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KGS, Kodiak Gas Services
We are a leading provider and operator of large horsepower contract compression infrastructure in the U.S, supporting the critical movement and processing of natural gas across key production regions.
Through our wholly-owned subsidiary, Kodiak Services, formed in 2011, we have built and operated a substantial fleet of high-reliability compression assets for more than a decade.
Kodiak Gas Services is centered on long term customer relationships, operational excellence, and disciplined capital deployment, positioning us to deliver stable performance while supporting the essential infrastructure needs of the domestic energy industry.
The business
What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.
The business in brief
read the 10-K →What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.
- What it is
- Revenue is Contract Services (90%) and Other Services (10%).
- Situation
- Distress / turnaround. Thin interest coverage, or operating cash burned against real debt, across the record. The balance sheet carries this situation; the debt schedule sets the clock.
- What moves the needle
- Operating margin has run about 29% through the cycle, a wide margin for the work it does — whether that reflects a durable edge or one that can fade is what the record weighs. That margin has stayed fairly steady relative to where it runs (22%–31% over the years), so unit growth and cost discipline, not a moving line, are the lever. Capital spending runs about 29% of sales, so the return earned on what it sinks into that plant weighs as much as the margin. Read this kind of business on rate base and the allowed return. On its own account, the filing leans hardest on customer concentration, set against the numbers in what the filing emphasizes, below.
- Is it a good business?
- Return on capital has rarely cleared the cost of capital (median 6%, above 15% in 1 of 5 years). By owner earnings: roughly 6% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. This is price-taker territory, where the balance sheet and the cycle matter more than any multiple; the rest is in the 10-K.
Every line is arithmetic on the company's filings, shown in full in the sections below.
Where the money comes from
read the 10-K →Contract Services is 90% of revenue, with Other Services the other meaningful segment at 10%.
- Contract Services90%$1.2B
- Other Services10%$127M
From the segment footnote of the company's own 10-K. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.
The record
Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.
The record, 2021–2025
realized figures from each filing · older years to the left| 2021’21 | 2022’22 | 2023’23 | 2024’24 | 2025’25 | TTMTTMMar 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Income statement | ||||||
| $606M | $708M | $850M | $1.2B | $1.3B | $1.3B | RevenueRevenue |
| 6% | 6% | 9% | 13% | 11% | 12% | SG&A / revenueSG&A/rev |
| $189M | $222M | $244M | $249M | $340M | $358M | Operating incomeOp. inc. |
| 31.2% | 31.4% | 28.7% | 21.5% | 26.0% | 27.0% | Operating marginOp. mgn |
| $181M | $106M | $20M | $50M | $81M | $68M | Net incomeNet inc. |
| — | 24% | 43% | 34% | 28% | 26% | Effective tax rateTax rate |
| Cash flow & returns | ||||||
| $250M | $220M | $266M | $328M | $600M | $557M | Operating cash flowOp. cash |
| $160M | $174M | $183M | $260M | $276M | $274M | DepreciationDeprec. |
| ($92M) | ($62M) | $57M | $162K | $219M | $191M | Working capital & otherWC & other |
| $202M | $259M | $220M | $337M | $315M | $356M | CapexCapex |
| 33.3% | 36.6% | 25.8% | 29.1% | 24.1% | 26.9% | Capex / revenueCapex/rev |
| $90M | $45M | $47M | $68M | $284M | $282M | Owner earningsOwner earn. |
| 14.8% | 6.4% | 5.5% | 5.8% | 21.7% | 21.3% | Owner earnings marginOE mgn |
| $48M | ($40M) | $47M | ($9M) | $284M | $200M | Free cash flowFCF |
| 7.9% | −5.6% | 5.5% | −0.8% | 21.7% | 15.1% | Free cash flow marginFCF mgn |
| $0 | $0 | $30M | $134M | $160M | $166M | Dividends paidDiv. paid |
| — | $0 | $0 | $40M | $104M | — | BuybacksBuybacks |
| 20% | 6% | 5% | 4% | 6% | — | ROICROIC |
| 19% | 46% | 2% | 4% | 7% | 6% | Return on equityROE |
| 19% | 46% | −1% | −6% | −7% | −8% | Retained to equityRetained/eq |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| $29M | $20M | $6M | $5M | $3M | $94M | Cash & investmentsCash+inv |
| $81M | $98M | $113M | $254M | $198M | $238M | ReceivablesReceiv. |
| — | $72M | $76M | $103M | $102M | $104M | InventoryInvent. |
| — | $38M | $50M | $58M | $73M | $72M | Accounts payablePayables |
| $81M | $132M | $140M | $299M | $226M | $270M | Operating working capitalOper. WC |
| — | $204M | $231M | $384M | $323M | $460M | Current assetsCur. assets |
| — | $189M | $211M | $319M | $386M | $360M | Current liabilitiesCur. liab. |
| — | 1.1× | 1.1× | 1.2× | 0.8× | 1.3× | Current ratioCurr. ratio |
| — | $306M | $306M | $415M | $409M | $409M | GoodwillGoodwill |
| $3.0B | $3.2B | $3.2B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.5B | Total assetsAssets |
| — | $2.7B | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.8B | Total debtDebt |
| — | $2.7B | $1.8B | $2.6B | $2.6B | $2.7B | Net debt / (cash)Net debt |
| 2.2× | 1.3× | 1.1× | — | — | 2.1× | Interest coverageInt. cov. |
| $960M | $229M | $1.1B | $1.4B | $1.2B | $1.2B | Shareholders’ equityEquity |
| 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.7% | 1.5% | 1.9% | 1.8% | Stock comp / revenueSBC/rev |
| Per share | ||||||
| 59.0M | 59.0M | 68.3M | 85.2M | 88.5M | 87.5M | Shares out (diluted)Shares |
| $10.28 | $12.00 | $12.45 | $13.61 | $14.78 | $15.13 | Revenue / shareRev/sh |
| $3.07 | $1.80 | $0.29 | $0.59 | $0.91 | $0.78 | EPS (diluted)EPS |
| $1.52 | $0.77 | $0.68 | $0.80 | $3.21 | $3.23 | Owner earnings / shareOE/sh |
| $0.81 | $-0.67 | $0.68 | $-0.11 | $3.21 | $2.29 | Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh |
| $0.00 | $0.00 | $0.44 | $1.57 | $1.80 | $1.89 | Dividends / shareDiv/sh |
| $3.42 | $4.40 | $3.22 | $3.96 | $3.56 | $4.07 | Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh |
| $16.27 | $3.88 | $16.72 | $16.13 | $13.64 | $13.43 | Book value / shareBVPS |
| 4-yr | 5-yr | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue / share | +9.5%/yr | +9.5%/yr (4-yr) |
| Owner earnings / share | +20.5%/yr | +20.5%/yr (4-yr) |
| EPS | −26.2%/yr | −26.2%/yr (4-yr) |
| Capital spending / share | +1.0%/yr | +1.0%/yr (4-yr) |
| Book value / share | −4.3%/yr | −4.3%/yr (4-yr) |
The record, charted
FY2021–2025Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.
Owner earnings vs. net income
Owner earningsNet incomeThe accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.
Where the cash went
ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetainedEach year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.
Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.
In fiscal 2025 the business turned $81M of profit into $284M of owner earnings: more cash than the profit line showed, after the non-cash charges and the capital it put back in.
| FY2025 | FY2024 | FY2023 | FY2022 | FY2021 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reported net income | $81M | $50M | $20M | $106M | $181M |
| Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back | +$276M | +$260M | +$183M | +$174M | +$160M |
| Stock-based compensationreal costnon-cash, but a real cost | +$25M | +$18M | +$6M | +$971K | +$1M |
| Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items | +$219M | +$162K | +$57M | −$62M | −$92M |
| Cash from operations | $600M | $328M | $266M | $220M | $250M |
| Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume | −$315M | −$260M | −$220M | −$174M | −$160M |
| Owner earnings | $284M | $68M | $47M | $45M | $90M |
| Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still | — | −$77M | — | −$85M | −$42M |
| Free cash flow | $284M | ($9M) | $47M | ($40M) | $48M |
| Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue | 22% | 6% | 5% | 6% | 15% |
Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the capital it must spend to hold its position . The cash-flow statement also adds stock comp back as non-cash, but it is a real cost paid in shares; counted as the expense it is (less $25M), owner earnings is nearer $260M.
Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.
Quality & stewardship
Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.
Owner’s Scorecard
Will it survive?
- ThinOperating income $340M ÷ interest expense $223M
What this means
Operating profit covers interest, but with little room. A bad year, a refinancing at higher rates, or a revenue wobble closes the gap fast.
- How heavy is the debt, net of cash? $2.6B · 7.5× operating profitHeavy net debtCash $3M − debt $2.6B
What this means
Netting $3M of cash and short-term investments against $2.6B of debt leaves $2.6B owed, about 7.5× a year's operating profit. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.
- Not enough data
What this means
The filing data didn't include the inputs for this check.
Is it a good business?
- Below average through the cycle5-yr median, range 4%–20%; 6% latest = NOPAT $244M ÷ invested capital $3.8BIndustry peers: median 6%
What this means
The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 5 years (it ran 6% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.
- Solid through the cycle5-yr median margin, range 5%–22%; latest $284M = operating cash $600M − maintenance capex $315MIndustry peers: median 18%
What this means
What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 22% of revenue this year, a 6% median across 5 years. Treating stock comp as the real expense it is (less $25M of SBC) leaves $260M.
- Cash-backedCash from ops $600M ÷ net income $81M
In the filing’s words The filing leans on adjusted, non-GAAP earnings, but the GAAP profit is itself cash-backed — the adjustments are not papering over a cash shortfall here.
What this means
How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.
How is the cash used?
- Returns most of itDividends + buybacks $264M ÷ Owner Earnings $284M
What this means
Of $284M Owner Earnings, $264M (93%) went back to shareholders, $160M dividends, $104M buybacks. Net of $25M stock comp, the real buyback was about $79M. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.
- Investing or harvesting? 1.14×MaintainingCapex $315M ÷ depreciation $276M
What this means
Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.
Graham’s defensive tests · 1 of 5 met
Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.
- Adequate size NearRevenue ≥ $2B · $1.3B
What this means
Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's 1972 floor was ~$100M of sales (≈ $700M today); we use a $2B revenue line as a conservative modern stand-in.
- Strong liquidity MissCurrent ratio ≥ 2× · 0.84×
What this means
Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.
- Conservative debt MissDebt ≤ working capital · $2.6B vs ($63M) WC
What this means
Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.
- Earnings stability PassA profit every year (5-yr record) · no losses
What this means
Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.
- Dividend record MissUninterrupted dividends · 3 of 5 yrs
What this means
An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.
- Moderate price —P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
What this means
Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are $0.57/share (latest year $0.91), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is $13.60/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.
Durability & moat, 2021–2025
Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.
- Profitable years 5 of 5
What this means
Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.
- Return on capital ≥ 15% 0 of 4 yrs
What this means
A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.
- Operating margin 31% → 24% (2-yr avg ends)
In the filing’s words The filing attributes gains to higher prices, but the margin in the record has not followed — the claim outruns the result here.
What this means
Through the cycle the operating margin slipped — about 31% early to 24% lately, median 29% — competition or costs are biting in.
- Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
What this means
The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.
- Owner earnings growth +27%/yr
What this means
Owner earnings grew about 27% a year over the record.
- Worst year 2024 · 21.5% op. margin
What this means
Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.
- Share count +10.7%/yr
What this means
The share count is rising, dilution works against you on a per-share basis.
- Dividend record rising
What this means
Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.
Does AI threaten the moat?
Low contestabilityThe moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.
Its FY2025 10-K names artificial intelligence as a competitive threat, in language that was not in the prior year's filing.
“Kodiak's competitors or other entities may also integrate artificial intelligence into their information systems and business operations more swiftly or effectively than Kodiak, potentially impairing its competitive edge and negatively impacting its financial performance.”
AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat.
Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.
All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.
Current Position
as of the latest quarter, Mar 31, 2026Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.
- Cash & short-term investments$94M
- Receivables$238M
- Inventory$104M
- Other current assets$23M
- Accounts payable$72M
- Other current liabilities$288M
From the company's latest filing.
How the cash was used, 2021–2025
Over the record, the business generated $1.7B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a reinvestor, most operating cash is plowed back into the business.
- Reinvested$1.3B · 80%
- Dividends$323M · 19%
- Buybacks$144M · 9%
- Returned to owners$467M
88% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, $323M as dividends and $144M as buybacks.
- Source of funding−$137M
Reinvestment and shareholder returns ran $137M beyond the operating cash the business generated, so the gap was financed off the balance sheet.
- Average price paid for buybacks$32.05
Across the years where the filing reports a share count, 4M shares were bought for $144M, about $32.05 each.
- Net change in share count48.3%
The diluted count rose from 59M to 88M: issuance (stock pay, deals) outran any buybacks, so owners were diluted on net.
- Dividend record$1.80/sh
Paid in 3 of the years on record. It was never cut over the span.
Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.
Management, ownership & pay
read the proxy →From the proxy: how much of the business the people running it own, and how they are paid, beside what the business earned for its owners in the same years.
| Fiscal year | Chief executive | Pay, as filed | “Actually paid” | Owner earnings |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Mr. McKee | $4.9M | $5.6M | $47M |
| 2024 | Mr. McKee | $6.1M | $13.5M | $68M |
| 2025 | Mr. McKee | $6.6M | $11.9M | $284M |
Both pay figures are the company’s own, from the pay-versus-performance table its proxy statement files. “As filed” is the Summary Compensation Table total: salary, bonus, and equity awards at their value on the day of grant. “Actually paid” is the SEC’s prescribed recalculation, which re-marks those equity awards to what they became as they vested; it can swing far above or below the filed figure in either direction, and negative years occur. Owner earnings are the whole business's, from the record above, for the same fiscal years.
- Insider ownership<1%
The stake all directors and executive officers hold together, per the 2026 proxy: skin in the game, the first thing Munger reads.
- Stock-based compensation$25M
The slice of the business handed to employees in shares this year, 2% of revenue, equal to 7% of operating profit. Buffett's oldest accounting fight: this is compensation, compensation is an expense, real whether or not the headline earnings admit it. One trap: the cash-flow statement adds SBC back, so the operating cash, and the owner earnings drawn from it, are flattered by exactly this amount; counted as the cost it is, what an owner keeps is lower.
Inverting the record
Invert: instead of why Kodiak Gas Services is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2021–2025.
2 of the 5 tests turned up something to look into; the other 3 came back clean.
- Look hereDid the share count rise anyway?48.3%
Diluted shares grew 48.3% over 2021–2025, even as the company spent $144M on buybacks. The repurchases were outrun by issuance — to staff, in a raise, or in a deal — and the filing says which; owners' slice still shrank. Read the buyback line beside this one, not on its own.
- Look hereDid receivables and inventory outpace sales?13% → 18% of sales
Receivables and inventory grew from $81M to $238M while revenue grew 118%: working capital is climbing faster than sales (13% of revenue then, 18% now). That can mean customers paying slower, stock building up, or revenue pulled forward. The filing's cash-flow and receivables notes say which.
- Is it less profitable than it was?
- Did reported profit become cash?
- Are "one-time" charges a yearly habit?
Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.
What an owner would ask, FY2025
read the 10-K →- Which reported numbers are a judgment call?Management names Revenue recognition, Acquisitions as critical estimates
each rests partly on management's judgment; the filing's note sets out the assumptionsverify →
The questions the record and the charts do not answer on their own; each carries the figure and the place to look.
Peers, Pipelines & Midstream
The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.
| Company | Revenue | Gross margin | Op. margin | ROIC | Owner earn. margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| KNTKKinetik Holdings Inc. | $1.8B | 30% | 8.1% | 3% | 22% |
| AROCArchrock | $1.5B | -25% | 17.8% | 6% | 16% |
| KGSKodiak Gas Services | $1.3B | — | 28.7% | 6% | 6% |
| NWNNorthwest Natural | $1.3B | — | 19.1% | 6% | 10% |
| DTMDT Midstream Inc. Common Stock | $1.2B | — | 51.1% | 5% | 59% |
| EEExcelerate Energy Inc. | $1.2B | — | 19.9% | 7% | 14% |
| AMAntero Midstream Corporation | $1.2B | — | 56.4% | 8% | 70% |
| USACUSA Compression Partners LP Common | $998M | — | 23.1% | — | 18% |
| Group median | — | — | 21.5% | 6% | 17% |
The price
What a price has to assume.
What the price implies
reverse-DCFType today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what Kodiak Gas Services has delivered.
Kodiak Gas Services’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.
Through the cycle, Kodiak Gas Services earns about $84M on its 6.4% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 21.7% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.
—
9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.
Enter a price above to run it.
A dated snapshot of the price you typed, the assumptions you set, and what the page showed for them. A snapshot is never edited after it is saved. Your notebook is yours alone — the commitment states what is stored and what we will never do.
Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.
Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.
Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.
Free cash flow $200M on 89M shares outstanding, per the 10-Q cover, as of 2026-05-06; net debt $2.7B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($356M) runs well above depreciation ($274M), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $241M, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.
Manual order: ← KG its page in the Manual KHC →
Industry order: ← GEL the Pipelines & Midstream chapter KMI →