Owner Scorecard


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ASML, ASML HOLDING NV

Semiconductor Equipment capital-intensive

ASML builds the photolithography machines that print circuit patterns onto silicon wafers — the single most critical and most expensive tool in making an advanced chip. It is the only company that makes the extreme-ultraviolet systems the leading-edge chipmakers cannot produce a modern processor without, so the whole industry's progress runs partly through its order book.

Latest annual: FY2025 20-F · figures as filed, in EUR · US listing is the ordinary share
ASML · ASML HOLDING NV
I

The business

What it sells, where the money comes from, the kind of company it is.

Revenue · FY2025
€32.7B
+15.6% YoY · 19% 5-yr CAGR
Vital signs · TTM, with 5-yr average
Revenue €32.7B 5-yr avg €25.7B
Gross margin 53% 5-yr avg 52%
Operating margin 34.6% 5-yr avg 33.3%
ROIC 84% 5-yr avg 79%
Owner-earnings margin 36% 5-yr avg 36%
Free cash flow margin 34% 5-yr avg 33%

The business in brief

read the 10-K →

What this business is and what moves its needle, from its own SEC filings.

What it is
Revenue is led by NXE (32%) and ArF immersion (32%), with 5 more lines behind.
What moves the needle
A near-monopoly on the one machine the semiconductor industry cannot do without. What decides it: whether the chipmakers keep pushing to smaller nodes, which only ASML's tools can print; the multi-year order book for systems that cost a fortune apiece; and the service and upgrade revenue the installed base pulls along behind it. The risks sit largely outside its hands — the chip cycle that swings its customers' spending, and the export rules governments place on whom it may sell to, which its own filing flags first. The figures are in the record below.
Is it a good business?
Return on capital has run high across the record (median 49%, above 15% in 10 of 10 years), though buybacks and expensed R&D and brands shrink the capital base, so the figure overstates the underlying economics. The steadier read is owner earnings: roughly 27% of revenue reaches owners as cash, consistently. Whether these returns reflect real pricing power or an accounting artifact is the judgment the 10-K is for.

Drafted from the company's filings and reviewed by hand; every number is shown in full in the sections below.

Where the money comes from

read the 20-F →

Revenue spreads across 7 lines, the largest NXE at 32%.

Revenue by product line, FY2025
  • NXE32%€10.4B
  • ArF immersion32%€10.3B
  • Service And Field Options25%€8.2B
  • EXE4%€1.2B
  • KrF3%€1.0B
  • Metrology And Inspection3%€825M
  • Other2%€734M
By geographyChina29%Taiwan26%South Korea25%United States13%Japan4%Singapore2%Other2%

From the segment footnote of the company's own 20-F. Shares are of total revenue; the profit bar shows each segment's share of segment operating profit, before unallocated corporate costs.

II

The record

Ten years of arithmetic, read across the cycle.

The record, 2016–2025

realized figures from each filing · older years to the left
2016’162017’172018’182019’192020’202021’212022’222023’232024’242025’25TTMTTMDec 2025
Income statement
€6.9B€9.0B€10.9B€11.8B€14.0B€18.6B€21.2B€27.6B€28.3B€32.7B€32.7BRevenueRevenue
46%45%46%45%49%53%51%51%51%53%53%Gross marginGross mgn
€1.8B€2.4B€3.0B€2.8B€4.1B€6.8B€6.5B€9.0B€9.0B€11.3B€11.3BOperating incomeOp. inc.
25.6%27.2%27.1%23.6%29.0%36.3%30.7%32.8%31.9%34.6%34.6%Operating marginOp. mgn
€1.6B€2.1B€2.6B€2.6B€3.6B€5.9B€5.6B€7.8B€7.6B€9.6B€9.6BNet incomeNet inc.
13%13%12%7%13%15%15%15%18%17%17%Effective tax rateTax rate
Cash flow & returns
€1.7B€1.8B€3.1B€3.3B€4.6B€10.8B€8.5B€5.4B€11.2B€12.7B€12.7BOperating cash flowOp. cash
€357M€418M€423M€449M€491M€471M€584M€740M€919M€1.0B€1.0BDepreciationDeprec.
(€249M)(€666M)€58M€236M€583M€4.5B€2.3B(€3.1B)€2.7B€2.0B€2.0BWorking capital & otherWC & other
€316M€339M€574M€767M€962M€901M€1.3B€2.2B€2.1B€1.6B€1.6BCapexCapex
4.6%3.8%5.2%6.5%6.9%4.8%6.1%7.8%7.3%4.8%4.8%Capex / revenueCapex/rev
€1.3B€1.5B€2.6B€2.8B€4.1B€10.4B€7.9B€4.7B€10.2B€11.6B€11.6BOwner earningsOwner earn.
19.6%16.5%24.2%23.9%29.6%55.7%37.3%17.1%36.3%35.6%35.6%Owner earnings marginOE mgn
€1.3B€1.5B€2.5B€2.5B€3.7B€9.9B€7.2B€3.3B€9.1B€11.1B€11.1BFree cash flowFCF
19.6%16.5%22.8%21.2%26.2%53.4%34.0%11.9%32.2%33.9%33.9%Free cash flow marginFCF mgn
€446M€517M€597M€1.3B€1.1B€1.4B€2.6B€2.3B€2.5B€2.6B€597MDividends paidDiv. paid
€400M€500M€1.1B€410M€1.2B€8.6B€4.6B€1.0B€500M€6.0BBuybacksBuybacks
15%19%23%21%28%74%96%69%71%84%84%ROICROIC
16%19%22%21%26%58%64%58%41%49%49%Return on equityROE
11%14%17%10%18%45%35%41%28%36%46%Retained to equityRetained/eq
Balance sheet
€2.9B€2.3B€3.1B€3.5B€6.0B€7.0B€7.3B€7.0B€12.7B€12.9B€12.9BCash & investmentsCash+inv
€700M€1.7B€1.5B€1.8B€1.3B€3.0B€5.3B€4.3B€4.5B€3.0B€3.0BReceivablesReceiv.
€2.8B€3.0B€3.4B€3.8B€4.6B€5.2B€7.2B€8.9B€10.9B€11.4B€11.4BInventoryInvent.
€593M€837M€964M€1.1B€1.4B€2.1B€2.6B€2.3B€3.5B€3.5B€3.5BAccounts payablePayables
€2.9B€3.9B€4.0B€4.5B€4.5B€6.1B€10.0B€10.8B€11.9B€10.9B€10.9BOperating working capitalOper. WC
€8.6B€8.9B€10.5B€12.1B€15.9B€18.2B€23.1B€24.4B€30.7B€30.6B€30.6BCurrent assetsCur. assets
€3.3B€3.2B€3.8B€4.7B€6.6B€12.3B€18.0B€16.3B€20.1B€24.3B€24.3BCurrent liabilitiesCur. liab.
2.6×2.8×2.8×2.6×2.4×1.5×1.3×1.5×1.5×1.3×1.3×Current ratioCurr. ratio
€4.9B€4.5B€4.5B€4.5B€4.6B€4.6B€4.6B€4.6B€4.6B€4.6B€4.6BGoodwillGoodwill
€17.2B€18.2B€20.1B€22.6B€27.3B€30.2B€36.3B€40.0B€48.6B€50.6B€50.6BTotal assetsAssets
€3.0B€3.0B€3.0B€3.1B€4.7B€4.6B€4.3B€4.6B€4.7B€4.4B€4.4BTotal debtDebt
€129M€749M(€93M)(€424M)(€1.4B)(€2.4B)(€3.0B)(€2.4B)(€8.0B)(€8.5B)(€8.5B)Net debt / (cash)Net debt
46.3×42.4×70.9×76.3×93.6×123.6×106.9×59.2×55.5×95.5×74.0×Interest coverageInt. cov.
€10.0B€10.7B€11.6B€12.6B€13.9B€10.1B€8.8B€13.5B€18.5B€19.6B€19.6BShareholders’ equityEquity
Per share
428M432M426M422M419M410M398M394M394M389M385MShares out (diluted)Shares
€16.07€20.77€25.67€28.04€33.35€45.35€53.20€69.93€71.81€84.00€84.76Revenue / shareRev/sh
€3.64€4.79€6.08€6.15€8.48€14.34€14.13€19.89€19.24€24.71€24.93EPS (diluted)EPS
€3.16€3.43€6.21€6.71€9.87€25.28€19.86€11.94€26.04€29.91€30.18Owner earnings / shareOE/sh
€3.16€3.43€5.86€5.95€8.75€24.23€18.10€8.34€23.12€28.50€28.76Free cash flow / shareFCF/sh
€1.04€1.20€1.40€3.14€2.54€3.33€6.43€5.96€6.23€6.56€1.55Dividends / shareDiv/sh
€0.74€0.79€1.35€1.82€2.30€2.19€3.22€5.47€5.25€4.05€4.08Cap. spending / shareCapex/sh
€23.32€24.77€27.30€29.87€33.08€24.71€22.14€34.13€46.94€50.43€50.89Book value / shareBVPS
Per-share growththe realized rate an owner's share compounded
9-yr5-yr
Revenue / share+20.2%/yr+20.3%/yr
Owner earnings / share+28.4%/yr+24.8%/yr
EPS+23.7%/yr+23.9%/yr
Dividends / share+22.7%/yr+20.8%/yr
Capital spending / share+20.8%/yr+12.0%/yr
Book value / share+8.9%/yr+8.8%/yr

The record, charted

FY2016–2025

Each measure over its full record; the current point and the worst year marked.

Share count
389Mpeak FY2017
ROIC
84%low FY2016
Gross margin
53%low FY2019

Owner earnings vs. net income

Owner earningsNet income

The accountant's number, and the cash an owner can take; the gap is the tell.

€11.6Bowner earningsvs.€9.6Bnet incomelow FY2016

Where the cash went

ReinvestBuybacksDividendsAcquisitionsRetained

Each year's operating cash, by what management did with it: the mix, and how it drifts.

FY2016FY2025

Net income is the accountant's number; owner earnings is the cash an owner could take out. The walk between them, off the cash-flow statement, and whether the gap is widening or holding.

In fiscal 2025 the business earned €11.6B of owner earnings, the operating cash left after the €1.0B it takes just to hold its position. It put €548M more into growth; free cash flow, after that spending, was €11.1B.

Reported net income€9.6B
Owner earnings€11.6B · 36% of revenue
FY2025FY2024FY2023FY2022FY2021
Reported net income€9.6B€7.6B€7.8B€5.6B€5.9B
Depreciation & amortizationnon-cash charge added back+€1.0B+€919M+€740M+€584M+€471M
Working capital & othertiming of cash in and out, other non-cash items+€2.0B+€2.7B−€3.1B+€2.3B+€4.5B
Cash from operations€12.7B€11.2B€5.4B€8.5B€10.8B
Maintenance capital expenditurethe spending needed just to hold position and volume−€1.0B−€919M−€740M−€584M−€471M
Owner earnings€11.6B€10.2B€4.7B€7.9B€10.4B
Growth capital expenditurediscretionary; spent to get bigger, not to stand still−€548M−€1.1B−€1.4B−€698M−€430M
Free cash flow€11.1B€9.1B€3.3B€7.2B€9.9B
Owner-earnings marginowner earnings ÷ revenue36%36%17%37%56%

Owner earnings is the cash an owner could pull out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position (here about €1.0B, roughly its depreciation, the rate its assets wear out). The other €548M of its capital spending is growth it chose, not upkeep it owed; charged only with the maintenance it must do, the business earns well more than the year's free cash flow shows.

Maintenance capex is estimated as depreciation where a growing business invests above it; free cash flow is the figure the scorecard's free-cash margin reads.

III

Quality & stewardship

Returns, the balance sheet, capital allocation, and pay.

Owner’s Scorecard

FY2025 20-F · source on SEC EDGAR →

Will it survive?

  • Comfortable
    Operating income €11.3B ÷ interest expense €153M
    What this means

    Operating profit covers interest with the kind of margin Graham wanted for a defensive holding. Necessary, not sufficient, it says solvent, not cheap.

  • Net cash
    Cash €12.9B − debt €4.4B
    What this means

    Cash and short-term investments exceed every dollar of debt by €8.5B, on net the company owes nothing, and can act from strength when others can't. Net debt is the leverage figure that matters: the cash is already set against the debt. Strategic or illiquid investments aren't counted here.

  • Long (60+ days)
    DSO 34 + DIO 271 − DPO 83 days
    What this means

    Days cash is tied up between paying suppliers and collecting from customers. Lower is better; a long cycle means growth itself eats cash.

Is it a good business?

  • Very high (≥25%) through the cycle
    10-yr median, range 15%–96%; 84% latest = NOPAT €9.3B ÷ invested capital €11.1B
    Industry peers: median 12%
    What this means

    The rate the business earns on the money tied up in it, Buffett's north star, because over time a stock tracks the ROIC beneath it. Above ~15% sustained hints at a moat; a return below the cost of capital (~8%) erodes value as a business grows rather than building it — the test Buffett weighs most. The headline is the median of the last 10 years (it ran 84% most recently), so one peak or trough year doesn't set the verdict. Asset-light businesses (R&D expensed, little capital) read artificially high, pair this with Owner Earnings.

  • High through the cycle
    10-yr median margin, range 17%–56%; latest €11.6B = operating cash €12.7B − maintenance capex €1.0B
    Industry peers: median 9%
    What this means

    What an owner could take out without starving the business: operating cash less the maintenance capital it must spend to hold its position — Buffett's owner earnings. That's 36% of revenue this year, a 24% median across 10 years.

  • Cash-backed
    Cash from ops €12.7B ÷ net income €9.6B
    What this means

    How much of reported profit showed up as operating cash. Above 1× is reassuring; well below suggests earnings lean on accruals. One year is noisy, growth and working-capital swings distort it, and this is operating cash, not free cash. Watch the multi-year trend.

How is the cash used?

  • Returns about half
    Dividends + buybacks €6.5B ÷ Owner Earnings €11.6B
    What this means

    Of €11.6B Owner Earnings, €6.5B (56%) went back to shareholders, €597M dividends, €6.0B buybacks. Returning most of it is the mark of a mature business with little left to reinvest at a high return; reinvesting most could mean a long runway, or empire-building. The split doesn't say which; the return earned on it (see ROIC) does.

  • Investing or harvesting? 1.53×
    Expanding
    Capex €1.6B ÷ depreciation €1.0B
    What this means

    Descriptive, not a grade. Above ~1× means investing faster than assets wear out (growth, or, sustained for years, today's earnings carrying less depreciation than tomorrow's will). Below means spending less than it's wearing out (efficiency, or a melting asset base). The ratio won't tell you which; the filings will.

Graham’s defensive tests · 4 of 5 met

Graham’s numerical criteria for the defensive investor (The Intelligent Investor, ch. 14), run on the filings. A floor of safety, not a buy signal; many fine modern businesses fail his strictest liquidity rules by design.

  • Adequate size
    Revenue ≥ $2B (a dollar floor) · €32.7B
    What this means

    Big enough to weather a storm. Graham's floor is a dollar figure — about $2B of revenue as a conservative modern stand-in. This company reports in its home currency and we carry no exchange rate, so we show the figure and leave the size bar for you to apply rather than convert it with a number we don't have.

  • Strong liquidity Miss
    Current ratio ≥ 2× · 1.26×
    What this means

    Current assets at least twice current liabilities, near-term bills covered without touching the business. Strict by design: many cash-rich modern firms run leaner and miss it, holding their cushion in longer-dated securities.

  • Conservative debt Pass
    Debt ≤ working capital · €4.4B vs €6.4B WC
    What this means

    Graham's rule that borrowings not exceed net current assets. Capital-heavy and buyback-heavy firms routinely fail it, read it next to interest coverage, not alone.

  • Earnings stability Pass
    A profit every year (10-yr record) · no losses
    What this means

    Graham wanted earnings in each of the past ten years, the stability a defensive owner leans on.

  • Dividend record Pass
    Uninterrupted dividends · paid every year (10)
    What this means

    An unbroken dividend was Graham's mark of durability. He wanted twenty years; the filings show about ten, and a single suspension breaks the streak. Non-payers, many fine modern compounders, fall outside his defensive net by design.

  • Earnings growth Pass
    Earnings +33% over the record · +303%
    What this means

    At least a third more earnings than a decade ago, averaging three years at each end. Net income (not per-share), so stock splits don't distort it, buybacks and dilution show up in the share-count line instead.

  • Moderate price
    P/E ≤ 15 and P/E × P/B ≤ 22.5 · decided by the price
    What this means

    Graham's valuation gate, the wall he kept between a sound business and a sound investment. Three-year average earnings are €21.64/share (latest year €24.93), the averaged base the calculator's gate runs on, and book value is €50.89/share. Enter a price in “What the price implies” just below for the P/E, P/B, and whether it clears. But this is the rule Buffett outgrew: there's no hard P/E law, and a wonderful business can deserve a far richer multiple if the thesis holds, treat it as the bargain-hunter's floor, not a verdict on the price.

Durability & moat, 2016–2025

Whether the record’s returns held, and what the capital reinvested earned.

  • Profitable years 10 of 10
    What this means

    Never lost money over the record, the earnings stability Graham insisted on.

  • Return on capital ≥ 15% 10 of 10 yrs
    What this means

    A moat shows up as a high return on invested capital that holds year after year, not one good vintage.

  • Operating margin 27% → 33% (3-yr avg ends)

    In the filing’s words The margin widened even though the filing names price competition — the gain came from volume or cost, not pricing power. Read where.

    What this means

    Through the cycle the operating margin widened — about 27% early to 33% lately, median 29% — pricing power intact or improving.

  • Reinvestment, incremental ROIC returns capital
    What this means

    The capital base barely grew: this business returns cash through dividends and buybacks rather than reinvesting. Judge it on the cash returned, not on compounding.

  • Owner earnings growth +26%/yr
    What this means

    Owner earnings grew about 26% a year over the record.

  • Worst year 2019 · 23.6% op. margin
    What this means

    Stayed profitable even in its hardest year, the resilience that survives recessions.

  • Share count −1.1%/yr
    What this means

    The share count is shrinking, buybacks are quietly growing your slice of the business.

  • Dividend record rising
    What this means

    Paid and raised the dividend across the record, the continuity Graham prized.

  • How management talks about it Promotional
    What this means

    The record is compounding, but the filing leans on a promoter’s vocabulary rather than the per-share, return-on-capital terms an owner uses. The results back the talk here; the register is still worth noting.

Does AI threaten the moat?

Low contestability

The moat is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded, the kind AI cuts costs within but does not contest.

In its own filing Framed as a capability

The filing positions AI as something the company uses, not something it fears.

“In 2025, the far-reaching impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on society and our industry became clear .”

AI is unlikely to contest a moat that is physical, regulated or balance-sheet-funded; here it reads more as a cost tool than a threat, and the company is using it that way.

Read from the filing's own risk factors, paired with the industry's structure under its SIC code; the durability is read above, the price below.

All figures as filed; the source filing is linked above.

Current Position

as of fiscal year-end, Dec 31, 2025

Can the business pay what it owes this year, off the freshest balance sheet: the quality of the assets, the debt actually coming due, and what a low ratio means here.

Current assets€30.6B
  • Cash & short-term investments€12.9B
  • Receivables€3.0B
  • Inventory€11.4B
  • Other current assets€3.2B
Current liabilities€24.3B
  • Debt due within a year€1.7B
  • Accounts payable€3.5B
  • Other current liabilities€19.1B
Current ratio1.26×all current assets ÷ what's due · Graham looked for 2×
Quick ratio0.79×stricter: inventory excluded
Cash ratio0.53×strictest: cash alone against what's due
Working capital€6.4Bthe cushion left after near-term bills
Debt due this year vs. cash€1.7B due · €12.9B cash covered by cash on hand, no refinancing forced · both figures from the Dec 31, 2025 balance sheet
Deeper floors
Tangible book value€14.5Bequity stripped of goodwill & intangibles
Net current asset value(€338M)Graham's net-net: current assets less all liabilities
Debt incl. operating leases€4.4B€44M of it operating leases
Deferred revenue€16.0Bcustomer cash collected before delivery; operating float

From the company's latest filing.

Not how much it owes, but when it falls due, and against what. The ladder the company files, beside cash on hand and a year's owner earnings.

'26€1.7B
'27€752M
'28€2M
'29€752M
'30€752M
later€507M

Bars scaled to the largest single year; “later” is everything due after 2030, shown apart since it dwarfs the years.

Due in the next 12 months€1.7Bthe first rung: what must be repaid or rolled over within the year
Within two years€2.4Bthe near wall, the part most exposed to today’s credit conditions
Biggest single year€1.7Bin 2026the lumpiest maturity, where a refinancing, if needed, is largest
Total scheduled principal€4.5Bevery year plus what lies beyond, as the footnote totals it

Against what the business has and earns

Cash & short-term investments, Dec 31, 2025€12.9B
One year of owner earnings (FY2025)€11.6B
Together, against €1.7B due next year14.5×

Cash on hand as of Dec 31, 2025 plus a year’s owner earnings comes to €24.5B against the €1.7B due in the twelve months after the Dec 31, 2025 schedule: 14 times it.

Maturity schedule extracted from the company’s Dec 31, 2025 annual report and reconciled to the total the table states.

How the cash was used, 2016–2025

Over the record, the business generated €63.1B of operating cash; how management split it reads as a cash returner, paying most of what it earns straight back to owners.

  • Reinvested€10.9B · 17%
  • Dividends€15.2B · 24%
  • Buybacks€24.3B · 39%
  • Retained (debt / cash)€12.6B · 20%
  • Returned to owners€39.5B

    69% of the owner earnings the business produced over the span, €15.2B as dividends and €24.3B as buybacks.

  • Average price paid for buybacks

    Buybacks ran €24.3B over the span, but the filings don't tag the share count needed to deduce the average price paid.

  • Net change in share count−9.9%

    The diluted count fell from 428M to 385M, so the buybacks outran the stock issued to staff.

  • Dividend record€6.56/sh

    Paid in 10 of the years on record, the per-share dividend growing about 23% a year. It was cut at least once along the way.

  • Return on what it retained75%

    Of the earnings it kept rather than paid out (€9.3B over the span), annual owner earnings (first three years vs last three) grew €7.0B, so each retained €1 added about 0.75 of yearly owner earnings. Buffett's test, run on owner earnings instead of market value.

Buybacks are gross of stock issued to staff; the share-count line above is the net of that, the figure that decides whether owners gained. The average price paid blends a year of purchases (and any accelerated repurchase), so it is close, not exact. The record of where the cash went and on what terms.

Inverting the record

Invert: instead of why ASML HOLDING NV is a good business, the question is what would make owning it a mistake, and whether those marks are in the record. Disconfirming tests across 2016–2025.

None of the 5 tests turned up a mark; each came back clean. A clean panel says only that these particular ways of being wrong are not written into the record.

Each test came back clean
  • Is it less profitable than it was?
  • Did the share count rise anyway?
  • Did debt outgrow the business?
  • Did reported profit become cash?
  • Did receivables and inventory outpace sales?

Each test is read from the filings and is noisy alone; a flag can mark a cyclical trough or a year of heavy investment as easily as a problem. The filing says which.

Peers, Semiconductor Equipment

The same industry, side by side on owner economics. Each figure is a through-cycle median, so a peak or trough year can’t distort it; the group median at the foot is the line to read each against.

CompanyRevenueGross marginOp. marginROICOwner earn. margin
DEDeere & Company$45.7B56%12.9%11%12%
CMICummins Inc.$33.7B25%11.3%20%8%
ASMLASML HOLDING NV€32.7B50%29.8%49%27%
BKRBaker Hughes Company$27.7B66%5.1%3%4%
ETNEaton Corporation PLC$27.4B33%16.3%12%11%
JCIJohnson Controls International PLC$23.6B34%9.7%7%6%
CARRCarrier Global Corporation Common Stock$21.7B27%13.1%14%9%
LRCXLam Research Corporation$18.4B46%28.8%52%24%
Group median40%13.0%13%10%
IV

The price

What a price has to assume.

What the price implies

reverse-DCF

Enter the US price, in dollars: the NYSE/Nasdaq quote you hold. ASML HOLDING NV's US listing is the ordinary share itself; figures in this tool are translated at EUR 1 = $1.145 (2026-07-17, reference rate); the dollar quote then reconciles exactly. The record tables elsewhere on this page remain as filed, in EUR.

Type today's close and see the owner-earnings growth you'd have to believe to justify it, beside what ASML HOLDING NV has delivered.

ASML HOLDING NV’s latest year runs above its own through-cycle margin — the reported figure may flatter a peak. So the tool opens on the through-cycle base, Graham’s averaging cutting both ways; clear the toggle below to read the latest year exactly as reported.

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Through the cycle, ASML HOLDING NV earns about $10.1B on its 26.9% median owner-earnings margin. This year’s 35.6% margin runs above that; the reported figure may flatter a peak you'd be paying on. Normalize, below, values the price on that through-cycle figure rather than the latest year. It comes pre-checked here for that reason, the same rule that already normalizes a trough; clear it to price the year as filed.

Base

The assumptions

9.0% = the 4.55% 10-year Treasury (Jul 15, 2026) + 4.45 points of equity premium. The rate you require is yours to set.

Enter a price above to run it.

Implied by the price
Owner-earnings growth · ’21→’25+5%/yr
Owner-earnings growth · ’16→’25+24%/yr
Owner-earnings yield
P/E (3-yr earnings ’23–’25)
P/B
Graham’s price gate

Graham capped the multiple at 15×; Buffett and Munger let that rule go: a wonderful business can deserve 50× if the thesis holds. The gate marks the bargain-hunter's floor.

Against a high-grade bond: Graham’s yardstick bond yield%

Prefilled with the 10-year Treasury (4.55%, as of Jul 15, 2026). Edit it for today’s exact figure, or a AAA corporate yield.

Graham measured a stock against the bond you could own instead, the heart of his margin of safety. Enter a price above to weigh the owner-earnings yield against this bond.

Free cash flow $12.7B on 385M shares outstanding, per the 20-F cover, as of 2025-12-31; net cash $9.8B. The base opens on the through-cycle figure (the latest year sits above the record’s own median, and Graham’s averaging cuts both ways); clear Normalize to use the year as filed. Net of stock comp treats option pay as the expense it is. Capex ($1.8B) runs well above depreciation ($1.2B), so this is a build-out; Steady-state swaps total capex for maintenance (≈ depreciation), lifting the base to about $13.3B, the cash it would throw off if it stopped expanding. The dials set the multiple a growth belief justifies; the price, and every dollar on this page, is yours.

Cite: Owner Scorecard, "ASML HOLDING NV (ASML), the owner's record," https://ownerscorecard.com/c/ASML, data as of 2026-07-09.

Manual order: ← ASM its page in the Manual ASND →

Industry order: ← AEHR the Semiconductor Equipment chapter ASYS →