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AROC, Archrock

Oilfield Services & Equipment capital-intensive Distress / turnaroundCyclical

We are an energy infrastructure company with a primary focus on midstream natural gas compression and a commitment to helping our customers produce, compress and transport natural gas in a safe and environmentally responsible way.

We are a premier provider of natural gas compression services, in terms of total compression fleet horsepower, to customers in the energy industry throughout the U.S., and a leading supplier of aftermarket services to customers that own compression equipment in the U.S.

Supports a must run service that is essential to the production, processing, transportation and storage of natural gas.

Latest annual: FY2025 10-K

AROC · Archrock

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025

$1.5B

+28.7% YoY · 11% 5-yr CAGR

Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average

Revenue $1.5B 5-yr avg $1.1B

Gross margin −20%

Operating margin −99.9% 5-yr avg 26.8%

ROIC −30% 5-yr avg 7%

Owner-earnings margin 28% 5-yr avg 16%

Free cash flow margin 16% 5-yr avg 6%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is: Revenue is Contract operations (85%) and Aftermarket services (15%).
Situation: Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock. Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
What moves the needle: Operating margin has run about 17% through the cycle, a solid margin the cost base and competition set as much as the price does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between 0.6% and 39% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 28% of sales, well above depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
Is it a good business?: Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 0 of 7 years). By owner earnings: roughly 16% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.

Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 10-K →

Contract operations is 85% of revenue, with Aftermarket services the other meaningful segment at 15%.

Revenue by reportable segment, FY2025

Contract operations85%$1.3B
Aftermarket services15%$218M

From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left

2016’16	2017’17	2018’18	2019’19	2020’20	2021’21	2022’22	2023’23	2024’24	2025’25	TTMTTMMar 2026
											Income statement
$807M	$795M	$904M	$965M	$875M	$781M	$846M	$990M	$1.2B	$1.5B	$1.5B	RevenueRevenue
14%	14%	11%	12%	12%	14%	14%	12%	12%	10%	10%	SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev
$5M	$47M	$121M	$163M	$20M	$147M	$162M	$254M	$356M	$588M	($1.5B)	Operating incomeOp. inc.
0.6%	5.9%	13.3%	16.9%	2.3%	18.8%	19.1%	25.6%	30.8%	39.5%	−99.9%	Operating marginOp. mgn
($55M)	$19M	$21M	$97M	($68M)	$28M	$44M	$105M	$172M	$322M	$325M	Net incomeNet inc.
—	—	23%	—	—	28%	27%	26%	26%	24%	24%	Effective tax rateTax rate
											Cash flow & returns
$274M	$202M	$226M	$290M	$335M	$237M	$203M	$310M	$430M	$622M	$692M	Operating cash flowOp. cash
$209M	$189M	$175M	$188M	$193M	$179M	$164M	$166M	$193M	$257M	$269M	DepreciationDeprec.
$111M	($14M)	$23M	($3M)	$200M	$19M	($17M)	$26M	$50M	$24M	$75M	Working capital & otherWC & other
$118M	$222M	$319M	$385M	$140M	$98M	$240M	$299M	$359M	$502M	$448M	CapexCapex
14.6%	27.9%	35.3%	39.9%	16.0%	12.5%	28.4%	30.2%	31.0%	33.7%	29.5%	Capex / revenueCapex/rev
$157M	($20M)	$51M	$102M	$195M	$140M	$39M	$144M	$236M	$365M	$423M	Owner earningsOwner earn.
19.4%	−2.5%	5.6%	10.6%	22.3%	17.9%	4.6%	14.5%	20.4%	24.5%	27.9%	Owner earnings marginOE mgn
$157M	($20M)	($93M)	($95M)	$195M	$140M	($36M)	$12M	$71M	$120M	$245M	Free cash flowFCF
19.4%	−2.5%	−10.3%	−9.8%	22.3%	17.9%	−4.3%	1.2%	6.1%	8.0%	16.1%	Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
$14M	$0	$0	$214M	—	—	—	—	$866M	—	$866M	AcquisitionsAcquis.
$35M	$34M	$58M	$79M	$89M	$89M	$90M	$96M	$110M	$142M	$147M	Dividends paidDiv. paid
$2M	$3M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$2M	$9M	$13M	$70M	—	BuybacksBuybacks
—	—	4%	6%	—	4%	5%	8%	8%	11%	-30%	ROICROIC
-8%	2%	3%	9%	-7%	3%	5%	12%	13%	22%	21%	Return on equityROE
−12%	−2%	−4%	2%	−17%	−7%	−5%	1%	5%	12%	12%	Retained to equityRetained/eq
											Balance sheet
$3M	$11M	$6M	$4M	$1M	$2M	$2M	$1M	$4M	$2M	$4M	Cash & investmentsCash+inv
$112M	$113M	$148M	$145M	$104M	$105M	$138M	$124M	$132M	$142M	$179M	ReceivablesReceiv.
$94M	$91M	$76M	$74M	$64M	$73M	$85M	$82M	$90M	$110M	$110M	InventoryInvent.
$33M	$55M	$55M	$60M	$31M	$39M	$64M	$61M	$58M	$44M	$67M	Accounts payablePayables
$173M	$150M	$169M	$159M	$137M	$139M	$158M	$145M	$165M	$208M	$221M	Operating working capitalOper. WC
$216M	$221M	$256M	$232M	$182M	$187M	$232M	$213M	$233M	$304M	$309M	Current assetsCur. assets
$107M	$131M	$151M	$139M	$112M	$125M	$149M	$152M	$189M	$197M	$219M	Current liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.0×	1.7×	1.7×	1.7×	1.6×	1.5×	1.6×	1.4×	1.2×	1.5×	1.4×	Current ratioCurr. ratio
—	—	$0	$101M	—	—	—	$0	$52M	$125M	$125M	GoodwillGoodwill
$2.4B	$2.4B	$2.6B	$3.1B	$2.8B	$2.6B	$2.6B	$2.7B	$3.8B	$4.3B	$4.4B	Total assetsAssets
$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.4B	Total debtDebt
$1.5B	$1.4B	$1.5B	$1.8B	$1.7B	$1.5B	$1.5B	$1.6B	$2.2B	$2.4B	$2.4B	Net debt / (cash)Net debt
0.1×	0.5×	1.3×	1.6×	0.2×	1.4×	1.6×	2.3×	2.9×	3.6×	-9.1×	Interest coverageInt. cov.
$719M	$777M	$842M	$1.1B	$936M	$891M	$861M	$871M	$1.3B	$1.5B	$1.5B	Shareholders’ equityEquity
1.1%	1.1%	0.8%	0.8%	1.2%	1.5%	1.4%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.5%	Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev
											Per share
103M	104M	109M	138M	151M	152M	153M	154M	162M	175M	174M	Shares out (diluted)Shares
$7.80	$7.60	$8.27	$7.02	$5.80	$5.15	$5.51	$6.42	$7.13	$8.53	$8.69	Revenue / shareRev/sh
$-0.53	$0.18	$0.19	$0.71	$-0.45	$0.19	$0.29	$0.68	$1.06	$1.84	$1.86	EPS (diluted)EPS
$1.51	$-0.19	$0.47	$0.74	$1.29	$0.92	$0.26	$0.93	$1.46	$2.09	$2.43	Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
$1.51	$-0.19	$-0.85	$-0.69	$1.29	$0.92	$-0.24	$0.07	$0.43	$0.68	$1.40	Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
$0.34	$0.33	$0.53	$0.57	$0.59	$0.59	$0.59	$0.62	$0.68	$0.81	$0.84	Dividends / shareDiv/sh
$1.14	$2.12	$2.92	$2.80	$0.93	$0.64	$1.56	$1.93	$2.21	$2.88	$2.57	Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
$6.95	$7.44	$7.69	$7.90	$6.20	$5.87	$5.61	$5.64	$8.15	$8.53	$8.70	Book value / shareBVPS

Share counts before 2018 are restated ×1.5 for a stock split, so per-share figures sit on one basis.

Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded

	9-yr	5-yr
Revenue / share	+1.0%/yr	+8.0%/yr
Owner earnings / share	+3.6%/yr	+10.1%/yr
Dividends / share	+10.2%/yr	+6.6%/yr
Capital spending / share	+10.9%/yr	+25.3%/yr
Book value / share	+2.3%/yr	+6.6%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked. Share counts on the current split basis.

Share count

175Mpeak FY2025

ROIC

11%low FY2018

Net debt ÷ owner earnings

6.6×peak FY2022

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

$365Mowner earningsvs.$322Mnet incomelow FY2017

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cash

Each year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.

FY2016FY2025

Owner-earnings bridge

FY2021–FY2025cash-flow statement, SEC EDGAR →

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned $365M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $257M it takes just to hold its position. It put $246M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $120M.

Reported net income$322M

Owner earnings$365M · 25% of revenue

	FY2025	FY2024	FY2023	FY2022	FY2021
Reported net income	$322M	$172M	$105M	$44M	$28M
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back	+$257M	+$193M	+$166M	+$164M	+$179M
Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost	+$19M	+$15M	+$13M	+$12M	+$11M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items	+$24M	+$50M	+$26M	−$17M	+$19M
Cash from operations	$622M	$430M	$310M	$203M	$237M
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume	−$257M	−$193M	−$166M	−$164M	−$98M
Owner earnings	$365M	$236M	$144M	$39M	$140M
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still	−$246M	−$166M	−$132M	−$76M	—
Free cash flow	$120M	$71M	$12M	($36M)	$140M
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue	25%	20%	15%	5%	18%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $257M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $246M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $19M), owner earnings is nearer $346M.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 10-K · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

Can it pay its interest? -9.3×

Does not cover its interest

Operating income ($1.5B) ÷ interest expense $165M

What this means
A full year of operating profit didn't cover the interest bill. This is the zombie zone: the business depends on refinancing, asset sales, or forbearance to service its debt.
How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.4B

Net debt against an operating loss

Cash $2M − debt $2.4B

What this means
Netting $2M of cash and short-term investments against $2.4B of debt leaves $2.4B owed, with no operating profit this year to measure it against — understand that combination before anything else about the company. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
How long is cash tied up? 48d

Tight

DSO 35 + DIO 21 − DPO 9 days

What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

Return on invested capital 6%

Below average through the cycle

7-yr median, range 4%–11%; -30% latest = NOPAT ($1.2B) ÷ invested capital $3.9B

Industry peers: median 6%

What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 7 years (it ran -30% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
Owner-earnings margin 15%

Solid through the cycle

10-yr median margin, range -3%–25%; latest $365M = operating cash $622M − maintenance capex $257M

Industry peers: median 18%

What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 25% of revenue this year, a 15% median across 10 years. It chose to put $246M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $120M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $19M of SBC) leaves $346M.
Are earnings backed by cash? 1.93×

Cash-backed

Cash from ops $622M ÷ net income $322M

What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

Where do the earnings go? 58%

Returns about half

Dividends + buybacks $212M ÷ Owner Earnings $365M

What this means
Of $365M Owner Earnings, $212M (58%) went back to shareholders, $142M dividends, $70M buybacks. Net of $19M stock comp, the real buyback was about $51M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
Investing or harvesting? 1.96×

Expanding

Capex $502M ÷ depreciation $257M

What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

Adequate size Near

Revenue ≥ $2B · $1.5B

What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
Strong liquidity Near

Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.54×

What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
Conservative debt Miss

Debt ≤ working capital · $2.4B vs $107M WC

What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
Earnings stability Miss

A profit every year (10-yr record) · 2 loss years

What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
Dividend record Pass

Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)

What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
Earnings growth —

Earnings +33% over the record · —

What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
Moderate price —

P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price

What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $1.14/share (latest year $1.84), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $8.51/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

Profitable years 8 of 10

What this means
Lost money in 2 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 10 yrs

What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
Operating margin 7% → 32% (3-yr avg ends)

In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.

What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 7% early to 32% lately, median 17% — pricing power intact or improving.
Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 24%

What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
Owner earnings growth +18%/yr

What this means
Owner earnings grew about 18% a year over the record.
Worst year 2016 · 0.6% op. margin

What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
Dividend record rising

What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Raised, but not as a competitor

The filing raises AI among its risks, but in other terms (security, regulation, energy or the like), not as a competitor to its product.

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets$309M

Cash & short-term investments$4M
Receivables$179M
Inventory$110M
Other current assets$16M

Current liabilities$219M

Accounts payable$67M
Other current liabilities$152M

Current ratio1.41×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×

Quick ratio0.91×stricter: inventory excluded

Cash ratio0.02×strictest: cash alone against what's due

Working capital$89Mthe cushion left after near-term bills

Revenue, latest quarter vs. a year ago+7.7%the freshest read on whether the business is still growing

Current ratio, recent quarters1.5× → 1.4×

Deeper floors

Tangible book value$1.3Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles

Net current asset value($2.6B)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities

Debt incl. operating leases$2.4B$14M of it operating leases

Deferred revenue$8Mcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated $3.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.

Reinvested$2.7B · 86%
Dividends$822M · 26%
Buybacks$107M · 3%

Returned to owners$929M
66% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $822M as dividends and $107M as buybacks.
Source of funding−$481M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $481M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet: debt rose from $1.5B to $2.4B.
Average price paid for buybacks$16.08
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 6M shares were bought for $92M, about $16.08 each. Year to year the price paid ranged from $7.78 (2023) to $20.16 (2025), and 2025, near the top of that range, was also its heaviest buyback year ($70M).
Net change in share count68.6%
The diluted count rose from 103M to 174M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
Dividend record$0.81/sh
Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 10% a year. It was never cut over the span.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Acquisitions & goodwill

from the balance sheet & the 10-year cash-flow record

Goodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.

Goodwill & intangibles$269M6% of all assets; the premium carried on the balance sheet for businesses acquired

Against book equity8%goodwill is this share of book equity; the rest is the company’s own retained and paid-in capital

Cash spent acquiring$1.1Bover 10 years buying other businesses, against $2.7B of capital spent building

$100M written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.

Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 10-year record, from the company's own filings.

Management, ownership & pay

read the proxy →

From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.

Fiscal year	Chief executive	Pay, as filed	“Actually paid”	Owner earnings
2021	Mr. Childers	$6.6M	$3.7M	$140M
2022	Mr. Childers	$7.2M	$7.3M	$39M
2023	Mr. Childers	$8.0M	$17.1M	$144M
2024	Mr. Childers	$8.5M	$30.7M	$236M
2025	Mr. Childers	$9.0M	$18.7M	$365M

Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.

Insider ownership2.9%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
Stock-based compensation$19M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 1% of revenue. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why Archrock is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

2 of the 6 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.

Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?68.6%
Diluted shares grew 68.6% over 2016–2025, even as the company spent $107M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
Look hereAre "one-time" charges a yearly habit?5 of 10 years
Management took an impairment or write-down in 5 of the last 10 years, $289M in all. Taken across the majority of the record, the "one-time" label is wearing thin — ask whether these are past deals coming due rather than genuinely isolated events. Read it beside the goodwill the company still carries.

And these came back clean

Is it less profitable than it was?
Did debt outgrow the business?
Did reported profit become cash?
Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

What an owner would ask, FY2025

read the 10-K →

Which reported numbers are a judgment call?
Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →

The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.

Peers, Oilfield Services & Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

Company	Revenue	Gross margin	Op. margin	ROIC	Owner earn. margin
SWXSouthwest Gas Holdings	$1.9B	51%	12.6%	6%	8%
KNTKKinetik Holdings Inc.	$1.8B	30%	8.1%	3%	22%
AROCArchrock	$1.5B	-25%	17.8%	6%	16%
KGSKodiak Gas Services	$1.3B	—	28.7%	6%	6%
NWNNorthwest Natural	$1.3B	—	19.1%	6%	10%
DTMDT Midstream Inc. Common Stock	$1.2B	—	51.1%	5%	59%
AMAntero Midstream Corporation	$1.2B	—	56.4%	8%	70%
USACUSA Compression Partners LP Common	$998M	—	23.1%	—	18%
Group median	—	30%	21.1%	6%	17%

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Archrock has delivered.

Archrock’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

Today’s price $

Through the cycle, Archrock earns about $241M on its 16.2% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 24.5% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base Normalize · through-cycle ($241M) Net of stock comp (−$23M) Steady-state · maintenance capex ($436M)

—

The assumptions Required return 9% Years of high growth 10 Terminal growth 2.5%

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price—

Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+35%/yr

Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+4%/yr

Owner-earnings yield—

P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)—

P/B—

Graham’s price gate—

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $245M on 175M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-04-29; net debt $2.4B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($448M) runs well above depreciation ($269M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $436M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Weigh AROC against another business →

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "Archrock (AROC), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/AROC, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ARMK its page in the Manual ARQT →

Industry order: ← AESI the Oilfield Services & Equipment chapter BKR →