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AMBA, Ambarella
Ambarella is a leading developer of low-power system-on-a-chip, or SoC, semiconductors and software for edge and physical artificial intelligence applications and intelligent automation.
Our technologies make electronic systems smarter, enabling them to become partially or fully autonomous with features such as intelligent automation, complex scene understanding, and autonomous decision-making.
We specialize in the development of deployable, scalable designs for intelligent electronic systems that utilize high-bandwidth sensors offering a proven path to mass production.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has reached 19% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −22%) on a 61% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Stock-based pay runs about 27% of sales, a real and recurring claim on owners that the GAAP margin understates. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −15%, above 15% in 1 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 11% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →94% of revenue comes from outside the United States.
- Taiwan70%$272M
- Asia Pacific other than Taiwan18%$71M
- North America other than United States6%$22M
- Europe5%$20M
- United States1%$6M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2026
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | 2026’26 | TTMTTMApr 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | |||||||||||
| $310M | $295M | $228M | $229M | $223M | $332M | $338M | $226M | $285M | $391M | $405M | RevenueRevenue |
| 66% | 64% | 61% | 58% | 61% | 63% | 62% | 60% | 60% | 59% | 59% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 14% | 16% | 22% | 23% | 25% | 21% | 23% | 34% | 26% | 19% | 19% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| 33% | 39% | 56% | 57% | 63% | 50% | 61% | 95% | 79% | 61% | 59% | R&D / revenueR&D/rev |
| $60M | $24M | ($40M) | ($50M) | ($61M) | ($30M) | ($74M) | ($155M) | ($127M) | ($83M) | ($76M) | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 19.5% | 8.3% | −17.7% | −21.7% | −27.4% | −8.9% | −22.0% | −68.2% | −44.4% | −21.1% | −18.8% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $58M | $19M | ($30M) | ($45M) | ($60M) | ($26M) | ($65M) | ($169M) | ($117M) | ($76M) | ($70M) | Net incomeNet inc. |
| Cash flow & returns | |||||||||||
| $113M | $85M | $24M | $39M | $31M | $39M | $44M | $19M | $34M | $74M | $33M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $2M | $5M | $7M | $12M | $12M | $14M | $20M | $25M | $26M | $26M | $25M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| $5M | $5M | ($13M) | $6M | $8M | ($37M) | ($22M) | $52M | $17M | $26M | ($16M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $3M | $4M | $3M | $2M | $2M | $10M | $15M | $12M | $10M | $16M | $15M | CapexCapex |
| 0.9% | 1.2% | 1.3% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 2.9% | 4.5% | 5.3% | 3.6% | 4.0% | 3.7% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $111M | $82M | $22M | $38M | $29M | $29M | $29M | $7M | $23M | $58M | $18M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 35.6% | 27.7% | 9.5% | 16.4% | 12.9% | 8.8% | 8.6% | 3.1% | 8.2% | 14.8% | 4.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $111M | $82M | $22M | $38M | $29M | $29M | $29M | $7M | $23M | $58M | $18M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 35.6% | 27.7% | 9.5% | 16.4% | 12.9% | 8.8% | 8.6% | 3.1% | 8.2% | 14.8% | 4.5% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | — | $0 | $0 | $307M | $0 | $0 | — | — | $0 | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| $20M | $55M | $100M | $0 | $1M | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $1M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 44% | 13% | -14% | -18% | -21% | -6% | -12% | -29% | -24% | -16% | -12% | ROICROIC |
| 13% | 4% | -7% | -10% | -13% | -5% | -11% | -30% | -21% | -13% | -11% | Return on equityROE |
| 13% | 4% | −7% | −10% | −13% | −5% | −11% | −30% | −21% | −13% | −11% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | |||||||||||
| $323M | $347M | $194M | $231M | $241M | $171M | $114M | $145M | $145M | $191M | $153M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $39M | $31M | $26M | $18M | $25M | $44M | $52M | $25M | $30M | $39M | $39M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $20M | $23M | $18M | $23M | $26M | $45M | $40M | $29M | $34M | $52M | $80M | InventoryInvent. |
| $20M | $20M | $13M | $15M | $21M | $31M | $18M | $29M | $22M | $54M | $53M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $39M | $35M | $32M | $27M | $30M | $58M | $75M | $25M | $42M | $37M | $66M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $469M | $493M | $410M | $451M | $497M | $267M | $305M | $280M | $321M | $410M | $405M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $54M | $53M | $39M | $53M | $74M | $89M | $83M | $83M | $121M | $178M | $167M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 8.6× | 9.3× | 10.5× | 8.4× | 6.7× | 3.0× | 3.6× | 3.4× | 2.6× | 2.3× | 2.4× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| $27M | $27M | $27M | $27M | $27M | $304M | $304M | $304M | $304M | $304M | $304M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $512M | $547M | $467M | $527M | $573M | $658M | $710M | $658M | $689M | $799M | $795M | Total assetsAssets |
| ($323M) | ($347M) | ($194M) | ($231M) | ($241M) | ($171M) | ($114M) | ($145M) | ($145M) | ($191M) | ($153M) | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $455M | $482M | $419M | $448M | $475M | $547M | $606M | $560M | $561M | $595M | $606M | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 15.7% | 19.2% | 26.7% | 29.2% | 31.5% | 26.5% | 32.9% | 49.2% | 37.8% | 25.1% | 23.2% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | |||||||||||
| 34.3M | 34.6M | 32.7M | 33.1M | 34.7M | 36.6M | 38.4M | 39.9M | 41.3M | 42.7M | 43.6M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $9.04 | $8.54 | $6.96 | $6.91 | $6.43 | $9.07 | $8.80 | $5.68 | $6.90 | $9.15 | $9.29 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $1.68 | $0.55 | $-0.93 | $-1.35 | $-1.72 | $-0.72 | $-1.70 | $-4.25 | $-2.84 | $-1.78 | $-1.60 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $3.22 | $2.36 | $0.66 | $1.14 | $0.83 | $0.80 | $0.76 | $0.18 | $0.57 | $1.36 | $0.42 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $3.22 | $2.36 | $0.66 | $1.14 | $0.83 | $0.80 | $0.76 | $0.18 | $0.57 | $1.36 | $0.42 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.08 | $0.11 | $0.09 | $0.06 | $0.06 | $0.26 | $0.39 | $0.30 | $0.25 | $0.36 | $0.34 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $13.24 | $13.94 | $12.82 | $13.54 | $13.70 | $14.96 | $15.80 | $14.04 | $13.59 | $13.93 | $13.89 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 9-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +0.1%/yr | +7.3%/yr |
| Owner earnings / share | −9.2%/yr | +10.3%/yr |
| Capital spending / share | +18.5%/yr | +45.2%/yr |
| Book value / share | +0.6%/yr | +0.3%/yr |
The record, charted
FY2017–2026Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2026 the business turned a $76M loss into $58M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2026 | FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | ($76M) | ($117M) | ($169M) | ($65M) | ($26M) |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$26M | +$26M | +$25M | +$20M | +$14M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$98M | +$108M | +$111M | +$111M | +$88M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$26M | +$17M | +$52M | −$22M | −$37M |
| Cash from operations | $74M | $34M | $19M | $44M | $39M |
| Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow | −$16M | −$10M | −$12M | −$15M | −$10M |
| Owner earnings | $58M | $23M | $7M | $29M | $29M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 15% | 8% | 3% | 9% | 9% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $98M), owner earnings is nearer ($40M).
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- No meaningful interest burdenLittle or no interest expense reported
What this means
Little or no interest expense reported, the business isn't leaning on lenders to operate.
- Net cash, debt-freeCash $191M − debt $0
What this means
Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by $191M, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- TightDSO 37 + DIO 120 − DPO 124 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.
Is it a good business?
- Not enough dataIndustry peers: median 8%
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
- Solid through the cycle10-yr median margin, range 3%–36%; latest $58M = operating cash $74M − maintenance capex $16MIndustry peers: median 15%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 15% of revenue this year, a 9% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $98M of SBC) leaves ($40M).
- Loss, but cash-generativeNet income ($76M) · cash from operations $74M
What this means
The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.
How is the cash used?
- Reinvests most of itDividends + buybacks $1M ÷ Owner Earnings $58M
What this means
Of $58M Owner Earnings, $1M (2%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $1M buybacks. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($98M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 0.61×HarvestingCapex $16M ÷ depreciation $26M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size MissRevenue ≥ $2B · $391M
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity PassCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 2.31×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (10-yr record) · 8 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · none paid
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth MissEarnings +33% over the record · −884%
What this means
At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-2.75/share (latest year $-1.73), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.56/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2026
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 2 of 10
What this means
Lost money in 8 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Operating margin 3% → −45% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing claims pricing power in its strongest form — price raised, volume held — yet the margin here has not widened to match. The claim leads the record; weigh them together.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 3% early to −45% lately, median −22% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Owner earnings growth −9%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings shrank about 9% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · −68.2% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +2.5%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- How management talks about it Promotional
What this means
The returns have faded, yet the filing reaches for a promoter’s vocabulary — world-class, best-in-class, disruptive — more than an owner’s. When the words sell harder than the results deliver, the gap is the thing to weigh.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“B USINESS Overview Incorporated in 2004, Ambarella is a leading developer of low-power system-on-a-chip, or SoC, semiconductors and software for edge and physical artificial intelligence (AI) applications and intelligent automation.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Apr 30, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$153M
- Receivables$39M
- Inventory$80M
- Other current assets$133M
- Accounts payable$53M
- Other current liabilities$114M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2026
Over the record, the business generated $503M of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.
- Reinvested$76M · 15%
- Buybacks$177M · 35%
- Retained (debt / cash)$250M · 50%
- Returned to owners$177M
41% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $177M as buybacks.
- Source of fundingOperating cash
Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span cash and short-term investments fell $170M.
- Average price paid for buybacks$43.87
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $175M, about $43.87 each.
- Net change in share count27.0%
The diluted count rose from 34M to 44M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record—
No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Dr. Feng-Ming (Fermi) Wang | $6.2M | $21.2M | $29M |
| 2023 | Dr. Feng-Ming (Fermi) Wang | $5.9M | −$5.2M | $29M |
| 2024 | Dr. Feng-Ming (Fermi) Wang | $5.8M | −$779k | $7M |
| 2025 | Dr. Feng-Ming (Fermi) Wang | $7.5M | $12.1M | $23M |
| 2026 | Dr. Feng-Ming (Fermi) Wang | $7.4M | $3.6M | $58M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership4.5%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- CEO pay ratio67:1
What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.
- Stock-based compensation$98M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 25% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Ambarella is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2026.
All 3 tests turned up something to look into. A record that trips every wire is one to understand slowly.
- Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?8.7% vs 24.3%
The owner-earnings margin averaged 24.3% early in the record and 8.7% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?27.0%
Diluted shares grew 27.0% over 2017–2026, even as the company spent $177M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?19% → 29% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $59M to $120M while revenue grew 31%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (19% of revenue then, 29% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2026
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Stock compensation as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Semiconductors
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KLICKulicke and Soffa Industries Inc. | $654M | 47% | 9.4% | 8% | 14% |
| LSCCLattice Semiconductor | $523M | 60% | 9.1% | 9% | 22% |
| SHLSShoals Technologies Group Inc. | $475M | 36% | 17.0% | 10% | 17% |
| MXLMaxLinear Inc. | $468M | 55% | -5.3% | -3% | 15% |
| POWIPower Integrations | $444M | 51% | 13.4% | 11% | 17% |
| SKYTSkyWater Technology Inc. | $442M | 16% | -6.2% | -14% | -12% |
| AMBAAmbarella | $391M | 61% | -21.4% | -15% | 11% |
| LASRnLIGHT Inc. | $261M | 28% | -9.8% | -16% | -2% |
| Group median | — | 49% | 1.9% | 3% | 14% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Ambarella has delivered.
Ambarella’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Ambarella earns about $44M on its 11.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 14.8% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Owner earnings $18M on 44M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-28; net cash $153M. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← AMAT its page in the Manual AMBQ →
Industry order: ← AMAT the Semiconductors chapter AMBQ →