qtr
Net income $93M yr-ago $77M
Net margin 46.7% yr-ago 46.0%
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What moves the needle
- Assets under management and the fee rate on them. What decides it: net flows in or out, the market's move on the assets already there (the firm rises and falls with the indices it invests in), the drift toward cheaper passive products, and the operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on pricing power & competition, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Operating margin has held high for a asset manager (median 33% across the record). It earns this on little capital, so return on equity has run near 29%, the leverage of a model that needs almost no plant to grow. A high return that does not fade can mark a moat, but whether the assets stay (net flows, not last year's market) is what the flow disclosures and the 10-K settle, not the multiple.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →59% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
Revenue by geography, FY2026
- International59%$449M
- United States41%$310M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $180M | $244M | $252M | $274M | $342M | $368M | $529M | $554M | $713M | $759M | $759M | RevenueRevenue |
| 8.6% | 23.2% | 26.6% | 28.3% | 36.4% | 57.7% | 31.1% | 35.3% | 37.3% | 42.7% | 43.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| 0.3% | 7.1% | 13.3% | 22.2% | 28.7% | 39.7% | 20.6% | 25.4% | 30.5% | 32.8% | 32.8% | Net marginNet mgn |
| $612K | $17M | $34M | $61M | $98M | $146M | $109M | $141M | $217M | $249M | $249M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| 34% | — | 48% | 19% | 20% | 31% | 34% | 28% | 18% | 23% | 23% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $80M | $94M | $109M | $114M | $184M | $164M | $222M | $113M | $292M | $419M | $419M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 1% | 22% | 30% | 39% | 41% | 42% | 26% | 27% | 30% | 27% | 27% | Return on equityROE |
| 1% | 10% | 14% | 21% | 25% | 28% | 9% | 14% | 20% | 18% | 18% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $241M | $294M | $361M | $474M | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.7B | $2.3B | $2.3B | Total assetsAssets |
| $32M | $48M | $49M | $50M | $87M | $76M | $117M | $120M | $284M | $372M | $372M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $60M | $78M | $110M | $155M | $238M | $347M | $415M | $525M | $717M | $915M | $915M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
FY2026 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →
Is it a good business?
- Operating margin 43.0%Wide fee margin (≥30%)Operating income $326M ÷ revenue $759MIndustry peers: median 25%
What this means
The heart of a asset manager: how much of each fee dollar survives the cost of running the business. Fees ride on assets under management, so the swing factors are net flows in or out and the market's move on the assets already there; the cost base is largely fixed, which lifts margins in a bull market and squeezes them in a bear one. A high margin held for years, through a market it does not control, is the operational mark of a real franchise.
- Net margin 32.8%WideNet income $249M ÷ revenue $759M
What this means
What reaches the owner after tax and interest. For a capital-light fee business this should be a wide share of revenue; when it is thin despite a high operating margin, debt taken on for acquisitions is usually the reason, so read it next to the balance sheet.
- Return on equity 27%Very high (≥25%)Net income $249M ÷ equity $915MIndustry peers: median 39%
What this means
Because the business ties up little capital, a healthy fee stream throws off a high return on the equity behind it. Read it with the buyback record: returning capital lifts this ratio honestly, but heavy debt taken to do so can flatter it.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Moderate contestabilityAI is likely to reshape costs and some products here without clearly contesting or sparing the core moat; how the company itself frames it is the tell.
In its own filing A competitive risk, new this year
Its FY2026 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“In addition, we may not identify or foresee future developments that could have a material adverse effect on an investment, including, for example, rapidly changing fundamentals in a certain sector, geography or asset class, or technological disruption of a specific company or asset or an entire industry, including as …”
The question is whether a moat the record shows as durable outlasts a technology that lowers the cost of part of what the firm sells. The durability is read in the record above, the filing's own framing of AI beside it; the industry label decides nothing on its own.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership7%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2025 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$51M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 7% of revenue, equal to 16% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Capital Markets & Asset Management
The same industry, side by side on fee margins. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Op. margin | Net margin | ROE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VCTRVictory Capital Holdings | $1.3B | 38.3% | 25.6% | 19% |
| APAMArtisan Partners | $1.2B | 35.1% | 21.8% | 74% |
| VRTSVirtus Investment Partners Inc. | $853M | 20.3% | 14.4% | 14% |
| RILYBRC Group Holdings Inc. | $789M | 10.7% | 7.8% | 10% |
| HLNEHamilton Lane | $759M | 33.2% | 23.8% | 29% |
| AAMIAcadian Asset Management Inc. | $564M | 24.8% | 16.8% | 102% |
| GCMGGCM Grosvenor Inc. | $558M | 18.9% | 3.3% | 168% |
| CNSCohen & Steers | $556M | 38.3% | 28.4% | 39% |
| Group median | — | 29.0% | 19.3% | 34% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Hamilton Lane has delivered.
Hamilton Lane’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
$
Through the cycle, Hamilton Lane earns about $323M on its 42.5% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 55.2% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
Base
—
The assumptions
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Implied by the price—
Owner-earnings growth · ’22→’26+16%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+17%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’17→’26+17%/yr
Owner-earnings yield—
What a growth belief costs, in multiples
The growth each return requires, at your price
P/E (3-yr earnings ’24–’26)—
P/B—
Graham’s price gate—
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner-earnings yield—
High-grade bond yield—
Margin over the bond—
Owner earnings $419M on 56M shares outstanding (a weighted cover-text, the only count this filer tags); net cash $93M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Hamilton Lane (HLNE), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/HLNE, data as of 2026-07-09.
Manual order: ← HLMN its page in the Manual HLT →
Industry order: ← HLI the Capital Markets & Asset Management chapter HOOD →