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KNTK, Kinetik Holdings Inc.
A regulated utility, earning a set return on the capital it sinks into its network.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- Situation
- Cyclical. Margins collapse and recover repeatedly across the record; a single year, good or bad, misstates the through-cycle earning power.
- What moves the needle
- Gross margin has run about 30% and operating margin about 8.1% through the cycle, a spread the cycle sets more than the company does. The margin is cyclical, swinging between −947% and 13% over the years, so the through-cycle figure carries more than any single year — and the balance sheet at the trough more than the peak. Capital spending runs about 25% of sales, below what it charges for depreciation, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on supplier & input dependence, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 3%, above 15% in 1 of 8 years). By owner earnings: roughly 22% of revenue reaches owners as cash, though it swings, and customers and suppliers fund the business through negative working capital. The cycle and the balance sheet decide this one; the worst year tells more than the median, and the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2017–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2017’17 | 2018’18 | 2019’19 | 2020’20 | 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||||||
| $15M | $77M | $136M | $410M | $662M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $1.7B | RevenueRevenue |
| −10% | 30% | 59% | — | — | — | — | — | — | 97% | Gross marginGross mgn |
| 26% | 10% | 8% | 6% | 4% | 8% | 8% | 9% | 7% | 8% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| ($12M) | ($12M) | ($1.3B) | ($1.0B) | $53M | $150M | $159M | $179M | $165M | $142M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| −76.2% | −15.9% | −946.8% | −248.8% | 8.1% | 12.4% | 12.7% | 12.1% | 9.3% | 8.2% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| ($187K) | ($4M) | ($358M) | $0 | $0 | $41M | $289M | $80M | $178M | $170M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | — | — | — | — | 6% | — | 22% | 22% | 22% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||||||
| $0 | $661K | $76M | $102M | $236M | $613M | $584M | $637M | $604M | $608M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $6M | $20M | $41M | $224M | $244M | $260M | $281M | $324M | $383M | $392M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($6M) | ($15M) | $393M | ($122M) | ($8M) | $269M | ($42M) | $157M | ($19M) | ($17M) | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $0 | $84M | $343M | $181M | $78M | $206M | $313M | $264M | $492M | $501M | CapexCapex |
| 0.0% | 109.4% | 252.3% | 44.2% | 11.8% | 17.0% | 24.9% | 17.8% | 27.9% | 28.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $0 | ($19M) | $35M | ($79M) | $158M | $407M | $272M | $374M | $221M | $216M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 0.0% | −25.3% | 25.6% | −19.3% | 23.8% | 33.5% | 21.6% | 25.2% | 12.6% | 12.5% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $0 | ($83M) | ($266M) | ($79M) | $158M | $407M | $272M | $374M | $112M | $107M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 0.0% | −108.6% | −196.2% | −19.3% | 23.8% | 33.5% | 21.6% | 25.2% | 6.3% | 6.2% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| — | — | — | — | — | $0 | $125M | $341M | $175M | $175M | AcquisitionsAcquis. |
| — | — | $0 | $0 | $0 | $39M | $81M | $175M | $194M | $199M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $0 | $6M | $0 | $176M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| -1% | — | -254% | -85% | 1% | 6% | 5% | 25% | 4% | 5% | ROICROIC |
| -0% | — | -3983222% | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | — | — | Return on equityROE |
| — | — | n/m | 0% | 0% | — | — | — | — | — | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||||||
| $0 | $450M | $6M | $24M | $19M | $6M | $5M | $4M | $4M | $720K | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $5M | $11M | $15M | — | $178M | $204M | $216M | $112M | $85M | $93M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| $743K | $6M | $4M | $4M | $2M | $5M | $3M | $4M | $5M | $5M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | — | — | — | $12M | $18M | $34M | $27M | $42M | $29M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $6M | $17M | $19M | $4M | $168M | $191M | $185M | $88M | $48M | $69M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| $6M | $468M | $32M | $43M | $218M | $242M | $257M | $295M | $302M | $319M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| $124M | $99M | $34M | $30M | $241M | $228M | $250M | $419M | $441M | $537M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| 0.0× | 4.8× | 0.9× | 1.4× | 0.9× | 1.1× | 1.0× | 0.7× | 0.7× | 0.6× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | — | — | — | $0 | $5M | $5M | $5M | $5M | $5M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $706M | $1.9B | $1.5B | $1.8B | $3.6B | $5.9B | $6.5B | $6.8B | $7.1B | $7.1B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $0 | $406M | $624M | $2.3B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $3.9B | Total debtDebt |
| — | ($450M) | $400M | $600M | $2.3B | $3.4B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.8B | $3.9B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| $556M | ($227M) | $9K | $10K | $10K | ($840M) | ($531M) | ($3.0B) | ($565M) | ($1.7B) | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| — | — | — | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.5% | 4.5% | 5.2% | 3.5% | 3.6% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||||||
| 62.3M | 8.7M | 3.7M | 0K | 0K | 41.7M | 146M | 60.1M | 62.7M | 66.7M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $0.24 | $8.87 | $36.25 | — | — | $29.12 | $8.59 | $24.67 | $28.16 | $25.96 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $-0.00 | $-0.51 | $-95.70 | — | — | $0.98 | $1.98 | $1.33 | $2.84 | $2.56 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $0.00 | $-2.24 | $9.29 | — | — | $9.76 | $1.86 | $6.22 | $3.53 | $3.24 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.00 | $-9.63 | $-71.11 | — | — | $9.76 | $1.86 | $6.22 | $1.78 | $1.60 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| — | — | $0.00 | — | — | $0.94 | $0.56 | $2.91 | $3.09 | $2.98 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $0.00 | $9.70 | $91.47 | — | — | $4.95 | $2.14 | $4.38 | $7.86 | $7.51 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $8.93 | $-26.22 | $0.00 | — | — | $-20.16 | $-3.63 | $-49.52 | $-9.02 | $-25.03 | Book value / shareBVPS |
The diluted share count moved ×1/7.19 into 2018 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/2.31 into 2019 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×11.12 into 2022 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×3.51 into 2023 — shares issued, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
The diluted share count moved ×1/2.43 into 2024 — shares retired, not a split the totals corroborate — and the per-share figures carry the counts as filed.
| 8-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +81.1%/yr | −1.1%/yr (3-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | — | −28.7%/yr (3-yr) |
| EPS | — | +42.8%/yr (3-yr) |
| Dividends / share | — | +48.5%/yr (3-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | — | +16.7%/yr (3-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2017–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedBeyond op. cashEach year's outlays against its operating cash: the mix, and how it drifts. The hatched cap is spending beyond that year's operating cash — financed from the balance sheet or borrowing, not operations.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business earned $221M of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the $383M it takes just to hold its position. It put $110M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was $112M.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $178M | $80M | $289M | $41M | $0 |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$383M | +$324M | +$281M | +$260M | +$244M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$63M | +$77M | +$56M | +$43M | — |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | −$19M | +$157M | −$42M | +$269M | −$8M |
| Cash from operations | $604M | $637M | $584M | $613M | $236M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$383M | −$264M | −$313M | −$206M | −$78M |
| Owner earnings | $221M | $374M | $272M | $407M | $158M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | −$110M | — | — | — | — |
| Free cash flow | $112M | $374M | $272M | $407M | $158M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 13% | 25% | 22% | 34% | 24% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about $383M, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other $110M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows. The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $63M), owner earnings is nearer $159M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- Interest expense not tagged in the data
What this means
No usable interest-expense line was tagged in the filing data, but the balance sheet carries real net debt — so the interest burden here is unknown, not absent. Read the debt on the net-debt check below.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $3.8B · 23.1× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $4M − debt $3.8B
What this means
Netting $4M of cash and short-term investments against $3.8B of debt leaves $3.8B owed, about 23.1× a year's operating profit (23.2× on the gross debt, before the cash). Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Negative, funded by othersDSO 18 + DIO 30 − DPO 275 days
What this means
Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. A negative cycle is a quiet moat: suppliers and customers fund the operation (Buffett's “float”), the company grows on other people's money.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle8-yr median, range -254%–25%; 4% latest = NOPAT $128M ÷ invested capital $3.2BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 8 years (it ran 4% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- High through the cycle9-yr median margin, range -25%–34%; latest $221M = operating cash $604M − maintenance capex $383MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 13% of revenue this year, a 22% median across 9 years. It chose to put $110M more into growth, so free cash flow this year was $112M — the gap is investment, not weakness. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $63M of SBC) leaves $159M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $604M ÷ net income $178M
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returned more than it generatedDividends + buybacks $370M ÷ Owner Earnings $221M
What this means
The company returned more than it generated: against $221M of Owner Earnings, $370M (167%) went back to shareholders, $194M dividends, $176M buybacks — the excess came from the balance sheet or borrowing, not the year's operations. Net of $63M stock comp, the real buyback was about $113M. Sustained, that pattern draws down cash or adds debt; the net-debt line above shows where it stands.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.29×ExpandingCapex $492M ÷ depreciation $383M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 0 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.8B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.69×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $3.8B vs ($138M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability MissA profit every year (9-yr record) · 5 loss years
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 4 of 9 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Earnings growth —Earnings +33% over the record · —
What this means
Earnings were negative early in the record, a growth rate isn't meaningful.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $2.77/share (latest year $2.70), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $-8.58/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2017–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 4 of 9
What this means
Lost money in 5 year(s), look at what happened there before trusting the average.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 1 of 7 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin −346% → 11% (3-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing ties gains to its own pricing, but names price competition too — pricing power that is real yet contested, not unopposed. The margin shows who is winning.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about −346% early to 11% lately, median 8% — pricing power intact or improving.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC 41%
What this means
Every extra dollar the business reinvested came back at a high incremental return — the lens GBM read for a moat that reinvests rather than merely harvests. The record and the 10-K are where you check whether the rate holds.
- Worst year 2019 · −946.8% op. margin
What this means
Operations went underwater in 2019, understand why before trusting the good years.
- Share count +0.1%/yr
What this means
Roughly flat share count, little dilution, little buyback.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.
“The Company is evaluating solutions to assist its employees in business activities and developing appropriate controls and parameters, but certain third parties may incorporate AI tools into their services and deliverables without the Company's knowledge or control.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$720K
- Receivables$93M
- Inventory$5M
- Other current assets$221M
- Debt due within a year$187M
- Accounts payable$29M
- Other current liabilities$321M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2017–2025
Over the record, the business generated $2.9B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$2.0B · 69%
- Dividends$490M · 17%
- Buybacks$182M · 6%
- Retained (debt / cash)$221M · 8%
- Returned to owners$671M
49% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $490M as dividends and $182M as buybacks.
- Average price paid for buybacks—
Buybacks ran $182M over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.
- Net change in share count7.1%
The diluted count rose from 62M to 67M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$3.09/sh
Paid in 4 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Acquisitions & goodwill
from the balance sheet & the 9-year cash-flow recordGoodwill grows only when a company acquires and falls only when it concedes it overpaid. The size of that bet, the cash put into buying rather than building, and how much has already been written off.
$1.0B written down across 1 year (2020): goodwill the company has already conceded it overpaid for, charged against earnings. A write-down costs no cash (the cash went out when the deal was signed), but it is management marking its own past judgment to market.
Goodwill, acquired intangibles and equity from the latest balance sheet; acquisition spend and write-downs summed across the 9-year record, from the company's own filings.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid.
- Insider ownership7.2%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$63M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 4% of revenue, equal to 38% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kinetik Holdings Inc. is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2017–2025.
1 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 4 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?7.1%
Diluted shares grew 7.1% over 2017–2025, even as the company spent $182M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Income taxes, Acquisitions, Contingencies as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Pipelines & Midstream
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WESWestern Midstream Partners LP Common | $3.8B | 73% | 43.1% | — | 38% |
| NGLNGL ENERGY PARTNERS LP Common | $3.2B | 14% | 2.8% | — | 1% |
| KNTKKinetik Holdings Inc. | $1.8B | 30% | 8.1% | 3% | 22% |
| AROCArchrock | $1.5B | -25% | 17.8% | 6% | 16% |
| KGSKodiak Gas Services | $1.3B | — | 28.7% | 6% | 6% |
| DTMDT Midstream Inc. Common Stock | $1.2B | — | 51.1% | 5% | 59% |
| AMAntero Midstream Corporation | $1.2B | — | 56.4% | 8% | 70% |
| USACUSA Compression Partners LP Common | $998M | — | 23.1% | — | 18% |
| Group median | — | 22% | 25.9% | 6% | 20% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kinetik Holdings Inc. has delivered.
Through the cycle, Kinetik Holdings Inc. earns about $381M on its 21.6% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 12.6% margin runs below that; the reported figure may understate a lean year. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $107M on 66M shares outstanding (a weighted basic average, the only count this filer tags); net debt $3.9B. The base is the latest year by default; Normalize values it on the through-cycle median owner-earnings margin (to avoid paying on a peak year). Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($501M) runs well above depreciation ($392M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $225M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← KNSL its page in the Manual KNX →
Industry order: ← KMI the Pipelines & Midstream chapter MPLX →