Owner Scorecard


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MXL, MaxLinear Inc.

Semiconductors asset-light UnprofitableDistress / turnaroundSerial acquirer

We are a provider of communications systems-on-chip, or SoCs, used in broadband, mobile and wireline infrastructure, data center, and industrial and multi-market applications.

We are a fabless integrated circuit design company whose products integrate all or substantial portions of a high-speed communication system, including radio frequency, or RF, high-performance analog, mixed-signal, digital signal processing, security engines, data compression and networking layers, and power management.

For example, cloud-based services increasingly require stringent low latency and extremely high-speed network connections between servers and storage within a data center.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K
MXL · MaxLinear Inc.
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
$468M
+29.7% YoY · −0% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue $509M 5-yr avg $707M
Gross margin 57% 5-yr avg 56%
Operating margin −19.3% 5-yr avg −14.2%
ROIC −9% 5-yr avg −6%
Owner-earnings margin 2% 5-yr avg 7%
Free cash flow margin 2% 5-yr avg 7%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by Broadband (44%) and Infrastructure (32%), with 2 more lines behind.
Situation
Unprofitable. No sustained operating profit across the record; an earnings multiple has nothing to rest on. What the record does show is revenue, the gross-margin trajectory, and the burn against the cash on hand. Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Serial acquirer. Goodwill and acquired intangibles are 46% of assets, with meaningful acquisition spending in 4 of the record's 10 years; much of what this business is was bought, at prices the record carries.
What moves the needle
Operating margin has reached 16% at its best but run negative through the cycle (median −5.5%) on a 54% gross margin — so the question is which reading is truer: whether the median was pulled below zero by one-off charges, by the cycle, or by spending it is still growing into, and whether it settles back at a profit. Inventory runs near 14% of sales, so how fast it turns back into cash — and the risk of writing it down when demand softens — sits alongside the margin. Read this kind of business on process leadership and the capex cycle. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median −3%, above 15% in 2 of 10 years). The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 15% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Revenue spreads across 4 lines, the largest Broadband at 44%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • Broadband44%$204M
  • Infrastructure32%$148M
  • Connectivity17%$78M
  • Industrial and multi-market8%$37M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMMar 2026
Income statement
$388M$420M$385M$317M$479M$892M$1.1B$693M$361M$468M$509MRevenueRevenue
59%49%54%53%44%56%58%56%54%57%57%Gross marginGross mgn
17%25%26%28%27%17%15%19%38%34%33%SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
25%27%31%31%38%31%26%39%62%45%41%R&D / revenueR&D/rev
$63M($22M)($19M)($22M)($101M)$65M$180M($38M)($223M)($127M)($98M)Operating incomeOp. inc.
16.3%−5.2%−5.0%−7.0%−21.1%7.3%16.1%−5.5%−62.0%−27.1%−19.3%Operating marginOp. mgn
$61M($9M)($26M)($20M)($99M)$42M$125M($73M)($245M)($137M)($132M)Net incomeNet inc.
4%12%28%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
$117M$75M$103M$78M$74M$168M$389M$43M($45M)$20M$22MOperating cash flowOp. cash
$27M$67M$79M$66M$77M$92M$81M$72M$54M$44M$44MDepreciationDeprec.
$8M($15M)$18M($215K)$48M($25M)$101M($10M)$80M$35M$36MWorking capital & otherWC & other
$9M$7M$8M$7M$12M$39M$41M$13M$18M$13M$12MCapexCapex
2.2%1.8%2.0%2.2%2.6%4.4%3.7%1.9%4.9%2.7%2.4%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$109M$68M$95M$71M$61M$129M$347M$30M($63M)$7M$10MOwner earningsOwner earn.
28.1%16.1%24.6%22.5%12.8%14.5%31.0%4.3%−17.5%1.5%2.0%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$109M$68M$95M$71M$61M$129M$347M$30M($63M)$7M$10MFree cash flowFCF
28.1%16.1%24.6%22.5%12.8%14.5%31.0%4.3%−17.5%1.5%2.0%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$101M$473M$0$0$160M$40M$0$13M$0$0$0AcquisitionsAcquis.
$3K$334K$0$0$0$24M$32M$0$0$20MBuybacksBuybacks
22%-3%-3%-3%-13%9%21%-5%-34%-20%-9%ROICROIC
17%-2%-7%-5%-25%9%18%-11%-47%-30%-29%Return on equityROE
17%−2%−7%−5%−25%9%18%−11%−47%−30%−29%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
$135M$72M$73M$93M$149M$131M$206M$187M$119M$73M$61MCash & investmentsCash+inv
$50M$66M$59M$50M$67M$120M$171M$171M$85M$46M$41MReceivablesReceiv.
$27M$53M$42M$32M$98M$132M$161M$100M$90M$78M$86MInventoryInvent.
$7M$17M$16M$13M$33M$53M$69M$22M$31M$38M$33MAccounts payablePayables
$70M$103M$86M$68M$133M$198M$263M$249M$144M$86M$94MOperating working capitalOper. WC
$213M$201M$185M$182M$362M$404M$563M$488M$323M$249M$249MCurrent assetsCur. assets
$55M$76M$75M$67M$234M$207M$341M$222M$182M$186M$147MCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
3.9×2.6×2.5×2.7×1.5×1.9×1.7×2.2×1.8×1.3×1.7×Current ratioCurr. ratio
$76M$238M$238M$238M$303M$307M$307M$319M$319M$319M$319MGoodwillGoodwill
$423M$825M$744M$706M$1.0B$1.1B$1.2B$1.1B$865M$796M$771MTotal assetsAssets
$0$348M$256M$207M$364M$306M$122M$122M$123M$124M$425MTotal debtDebt
($135M)$276M$183M$114M$215M$176M($84M)($65M)$4M$51M$364MNet debt / (cash)Net debt
606.3×-2.1×-1.3×-2.0×-7.8×5.0×18.5×-3.6×-20.5×-12.6×-10.1×Interest coverageInt. cov.
$352M$387M$400M$415M$391M$489M$676M$686M$516M$452M$454MShareholders’ equityEquity
5.6%7.8%8.2%10.1%9.9%6.7%7.3%8.0%18.3%16.5%14.6%Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
Per share
67.7M66.3M68.5M71.0M73.1M79.7M80.9M80.7M83.6M86.6M87.6MShares out (diluted)Shares
$5.73$6.34$5.62$4.47$6.54$11.20$13.86$8.59$4.31$5.40$5.81Revenue / shareRev/sh
$0.91$-0.14$-0.38$-0.28$-1.35$0.53$1.55$-0.91$-2.93$-1.58$-1.51EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.61$1.02$1.39$1.01$0.84$1.62$4.30$0.37$-0.75$0.08$0.12Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.61$1.02$1.39$1.01$0.84$1.62$4.30$0.37$-0.75$0.08$0.12Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.13$0.11$0.11$0.10$0.17$0.49$0.51$0.17$0.21$0.15$0.14Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$5.21$5.85$5.84$5.84$5.35$6.14$8.37$8.50$6.18$5.22$5.19Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share−0.7%/yr−3.8%/yr
Owner earnings / share−28.2%/yr−37.3%/yr
Capital spending / share+1.6%/yr−3.1%/yr
Book value / share+0.0%/yr−0.5%/yr

The year, in the company's words

the filing →

Verbatim from the 10-K's management discussion. Each sentence is shown only because its subject, direction, and stated figures check out against the filed numbers on this page. The words are the company's; the arithmetic is the record's.

  • Broadband+75.0%
    “Broadband net revenue increased by $87.6 million, driven by increases in the volume of broadband SoC and cable data shipments in this category.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Connectivity+39.8%
    “Connectivity revenue increased $22.2 million due to improvements in the volume of Wi-Fi, ethernet, and MoCA product shipments.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record
  • Industrial and multi-market-49.9%
    “Industrial and multi-market revenue decreased $37.0 million driven by a decreased volume of shipments of high-performance analog and component products in this category.”
    ✓ figure matches the filed record

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
87Mpeak FY2025
ROIC
−20%low FY2024
Gross margin
57%low FY2020
Net debt ÷ owner earnings
7.2×peak FY2025

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$7Mowner earningsvs.($137M)net incomelow FY2024

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business turned a $137M loss into $7M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.

FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income($137M)($245M)($73M)$125M$42M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+$44M+$54M+$72M+$81M+$92M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost+$77M+$66M+$55M+$82M+$59M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+$35M+$80M−$10M+$101M−$25M
Cash from operations$20M($45M)$43M$389M$168M
Capital expenditurecash put back in to keep running and to grow−$13M−$18M−$13M−$41M−$39M
Owner earnings$7M($63M)$30M$347M$129M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue2%-17%4%31%14%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $77M), owner earnings is nearer ($70M).

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Does not cover its interest
    Operating income ($127M) ÷ interest expense $10M
    What this means

    A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.

  • Net debt against an operating loss
    Cash $73M − debt $124M
    What this means

    Netting $73M of cash and short-term investments against $124M of debt leaves $51M owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 36 + DIO 141 − DPO 69 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Below average through the cycle
    10-yr median, range -34%–22%; -20% latest = NOPAT ($100M) ÷ invested capital $503M
    Industry peers: median 8%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran -20% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • Solid through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range -17%–31%; latest $7M = operating cash $20M − maintenance capex $13M
    Industry peers: median 17%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 2% of revenue this year, a 14% median across 10 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $77M of SBC) leaves ($70M).

  • Loss, but cash-generative
    Net income ($137M) · cash from operations $20M
    What this means

    The company reported a net loss, so a conversion ratio isn't meaningful. What matters then is whether operations still threw off cash, here, they did.

How is the cash used?

  • Returned more than it generated
    Dividends + buybacks $20M ÷ Owner Earnings $7M
    What this means

    The company returned more than it generated: against $7M of Owner Earnings, $20M (285%) went back to shareholders, $0 dividends, $20M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. But the buybacks barely exceed stock issued to employees ($77M SBC), net of dilution, little was truly returned. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.

  • Investing or harvesting? 0.29×
    Harvesting
    Capex $13M ÷ depreciation $44M
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 6 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size Miss
    Revenue ≥ $2B · $468M
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.34×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Miss
    Debt ≤ working capital · $124M vs $63M WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Miss
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · 7 loss years
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Miss
    Uninterrupted dividends · none paid
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Miss
    Earnings +33% over the record · −1856%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $-1.69/share (latest year $-1.53), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $5.05/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 3 of 10
    What this means

    Lost money in 7 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 2 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 2% → −32% (3-yr avg ends)
    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 2% early to −32% lately, median −6% — competition or costs are biting in.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Worst year 2024 · −62.0% op. margin
    What this means

    Operations went underwater in 2024, understand why before trusting the good years.

  • Share count +2.8%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product; it frames AI mainly as a capability.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$249M
  • Cash & short-term investments$61M
  • Receivables$41M
  • Inventory$86M
  • Other current assets$62M
Current liabilities$147M
  • Accounts payable$33M
  • Other current liabilities$114M
Current ratio1.70×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio1.12×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.42×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital$103Mthe cushion left after near-term bills
Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+43.0%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing
Current ratio, recent quarters2.1× → 1.7×
Deeper floors
Tangible book value$89Mequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value($68M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases$151M$27M of it operating leases

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $1.0B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a balanced allocator, splitting cash between the business, owners, and the balance sheet.

  • Reinvested$167M · 16%
  • Buybacks$75M · 7%
  • Retained (debt / cash)$779M · 76%
  • Returned to owners$75M

    9% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $0 as dividends and $75M as buybacks.

  • Source of fundingOperating cash

    Operating cash covered reinvestment and returns; over the span debt rose $425M and cash and short-term investments fell $68M.

  • Average price paid for buybacks$34.71

    Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 2M shares were bought for $75M, about $34.71 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $17.48 (2025) to $55.83 (2022), and 2022, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($32M).

  • Net change in share count29.5%

    The diluted count rose from 68M to 88M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.

  • Dividend record

    No dividend line was reported in the filing data over the span; the record here neither confirms nor rules out a payout.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$367M46% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired
Against book equity71%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital
Cash spent acquiring$788Mover 10 years buying other businesses, against $167M of capital spent building

None written down over the record; the goodwill is still carried at full cost. That is the deals holding their value on the books so far; whether they keep doing so is the test an owner watches, since the write-down, when it comes, is the admission the price was too high.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal yearChief executivePay, as filed“Actually paid”Owner earnings
2021Dr. Seendripu$6.2M$52.8M$129M
2022Dr. Seendripu$8.7M−$26.8M$347M
2023Dr. Seendripu$8.9M$2.8M$30M
2024Dr. Seendripu$26.4M$22.8M($63M)
2025Dr. Seendripu$7.8M$3.5M$7M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

  • Insider ownership7.7%

    The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.

  • CEO pay ratio55:1

    What the chief earns for every dollar the median employee makes, per the 2026 proxy. A high ratio alone settles nothing; some businesses are genuinely top-heavy in scarce skill. A runaway figure is where Buffett starts asking whether the board is doing its job.

  • Stock-based compensation$77M

    The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 16% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why MaxLinear Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

4 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 1 came back clean.

  • Look hereIs it less profitable than it was?−3.9% vs 22.9%

    The owner-earnings margin averaged 22.9% early in the record and −3.9% across the last three years, and the latest year has not recovered. Ask the filing whether that is a structural drift or a cyclical trough — price, mix, cost, or a competitor — and whether it is permanent.

  • Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?29.5%

    Diluted shares grew 29.5% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $75M on buybacks. The repurchases were a treadmill: stock issued to staff outran them, so owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.

  • Look hereDid debt outgrow the business?$0 → $425M

    Debt rose from $0 to $425M while owner earnings went from about $90M to ($9M): the borrowing grew and the earnings that would carry it are not there now. Debt raised for buybacks or deals rather than growth is the kind that bites in a downturn.

  • Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?20% → 25% of sales

    Receivables and inventory grew from $77M to $127M while revenue grew 31%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (20% of revenue then, 25% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.

And these came back clean
  • Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →
  • How much of the revenue rides on one buyer?
    ≈$331M · 65% of revenue on the largest customers (TTM)
    “In the year ended December 31, 2025, two customers accounted for 28% of our net revenue, and our ten largest customers collectively accounted for 65% of our net revenue, of which distributor customers accounted for less than 10% of our net revenue.”verify →
  • Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
    Management names Revenue recognition, Income taxes, Inventory, Acquisitions as critical estimates

    each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Semiconductors

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
RMBSRambus$708M80%11.9%3%44%
KLICKulicke and Soffa Industries Inc.$654M47%9.4%8%14%
LSCCLattice Semiconductor$523M60%9.1%9%22%
SHLSShoals Technologies Group Inc.$475M36%17.0%10%17%
MXLMaxLinear Inc.$468M55%-5.3%-3%15%
POWIPower Integrations$444M51%13.4%11%17%
SKYTSkyWater Technology Inc.$442M16%-6.2%-14%-12%
AMBAAmbarella$391M61%-21.4%-15%11%
Group median53%9.2%6%16%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what MaxLinear Inc. has delivered.

$
Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth, delivered
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Owner earnings $10M on 90M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-16; net debt $364M. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "MaxLinear Inc. (MXL), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/MXL, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← MX its page in the Manual MYE →

Industry order: ← MX the Semiconductors chapter NA →